I think that what we scientifically know, is a rough estimation of what is really there in-itself. — Bob Ross

I suppose, depending on how logically consistent one wishes to be, but generally I agree with that, which should relieve me of scientific anti-realism. What we scientifically know, then, just indicates a particular method; that which is known about being what it may.

Without taking an anti-realist position, I don't see how you can explain the observable phenomena of 'time dilation', for example, by appeal to "phenomenal", a priori, time. — Bob Ross

All time dilation shows is the relation between sets of conditions with respect to each other. Nothing particularly amazing about it, insofar as time dilation only manifests to that which is outside both relative sets of conditions, so if a guy is contained in one or the other of those, there is no time dilation for him at all, but he intuits relations in time for himself a priori nonetheless.

But regarding your concern, maybe it is that appeal to phenomenal intuitions of time isn’t really necessary to explain the scientific experimental result. Or to explain even the mathematical justification before the scientific experimental result. Maybe it is sufficient to presuppose the intuition within the domain of empirical science, and only appeal to it within the domain of metaphysics, the interest of which being the possibility of knowledge itself.

I think ‘using’ a concept is more generic than ‘presupposing it’: both are ‘using’ it, the former is just what it means to ‘use’ generally, and the latter is to leave it unexplicated. — Bob Ross

I think I see what you mean. Though it strikes me as very difficult to be able to say which concepts are presupposed by which understandings. Could you take the statement "the cat is on the mat" and spell out all of its presupposed concepts, and the underlying fundamental concepts which are implicit in those presuppositions?

You are absolutely right that one can learn a concept through merely interacting with it or observing other people discuss about it, without its exact definition being clarified. I just don’t see how this negates my position, I guess. — Bob Ross

I've not been too explicit in spelling out how I disagree with you. I think we do disagree, but I don't know exactly where. I think we're getting close though.

If we want to be really technical, then I would say that we first, in our early years, learn notions; then we (tend to) refine them in our young adulthood into ideas; then we (tend to) refine them more in our older years into concepts. I just mean to convey that we sort of grasp the ‘idea’ behind a thing slowly (usually) through experience (whether that be of other people conversing or interacting with something pertaining to the ‘idea’); and I sometimes convey this by noting a sort of linear progression of clarity behind an ‘idea’ with notion → idea → concept. It isn’t a super clean schema, but you get the point.

I think I get the point. The prospect of cleanliness strikes me as an illusion though? I don't believe concepts have a linear progression of articulation like that, especially in discrete stages of clarity. That seems to me to make a concept very fixed while its articulation and understanding highly varies. I don't doubt that people can "aim their understandings" at a common concept while wrestling with it, even explicitly.

A good example of this is Eulerian polygon in Lakatos' Proofs and Refutations. People offered many definitions of Eulerian polygons over the years. But people came up with "counterexamples" to those - things which obviously were not Eulerian polygons -intensionally- but were Eulerian polyhedron -extensionally- in terms of the definition.

That history illustrates two things, in my view, that definition is in some sense derivative of communally negotiated understanding -even of intensionally fixed analysands like the concept of the Eulerian polyhedron -, and that communal articulation changes such conceptions.

Out in the wild, away from concepts which can be relatively well explicated in a formal language, things are both much fuzzier analytically and much more concrete pragmatically+semantically, I believe. Understanding what a chair is must include the act of sitting upon it, not just the words "something you can sit on" - which includes the floor and rocks. And there are no speech acts which are behaviourally equivalent to the act of sitting, since that's not what words do, they don't sit down.

Because the majority of the concepts we enjoy in our lives are more analytically fuzzy, their "full" explication, something maximally clear, cashes out in a pragmatic - perhaps even phenomenological - understanding rather than explicating word strings. Even if that pragmatic understanding must be accompanied by the appropriate words. eg "I sit down in my chair", and I am sitting, I illustrate this by sitting down.

That strikes me as most concepts must, thus, be fundamental. If they are constituted by being unable to be explicated. Since I cannot explicate sitting down with words alone. And if such explication is broadened to speech acts, then I can sit down while saying "this is sitting down", and explication becomes part of the fuzzy world of communally negotiated - social - understandings. In which clarity turns out to be grasping pragmatics and context.

However, “is” is linguistic, not conceptual. I am asking what it means ‘to exist’, not how we use the term ‘is’ (or similar words). — Bob Ross

Well, that's the point at issue. If you know how to use the word "being", and related words such as "exist", "is", and so on - what more is there to the meaning of "the concept of being"?

I'll contend that the notion of "concept" is an hypostatisation of word use. After all, if the concept gives the meaning of some word, and the meaning of a word is its use in a language, then the concept is pretty much just the way a word is used.

The common alternative is to consider concepts to be pieces of mental furniture, the "stuff" we have sitting around in our minds. This picture is fraught with inconsistencies. How, for example, can the concept of "existence" in your mind be the same as that in my mind? In the same way that the armchair in your lounge room is the same as that in my lounge room? But you could come and see my lounge chair - you can't inspect my concept of exists.. all you have access to us the way I use it...

And so on, with all the machinations of the private language argument thrown on top of the notion of simples.

Existential quantification presupposes, and does not answer itself, what it means ‘to exist’. It is a way to quantify existence (in a way). E.g., by claiming “there is something that is green” in the sense that there exists something green, presupposes the concept of what it means to exist—so it can’t itself being a proper analysis of ‘to be’. See what I mean? — Bob Ross

I think that there are a number of ways of using these words, and that we can sort them out much more clearly than the mysterious use of "being" fond in so much ontology. Parsing talk of existence forced logicians to confront these distinctions, and to come up with the clarificationI described in the previous post - at least three differing uses of "is".

The grain of truth in what you are suggesting might be seen in etymology, where to "ex sistere" is to "stand forth". To exist is to be differentiated from the stuff around you - a notion not so far from "to exist is to be the subject of a predicate", and so different to the stuff that is not subject to that predicate.

And all this is by way of showing that we can have a reasonably clear analysis of existence, and that in such circumstances "existence" is not a simple.

Anyway, this is an offer of a different way to see the issue. Take it or leave it.

Again, you are confusing language with concepts. The dictionary doesn't define concepts, it defines words (in a particular language).

But "time dilation" doesn't refer to a condition in the temporal form of our experience: it refers to conditions of how time works independently of our forms of experience. The temporal sequencing of events changes depending on one's inertial frame, and this doesn't seem like it is something that is merely an a priori condition of our experience. Doesn't that suggest there is a cosmic time?

But regarding your concern, maybe it is that appeal to phenomenal intuitions of time isn’t really necessary to explain the scientific experimental result

How? I don't see it.

Could you take the statement "the cat is on the mat" and spell out all of its presupposed concepts, and the underlying fundamental concepts which are implicit in those presuppositions?

I can certainly make my best attempt, although I do (already) concede that it will be highly improbable that I will be able to explicate recursively all of them.

The concepts that come to mind to me, in terms of “first-order” concepts in play, are:

- Cat
- Mat
- Predication
- The concept of ‘horizontally on top of’: not sure if there is a word in english for this.

Of course, there are sub-concepts at play that I can’t take the time to expound. The most fundamental would probably be:

- Spatiality
- Being
- Identity
- Temporality

Perhaps more, as well.

Does that help?

The prospect of cleanliness strikes me as an illusion though? I don't believe concepts have a linear progression of articulation like that, especially in discrete stages of clarity.

Agreed. However, I still think the elaboration is necessary for the demonstration of the (general) evolution of “ideas”.

That history illustrates two things, in my view, that definition is in some sense derivative of communally negotiated understanding -even of intensionally fixed analysands like the concept of the Eulerian polyhedron -, and that communal articulation changes such conceptions.

Are you saying that concepts get their meaning from social interaction? This may be the source of our disagreement, as I think words are very much like you described, but not concepts.

We can call a ‘triangle’ whatever we want linguistically, and conceptually our understanding of a ‘triangle’ is limited or has evolved through social interaction, but the concept of ‘triangle’ is left unaffected by our understanding of it. I do NOT mean to say that there is an abstract object of ‘triangle’, or anything like that, but I do think that there is a distinction between the concept itself and our understanding of it; whereas, if I am understanding you correctly, there is only the concept insofar as ‘we’ (society or what not) understand it. Am I understanding correctly?

Understanding what a chair is must include the act of sitting upon it, not just the words "something you can sit on" - which includes the floor and rocks. And there are no speech acts which are behaviourally equivalent to the act of sitting, since that's not what words do, they don't sit down.

That’s fair. I don’t see anything wrong with that.

Because the majority of the concepts we enjoy in our lives are more analytically fuzzy, their "full" explication, something maximally clear, cashes out in a pragmatic - perhaps even phenomenological - understanding rather than explicating word strings. Even if that pragmatic understanding must be accompanied by the appropriate words. eg "I sit down in my chair", and I am sitting, I illustrate this by sitting down.

Where I think it gets even more interesting, is with primitive concepts. It doesn’t seem like there is an analogous action you can take, to sitting down, to implicitly demonstrate the concept of ‘being’. You know what I mean? Likewise with space, time, true, false, value, etc.

That strikes me as most concepts must, thus, be fundamental. If they are constituted by being unable to be explicated.

I don’t think so, or perhaps you are referring to something else by ‘fundamental’ (such as ~’unable to be completely explicated’). I still think you would agree that there is a sufficient, albeit not complete, definition one can give of a ‘chair’ (or ‘sitting down’, etc.); I think this cannot even be done for primitive concepts.

I split concepts into two general categories: simple (i.e., primitive) and complex (i.e., non-primitive). The former cannot be broken down into any concepts which it relates to, and the latter can be.

For example, the concept of a cat is complex; because it comprised off other concepts (e.g., ‘organism’, ‘number’, ‘(the number) four’, ‘leg’, ‘color’, ‘texture’, ‘teeth’, etc.): once one understands, whether that be implicitly or explicitly, the concepts, and their relations, that comprise the concept of a cat, the concept itself is understood. This is not the case with simple concepts.

The concept of being cannot be broken down into any smaller conceptual composition; and so it is impossible to convey (implicitly or explicitly) it by appeal to other concepts (and their relations to each other)(like the concept of a cat): only by pure intuition do we grasp what it is, and it is an absolutely simple building block of all other concepts. I cannot perform an action that demonstrates the concept of being, nor explicate it in words (without circularly referencing it). I cannot add anything new to any analytical work on the ontology of Being; because it is absolutely simple.

Correct me if I am wrong, but I think what you are noting is that the fact that we cannot explicate (fully) a concept, it does not follow that it is (1) circular nor (2) primitive; and I actually agree with that. I just think that trying to explicate (sufficiently) a primitive concept demonstrates quite conclusively that it is really such—absolutely simple. Try to ask someone to define ‘being’, and, if they grasp what is being asked, they will appeal to it in its own definition.

Bob

Again, you are confusing language with concepts. The dictionary doesn't define concepts, it defines words (in a particular language). — Bob Ross

You are misunderstanding concepts as if they are some separate entity from language. Concepts, words, ideas and notions are part of language. Their meanings can only be understood fully in the use of language in some context.

Doesn't that suggest there is a cosmic time? — Bob Ross

I suppose one could be justified in claiming something like, “….There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy…”, while at the same time, the guy next to him could retort with, ehhhh, so what if there are.

Even if there is such a thing as cosmic time, isn’t that just another conception given from the same intelligence from which all others arise? Why should cosmic time that manifests in certain objective or empirical relations, negate the subjective intuitional form of time in general, which is the condition of every relation?

Gotta admit to the fascinating science, though, all things considered.

I'll contend that the notion of "concept" is an hypostatisation of word use. After all, if the concept gives the meaning of some word, and the meaning of a word is its use in a language, then the concept is pretty much just the way a word is used.

The problem I have is that concepts are more fundamental than language, and it is a mistake to reduce the former to the latter.

For example, we cannot properly express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english; but this is just a linguistic limitation. I can only say "a non-spatial entity would exist 'beyond' what is in space", but the concept of a non-spatial entity's relation to space as 'beyond' it is perfectly sensible albeit linguistically nonsensical.

Likewise, if you're position is true, then that which cannot be currently express with all (or perhaps a given) language cannot be a valid concept (since what we linguistically express, for you, is the concept); but this is clearly not true. There are languages which don't have any words which express things which other languages do. The concept of a triangle is still such even if we have no language capable of conveying it.

Conceptual analysis is surely restrained, to some extent, by language (as you are correct that we convey concepts with language) but they are not thereby themselves reducible to language. As we expand language, we are capable of explicating more concepts--and that is there relation to each other.

:up:

...there are many theories of logic; and to that I say that there is only one, — Bob Ross

But see this argument for logical nihilism:

To be a law of logic, a principle must hold in complete generality
No principle holds in complete generality
____________________
There are no laws of logic. — Gillian Russell

and

Logical laws are supposed to work in every case. Modus Tollens, non-contradiction, identity - these work in any and all cases. A logical nihilist will reject this...

...there are two ways to deal with this argument.

A logical monist will take the option of rejecting the conclusion, and also the second premise. For them the laws of logic hold with complete generality.

A logical pluralist will reject the conclusion and the first premise. For them laws of logic apply to discreet languages within logic, not to the whole of language. Classical logic, for example, is that part of language in which propositions have only two values, true or false. Other paraconsistent and paracomplete logics might be applied elsewhere.

A few counter-examples of logical principles that might be thought to apply everywhere.

Identity: ϑ ⊧ ϑ; but consider "this is the first time I have used this sentence in this paragraph, therefore this is the first time I have used this sentence in this paragraph"

And elimination: ϑ & ϒ ⊧ ϑ; But consider "ϑ is true only if it is part of a conjunction". — Banno

I'll go with logical pluralism. Logic itself depends on what one is doing. It's the grammatical structure we choose for the purpose at hand. It cannot therefore provide the "simple" you desire.

I am not seeing how the concept of ‘being’ is merely being ‘held constant’ for us to ‘move other things’ — Bob Ross

Then may I commend again Philosophical Investigations, §48? We choose what is to count as a simple in the diagram, be it colour, or shape, or letter, or position; and each can in turn be defined in terms of the other. Here Wittgenstein is undoing the enterprise of the Tractatus, which is very much the same enterprise you suggest in your other thread, constructing the world from logical atoms.

I hope you don't lump me in with Corvus, who's understanding of logic is... problematic.

For example, we cannot properly express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english; but this is just a linguistic limitation. I can only say "a non-spatial entity would exist 'beyond' what is in space", but the concept of a non-spatial entity's relation to space as 'beyond' it is perfectly sensible albeit linguistically nonsensical. — Bob Ross

It seems to me that you do here what you claim to be unable to do - to express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english.

The concept of a triangle is still such even if we have no language capable of conveying it. — Bob Ross

Which is to say nothing more than that there are triangles even if there are no folk around to talk about them - that is, to accept realism.

Conceptual analysis is surely restrained, to some extent, by language (as you are correct that we convey concepts with language) but they are not thereby themselves reducible to language — Bob Ross

Sure. Concepts can be shown, by our acts, as well as said. Indeed saying is just another act. The point being that concepts are not fundamental to mind, actions are. Concepts are just a way of explaining acts.

A child understands "3" by taking three lollies, by holding up three fingers, by taking one toy from four, and so on; not by having a something in her mind. Further, using the word "three" is tertiary to these other acts.

For example, we cannot properly express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english; but this is just a linguistic limitation. I can only say "a non-spatial entity would exist 'beyond' what is in space", but the concept of a non-spatial entity's relation to space as 'beyond' it is perfectly sensible albeit linguistically nonsensical. — Bob Ross

Yeah, it is better I am not clumped with Banno in a thread. From his comment, it is obvious Banno seems to be still in huff or under some sort of psychological trauma from my comments on his Logic in the past. All I said was I didn't agree with him.

Anyway I will make my point short. I can see your point in your last post. But let me say this to you to make the counterfactual point to your point. If you didn't explain your point on the non-spatial objects concepts as clearly as you did, in the grammatical form of standard language, I wouldn't have a clue what you were trying to mean.

A non-spatial entity that exists 'beyond' what is in space cannot be captured by human perception anyway. It can only be described and expressed in logically coherent statements. Concepts get formed via the descriptions using the language. It is a part of language. As you say, some languages don't have certain concepts, but it is not because language in general is unable to form the concepts. It is because no speakers of the language have not tried to form the concepts yet in the language.

To be a law of logic, a principle must hold in complete generality
No principle holds in complete generality
____________________
There are no laws of logic.

A “completely general” logical principle sounds like confused jargon for “absolute” logical principle; or it refers to a principle being general, which doesn’t lend support to the claim.

Principles in logic, as far I know, are absolute. When can you validly disregard the law of non-contradiction, for example?

I'll go with logical pluralism. Logic itself depends on what one is doing.

I don’t completely disagree with this: I am not denying that we may use different “logical theories” for different purposes; however, they are built off of classical logic.

The only classical logic axiom one may be able to get away with, is not using the law of excluded middle.

Ternary logic, for example, is just a built-up, more-complex version of binary logic. These logical theories are not separate from each other, but share at their core the fundamental (classical) logic.

We choose what is to count as a simple in the diagram, be it colour, or shape, or letter, or position; and each can in turn be defined in terms of the other.

So you think ‘being’ is a simple concept because you choose it to be?

If that is the case, then it should be easy for you to demonstrate this: choose something else (or multiple concepts) to be simple, and comprise ‘being’ from it.

I hope you don't lump me in with Corvus, who's understanding of logic is... problematic.

Lol, I thought you were both expressing the same thing; but, apparently, I missed something important.

It seems to me that you do here what you claim to be unable to do - to express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english.

I thought you were going to say that (; and thereby confuse the ungrammatical expression of the concept with the concept itself.

Which is to say nothing more than that there are triangles even if there are no folk around to talk about them - that is, to accept realism.

Which can’t be the case if the concept of a triangle is just the inter-subjectively agreed upon word ‘triangle’. There must be an underlying concept of a triangle at play here.

Sure. Concepts can be shown, by our acts, as well as said. Indeed saying is just another act. The point being that concepts are not fundamental to mind, actions are. Concepts are just a way of explaining acts.

A child understands "3" by taking three lollies, by holding up three fingers, by taking one toy from four, and so on; not by having a something in her mind. Further, using the word "three" is tertiary to these other acts.

:up:

You missed the point: my linguistic expression of 'beyond' space is incoherent. 'Beyond' refers to something in space.

You missed the point: my linguistic expression of 'beyond' space is incoherent. 'Beyond' refers to something in space. — Bob Ross

Your keep parroting "You missed the point." in most messages you write wouldn't help you on understanding.

"Beyond" can mean other things too depending on the context. For example, "It is beyond me." - it does't mean something in space.

If your reader didn't understand what you wrote, then it is likely that your writing was not grammatically correct or it was out of context.

I'll just point out there are some nice, accessible lectures on youtube from the philosopher Banno cites, Gillian Russell. Highly recommend taking a look!

But this seems like you are agreeing now with me that you cannot define being. — Bob Ross

Definition is a matter of linguistic practice, which is different from the actual contents of our mind. How much some definitions reflect contents of our mind is what makes a definition accurate or inaccurate. Perhaps we cannot accurately define being, as it is as basic or more than any other concept we have — I was thinking of making a thread on this topic —, but we can give a functional definition of it, which is what I presented.

Your keep parroting "You missed the point." in most messages you write wouldn't help you on understanding.

I have explained it multiple times, and am unsure what else to say. Concepts are not words.

"Beyond" can mean other things too depending on the context. For example, "It is beyond me." - it does't mean something in space.

“it is beyond me” refers to something which is spatially separate from yourself; so, no, this is not an example of a different meaning of ‘beyond’ that is aspatial.

If your reader didn't understand what you wrote, then it is likely that your writing was not grammatically correct or it was out of context.

I didn’t understand this part: what do you mean?

Thank you! I will take a look.

Notwithstanding my critique of your "functional" definition, I wholly agree with your description: :up:

@fdrake

I think I just figured out what we are seemingly in disagreement about, and that, upon clarification, we are not really in any disagreement at all.

My OP, I see now, is a bit ambiguous: I did not make any distinction between the meaning of a concept and its definition. I don't think that simple concepts are themselves circular and unknowable in meaning but, rather, what I was referring to by 'definable' is the explication of meaning.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you read the OP and thought that I was referring to 'meaning' by 'definition'; and therefrom arises the disagreement. Am I on the right track?

A “completely general” logical principle sounds like confused jargon for “absolute” logical principle; or it refers to a principle being general, which doesn’t lend support to the claim. — Bob Ross

Well, it's from Gillian Russell, so I'll take it as legit. But I went too quickly, and lost you. Russell's approach is to highlight cases where what are generally considered logical laws fail - I gave a few examples, more can be seen in the linked literature on Logical Nihilism. These cases serve to verify the second premise, that there are no general laws, and hence logical monism. We are left with deciding that there are no laws of logic, or that they do not apply with complete generality.

Hence, the laws of logic fashion discrete, related languages within logic.

When can you validly disregard the law of non-contradiction, for example? — Bob Ross

The Law of non-contradiction, ⊨ ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ), need not be true in a Klein logic, I believe. This would add a line to the truth table where if φ is neither T or F, so is ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ). Non-contradiction applies only to those logics which are biconditional, and hence not to all logics.

These logical theories are not separate from each other, but share at their core the fundamental (classical) logic. — Bob Ross

It does not follow that there are logical laws that apply in all cases. Indeed, one of the games played in doing logic is to see what happens when a supposed law is denied. Nothing need be held constant throughout the whole enterprise - just as no individual thread need run the whole length of a rope.

for — Bob Ross

If that is the case, then it should be easy for you to demonstrate this: choose something else (or multiple concepts) to be simple, and comprise ‘being’ from it. — Bob Ross

The trouble here is that "being" is not one thing, but a group of things. I tried to explain that by setting out the various logical parsings of "is".

Treating several notions as if they are one is a sure way to extend a discussion indefinitely.

Cheers.

...the concept of a triangle is just the inter-subjectively agreed upon word ‘triangle’. There must be an underlying concept of a triangle at play here. — Bob Ross

Note my bolding: not just.

Alpha, Beta and Gamma Triangulum form a triangle in the night sky. If one adopts a realist approach, that triangle will still be there when unobserved. Such an approach can be understood as supposing a binary logic - that the triangle is either there or it is not: "There is a triangle" is true, or it is false. An antirealist approach might be understood as adopting Klein Logic, such that "There is a triangle" is true when observed, and neither true nor false when unobserved.

On a realist account there are triangles even when folk are not around to see them.

What this shows is that "Triangle" is both a way of using words and a way of talking about how things are. And because "Triangle" is about how things are, "Triangle" goes on even when there are not folk to talk about it.

That's probably not as clear as I'd like it to be. That is, language games are not just about words, but about the stuff around us. That's what is "at play" here, not mental furniture.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you read the OP and thought that I was referring to 'meaning' by 'definition'; and therefrom arises the disagreement. Am I on the right track? — Bob Ross

I think that's on the right track. Thank you for the help.

My OP, I see now, is a bit ambiguous: I did not make any distinction between the meaning of a concept and its definition. I don't think that simple concepts are themselves circular and unknowable in meaning but, rather, what I was referring to by 'definable' is the explication of meaning. — Bob Ross

I believe I also think of explication differently. As in, someone might learn what "is" means - and thus gain an understanding of what it means to be - through standard use of the word, and I'd count that as an explication of "is" and an explication of what it means to be. Though neither of those explications is an attempt to be as exhaustive or wide ranging as offering a definition might be.

I suppose when I read "explication", from you, I was reading it like expression. As in, "the cat is on the mat" and "there is a cup on that table" are both expressions/explications of "is", even though both senses of "is" are different but related in both. If instead you meant explication as a type of speech act, like offering a definition, or illustrating use, I think I was going off kilter.

I would also disagree with the latter use of explication with regard to fundamental concepts, but for a different reason.

Thanks again! I appreciate the continued thought on the matter.

When can you validly disregard the law of non-contradiction, for example? — Bob Ross

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/ for example

But you can see its challenges in the very article, so maybe it is not "validly".

“it is beyond me” refers to something which is spatially separate from yourself; so, no, this is not an example of a different meaning of ‘beyond’ that is aspatial. — Bob Ross

From your post, it appears that you might not be a native speaker of English language actually. When you said "It is beyond me", it sounds like "It is behind me in space." literally, but it actually means, you are "unable to understand". "Beyond imagination" would mean "unable to imagine". It has nothing to do with physical space in this context.

"Beyond" would only indicate physical space, if you were talking about a placement of a physical object in your sentence.

See my point? Even a simple word, "beyond" has different meanings depending on the context, and how you use it.

You have to provide an argument yourself instead of lazily linking a long article: I am not going to take the time to debate a Dialetheist's perspective from stanford. I reject the view, is all I will say for now until you provide your own view on it.

That a word is spatially referent, DOES NOT mean that it refers to something in phenomenal or cosmic space. "Beyond" refers to a thing and another thing, the former of which is outside, at some distance, of the other.

When I say "imagine a red ball and another blue ball, and the blue ball is beyond the red ball by 3 meters north": "beyond" here is still spatially referent, even though neither the red nor blue ball exist.

"It is beyond me", "that is above my pay grade", "that went over my head", etc. are spatially referent idioms that mean that they didn't understand something: the idiom conveys it through spatial representation (e.g., "beyond", "above", "over", etc.). Without the concept of space, none of these idioms make any sense; so they are not separate senses of the words.

That is all fair. I can see concepts which are primitive (in the sense I mean it) being explicable in the sense of being capable of physical or gestural expression; I was referring to a grasping of the concept via verbalization or explicated thinking (if that makes sense). I don't think we are in disagreement afterall.