I think that what we scientifically know, is a rough estimation of what is really there in-itself. — Bob Ross
Without taking an anti-realist position, I don't see how you can explain the observable phenomena of 'time dilation', for example, by appeal to "phenomenal", a priori, time. — Bob Ross
I think ‘using’ a concept is more generic than ‘presupposing it’: both are ‘using’ it, the former is just what it means to ‘use’ generally, and the latter is to leave it unexplicated. — Bob Ross
You are absolutely right that one can learn a concept through merely interacting with it or observing other people discuss about it, without its exact definition being clarified. I just don’t see how this negates my position, I guess. — Bob Ross
If we want to be really technical, then I would say that we first, in our early years, learn notions; then we (tend to) refine them in our young adulthood into ideas; then we (tend to) refine them more in our older years into concepts. I just mean to convey that we sort of grasp the ‘idea’ behind a thing slowly (usually) through experience (whether that be of other people conversing or interacting with something pertaining to the ‘idea’); and I sometimes convey this by noting a sort of linear progression of clarity behind an ‘idea’ with notion → idea → concept. It isn’t a super clean schema, but you get the point.
Well, that's the point at issue. If you know how to use the word "being", and related words such as "exist", "is", and so on - what more is there to the meaning of "the concept of being"?However, “is” is linguistic, not conceptual. I am asking what it means ‘to exist’, not how we use the term ‘is’ (or similar words). — Bob Ross
I think that there are a number of ways of using these words, and that we can sort them out much more clearly than the mysterious use of "being" fond in so much ontology. Parsing talk of existence forced logicians to confront these distinctions, and to come up with the clarificationI described in the previous post - at least three differing uses of "is".Existential quantification presupposes, and does not answer itself, what it means ‘to exist’. It is a way to quantify existence (in a way). E.g., by claiming “there is something that is green” in the sense that there exists something green, presupposes the concept of what it means to exist—so it can’t itself being a proper analysis of ‘to be’. See what I mean? — Bob Ross
But regarding your concern, maybe it is that appeal to phenomenal intuitions of time isn’t really necessary to explain the scientific experimental result
Could you take the statement "the cat is on the mat" and spell out all of its presupposed concepts, and the underlying fundamental concepts which are implicit in those presuppositions?
The prospect of cleanliness strikes me as an illusion though? I don't believe concepts have a linear progression of articulation like that, especially in discrete stages of clarity.
That history illustrates two things, in my view, that definition is in some sense derivative of communally negotiated understanding -even of intensionally fixed analysands like the concept of the Eulerian polyhedron -, and that communal articulation changes such conceptions.
Understanding what a chair is must include the act of sitting upon it, not just the words "something you can sit on" - which includes the floor and rocks. And there are no speech acts which are behaviourally equivalent to the act of sitting, since that's not what words do, they don't sit down.
Because the majority of the concepts we enjoy in our lives are more analytically fuzzy, their "full" explication, something maximally clear, cashes out in a pragmatic - perhaps even phenomenological - understanding rather than explicating word strings. Even if that pragmatic understanding must be accompanied by the appropriate words. eg "I sit down in my chair", and I am sitting, I illustrate this by sitting down.
That strikes me as most concepts must, thus, be fundamental. If they are constituted by being unable to be explicated.
Again, you are confusing language with concepts. The dictionary doesn't define concepts, it defines words (in a particular language). — Bob Ross
Doesn't that suggest there is a cosmic time? — Bob Ross
I'll contend that the notion of "concept" is an hypostatisation of word use. After all, if the concept gives the meaning of some word, and the meaning of a word is its use in a language, then the concept is pretty much just the way a word is used.
...there are many theories of logic; and to that I say that there is only one, — Bob Ross
andTo be a law of logic, a principle must hold in complete generality
No principle holds in complete generality
____________________
There are no laws of logic. — Gillian Russell
Logical laws are supposed to work in every case. Modus Tollens, non-contradiction, identity - these work in any and all cases. A logical nihilist will reject this...
...there are two ways to deal with this argument.
A logical monist will take the option of rejecting the conclusion, and also the second premise. For them the laws of logic hold with complete generality.
A logical pluralist will reject the conclusion and the first premise. For them laws of logic apply to discreet languages within logic, not to the whole of language. Classical logic, for example, is that part of language in which propositions have only two values, true or false. Other paraconsistent and paracomplete logics might be applied elsewhere.
A few counter-examples of logical principles that might be thought to apply everywhere.
Identity: ϑ ⊧ ϑ; but consider "this is the first time I have used this sentence in this paragraph, therefore this is the first time I have used this sentence in this paragraph"
And elimination: ϑ & ϒ ⊧ ϑ; But consider "ϑ is true only if it is part of a conjunction". — Banno
Then may I commend again Philosophical Investigations, §48? We choose what is to count as a simple in the diagram, be it colour, or shape, or letter, or position; and each can in turn be defined in terms of the other. Here Wittgenstein is undoing the enterprise of the Tractatus, which is very much the same enterprise you suggest in your other thread, constructing the world from logical atoms.I am not seeing how the concept of ‘being’ is merely being ‘held constant’ for us to ‘move other things’ — Bob Ross
It seems to me that you do here what you claim to be unable to do - to express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english.For example, we cannot properly express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english; but this is just a linguistic limitation. I can only say "a non-spatial entity would exist 'beyond' what is in space", but the concept of a non-spatial entity's relation to space as 'beyond' it is perfectly sensible albeit linguistically nonsensical. — Bob Ross
Which is to say nothing more than that there are triangles even if there are no folk around to talk about them - that is, to accept realism.The concept of a triangle is still such even if we have no language capable of conveying it. — Bob Ross
Sure. Concepts can be shown, by our acts, as well as said. Indeed saying is just another act. The point being that concepts are not fundamental to mind, actions are. Concepts are just a way of explaining acts.Conceptual analysis is surely restrained, to some extent, by language (as you are correct that we convey concepts with language) but they are not thereby themselves reducible to language — Bob Ross
For example, we cannot properly express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english; but this is just a linguistic limitation. I can only say "a non-spatial entity would exist 'beyond' what is in space", but the concept of a non-spatial entity's relation to space as 'beyond' it is perfectly sensible albeit linguistically nonsensical. — Bob Ross
To be a law of logic, a principle must hold in complete generality
No principle holds in complete generality
____________________
There are no laws of logic.
I'll go with logical pluralism. Logic itself depends on what one is doing.
We choose what is to count as a simple in the diagram, be it colour, or shape, or letter, or position; and each can in turn be defined in terms of the other.
I hope you don't lump me in with Corvus, who's understanding of logic is... problematic.
It seems to me that you do here what you claim to be unable to do - to express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english.
Which is to say nothing more than that there are triangles even if there are no folk around to talk about them - that is, to accept realism.
Sure. Concepts can be shown, by our acts, as well as said. Indeed saying is just another act. The point being that concepts are not fundamental to mind, actions are. Concepts are just a way of explaining acts.
A child understands "3" by taking three lollies, by holding up three fingers, by taking one toy from four, and so on; not by having a something in her mind. Further, using the word "three" is tertiary to these other acts.
You missed the point: my linguistic expression of 'beyond' space is incoherent. 'Beyond' refers to something in space. — Bob Ross
But this seems like you are agreeing now with me that you cannot define being. — Bob Ross
Your keep parroting "You missed the point." in most messages you write wouldn't help you on understanding.
"Beyond" can mean other things too depending on the context. For example, "It is beyond me." - it does't mean something in space.
If your reader didn't understand what you wrote, then it is likely that your writing was not grammatically correct or it was out of context.
Well, it's from Gillian Russell, so I'll take it as legit. But I went too quickly, and lost you. Russell's approach is to highlight cases where what are generally considered logical laws fail - I gave a few examples, more can be seen in the linked literature on Logical Nihilism. These cases serve to verify the second premise, that there are no general laws, and hence logical monism. We are left with deciding that there are no laws of logic, or that they do not apply with complete generality.A “completely general” logical principle sounds like confused jargon for “absolute” logical principle; or it refers to a principle being general, which doesn’t lend support to the claim. — Bob Ross
The Law of non-contradiction, ⊨ ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ), need not be true in a Klein logic, I believe. This would add a line to the truth table where if φ is neither T or F, so is ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ). Non-contradiction applies only to those logics which are biconditional, and hence not to all logics.When can you validly disregard the law of non-contradiction, for example? — Bob Ross
It does not follow that there are logical laws that apply in all cases. Indeed, one of the games played in doing logic is to see what happens when a supposed law is denied. Nothing need be held constant throughout the whole enterprise - just as no individual thread need run the whole length of a rope.These logical theories are not separate from each other, but share at their core the fundamental (classical) logic. — Bob Ross
for — Bob Ross
The trouble here is that "being" is not one thing, but a group of things. I tried to explain that by setting out the various logical parsings of "is".If that is the case, then it should be easy for you to demonstrate this: choose something else (or multiple concepts) to be simple, and comprise ‘being’ from it. — Bob Ross
Note my bolding: not just....the concept of a triangle is just the inter-subjectively agreed upon word ‘triangle’. There must be an underlying concept of a triangle at play here. — Bob Ross
I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you read the OP and thought that I was referring to 'meaning' by 'definition'; and therefrom arises the disagreement. Am I on the right track? — Bob Ross
My OP, I see now, is a bit ambiguous: I did not make any distinction between the meaning of a concept and its definition. I don't think that simple concepts are themselves circular and unknowable in meaning but, rather, what I was referring to by 'definable' is the explication of meaning. — Bob Ross
“it is beyond me” refers to something which is spatially separate from yourself; so, no, this is not an example of a different meaning of ‘beyond’ that is aspatial. — Bob Ross
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