Metaphysician Undercover, I have in mind by "possible being" something more like a "contingent being" rather than a being that is merely possible but not actual. Based on what I read, the reading of "possible" as meaning "contingent" that is "as what could have or could not have occurred/ existed" is consistent with Aquinas' use of the term "possible."
To summarize and condense, the argument I am suggesting as an interpretation of Aquinas' Third Way is as follows:
1. If everything is contingent, then it is possible for there to be nothing now.
2. But it is not possible for there to be nothing now.
3. Therefore it must be false that everything is contingent.
4. Therefore, there must be a necessary being.
To say a bit more, I think that Aquinas is not only rejecting that "there is nothing now." rather, he is in addition rejecting even the possibility that there is nothing now.
Thoughts? — NotAristotle
I am going to be a bit argumentative here, and say, well whether you admit of an infinite sequence of contingents or not, we still have the problem that "now" is in the midst of those contingents. Get what I mean? Like, even if the contingents are not infinite in duration through time, "now" could be within the timespan of those contingents. That seems like a problem and it is a problem even if we only have a finite duration of contingents. It seems like a problem whether the principle of plentitude is recognized or not. — NotAristotle
That is why I prefer an alternative interpretation of the argument. Instead of saying, "by the principle of plentitude there would be nothing now, therefore there must not be only contingents," I am saying, "the very possibility of nothing now requires the existence of only contingents...but this isn't a possibility...therefore there must be a necessary being." — NotAristotle
because if there ever was a time when there was nothing, there would be no contingents right now — Metaphysician Undercover
However, I am not sure that that is Aquinas' argument in the 3rd Way. — NotAristotle
-- unless nothing occurred at a time after now. — NotAristotle
To your point about the incompatibility of nothing and contingents, allow me to rephrase.. how about "if there is nothing at any time (or even at all times) there could not be a necessary being; any beings that exist, if they exist at all, would have to be contingent beings." — NotAristotle
And I think I am claiming the possibility of nothing in the same way that Aquinas does; that is, if all beings were contingent, there could have been nothing. The possibility of nothing is asserted within a conditional; I do not know enough about logic to know whether that makes it a logical possibility or not. — NotAristotle
What I am claiming is that, were all beings contingent, it would be possible for there to be nothing at some (or all) times; and in particular, it would be possible for there to be nothing now (if everything were contingent). But, I contend that it is impossible for there to be nothing now. Therefore, by modus tollens, it cannot be the case that all beings are contingent. And therefore, there must be a necessary being. — NotAristotle
Second, I have the same objection that I voiced to Wayfarer; namely, Aquinas says: "Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence." If what you are saying about his argument is correct, surely he would have said "...then at one time there must have been nothing in existence." Yet that is not what he says. — NotAristotle
Additionally, if your interpretation is correct, then the principle of plenitide is not actually doing any work. That is because by definition, according to your definition, all contingent things require a cause. In that case it doesn't matter how much time is involved. — NotAristotle
An objection to Aquinas' argument, in my opinion, is that, while there could have been a time when nothing was in existence, there also could have been "possible beings" in existence at all times. In that case, the absurdity that Aquinas is suggesting need not occur. In other words, there is nothing absurd about all beings being "merely possible" beings. And in other words there need not be a necessary being. — NotAristotle
Furthermore, I disagree with the definition of contingent you have deployed. I would define contingent here as "possible to be or not to be." If everything is contingent, then according to your definition nothing is contingent because nothing is possible to be (if everything is contingent). That seems contradictory. — NotAristotle
the contingent things existing now must exist now — NotAristotle
It appears like what you are proposing is something like: "we notice that there are beings now, and what exists now must exist, therefore being is necessary. That's a nice simple argument, but it isn't Aquinas' argument. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see the problem. The time referred to as "now" is in the midst of the contingents, that is described as what we observe, contingent beings. But it's not a problem to the argument, because if there ever was a time when there was nothing, there would be no contingents right now, because contingents require a cause, and nothing could not ever be a cause. That's what a contingent being is, one which requires a cause for its existence. So, the possibility of nothing is ruled out in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah! That is essentially the argument. I would amend it just by adding "...and what exists now must exist [now]..." — NotAristotle
I am not sure that my objection about "now" being at the time of contingents is fully met. The possibility remains that "now" is within the time span of an infinite sequence of contingents, and that the time of "nothing" will occur sometime after "now." — NotAristotle
But if that is the case then the infinite sequence of beings can all being contingent and there needn't be a necessary being; that is a problem for the argument and that is essentially the objection. — NotAristotle
You are proposing that the sequence of contingent beings has a beginning, in order to avoid the infinite time prior to now, and the principle of plenitude, which would indicate that in that infinite time there would be a time of nothing. But contingent beings must have a cause. If there is a first contingent being, one which is prior to all other contingent beings, it cannot have a contingent being as its cause, then its cause is necessary, and this is necessary being as distinct from contingent being. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is sort of like Aristotle's law of identity. Whatever exists [now] must be what it is, and not something else. This is expressed as the following necessity: "A thing is the same as itself". Notice though, that this relates to a thing's essence, what the thing is, which cannot be other than the thing's essence, what the thing is. But this principle has not been extended to a thing's existence, as you propose, and I believe it cannot be, for the following reason. — Metaphysician Undercover
In fact, the "now" changes as we speak. Therefore we cannot make the proposed statement, "it is necessary that what exists now exists now", because time has past between the first "now" and the second "now" such that they refer to different times which accordingly have different existents. — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem is that there will be or may be nothing posterior to "now," that is, if we are still operating on the hypothetical assumption that everything is contingent only. — NotAristotle
Fortunately, I am not appealing to the law of identity; rather, I am appealing to the law of noncontradiction. In particular, I am appealing to what Aristotle says in De Interpretatione. The first sentence of Part 9 especially: "In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions, whether positive or negative, must be true or false." In other words, it must be true or false that something exists now, it cannot be both true and false. — NotAristotle
I am not using now in a purely indexical sense. By "now" I mean this exact present moment. Which, in a few seconds will have become "then." Still, something must have existed in "that" moment. — NotAristotle
you are just carrying on with a proposed possibility which has already been proven to actually be impossible by being incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover
I really do not think you will make any progress in this direction. — Metaphysician Undercover
This does not resolve the issue with "now". — Metaphysician Undercover
How is the proposed hypothetical possibility impossible by being incoherent? — NotAristotle
Okay fine, let's forget about "now" and say instead that any moment in the past must have been. I will reformulate my argument:
1. If everything is contingent, then there could have been nothing in the past.
2. But there couldn't have been nothing in the past, something having already existed in the past.
3. Therefore (by modus tollens) it must be false that everything is contingent.
4. Therefore there must be a necessary being. — NotAristotle
Although I really do think Aquinas meant "now" as I do, in the colloquial sense, not in the technical sense you have described. Otherwise, wouldn't the objection you stated concerning "now" be a problem for Aquinas too? — NotAristotle
By the nature of "contingent being", it is shown that it is impossible that "all being is contingent" by Aquinas' argument. Therefore the hypothesis "everything is contingent only" is rendered incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see how the necessity of the premise (2) "something existed in the past" is supported, when (1) explicitly says there could have been nothing in the past. That is the point of Aquinas' layout, it shows how (2) which contradicts (1), rendering the primary hypothesis "everything is contingent", as incoherent, is derived. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no need for Aquinas to elaborate or clarify his use of "now" because he does not use it to distinguish between past and future. You made that distinction in your argument, so this left you open to that criticism. — Metaphysician Undercover
But that is the problem isn't it; Aquinas' argument as you have stated it does not go through if there could be nothing posterior to "now." If there could be nothing posterior to "now" it could be the case that everything is merely contingent. — NotAristotle
But (1) does not explicitly say there could have been nothing in the past; it says "if everything is contingent, then there could have been nothing in the past." It's a conditional statement, that is it. And that is basically what Aquinas is doing too, he is entertaining, in the same way a conditional does, the possibility that "everything is contingent." — NotAristotle
prior to now — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem for the principle of plenitude is not when nothing is prior to now; the principle handles that objection well. The problem is when nothing will occur (or may occur) after now. That's the objection I am stating. Do you see why I think it is a problem for the argument you stated? — NotAristotle
Since "all being is contingent being" implies an infinite regress of causation, therefore an infinite amount of time prior to now, nothing would have already occurred, prior to now, by the principle of plenitude — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore the proposition "all things are contingent is incoherent", and there is necessary being. — Metaphysician Undercover
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