1. Thought
Facts>Atomic Facts> Objects — 013zen
:
“The picture is a fact” (2.141).
“The picture is a model of reality” (2.12). — 013zen
(2.01)We picture facts to ourselves.
When it is the case, to a fact corresponds an atomic fact and is called a positive fact:
“What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts” (2).
When it is not the case, to a fact corresponds the nonexistence of atomic facts, and is called a negative fact:
“(The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact)” (2.06). — 013zen
(2)What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
(2.06)(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative
fact.)
An online edition of the text with side-by-side translations can be found here. — Wayfarer
I would not put facts and objects under the heading of Thought. They are independent of thought. I would put them under Reality. — Fooloso4
We picture facts to ourselves.
(2.01) — Fooloso4
“The picture is a fact” (2.141). — 013zen
2.1511 Thus the picture is linked with reality; it reaches up to it.
2.15121 Only the outermost points of the dividing lines touch the object to be measured.
2.1514 The representing relation consists of the co-ordinations of the elements of the picture and the things.
2.1515 These co-ordinations are as it were the feelers of its elements with which the picture touches reality.
It is a 1-to-1 correspondence which preserves the relevant form between structures. — 013zen
the Tractatus presents a three part isomorphism between: 1. Thoughts 2. Language 3. Reality — 013zen
A proposition can be analyzed into an elementary proposition, and to this corresponds an atomic fact. — 013zen
I'm not sure that isomorphism is the right word, as it suggests that they are independent of each other.
Thought and language are two aspects of the same thing. A proposition is a thought and a thought is a proposition. — RussellA
Leaving aside the perhaps trivial point that we can have thoughts that are non-propositional...I don't read him as suggesting that language is the only picture-making tool at our disposal. — J
Now it is becoming clear why I thought that thinking and language were the same. For thinking is a kind of language. For a thought too is, of course, a logical picture of the proposition, and therefore it just is a kind of proposition.
It is clear that, when a person believes a proposition, the person, considered as a metaphysical subject, does not have to be assumed in order to explain what is happening. What has to be explained is the relation between the set of words which is the proposition considered as a fact on its own account, and the “objective” fact which makes the proposition true or false.
It is a 1-to-1 correspondence which preserves the relevant form between structures.
— 013zen
It seems there are a number of places in the text where we do not have a way to confirm or deny that. The passages move from thinking to language in a sequence. — Paine
Do you think of the "isomorphism' as a freedom to move forward or backwards in that regard? — Paine
I seriousl doubt Wittgenstein understood half of what he wrong. — AmadeusD
You can see how the above was seized upon by the Vienna Circle as grounds for their verificationism, even if Wittgenstein himself disowned them. — Wayfarer
I'm not sure that isomorphism is the right word, as it suggests that they are independent of each other. — RussellA
Thought and language are two aspects of the same thing. A proposition is a thought and a thought is a proposition. — RussellA
Now it is becoming clear why I thought that thinking and language were the same. For thinking is a kind of language. For a thought too is, of course, a logical picture of the proposition, and therefore it just is a kind of proposition.
IE, the elementary proposition (aka atomic proposition) "grass is red" — RussellA
It seems that Wittgenstein doesn't distinguish between propositional thoughts, "snakes are reptiles" and non-propositional thoughts, "Indiana Jones fears snakes" — RussellA
It is clear that, when a person believes a proposition, the person, considered as a metaphysical subject, does not have to be assumed in order to explain what is happening. What has to be explained is the relation between the set of words which is the proposition considered as a fact on its own account, and the “objective” fact which makes the proposition true or false.
Simple objects are not like the objects we encounter in the world. Objects in the world are a configuration of simple objects. These complex objects are facts. A state of affairs. Simple objects are not the objects of empirical science. They are not physical entities. They are not what we would find if we divided physical objects to the point where further division is no longer possible. They are not something like subatomic particles. — Fooloso4
we know that there must be simple physical entities to which correspond our simple objects, right? — 013zen
(2.0231)The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented—only by the configuration of objects that they are produced.
I think that Wittgenstein, like any philosopher - or human for that matter - is simply thinking through these problems, and gets some things right and other things wrong. We read other philosophers to try and see how these problems have been handled, and what we can learn from them. — 013zen
I agree. Wittgenstein, though, is not treated this way by the majority of his adherents. — AmadeusD
Plus, I was being a little bit more negative - I think he makes less sense than 'some right, some wrong'. He's mostly senseless, making htings up. — AmadeusD
I think it can be seen in how the text uses the terms that it employs. I can see many places which seem to confirm this. — 013zen
2.0121 Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others.
2.173 A picture represents its subject from a position outside it. (Its standpoint is its representational form.) That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly.
4.0641 The negating proposition determines a logical place with the help of the logical place of the negated proposition. For it describes it as lying outside the latter’s logical place.
4.12 Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—logical form.
4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.
5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
So we cannot say in logic, ‘The world has this in it, and this, but not that.’
For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also. For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.
What we cannot think, that we cannot think: we cannot therefore say what we cannot think.
We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either. — Ibid.
Do you think of the "isomorphism' as a freedom to move forward or backwards in that regard?
— Paine
I'm sorry, I don't completely understand. Would you be able to phrase it differently? — 013zen
I don't think so. As I understand it, or perhaps misunderstand it, there are no simple physical entities or objects. Every physical object is complex. The problem is to explain how a configuration of simple non-physical objects results in a physical object. It may be that this indicates that I have got something wrong, but it may simply be that Wittgenstein would have said that such problems are a matter of science not logic. — Fooloso4
The problem is to explain how a configuration of simple non-physical objects results in a physical object. — Fooloso4
The order of the statements in the text begins with conceptions before introducing propositions. Is that order important to understanding what is presented? — Paine
The difference between what is said versus what is shown becomes a limit to what can be regarded as equal or the same. In that way, Wittgenstein is challenging what most have taken for granted. — Paine
Wittgenstein, though, is not treated this way by the majority of his adherents. — AmadeusD
I am still having trouble completely seeing how this precludes the possibility of an isomorphism — 013zen
4.12 Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it — Ibid.
What do you make of:
4.12 Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it
— Ibid. — Paine
Citing this is not an argument for 'precluding a possibility', as you put it. On the other hand, maybe this would be a good time for you to provide what supports your view of the text. — Paine
He complicates this by using the term 'object' in both cases without always making the distinction clear. — Fooloso4
I would say this is generally true of adherents :P
I've never met a Kantian that thinks Kant is wrong, or a Humean that thinks Hume is wrong. lol — 013zen
I'd be interested to hear more. I wouldn't say that he's making things up, but he does take himself to be doing something creative. — 013zen
One might then wonder why anyone bothers trying to make sense of it. — Fooloso4
He seems to have basically invented his own use of things like "language" "reality", "thought" and "object" and then run with it, in the same manner he apparently taught his student - everyone else is wrong. — AmadeusD
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