Lots of questions that don't address the question I asked.

What is that worldview? Is it individual or common to all Buddhist monks? What are we to make of divergent views within and between Buddhist schools of thought? — Fooloso4

That worldview is Buddhism. Just as physicalism is an umbrella concept to many a variety, so too is Buddhism.

What do they say about the nature of reality? Why should we accept that what they describe is actual knowledge into the nature of reality? — Fooloso4

What Buddhism in general upholds. My previous post was not about you accepting it; it was about sufficient justification to uphold that it might be, if not in fact being. Hence, justification which presents the case that while you can uphold your rejection, others can be quite warranted in accepting the possibility.

That a worldview has benefits for those who hold it only shows that holding this worldview has benefits, not that the worldview corresponds reality. An unrealistic or false worldview might also have benefits. — Fooloso4

Something fishy about this affirmation. Many, if not all, unrealistic or false worldviews, or views in general, will lead to unwarranted suffering if not untimely deaths (the issue of climate change comes to mind as just one example of this). It to me is what generally makes unrealistic or false perspectives unfavorable. But this can open wide a can of worms, which I don't currently want to get into.

Currently short on time so I'll leave it at that.

The article Buddha's Brain: Neuroplasticity and Meditation says, "When the framework of neuroplasticity is applied to meditation, we suggest that the mental training of meditation is fundamentally no different than other forms of skill acquisition that can induce plastic changes in the brain." — wonderer1

Isn't that enough? The fact that thought can have similar effects to practical physical enaction is meaningful to me.

Isn't that enough? The fact that thought can have similar effects to practical physical enaction is meaningful to me. — Pantagruel

You had said there were "unique" features, so I was curious as to support for this uniqueness.

You had said there were "unique" features, so I was curious as to support for this uniqueness. — wonderer1

As I said, this seems quite unique to me. I don't know whether I would be capable of it. There are other studies looking at long term effects in emotion regulation networks as well.

Lots of questions that don't address the question I asked. — javra

Actually my questions are in response to the question you asked.

That worldview is Buddhism. Just as physicalism is an umbrella concept to many a variety, so too is Buddhism. — javra

If that worldview is based on knowledge of reality then why not a single unified view or description of reality?

... it was about sufficient justification to uphold that it might be, — javra

How can the question of whether there is sufficient justification that it might be when there is divergence with regard to what it might be?

Something fishy about this affirmation. — javra

Unless I misunderstood you, you argued in favor of the benefit of holding "the Buddhist worldview." My point is that there can be different worldviews that are beneficial.

If someone claims to have mathematical knowledge it can be demonstrated. Can the same be said of someone who claims to have mystical knowledge? — Fooloso4

:nerd: :up:

Russell's universals unlike Forms are not causes. — Fooloso4

In Platonist philosophy, forms are causal only in the sense of serving as models or archetypes. For example, the reason any particular beautiful thing is beautiful is because it participates in, or imitates, the Form of Beauty. In this sense, the Forms impart things with their essence and make them intelligible to human minds. But they're not causal in the material sense, they're rather more like what would become the 'formal cause' in Aristotle (and I don't know if that has a counterpart in modern thought). Russell's comments, and the others quoted, are illustrative of universals in the Aristotelian sense and are relevant to the argument that the faculty of mind which grasps the forms is different in kind to the sensory faculties, a difference which is downplayed or lost in empiricism (per Maritain). Those passages I quoted all converge on the fact that the forms or ideas are not abstract entities in some non-existent ethereal realm, but are rather the principles of intelligibility in particular beings.

If someone claims to have mathematical knowledge it can be demonstrated. Can the same be said of someone who claims to have mystical knowledge? — Fooloso4

As mystical insight is experiential and first-person, the criteria for assessing it are different to those of mathematics and science, which are objective and known in the third person. But there is an abundant cross-cultural literature describing it, not that I expect many here to be interested in it.

They claim to know something we do not. You seem inclined to believe them. I am not. — Fooloso4

But then, you're making ignorance the yardstick for how their claims are to be judged. Why should we accept that interpretation, which calls into doubt many other interpretations?

First please demonstrate why idealism implies anti-realism in the first place.
— Wayfarer
I never claimed or implied "idealism implies anti-realism — 180 Proof

The clear implication of this post:

So, again, please demonstrate how, as you claim, 'the established facts of evolution and cosmology are "equally compatible" with idealism (i.e. antirealism) as they are with physicalism'. — 180 Proof

But please don't go to any trouble to re-explain it, besides, it belongs in the other thread on 'arguments for physicalism'.

Experiencing altered or heightened states of consciousness is of course possible, and I know that from my own ample stock of such experiences. The point about these states is that they do not yield determinate knowledge of anything, unlike empirical investigations and logic/ mathematics.

The ability to bring about such states is akin to expertise in music, art or poetry, and what is known is akin to aesthetics, not science or logic. So, to go back to previous examples I have given, the existence of God, karma, immortality, heaven and hell and so on cannot be demonstrated in any way analogous to how scientific knowledge and mathematical truths can. Similarly, aesthetic quality, beauty and sublimity cannot be demonstrated, they can only be felt or not.

Getting this clear is important because failing to understand the difference between determinable knowledge and intuitive feelings and faith leads to the possibility of fundamentalism and abuses of the gullible by those who seek to deceive for gain, or those who deceive themselves into believing they have some kind of special access to transcendent absolute truths or ultimate knowledge to offer.

In Platonist philosophy, forms are causal only in the sense of serving as models or archetypes. — Wayfarer

See, for example, Socrates discussion of his "second sailing" (99d):

On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true ...

I am going to try to show you the kind of cause with which I have concerned myself. I turn back to those oft-mentioned things and proceed from them. I assume the existence of a Beautiful, itself by itself, of a Good and a Great and all the rest ...

Consider then, he said, whether you share my opinion as to what follows, for I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything. Do you agree to this sort of cause?

... I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for all these confuse me—but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for all these confuse me—but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else.” That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else.

(99d-100e)

He goes on to admit that this this is inadequate and that material causes are needed as well, but this discussion is in response to Anaxagoras' claim that Mind is the cause of everything. There is some ambiguity. Socrates says:

I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best.

(97d)

Is Socrates referring to his own mind or the human mind of Mind. I might say universal Mind.

As mystical insight is experiential and first-person, the criteria for assessing it are different to those of mathematics and science, — Wayfarer

The problem is, how can we assess it?

But there is an abundant cross-cultural literature describing it, not that I expect many here to be interested in it. — Wayfarer

Such stories are weak evidence for anything real corresponding to them. Should we accept that there are Olympian or Egyptian gods?

But then, you're making ignorance the yardstick for how their claims are to be judged. — Wayfarer

I assume you do not accept every claim about things you do not know.

Actually my questions are in response to the question you asked. — Fooloso4

Yes, but they do not answer the question I asked.

If that worldview is based on knowledge of reality then why not a single unified view or description of reality? — Fooloso4

Because the knowledge of reality the worldview is based on (this being different than being equivalent to) will not be perfectly comprehensive of all aspects of realty and, by my appraisal, it certainly can’t be infallible. As a brief justification, this because no human can be omniscient, if this notion is even logically cogent to begin with.

Nothing in science is infallible or perfectly comprehensive, and scientific paradigms – from the theory of relativity to the theory of evolution – have variations within them. Yet we don’t thereby conclude that scientific paradigms are not based on (fallible) knowledge of reality.

How can the question of whether there is sufficient justification that it might be when there is divergence with regard to what it might be? — Fooloso4

See the above mentioned.

Unless I misunderstood you, you argued in favor of the benefit of holding "the Buddhist worldview." My point is that there can be different worldviews that are beneficial. — Fooloso4

This is, or at least can be, part and parcel of an outlook termed perennialism. And it does not contradict all such different views being founded upon incomplete and fallible knowledge of a singular reality, superficially incommensurate as these different worldviews might be.

Again, in answering these questions I’m not presenting an argument for why esoteric insights into reality should be accepted by you but, instead, arguments for why it is unwarranted to dismiss the possibility in such a manner that one then claims irrational others who find the possibility viable. And yes, I find that it boils down to underlying suppositions of physicalism vs. non-physicalism. Neither of which can be conclusively evidenced, much less upheld with infallible knowledge.

they do not yield determinate knowledge of anything, unlike empirical investigations and logic/ mathematics. — Janus

Ok. A lot of people place a lot of stock in logic, mathematics, and science. Let's take string theory. It looks all highly scientific, is based on a lot of advanced math. It's an hypothesis. Is it "determinate knowledge"? Maybe. It's a complex hypothesis about the nature of reality. Same thing for dark matter and dark energy cosmology. Bunch of unknowns.

There are things which are trivially evident, and there are things which are harder to grasp. Exactly where that line gets drawn that you call "determinate knowledge" is a function of innate ability, expertise, and experience.

Is Socrates referring to his own mind or the human mind of Mind. I might say universal Mind. — Fooloso4

I am, as I mentioned, reading a recent book Thinking Being: Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition by Eric Perl (which is out of print and impossible to get, except that a kindly soul has posted a PDF of it.)

From which, in a discussion of the 'separateness' of the forms, and the idea of levels of being, we read:

The strongly visual imagery and the references to a “place” may incline us to read this as a voyage to ‘another world.’ But Socrates has already warned us that he is telling not “what the soul actually is” but rather “what it is like” (246a5) and later expressly refers to this story as a “mythic hymn” (265c1). The “place above the sky” is not in fact a place, since what is ‘there’ has no shape or color, is not bodily at all. Rather, the flight is a mythic representation of the psychic, cognitive attainment of an intellectual apprehension of the intelligible identities, ‘themselves by themselves,’ that inform and are displayed by, or appear in, sensible things. The forms are metaphorically represented in spatial terms as ‘outside’ the entire cosmos in that they are not themselves sensible things, not additional members of the sensible world.

I'm still only part-way through this book, but it's making a lot of things clear to me. (I learned about it in one of John Vervaeke's video lectures.)

The problem is, how can we assess it (mystical claims)? — Fooloso4

As I understand it, it requires both aptitude and application. If you look into the various mystical religious movements - sufism, Zen, Vedanta, Christian Mysticism - you will find there is extensive literature, a recognised lineage of teachers, in short a framework within which these disciplines are transmitted and made meaningful.

Such stories are weak evidence for anything real corresponding to them. Should we accept that there are Olympian or Egyptian gods? — Fooloso4

Especially if you're predisposed against them. But this is what hermenuetics is - intepretation of ancient texts, (often but not always religious in origin). Also consider 'mythos' as indicative of stages in the development of consciousness e.g. Julian Jayne's Bicameral Mind, in which the mind once operated in a state in which cognitive functions were divided between one part of the brain which appears to be "speaking", and a second part which listens and obeys—a bicameral mind, the breakdown of which gave rise to what we now think of as 'consciousness'. Richard M Bucke's Cosmic Consciousness is another model.

I assume you do not accept every claim about things you do not know. — Fooloso4

Of course not. In none of this am I putting myself forward as an exemplar or possessor of esoteric knowledge. But I've studied comparative religion, Mircea Eliade, William James, Evelyn Underhill, and I don't believe it's all moonshine. Whereas, seems to me vital for a lot of people to believe it must be. It's what Max Weber calls the great disenchantment.

Which brings me to:

I think all of our readings are by default modern. We cannot escape being modern. It is our cave. — Fooloso4

Socrates says that the free prisoner would think that the world outside the cave was superior to the world he experienced in the cave and attempt to share this with the prisoners remaining in the cave attempting to bring them onto the journey he had just endured; "he would bless himself for the change, and pity [the other prisoners]" and would want to bring his fellow cave dwellers out of the cave and into the sunlight (516c).

The returning prisoner, whose eyes have become accustomed to the sunlight, would be blind when he re-entered the cave, just as he was when he was first exposed to the sun (516e). The prisoners who had remained, according to the dialogue, would infer from the returning man's blindness that the journey out of the cave had harmed him and that they should not undertake a similar journey. Socrates concludes that the prisoners, if they were able, would therefore reach out and kill anyone who attempted to drag them out of the cave (517a).

In all humility, I think this accounts for a lot of the outrage resistance that advocacy of philosophical idealism provokes. Moderns don't want the world to be like that.

Exactly where that line gets drawn that you call "determinate knowledge" is a function of innate ability, expertise, and experience. — Pantagruel

I think it is fairly clear what is determinate knowledge and what is not. Scientific hypotheses or theories in general are never definitively proven or certainly known to be true, the observed phenomena they predict that may warrant their veracity can certainly be confirmed or disconfirmed. Only basic empirical observations and mathematical and logical truths are known to be true.

Is String Theory a scientific theory or a metaphysical speculation? That is a different question, and I don't know the answer to that. Apparently, String Theory is woven out of some very elegant mathematics; whereas what we usually term 'metaphysical speculations" are not, so does that tell us anything about ST? Maybe, I'm not mathematician, so I don't have an opinion about it.

The same goes for DM and DE. Current astrophysical theory suggest that they exist, but of course it could be wrong due to some factor(s) that are not currently known. Science doesn't yield absolute truths, and nor does it purport to; it is always and only ever a work in progress.

In all humility, I think this accounts for a lot of the outrage I provoke in the advocacy of philosophical idealism. — Wayfarer

Humility or no humility, you really are deluded it seems; in that you apparently can't but interpret mere disagreement as outrage.

I think it is fairly clear what is determinate knowledge and what is not. — Janus

Sure, things that are trivially true are usually trivially evident. But some things are not trivially evident. And to people who lack the ability to comprehend the basis of organic chemistry, for example, there is a whole lot of determinate knowledge that is not clear. So if you are talking about an ideal knower, who is equally well-informed (and equally capable) in all areas, then maybe it is clear. But if there are such knowers, they are less rather than more common. Agreeing in theory as to what constitutes knowledge, and agreeing in practice as to the details of knowledge are not at all the same thing. For the bulk of human history, knowing how to throw a stone accurately in the terrestrial gravity field was far more important than knowing that the interior angles of a triangle sum to 180 degrees.

Only basic empirical observations and mathematical and logical truths are known to be true. — Janus

I assume that you are classifying privileged internal mental states as empirical observations then, since I know and experience the truth of my own experiences.

Noted and updated.

In speaking of the fear of religion, I don't mean to refer to the entirely reasonable hostility toward certain established religions and religious institutions, in virtue of their objectionable moral doctrines, social policies, and political influence. Nor am I referring to the association of many religious beliefs with superstition and the acceptance of evident empirical falsehoods. I am talking about something much deeper--namely, the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself. I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn't just that I don't believe in God and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief. It's that I hope there is no God! I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that.

My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. One of the tendencies it supports is the ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life, including everything about the human mind. Darwin enabled modern secular culture to heave a great collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world. Instead they become epiphenomena, generated incidentally by a process that can be entirely explained by the operation of the non-teleological laws of physics on the material of which we and our environments are all composed. — Thomas Nagel

Tell me this is not a factor in these discussions. :lol:

Sure, things that are trivially true are usually trivially evident. But some things are not trivially evident. And to people who lack the ability to comprehend the basis of organic chemistry, for example, there is a whole lot of determinate knowledge that is not clear. — Pantagruel

People can be reliably trained in chemistry and other scientific disciplines, such that things will be evident to them. This is not so in music, art, poetry or mysticism: people cannot be reliably trained to be able to alter their consciousness to achieve excellence in these fields. They can be reliably trained to understand the techniques involved in any discipline, but this does not guarantee success, even in mathematics and science there is a creative aspect that cannot be taught but is down to personal talent.

I assume that you are classifying privileged internal mental states as empirical observations then, since I know and experience the truth of my own experiences. — Pantagruel

You may or may not know "the truth of your own experiences" whatever that might mean. Assuming for the sake of argument that you do know, the point is that you are the only one, so such knowledge can never be intersubjectively corroborated.

Tell me this is not a factor in these discussions. :lol: — Wayfarer

You obviously think it is a factor. This is one of the quotes you regularly post. I don't agree with that passage: I am not afraid of religion. I would not want there to be a god of the kind present in the OT. I am not afraid of eternal life; an eternal life of bliss and constant learning would be great as far as I am concerned. I am not afraid of heaven; reuniting with my loved ones in eternity would also be great. Obviously, I don't long for Hell, but I am not afraid of it because I have no reason to believe it is real. So, it is not a factor for me, at least, and I am not going to do a Nagel and speak for others.

Nagel doesn't specify what kind of God he does not want to exist. And he is unwarrantedly projecting his own psychology to others.

purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world. — Thomas Nagel

How can they be fundamental features of the world when there is no evidence that they are? Christians think there is a fundamental purpose, meaning and design, Buddhists not so much, as far as I understand it. People can for sure believe there is a fundamental purpose, but this is, as the name suggests, fundamentalism, one of the greatest curses humankind has brought upon itself or had brought upon it by authorities wishing to control the masses.

Of course, both human and animal life are replete with purpose meaning and design, but these purposes, meanings and designs are as diverse as the animals and humans who have and exemplify them.

You may or may not know "the truth of your own experiences" whatever that might mean. Assuming for the sake of argument that you do know, the point is that you are the only one, so such knowledge can never be intersubjectively corroborated. — Janus

If I don't have certainty of my own experience I can't very well have certainty about anything else, since anything else will always be an aspect of that experience.

As far as being "reliably trained," you oversimplify. Not everyone can be reliably trained, it requires at least some aptitude. Conversely, for people with the appropriate aptitude, the contention is that they are being educated with spiritual knowledge, whose broadened awareness is the practical result. Knowledge of the human spirit evolves right along with civilization. Some people even think that is what civilization is. Hegel, to name one. As well as the hordes who have tried to follow in his footsteps.

Nagel's anecdotal, fact-free, special pleading is embarrassing and I'm not at all surprised that you're a sucker for it, Wayf, since it agrees with your fear of naturalism – philosophical suicide (Camus).

As a brief justification, this because no human can be omniscient, — javra

Does that mean that at least some of what you claim the Buddhist knows about reality that the rest of us do not know is not something known by the Buddhist after all?

Nothing in science is infallible or perfectly comprehensive — javra

Right, but science is self-corrective. When it becomes evident that a theory is problematic it is revises or replaced. That is a feature of science.

How can the question of whether there is sufficient justification that it might be when there is divergence with regard to what it might be?
— Fooloso4

See the above mentioned. — javra

Analogously: is there sufficient justification for the claims of Christianity? Since there are many and at least in some cases contradictory claims in order to answer that wouldn't you need to know which claims? Doesn't the same true of Buddhism?

This is, or at least can be, part and parcel of an outlook termed perennialism. — javra

One criticism of perennialism is that it tends to homogenize divergent claims.

dismiss the possibility in such a manner that one then claims irrational others who find the possibility viable. — javra

Where have I said that?

I find that it boils down to underlying suppositions of physicalism vs. non-physicalism. — javra

Speaking for myself, it boils down to whether there is sufficient evidence for me to accept extraordinary claims.

Does that mean that at least some of what you claim [the Buddhist claims] the Buddhist knows about reality that the rest of us do not know is not something known by the Buddhist after all? — Fooloso4

In trying my best to understand this question, I'll say yes: Fallible knowledge can be wrong in principle. But this question strikes me as addressing the epistemological issue of fallible vs. infallible knowledge. And, although it currently seems to me to be the elephant in the room to all this, it is not a topic I currently want to engage in.

Where have I said that? — Fooloso4

Where have I said that you said it?

I'm still only part-way through this book ... — Wayfarer

Perhaps sooner or later you will come across something that addresses what I am saying rather than correcting misunderstandings that someone else might make.

You have missed the point about universals and mind.

If you look into the various mystical religious movements - sufism, Zen, Vedanta, Christian Mysticism - you will find there is extensive literature, a recognised lineage of teachers, in short a framework within which these disciplines are transmitted and made meaningful. — Wayfarer

There are people who are attracted to this kind of thing. The hook is always that you have to buy into it and be committed to it. To assess it you must first accept it.

But this is what hermenuetics is - intepretation of ancient texts, — Wayfarer

There is a difference between the interpretation of a text and accepting its claims. The fact that similar stories come up in different places is not a good reason to accept the stories as true.

Also consider 'mythos' as indicative of stages in the development of consciousness e.g. Julian Jayne's Bicameral Mind ... — Wayfarer

Yes, I have considered that. I don't buy it. I think it shows a lack of understanding of mythos and a gross underestimation of the sophistication of its authors.

I think all of our readings are by default modern. We cannot escape being modern. It is our cave.
— Fooloso4

Socrates says that the free prisoner would think that the world outside the cave was superior to the world he experienced in the cave ... — Wayfarer

If you have escaped the cave then you would see things differently than us cave dwellers. I have not. I can only see things as I can from within the cave.

You beat me to the punch citing Phaedo where Socrates asks what causes could be understood or claimed to be true. That bears directly upon the reference to generative power in the Republic and the passage I quoted earlier:

509B “I assume you will agree that the sun bestows not only the ability to be seen upon visible objects, but also their generation and increase and nurture, though the sun itself is not generation.” — ibid

We can recognize the generative power of the sun without doubting its presence or knowing how it is possible. If the sun analogy is to carry forward into the presence of the Good, a similar gap confronts us.
In the analogy of the divided line, the generation of the forms is not revealed by stating they were made by the Good. Presumably, by this account, no amount of getting better at getting closer to the 'real objects' will reveal how the generation occurs by itself.

The question of that creative power is interpreted in many ways. There are creation accounts and myths, such as those found in the Timaeus and other dialogues, which imagine how the world may be constituted. It is not an appeal to a 'materialist' set of principles to observe there is a difference when Plato is using those stories and drawing the limits to our explanations through arguments. We have been arguing about Gerson's thesis since I got here. Much of that dispute involves how to read that difference in Plato's language. In view of these years of wrangling over texts and their meaning, do you see the opposition to Gerson's thesis as only a part of this one?:

In all humility, I think this accounts for a lot of the outrage resistance that advocacy of philosophical idealism provokes. Moderns don't want the world to be like that. — Wayfarer

If I don't have certainty of my own experience I can't very well have certainty about anything else, since anything else will always be an aspect of that experience. — Pantagruel

It depends on what you mean by "being certain of my own experience". Perhaps there is no absolute certainty anywhere to be found, but you can be certain as you can be that you are looking at a tree if you are looking at a tree, or that 2+2=4, and a plethora of things that are usually classed as "general knowledge:".

As far as being "reliably trained," you oversimplify. Not everyone can be reliably trained, it requires at least some aptitude — Pantagruel

I assumed that it would be taken as read that aptitude would be required.

Conversely, for people with the appropriate aptitude, the contention is that they are being educated with spiritual knowledge, whose broadened awareness is the practical result. Knowledge of the human spirit evolves right along with civilization. Some people even think that is what civilization is. Hegel, to name one. As well as the hordes who have tried to follow in his footsteps. — Pantagruel

What is spiritual knowledge though, beyond being in an altered state of conscious or "broadened awareness"? What facts or metaphysical truths can it guarantee? If you think there are such facts or truths, how does it guarantee them? That "some people" think or "Hegel" thinks something is no guarantee of its truth, is it? How could it be?

Does that mean that at least some of what you claim [the Buddhist claims] — Fooloso4

More to the point, you seem to accept that there is:

... insight into deeper levels of reality — javra

Unless I misunderstood you, you point to Buddhism in support of this claim.

As a brief justification, this because no human can be omniscient,
— javra — Fooloso4

A doctrinal note - a Buddha is not (just) human, nor a God, nor a Demi-god (‘yaksa’). Buddha means ‘awakened’,

That bears directly upon the reference to generative power in the Republic — Paine

Good point. I should have pointed out that the question of generation (and decay) is what the passages I quoted from the Phaedo regarding Forms and causes are about.

The ambiguity of Mind/mind is that whether Socrates has shifted from Mind to mind or whether what his human mind does in making things intelligible is an imitation or likeness of what Mind does.

We have been arguing about Gerson's thesis since I got here. Much of that dispute involves how to read that difference in Plato's language. In view of these years of wrangling over texts and their meaning, do you see the opposition to Gerson's thesis as only a part of this one?:

"In all humility, I think this accounts for a lot of the resistance that advocacy of philosophical idealism provokes. Moderns don't want the world to be like that." — Paine

In Platonism and Naturalism: The Possibility of Philosophy, Lloyd Gerson argues that Platonism and naturalism are basically incommensurable. On this forum, naturalism is ascendant. (This is a rather good online lecture and summary of Gerson's book. I'm also finding Eric Perl's book, mentioned above, very informative, although I doubt anyone here will like it.)

Incidentally, I've announced elsewhere I'm signing out for February to concentrate on other projects, so bye for now.

and I know that from my own ample stock of such experiences. — Janus

:wink:

he point about these states is that they do not yield determinate knowledge of anything — Janus

*yet. We may be merely embarking on an arena for which we have no handbook. Definitely less likely though.

The idea of the esoteric, secrets and the hidden may be problematic, especially as it involves the mysterious and the unknown. In general, the unveiling of 'the unknown, may be more helpful as opposed to it remaining unknown. The idea of 'the hidden' in philosophy may be problematic, as if trying to go beyond 'gaps', but it may end up with obscurity rather than any meaningful explanabtions. In this way, the ideas of the esoteric may involve more of a demystification rather than clarification of ideas and understanding. — Jack Cummins

Philosophers are traditionally and for the most part elitist. They regard mankind as children that they must hide the truth from. — Tom Storm

My own take on this issue is that it is precisely the unknown that is at issue. The unknown, or mystery, is, in one respect, only that which remains to be known. If there is any confidence in what is known, and I am asking 'is there?' then we can 'safely' continue the practices we have, the Scientific Method, etc. and delve, delve, delve like good little Doozers until we are Margery, the All Knowing Tash Heap (Fraggle Rock).

But what if it is the nature of reality itself to deny knowing? What if what we know is only there to delude us? I am not just being coy here.

Can we really know anything? Is the verb to know different than the verb to be when combined with awareness? How is the difference between those two perspectives treated?

I offer that in the case of 'to know', we do indeed delude ourselves of a certain certainty that in fact is not actually present. What we find in 'science' does not refute this sentiment at all. In fact, science itself is based on making incremental progress towards ... something. We could also debate what that something is. Is it truth? Is it practical success in the world, where truth is not required but instead a fair approximation will do nicely, thank you!

I offer that in the case of 'to be' aware does not specify arrival. I mean, when one is aware of something, it can be discussed. But to say one is aware of something presumes not too much one way or another about the extent of the knowledge had. I do think this distinction is not only relevant, but itself a disposition that can be called finally, wise.

This is not Sparta! This is Philosophy! And I for one prefer the old ways, the mud and the glory! Give me the love of wisdom! And then be about your business, if you claim to be a lover of wisdom. The which means, at least be aware (ha ha) of the difference between 'knowing' and 'being aware'.

This thread, and correct me if I am wrong @Jack Cummins, for I have certainly not read all of it, is about the esoteric, and I myself would put forth that less is understood about wisdom than any other subject possible. That is precisely because wisdom is all other virtues or 'good' traits combined. Leave out even one virtue, among a list whose member virtues are not known, and you fail at wisdom. What, then, must we do? This is at least the thread of living dangerously!

I will spare everyone the arguments along the lines of intelligence and wisdom being two different things. But I did read quite a few posts so far in this thread that suggest to me that argument has not yet been won entirely, a thing of great disquiet for me. Really? Well, I said I would spare everyone, so I will start then with a first statement. Wisdom >> Intelligence!

That means, if the symbolism is not clear enough, that wisdom is superior to intelligence. If there are professional logical symbols that mean 'is only a part of' then I would use those symbols instead. But, the heavy takeaway is that wisdom is a superior skill in every way to intelligence. Some might claim, as I just kind-of did, that intelligence is a part of wisdom, and that is fine. But the real right way to say it for Scotsmen and Klingon's alike is that awareness is part of wisdom. Intelligence is only a personal facility with awareness. One might argue that lessens again the importance of intelligence, but that is not my primary goal.

It could be asserted, and I do, that life's only purpose is the earning of wisdom. The divergent nature of that assertion is epic, but I am not trying to derail the thread. Wisdom is the most esoteric mystery that there is.

So, there seems to be some worry about the relationship between logic and a penchant for esoteric goings on, or interest in the esoteric. I mean is that not obvious? This is where I suppose many and most will be offended or start objecting in earnest and I would not have it any other way. Logic is only fear. There is nothing else to logic but the emotion of fear. I'm sure the anger is welling up against me even now. It's nothing but tragicomical to me when proponents of logic say things like, 'stop getting emotional and instead use reason'. Do not make me laugh! Logic is only emotion, only fear.

{My argument that logic is only fear is much more extensive than this, but this bit will suffice for this thread's purposes}

Fear is the limiting force within reality. It is responsible for all aspects of the drives for comfort and certainty. And why then is fear a limiting force? Well, ask yourself, where do you draw the line on comfort? Where is that border within reality for you? Are we a hive mind? Or do you need to believe that you are a separate individual? Is that more comfortable for you? Fear is talking. Everything we consider identity to be is only a separation born of fear. It is for comfort as a goal. And its rigidity is the limit, the asymptote of that effect. Fear takes short cuts. Fear is Pragmatism. Fear is Logic. Fear is thought itself (more on that in another thread).

There are many words that express fear, whether or not the user is aware of this truth. 'Certainty' is one of them, perhaps the worst. This is the delusion of 'knowing', instead of 'to be' aware of something, which, as mentioned, is to me the healthier, the wiser, response or way to be. Another fear word is the word 'like'. Like is the friendship component of the 3 parts of love. The other two being passion and compassion. We like those that are like us, speaking to identity. 'Comfort' is a fear word. We are comfortable with those that we are not afraid of. But there is more to this.

Fear type people have more trouble socializing than other types do. Why is that? It is because any overt expression of fear spreads fear within the group. So, animated or excited states cause fear and that leads to, one word is best, panic. This gives rise to the more traditional, colloquial, and horridly derivative meaning of the word fear. That definition of fear is entirely insufficient and rather dull-minded. No, fear needs a new better, more primal definition. And wouldn't you know it, I have one handy, for some reason. Here it is: 'Fear is an excitable state that arises from matching a pattern from one's past'.

This excitement of 'knowing' or being aware of something is not conducive in some way to social interaction, and that effect is multiplied when anything serious is being attempted in groups. Sports and especially partying are not great theaters for fear to strut its excitement. Times are changing but nerds the world over were shunned, feared, for this reason. They ruin the comfort of others, often enough. Now get a bunch of fear types together (looks around the forum 'knowingly') and things are fine because that excitement is indeed comfortable to such types. Fear types are good with fear.

Are we getting to the point eventually? Maybe! You let me know!

So, what is the first (and only) fear? It is fear of the unknown. Enter our trusty OP and esoterica. Rare or hidden or unknown knowledge. What could possibly inspire more fear/excitement? It's bad enough getting with a bunch of logicians and nerds of all walks of life and having them regale you, foaming at the mouth, about their subject of expertise. Now, we are adding a new wrinkle and this one folds space. You have to do spice to gaze into the unknown, and we all know the unknown gazes back into you. It's positively terrifying. It's actually like a new stage of fear, the old fear revisited, the unknown as a topic or pattern. And now we are making things up! Because the unknown is still unknown right? Or is it?

Would we even accept a map of the unknown if it were handed to us? Should we? Raise your hand in your chair at home if you really do want to know it all! Although my hand is up, I am one who believes that the wise wisely inflict necessary suffering on the unwise. I understand that more and more awareness means more and more suffering. The more awareness we have, the more we realize that wisdom is the only 'good' path. Is your hand still up? In the amazing and amazingly hokey movie 'Krell' the cyclops race is gifted with foresight at the cost of one of each of their eyes. But the gods were cruel. They only allowed this gift with respect to the individual knowing when and how they would die. The beauty of awareness is thus very well demonstrated.

The OP shows a clear worry about two things in particular to me, the nature and subject of God, and the value of logic and reason versus the mysteries of the unknown. It's of interest in part because there is evidence that the two are related.

I am not saying God is only the mystery, the unknown. God is also that which is already known, both sets of things, combined. But fear and its subset, logic, both, are only ... cowardly responses to all that is, reality. We must look to other emotions to balance fear. And there are only two other emotions, anger, and desire. {All emotions are only a mix of these three} It is desire that represents the unknown. Unlike what people would normally say, desire does not make us go there. It represents it. Fear is driving the need to become aware. Desire represents that which has yet to be tamed, had, known. Desire is mystery itself, chaos. This is in contrast to what fear is, order. And what is logic, if not orderly?

The limiting force (fear) and the limitless force (desire) come together to create this situation where we are aware of things somewhat on one side (still deluded) and aware that we are not aware of things on the other side (also deluded). The dividing line is now, the present.

If we add the conjecture as mentioned that God is only all of it, everything, known and unknown, then the purpose of life seems to be to become God. It's not a new idea, exactly. But understanding the interactions between fear and desire more correctly is a new way of looking at that old idea. Hopefully, that is enough fuel for commentary.