Witt does seem to disregard his own statements, and say quite a bit about what shouldn't be said...but, that's because this isn't the agenda of the work, despite discussing many relevant positivist ideas, and problems. — 013zen

That suggests you agree with Russell in a way that I do not. Russell says:

The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts. Given the syntax of language, the meaning of a sentence is determined as soon as the meaning of the component words is known. In order that a certain sentence should assert a certain fact there must, however the language may be constructed, be something in common between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the fact. This is perhaps the most fundamental thesis of Mr. Wittgenstein’s theory. That which has to be in common between the sentence and the fact cannot, he contends, be itself in turn said in language. It can, in his phraseology, only be shown, not said, for whatever we may say will still need to have the same structure. — ibid.

The text does not support this addition to the thesis. The portion I quoted brings the "same structure" idea into question.

I hope this helps. — 013zen

It doesn't. You make a distinction between the world as pictures in the mind and reality not being pictures in the mind.

A proposition is a picture of reality.

(4.021)

What do you find in the text regarding pictures that is true of the world but not true of reality? Wheren does he make a distinction between the pictures of the world being in the mind and pictures of reality not being in the mind?

From that perspective, Witt does seem to disregard his own statements, and say quite a bit about what shouldn't be said... — 013zen

Of course we can make statements about ethics and aesthetics, but we cannot compare them to the facts of the world in order to determine whether they are true or false. They are outside the bounds of logic.

So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher.

(6.42)

What can be said are the propositions of science. The only proper propositions are those that say something about the way things are in the world, that is, matters of fact. Ethics and aesthetics are not matters of fact. They say nothing about the world. Treating them the way we treat propositions leads only to confusion and fallacy. This does not mean that ethics and aesthetics and unimportant, but that they are so important that we should not regard them as something other than they are.

I'll accept that defense, thank you for the insight. I decided to pick up the text and got an audiobook of it also. Would you say Wittgenstein was attempting to bridge the gap between the disciplines of science and philosophy?

Not quite, I'm here to learn, not debate. Zen's insight was enough of a glimmer to find a path I could get behind. A simple deflection isn't going to convince someone who has a healthy skepticism now will it? Thanks for the SEP post by the way. The replies to it were actually more interesting but without it, you and zen wouldn't have had that little exchange.

That suggests you agree with Russell in a way that I do not. Russell says: — Paine

I apologize, I must have been unclear in my writing. I was trying to say that, from Russell's perspective, such seems to be the case. I do not agree with Russell on this point.

It doesn't. You make a distinction between the world as pictures in the mind and reality not being pictures in the mind. — Fooloso4

So, this all depends on what we take Witt to mean by "logical space". Where or what is logical space?

For this, I draw on Frege's writing in "The Thought" wherein he wants to say that there are ideas, such as for example Pythagoras' theorem which is true regardless of what anyone thinks about the theorem, and seems to exist in its own space, therefore. It can exist in the mind, and form the content of thought, but is in some sense mind independent without being a "part" of reality.

I think Witt has a similar conception. Logical space is like the the common playing field of thoughts, without being tied to any individual instance of thought.

I can, for instance, imagine a purple pig dancing the macarena while smoking a joint, and despite existing in my mind at the moment, its possibility lies in logical space prior to the thought. Someone else can have the same thought, or may have already had the same thought before me; it isn't a genuine creation of my mind, but it is instantiated in my mind.

Pictures and the world exist in the logical space...they mirror the logic of reality, but they are distinct from it and exist separate from it.

What do you find in the text regarding pictures that is true of the world but not true of reality? — Fooloso4

"What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner rightly or falsely is its form of representation" (2.17).

The only commonality between pictures which compose the world, and reality, is the logical form of the picture and the state of affairs it is a picture of.

Wheren does he make a distinction between the pictures of the world being in the mind and pictures of reality not being in the mind? — Fooloso4

This is tangled.

The world is made up of pictures, and those pictures are pictures of possible or actual reality. The world, is a possible picture of reality.

There are not "pictures of the world" and "pictures of reality", with one being in the mind and the other not.

Would you say Wittgenstein was attempting to bridge the gap between the disciplines of science and philosophy? — DifferentiatingEgg

It depends on what you mean by "attempting to bridge the gap".

Witt is quite clear that he considers Science as an activity involved in one type of business, and philosophy another activity....he does believe, however, that the activity of philosophy can, if anything, be helpful to the activity of science, without taking part in the activity of science itself. The relationship is mutually beneficial, but each is doing their own thing.

"Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.
(The word 'philosophy' must mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences)" (4.111).

"The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity...

Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the
thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred." (4.112)

"Philosophy limits the disputable sphere of natural science" (4.113)

not sure how to delete a post but it posted a few times

Sure, sounds like Wittgenstein's approach is more of a style of marriage between science and philosophy, where as Russell and the others were more in the line of trying to make a baby out of science and philosophy?

They say nothing about the world. Treating them the way we treat propositions leads only to confusion and fallacy. This does not mean that ethics and aesthetics and unimportant, but that they are so important that we should not regard them as something other than they are. — Fooloso4

I agree with this. What originally got me interested in Witt many, many, moons ago was my BA thesis on Wittgenstein's ethics. It's clear that Witt considered ethical considerations important, but academically stale.

As you say, he suggests that the common theme of treating "the good" as an adjective, or something to discover about the world is entirely wrong headed, and leads to confusion.

The ethical dimensions of the Tractatus have always been of interest to me, especially considering the letter Witt wrote to Von Ficker wherein he identifies the purpose of the work as "ethical".

↪013zen Sure, sounds like Wittgenstein's approach is more of a style of Marriage between Science and Philosophy, where as Russell and the others were more of trying to make a baby out of Science and Philosophy? — DifferentiatingEgg

The discussion is centered around the ancient distinction between science and metaphysics, with the latter being the domain of philosophy.

Aristotle said we engage in philosophy to explain why things happen, as opposed to science which explains how they happen.

Bacon, calling philosophy and metaphysics the "handmaiden" of the sciences calls attention to this relation, and sets to set up philosophy in a manner which can be truly helpful to science.

Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, etc all trying to establish this agenda at different times in their projects, set out to establish a course for philosophy wherein one could derive genuine metaphysical knowledge.

Russell and others came in after this, and were concerned with the same project. They thought philosophy should mirror the rigor and style of mathematics, whereby things could be "proven" true.

Witt, I think is commenting on this, saying that this conception of the relationship is wrongheaded. Philosophy can only aid the sciences by clarifying what science provides us. It can't, on its own, tells us what's true.

So, to summarize, I take Russell and other's approach to the relationship between science and philosophy to be constructive in their conceptions. They thought philosophy could provide insights that go above and beyond science. Witt takes the relation to be more interpretive; philosophy can only help clarify thoughts for scientists.

Logical space is like the the common playing field of thoughts, without being tied to any individual instance of thought. — 013zen

Logic underlies both thought and the world. Logic is prior to, independent of, and the transcendental condition for them.

The only commonality between pictures which compose the world, and reality, is the logical form of the picture and the state of affairs it is a picture of. — 013zen

The pictures do not compose the world. The world is not a collection or arrangement of pictures. The pictures of the world are pictures of reality made possible by the logical structure underlying both the picture and the world, that is, the picture and reality.

The world is made up of pictures — 013zen

The world is not made up of pictures. Nowhere does Wittgenstein say this.

The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

(1.1)

A fact is not a picture, although a picture can picture a fact.

The world, is a possible picture of reality. — 013zen

The world is not a possible picture.

The world is all that is the case.

(1)

All that is the case is not a picture of what might be the case.

There are not "pictures of the world" and "pictures of reality", with one being in the mind and the other not. — 013zen

Isn't that what you said?

There is a distinction being made between reality and the world. The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind. — 013zen

The pictures do not compose the world. The world is not a collection or arrangement of pictures. The pictures of the world are pictures of reality made possible by the logical structure underlying both the picture and the world, that is, the picture and reality. — Fooloso4

I agree that pictures don't compose the world. Wittgenstein's picture theory is composed of thought and propositions, thought (we picture facts to ourselves, and a logical picture is a thought T. 2.2 and 3) being the precursor to the proposition. All propositions are possible pictures of facts in the world. True propositions are pictures of actual facts, as opposed to possible facts. The logical structure of both the proposition and the world of facts provide the impetus for his picture theory.