I don't think consciousness is outside the range of human perception; you perceive yourself to be conscious, no? — Janus

A different topic altogether, but I wanted to comment: If perception necessarily addresses the apprehension of phenomena, then no, one as consciousness does not perceive owns own consciousness. Moreover, were consciousness perceivable then the philosophical problem of other minds would not be a problem of any kind.

Am I not allowed to argue for what I believe can and cannot be coherently philosophically investigated? — Janus

You sound victimized. Let's refresh.

We can know nothing whatsoever about whatever might be "beyond being". The idea is nothing more than the dialectical opposite of 'being'. Fools have always sought to fill the 'domains' of necessary human ignorance with their "knowing". How much misery this has caused humanity is incalculable. — Janus

You view this as "an argument for what you believe" whereas to me it is nothing more and nothing less than an emotively expressed authoritarian assertion: one which wants to disallow me from thinking freely.

A difference of options.

(Just saw that Wayfarer stated something similar, but will post this anyway.)

Moreover, were consciousness perceivable then the philosophical problem of other minds would not be a problem of any kind. — javra

"The philosophical problem of other minds", seem to me to be more a problem that some people have that is caused by philosophy rather than something to be taken very seriously.

Yes, we can't very reasonably say we perceive other minds, but I certainly have plenty of good reason to think that I recognize other minds. I.e. that minds have recognizable signatures. Don't you have good reasons to think so as well?

Isn't the performative contradiction rather obvious?

I fully accept the established facts of evolution and cosmology. — Wayfarer

Evolution and cosmology were examples pertinent to young earth creationism cases of science denial.

Do you still deny that there is scientific evidence for physicalism?

Evolution and cosmology were examples pertinent to young earth creationism cases of science denial.

Do you still deny that there is scientific evidence for physicalism? — wonderer1

I regard creationism as on a par with flat-earth theories and the like. It has no merit whatever. But young-earth creationism and anti-scientific ideologies are not typical of mainstream Christianity, and they're certainly not typical of idealism. That you seem to equate them shows a misunderstanding on your part.

As a child, I grew up on the excellent Time-Life series of books on naturalism and evolution, I'm thoroughly versed in evolutionary theory and am interested in paleontology and especially in paleoanthropology. I hadn't been much aware of Biblical creationism until Richard Dawkins started kvetching about it in the early noughties (I grew up in Australia, and creationism has very little presence here. For instance the creationist ideologue, Ken Ham, had to re-locate from Australia to Kentucky to attract an audience.) As for cosmology, I follow that with interest also, you might notice I started a thread on the JWST. I read a fair amount of popular science books and articles. So I don't have any problems with science.

Let's make it clear what 'physicalism' is. Per the SEP entry on same:

Physicalism is, in slogan form, the thesis that everything is physical. The thesis is usually intended as a metaphysical thesis, parallel to the thesis attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, that everything is water, or the idealism of the 18th Century philosopher Berkeley, that everything is mental. The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the condition of being physical. Of course, physicalists don’t deny that the world might contain many items that at first glance don’t seem physical — items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or social, or mathematical nature. But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are physical, or at least bear an important relation to (or supervene on) the physical.

That is what I'm disputing. But it doesn't mean that I believe that evolution or the Big Bang didn't occur, or that the Universe is not as science describes it, or other empirical facts. There's no need for me to do that.

Turning to the SEP entry on Idealism, what I argue for is nearer to this:

although the existence of something independent of the mind is conceded, everything that we can know about this mind-independent reality is held to be so permeated by the creative, formative, or constructive activities of the mind (of some kind or other) that all claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of self-knowledge.

I wouldn't put it exactly like that but it's at least a starting-point (I put it in my terms in the Mind-Created World OP.)

There have been, and are, scientists who are inclined to idealism, and of course many that are not (and probably many more that fall into neither camp.) But neither view is a scientific theory per se. They are metaphysical conjectures or philosophical frameworks.

Just for a lark, I googled 'idealist scientists', and look who comes back:



I feel I'm in good company :-)

What I quoted was not an argument, but an angry denunciation. — Wayfarer

Bullshit, more projection, I felt no anger when I wrote it—it simply presented my thoughts on the matter.

Again, you're just singing from the positivist playbook — Wayfarer

:lol: It would be laughable if it wasn't so lame—instead of argument you seek to dismiss what I say by characterizing it as being representative of one of your bogeymen. I don't agree with the positivists regarding verification, nor do I think that speculative metaphysics is worthless.

Even if what I've been arguing was an example of positivist thinking, so what? If you disagree with it you still need to provide some argument for your disagreement if you want what you are doing here to be more than merely expressing your opinion or presenting your favorite passages which are themselves nothing more than mere assertions. When are you finally going to come up with an actual argument?

one as consciousness does not perceive owns own consciousness. — javra

"One as consciousness"? One is not consciousness; one is either conscious or not, and one can indeed perceive that one is conscious when one is conscious. I know I can, although I suppose I cannot speak for you.

You sound victimized. Let's refresh. — javra

More projection—I don't feel victimized at all because I am not subject to your prescriptions or proscriptions, even though it seems you would have me be so. You were erroneously making out that I am seeking to dictate what others should think, rather than recognizing that I am merely exercising my right to question and critique what others are asserting and asking for arguments to back up those assertions. If you don't want to play you don't have to—I don't mind either way.

You view this as "an argument for what you believe" whereas to me it is nothing more and nothing less than an emotively expressed authoritarian assertion: one which wants to disallow me from thinking freely. — javra

That's nonsense—I don't care what you think, but if you present thoughts on here, then I think it is fair to ask for justification of those thoughts. So, if you think we can know something about whatever lies beyond being, then explain how we might do that. I'm asking because I can't see any way to do that, and if you can't explain how you could do that then I will continue to believe that you are either bluffing or simply deceiving yourself if you continue to assert that such a thing is possible..

When I don't believe that objections are justified I feel no reason to respond to them.

Convenient cop out...why did you bother to respond to my post in the first place if that's the way you feel? I think you are either trying to deceive me or deceiving yourself, because you are loath to admit that you have no argument, but it's not my problem anyway, so...

So, again, please demonstrate how, as you claim, 'the established facts of evolution and cosmology are "equally compatible" with idealism (i.e. antirealism) as they are with physicalism'.
— 180 Proof

First please demonstrate why idealism implies anti-realism in the first place. — Wayfarer

Answer my question, Wayfarer, and then I'll answer yours.

secular culture

The topic raisrd by OP is "the nature of esoteric forms of philosophy" and not "secular culture". Stop trying to shift the goalposts. :sweat:

Stop trying to shift the goalposts. :sweat: — 180 Proof

I'm not shifting them. You're just not seeing them :rofl:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/877821

This post outlines why I don’t believe there’s any specific conflict between idealism and science. There’s a conflict between idealism and scientific materialism, but as you’ve already agreed, most scientists don’t push scientific materialism.

I'd be surprised if most scientists did not believe that the universe existed before humans appeared on the scene.

From a reply to you, Wayfarer, on your thread "The Mind-Created World" ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/842295

Furthermore ...

So what is 'mind'? AFAIK, basically mind is a recursive (strange looping, phenomenal self-modeling) aspect of More/Other-than-mind – a nonmental activity (process ... anatman), not an entity (ghost-in-the-machine ... X-of-the-gaps), that is functionally blind to its self-recursivity the way, for instance, an eye is transparent to itself and absent from its own field of vision. — 180 Proof

And (from the same thread) ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/844726

– – – – –

scientific materialism — Wayfarer

Again, changing the subject – or you're just confused, sir: "metaphysical physicalism", which you claim to "take issue" with, is not synonymous with "scientific materialism". :roll:

Anyway.

This post outlines why I don’t believe there’s any specific conflict between idealism and science.

The jist of my criticism of that post: Insofar as mind is nonmind-dependent (i.e. embodied), only conceptions – interpretations – of nonmind are "mind-created" abstractions from nonmind (i.e. mappings of the territory). Consequently, "idealism" equates mapping (meaning) to the territory itself as if from outside the territory (re: transcendence / transcendental (i.e. dis-embodied viewpoint)) – which is a cognitive illusion, or delusion :sparkle: – whereas "physicalism" proposes using (useable) aspects of – abstractions from – the territory for mapping other aspects of the territory ineluctably from within the territory (re: immanence i.e. embodied viewpoint). IME, modern scientific practices work in spite of the former 'metaphysical bias' and are facilitated by the latter methodology. This is why I think idealism and physicalism are not "equally compatible" with modern science.

First please demonstrate why idealism implies anti-realism in the first place. — Wayfarer

I never claimed or implied "idealism implies anti-realism"; I think the terms are interchangeable because they both, in effect, denote a 'rejection of the nonmind-dependence of mind.' (i.e. both imply a version of dis-embodied cognition). :sparkle:

You keep saying that 'we' do not know and can never know the forms - does this 'we' include Plotinus, Proclus, all the philosophers before and since? — Wayfarer

I think so. But we (you and I) don't know what Plotinus or Proclus knows, do we? They claim to know something we do not. You seem inclined to believe them. I am not. Many others have claimed to know something we do not. I am not inclined to believe them based on their reports of mystical experience.

Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. — Edward Feser

According to Plato's Divided Line mathematical objects are not known by noesis. They are hypothetical, objects of reason or dianoia.

Russell's universals unlike Forms are not causes.

See Paine's post above.

Many others have claimed to know something we do not. I am not inclined to believe them based on their reports of mystical experience. — Fooloso4

Just as I have consistently argued for the existence of a spectrum of consciousness there is also evident a spectrum of knowledge (possibly there is a connection). Individuals with certain mental capacities are capable of grasping complex mathematical concepts far beyond the ken of most folks. Savants can have incredible mathematical (and other) skills, often with minimal formal training.

Given the breadth and depth of human knowledge and experience, I don't find it in the least surprising that people of varying constitutions and varying experiences have a variety of different types of knowledge, or that some people have intuitions and awareness that some others do not share. In fact, it would be surprising if there were not such a variety. Brain scans of Buddhist monks exhibit a variety of unique features, including enhanced neuroplasticity.

Individuals with certain mental capacities are capable of grasping complex mathematical concepts far beyond the ken of most folks. — Pantagruel

If someone claims to have mathematical knowledge it can be demonstrated. Can the same be said of someone who claims to have mystical knowledge?

If someone claims to have mathematical knowledge it can be demonstrated. Can the same be said of someone who claims to have mystical knowledge? — Fooloso4

Are you suggesting that those are the only possible kinds of knowledge? "Mystical" could in one sense just mean "beyond our current understanding." In which case, the negative prejudice associated with the word is attributable to the critic. IMO there is knowledge appertaining to the possible transcendence of consciousness, especially in the case where expansion of knowledge could also be construed as expansion of consciousness. In which case, people who claim not to be able to understand something are telling the truth, and are simply not capable of (or interested in) experiencing the type of consciousness in question.

"Mystical" could in one sense just mean "beyond our current understanding." — Pantagruel

Does anything more follow from "is possible" than is possible?

If someone claims to have mathematical knowledge it can be demonstrated. Can the same be said of someone who claims to have mystical knowledge? — Fooloso4

This touches on my interest in intuition, understood as deep learning in neural networks. It seems to me that there are two seperate issues involved.

1. Having demonstrable knowledge.
2. Having an explanation for that knowledge.

Though I haven't done any meaningful degree of study of the history of explanations for intuition, my impression is that intuition has been mysterious and subject to being explained in supernatural or mystical terms until the 1980s, when the beginnings of a neuroscientific basis for understanding intuition were developed.*

Given that intuition has been (and probably still is for most) such a mystery, it seems understandable to me that people often have practically demonstrable knowledge while often being mistaken in their beliefs as to the basis of that knowledge.

* The second wave blossomed in the late 1980s, following the 1987 book about Parallel Distributed Processing by James L. McClelland, David E. Rumelhart et al., which introduced a couple of improvements to the simple perceptron idea, such as intermediate processors (known as "hidden layers" now) alongside input and output units and used sigmoid activation function instead of the old 'all-or-nothing' function. Their work has, in turn, built upon that of John Hopfield, who was a key figure investigating the mathematical characteristics of sigmoid activation functions.[2] From the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, connectionism took on an almost revolutionary tone when Schneider,[4] Terence Horgan and Tienson posed the question of whether connectionism represented a fundamental shift in psychology and GOFAI.[2] Some advantages of the second wave connectionist approach included its applicability to a broad array of functions, structural approximation to biological neurons, low requirements for innate structure, and capacity for graceful degradation.[5] Some disadvantages of the second wave connectionist approach included the difficulty in deciphering how ANNs process information, or account for the compositionality of mental representations, and a resultant difficulty explaining phenomena at a higher level.[6]

The current (third) wave has been marked by advances in Deep Learning allowing for Large language models.[2] The success of deep learning networks in the past decade has greatly increased the popularity of this approach, but the complexity and scale of such networks has brought with them increased interpretability problems.[7]

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Connectionism

This touches on my interest in intuition, understood as deep learning in neural networks. It seems to me that there are two seperate issues involved.

1. Having demonstrable knowledge.
2. Having an explanation for that knowledge. — wonderer1

Intuitions often turn out to be wrong. In all such cases there is no demonstrable knowledge.

my impression is that intuition has been mysterious and subject to being explained in supernatural or mystical terms until the 1980s — wonderer1

This has been the case with many advances in science.

Does anything more follow from "is possible" than is possible? — Fooloso4

Possibly.

Moreover, were consciousness perceivable then the philosophical problem of other minds would not be a problem of any kind. — javra


"The philosophical problem of other minds", seem to me to be more a problem that some people have that is caused by philosophy rather than something to be taken very seriously.

Yes, we can't very reasonably say we perceive other minds, but I certainly have plenty of good reason to think that I recognize other minds. I.e. that minds have recognizable signatures. Don't you have good reasons to think so as well?

Isn't the performative contradiction rather obvious? — wonderer1

Aye. In many a way its right up there with p-zombies and brains in a vat. But these are only a problem in practice if one is in search of infallible knowledge. Otherwise, such philosophical problems, or issues, in and of themselves give no warrant whatsoever to doubting one’s fallible knowledge of reality at large, which includes other minds.

But that does not then dispel the philosophical, or more specifically epistemological, problem of other minds. "Problem" because that is what the issue is traditionally termed and known by. For example:

Here granting that an AI program has the capacity to become conscious, how would one (fallibly) know when it so becomes? One certainly can’t perceive its consciousness or the lack of. So it would be an inference based on its behaviors. And yet how can we so infer the moment that it becomes conscious?

Here’s another more unavoidable example: At which point in the chain of life does consciousness first occur? Some say that only humans are conscious beings, such that, for example, dogs and cats are not. While I take the opposite view, I have been unable to successfully argue for dogs and cats being conscious beings so as to convince those who disagree. Again, we cannot perceive consciousness, nor the mind which is contingent upon it. We can only infer it from behaviors. And there so far is no established principle(s) by which this inference can be made in impartial ways that thereby resolve the disagreements among humans. (And there are related issues, such as that of whether lesser animals experience emotions, but I'll cut this short.)

In sum, unless one is in search of infallible certainties, I don’t find any performative contradiction in acknowledging the issue - this, for instance, as it was presented in the two examples just provided - while at the same time not in any way doubting one's fallible knowledge of other minds. Goes hand in hand with fallibilism.

Does anything more follow from "is possible" than is possible?
— Fooloso4

Possibly. — Pantagruel

Ha! And possibly not.

I don't care what you think, — Janus

Duely noted.

Ha! And possibly not. — Fooloso4

Yes, that is the definition of possible. The question is, to what extent is knowledge instrumental in actualizing the possible? A savant card-counter could win a huge amount of money from a game of blackjack that would leave most people broke. That's why I never eliminate possibilities unnecessarily. You don't know what you don't know.

Here's a nice quote from Thomas Hardy that illustrates a reversal of the materialistic prejudice through the clever usage of real and corporeal. It involves Mr. Melbury who is deeply animated by considerations of possibilities regarding his daughter's future, which would have been observable "Could the real have been beheld, instead of the corporeal merely."

I love this locution. I'm going to start regarding the day to day world as the "corporeal"....

The question is, to what extent is knowledge instrumental in actualizing the possible? — Pantagruel

My question in line with this tread is the extent to which possible knowledge is mistaken for actual knowledge. I might grant that it is possible that someone has knowledge of a transcendent reality that most of us know nothing of, but it is a questionable leap across an abyss from what cannot be absolutely ruled out to ruling it in, to accepting it as privileged knowledge of a higher reality.

A savant card-counter could win a huge amount of money from a game of blackjack that would leave most people broke. — Pantagruel

That they can do this is not merely a theoretical possibility. They can demonstrate their ability to do this. How does one demonstrate that there is a realm of Forms that they have knowledge of?

That they can do this is not merely a theoretical possibility. They can demonstrate their ability to do this. How does one demonstrate that there is a realm of Forms that they have knowledge of? — Fooloso4

Addressing this via the more general issue of insight into deeper levels of reality and with the following in mind:

Brain scans of Buddhist monks exhibit a variety of unique features, including enhanced neuroplasticity. — Pantagruel

If a Buddhist monk’s worldview is in no way comprised of actual knowledge but only of arbitrary imaginations which are thereby devoid of any rational justification and, hence, rational grounding; then the empirically verifiable benefits of their upheld worldview upon their Central Nervous System would by entailment be nothing more than a wild coincidence devoid of any explanation. This then gives warrant in either accepting that a) at least some Buddhist monks have actual knowledge into the nature of reality (edit: this as they by in large claim to have) that others don’t grasp or else b) utterly inexplicable coincidences (which are by definition devoid of any meaningful connection) occur not only very commonly but with very predictable regularity between worldview upheld and its effects upon quality of life and CNS.

Does scenario (b) hold a significantly greater justification than scenario (a)? (And yes, I take it that both scenarios could well be deemed absurd from different vantages.)

No infallible proof to be had by this either way. But to me it does illustrate a sturdy enough justification for upholding the possibility, if not outright actuality, of some people’s insights into reality which others by in large lack. Insights that are in no way “secret” – for most Buddhists desire to be as transparent about them as they can be - but are nevertheless esoteric in that most others find these insights difficult to comprehend.

Brain scans of Buddhist monks exhibit a variety of unique features, including enhanced neuroplasticity. — Pantagruel

Can you provide a reference?

The article Buddha's Brain: Neuroplasticity and Meditation says, "When the framework of neuroplasticity is applied to meditation, we suggest that the mental training of meditation is fundamentally no different than other forms of skill acquisition that can induce plastic changes in the brain."

If a Buddhist monk’s worldview — javra

What is that worldview? Is it individual or common to all Buddhist monks? What are we to make of divergent views within and between Buddhist schools of thought?

at least some Buddhist monks have actual knowledge into the nature of reality that others don’t grasp ... — javra

What do they say about the nature of reality? Why should we accept that what they describe is actual knowledge into the nature of reality?

... then the empirically verifiable benefits of their upheld worldview upon their Central Nervous System would by entailment be nothing more than a wild coincidence devoid of any explanation. — javra

That a worldview has benefits for those who hold it only shows that holding this worldview has benefits, not that the worldview corresponds reality. An unrealistic or false worldview might also have benefits.

What is the basis of the worldview? Is it the result of what is viewed, of what is seen in a way similar to the philosophers of the Republic see? These philosophers are, by the way, markedly different from Socrates or how philosophers are described in other dialogues. Or is it a worldview that is based on opinion and attitude? Something we can all accept and benefit from?