The Breadth of the Moral Sphere

Leontiskos

(This thread tends to go hand in hand with my post <here>)

Introduction

What is the breadth of the moral sphere? The common view is that some acts are moral, such as giving a starving man food or committing murder, and some acts are non-moral, such as taking one’s dog for a walk.¹ You should immediately notice that by “moral” I do not mean morally good; by “moral” I am not talking about the opposite of immoral. Instead, when I use the term “moral act” I am referring to an act that belongs to the species of moral-and-immoral-acts; or an act that belongs to the species of good-and-bad-acts. More simply, I am referring to an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny, evaluation, or judgment. A moral act is an act that can be legitimately (and, thus, morally) judged good or bad; a non-moral act is an act that cannot.

There are two theses that I am prepared to defend regarding the breadth of the moral sphere. Both of them will clash with modern language and intuitions, for I am convinced that modern thinking about the moral sphere is confused and perhaps even incoherent.

Thesis 1: All human acts are moral acts

For Aristotle, virtue and teleology permeate all aspects of life. For Aquinas, any act that flows from intention is a moral act.² In order to understand why all human acts are moral acts we must understand the difference between applying scrutiny to an act and applying moral scrutiny to an act, for above I noted that a moral act is an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny. Or in other words, we must attempt something that very few are willing to attempt: we must attempt to define the moral.

Before we do that, what is meant by a “human act”?

those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man.

[...]

moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as human acts. — Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, Q. 1, A. 1 & A. 3

A human act is any act that we do on purpose; any act that proceeds from a deliberate will. Objection 3 to the first article gives the complement of human acts, “But man does many things without deliberation, sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on something else.” In his reply to objection 3 Aquinas says, “Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the proper principle of human actions.”

So what does it mean for something to be moral?³ In keeping with the foregoing, I will define morality by reference to a definition of moral judgments. A moral judgment is_df a non-hypothetical ought-judgment. Strictly speaking, a moral act is an act that involves a moral judgment, but for the pedagogical purposes of this thread I am primarily thinking of a moral act as, “an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny, evaluation, or judgment” (see above). Admittedly, there is a difference between an act that involves a moral judgment and an act that is susceptible to moral judgment, especially on non-Aristotelian theories. This difference should be largely irrelevant, although I will tease out some of the implications as we go.⁴

For clarity:

A moral act is an act that involves a moral judgment, or an act that is susceptible to moral judgment.
A moral judgment is a non-hypothetical ought-judgment.

What then is a non-hypothetical ought-judgment? An ought-judgment is simply a judgment about what to do, past, present, or future. For instance, “He should have done that; she oughtn’t do this.” But what does it mean to say that some ought-judgment is non-hypothetical? It means:

He ought to do X ~~if he wants Y~~.
(including:)
He ought to do X because he wants Y.

A judgment that is non-hypothetical is not therefore a judgment that is necessarily non-instrumental. “He ought to do X because he wants Y,” is instrumental but it is not hypothetical, for it involves no hypo-thesis. A variant of this sort of judgment could be written, “He ought to do X because he ought to want (or attain) Y.” A non-hypothetical ought-judgment is a judgment in the simplest sense, a judgment “all things considered.” A hypothetical ought-judgment merely presents one consideration that is intended to influence the inevitable all-things-considered judgment which will eventually take place.

Let’s take an example:

You ought to fix your car. (non-hypothetical)
You ought to fix your car if you want to travel to work. (hypothetical)
You ought to fix your car because you need to travel to work. (non-hypothetical)

Let’s focus on the latter two examples in this set of three. These two judgments are not saying the same thing. The non-hypothetical judgment involves a secondary judgment that traveling to work is necessary, and the hypothetical judgment prescinds from this secondary judgment. Only non-hypothetical grounds can result in non-hypothetical conclusions. The statement, “You ought to fix your car if you want to travel to work,” is hypothetical because the antecedent of the conditional is not being asserted. Therefore it is not a judgment about “what to do” simpliciter (all things considered). Instead of saying, “This is what should be done,” it says, “This is something you should take into account when deciding what should be done.”

If you want to travel to work, then you should fix your car.
You want to travel to work.
Therefore, you should fix your car.

The non-hypothetical judgment includes (1), (2), and (3). The hypothetical judgment affirms (1) but not (2) or (3). Those who are paying attention may recognize that on this account moral acts are bound up with normative ends. Note that this is a logical analysis, not a linguistic analysis. Sometimes in everyday speech people will equivocate between, “He ought to do X if he wants Y,” and “He ought to do X because he wants Y.” Tone of voice, for example, often indicates whether the locution is hypothetical.

Note that a non-hypothetical judgment is not the same thing as a categorical imperative. We could say that all categorical imperatives are non-hypothetical judgments, but not all non-hypothetical judgments are categorical imperatives. For example, “You should fix your car,” is not a categorical claim because it only holds given certain circumstances.

Acts and regrets are non-hypothetical

Following in the footsteps of Philippa Foot, many are accustomed to claim that morality is merely a matter of hypothetical judgments, or that non-hypothetical judgments are rare.⁵ To give an indication of how gravely mistaken this opinion is, consider the fact that acts and regrets are all non-hypothetical. Each time we concretely choose and act we are making a non-hypothetical, all-things-considered judgment. As soon as I decide whether to fix my car all of the previously-hypothetical considerations become non-hypothetical, and this is a large part of what it means “to make a decision” or “to decide.” To make a decision is to gather up all the hypothetical considerations and render an all-things-considered judgment.

Similarly, when we regret some act we are also making a non-hypothetical judgment. To say that one regrets an act is to judge that they should not have carried out that act, and this sort of judgment is never hypothetical; it never means, “I should not have done that if…” Such a hypo-thesis would undermine the regret itself, placing it in limbo. Therefore the idea that one can get along in life with only hypothetical judgments is absurd.

What are examples of non-moral acts?

As noted above, the only non-moral acts are acts that do not flow from rational deliberation, such as absentmindedly stroking one’s beard. Or if the doctor hits your knee to check your reflexes and you kick him, you are not morally culpable because the kick did not flow from rational deliberation; it did not flow from you. The difference in these cases is that I am not choosing to act in any way. My body is doing something of its own accord, and these things do not count as moral acts. “Deliberation” is not for Aquinas something that must involve taking time in premeditation. The split-second braking to avoid a pedestrian is therefore a moral act, an act which flows from our humanness, our rational and intentional nature.

Thesis 2: All interpersonal acts are justice acts

All human acts are moral acts, and in a similar way, whenever we are engaged in interpersonal acts we are operating within the realm of justice, a subset of morality. Following the logic of the introduction, a justice act is an act that is susceptible to scrutiny, evaluation, or judgment according to criteria of justice. As before, a justice act is not a just act, but is instead an act that belongs to the species of just-and-unjust-acts.

Again, let us begin by defining the subject-term before moving to define justice. What is an interpersonal act? An interpersonal act is simply an act that has an effect on other people.⁶ What then is a justice act? A justice act is an act that can be legitimately judged good or bad insofar as it affects other people. More precisely, a justice act is an act that involves a moral judgment insofar as the act is interpersonal. Or, as above, an act that is susceptible to moral judgment insofar as the act is interpersonal.

Some interpersonal acts are commonly accepted to be acts which pertain to justice, such as murder, theft, and adultery. Yet for thesis 2 all interpersonal acts will be justice acts. For example, we are prone to say that if I get on a public bus and sit down in an open seat I have not acted justly or morally. We are prone to say that in this instance I acted in a way that is distinct from the realms of justice and morality. But this is incorrect, and it is incorrect because my act is interpersonal, and involves treating everyone else on the bus rightly. For instance, I did not sit down on the floor or on another passenger’s lap, I did not run up and down the aisle blaring loud music, I did not lie down and occupy four seats on a busy bus, etc. My interpersonal act was just because it respected the other people on the bus. Such behavior is of course commonplace and taken for granted, but this does not mean that the behavior is distinct from the realm of justice or morality. A well-oiled society is brimming over with unnoticed acts of justice.

Why speak about susceptibility to moral scrutiny or judgment?

Suppose someone has only one moral rule, “Do not do anything with your fingers crossed.” Now suppose they urinate. Is this a moral act? Well, apparently if their fingers were crossed when they urinated then they acted immorally. If their fingers were not crossed then they did not act immorally. The question then arises: is every act that is not immoral thereby moral? This is debatable, but it is not debatable that their act of urinating is susceptible to moral scrutiny, and this is because their fingers might have been crossed.

More precisely, the concept of susceptibility helps highlight the central moral notions of volition and negligence. The notion of negligence says that someone who absentmindedly forgets about their moral rule and urinates with their fingers crossed may be acting immorally via negligence. The argument would look something like this: “You acted immorally.” “But I forgot to apply my rule!” “You shouldn’t have forgotten. You are at fault for forgetting.” Most are willing to admit that negligence is at least sometimes immoral. The idea here is that if some moral rule is in principle applicable to a set of acts, then every act within that set is susceptible to moral scrutiny or judgment. Because one can be held responsible for omissions, sitting down on a bus seat can be morally praiseworthy and neglecting to apply a moral rule can be morally blameworthy. Morality is therefore not only about what someone does or considers. It is also about what they fail to do or fail to take into consideration.

For more on this topic, see Objection 4 below.

How to disagree with the OP

Thesis 1 and thesis 2 represent two categorical claims:

All human acts are moral acts
All interpersonal acts are justice acts

To disagree, one should argue for one of the following conclusions:

Some human acts are not moral acts
Some interpersonal acts are not justice acts

Given the nature of this topic it is important to try to give arguments when you object. See Objection 3 below for a very common objection.

Motivation for Thread

(The site guidelines encourage me to state my motivation)

There are different motivations for writing this thread, but one of the primary motivations is to address a common claim. The claim is something like, “You should behave in such-and-such a way, but this has nothing to do with morality.” Our culture is filled with non-hypothetical ought-claims that masquerade as non-moral claims, and this seems to be nothing more than a mendacious technique for controlling other people. But again, there are many other reasons. Confusion surrounding this topic seems to abound on the forum more than anything else.

Footnotes

For the sake of simplicity I will speak about acts, but the logic of this thread is not restricted to acts.
See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.vii and Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, Q. 18, A. 9. See also G.E.M Anscombe, ‘All human action is moral action. It is all either good or bad. (It may be both.) This needs a lot of clarification. First, let me point to an implication. It means that "moral" does not stand for an extra ingredient which some human actions have and some do not. The idea of the moral as an aspect that is to be seen in some human actions, or feIt by the agent, arid which may be lacking, perhaps is lacking if it is not feIt by the agent - this idea is rejected by the equation "Human action = moral action" ’ (Medalist's Address: Action, Intention and ‘Double Effect,’ 13).
This will be the most subtle, original, and controversial part of the argument.
Note that this OP makes no distinction between first person moral judgments and second person moral judgments. That is, no distinction is made between judging what I should do, and judging what someone else to do, for both of these judgments are fundamentally the same.
Philippa Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives.”
Or more generally, an interpersonal act is an act that has an effect on other moral patients.

Leontiskos

Objection 1: “Morality is nothing more than justice”

There is a position which says that all interpersonal acts are justice acts, and morality pertains to interpersonal acts rather than to the entirety of human acts. More succinctly: acts that are not justice acts are not moral acts. I have no qualms with this position, at least for the purposes of this thread. It strikes me as a reasonable position, especially given our liberal intuitions.

Objection 2: The Moral Spectrum

A popular view would hold that acts exist on a moral spectrum, such as the following:

| Heroically virtuous | Mildly good | Neutral | Mildly bad | Heinous |

According to this objection the “neutral” acts are not moral acts.

I would respond by pointing to an analogous spectrum, the spectrum of color between light and dark. Although there is a sense in which we might point to a color in the middle of this spectrum and say that it is neither light nor dark, this is not a philosophically rigorous claim. All of the colors on the spectrum belong to the species of light-and-dark-colors, even the ones in the middle that are relatively indistinct. Drawing out their color will require greater scrutiny, but lightness and darkness are not entirely absent from them. The same holds for the moral spectrum. I grant that there are acts which are only mildly moral or immoral, but not that the spectrum admits of perfectly neutral acts.

Objection 3: “But we don’t use the word ‘moral’ that way”

I have received this objection often. This is what inevitably happens:

Objector: No one says that walking the dog is a moral act!
Leontiskos: My contention is that your understanding of the extension of moral acts is incoherent. Are you willing to try to provide a coherent definition of morality?
Objector: No, I am not willing to do that.

With apologies to those who have taken the “linguistic turn,” lexicography is not philosophy, even if it plays an important role in philosophy. In philosophy one is not allowed to object with terms that they are unwilling or unable to define. It seems to me that the reason no one has taken up my challenge is because they know that their conception of morality is incoherent.

↪Michael

even went so far as to admit that his metaethics is incoherent. In my addendum I provide the thread that, when pulled on, will unravel the source of the confused intuitions that underlie our modern language about morality.

Recall also Socrates’ challenge to stop producing random examples and instead provide an actual account or definition of morality. The challenge is to provide an alternative account of morality that is not incoherent. The method will end up being abductive. The colloquial understanding of morality is comfortable to us, but given its incoherence we will have to look for something else. Where else shall we look?

Objection 4: “Sitting down on the bus involves no intention vis-à-vis other people”

“When someone sits down on a bus they are usually not intending to render justice unto other people, and therefore their act is neither a just act nor a justice act.”

Note that this is parallel to the “finger crossing” example above, for the same question arises in mundane cases where fingers are not being crossed. Implicit volition tends to be a difficult topic for the modern mind given our consensual framework. First we should notice that someone who is playing loud music on the bus is also usually not intending to act unjustly towards the other passengers, but their act is nevertheless unjust.

The reason we can act well or poorly even without trying to act well or poorly is because we are creatures of habit (and Aristotle calls these habits virtues and vices). Yet we have control over our habits because habits flow from acts and we have control of our acts. Habits are what allow us to act in a determinate manner even when we are not giving explicit attention to that habitual aspect of action. Therefore we are expected to act in certain ways even without always explicitly thinking about those ways of acting, and this makes sense in light of habits (habitus).

Objection 5: Morality correlates to importance

Moral acts are important acts
Not all human acts are important acts
Therefore, not all human acts are moral acts

This is similar to Objection 2. I would respond by saying that everything someone does is something they consider worthwhile or worth doing. The simple fact that time is scarce leads us to try to use our time wisely and do things that are worthwhile.

On the other hand, not everything is equally worthwhile, and someone might use the idea of morality to denote those things or rules that are worth taking especially seriously. This is fine so long as we do not forget that there is no qualitative difference between more important things and less important things, for all things that are worth doing have a minimum level of importance.

Addendum

I drafted this thread within a few weeks of joining TPF, almost a year ago. Confusion regarding the extension of the moral sphere strikes me as one of the most widespread errors on this website. The reason I did not post the thread earlier is because the topic has a tendency to keep sprouting new arms and legs. Let me gesture towards a few of those arms and legs even at the risk of derailing my own thread.

In one way it is true that the set of acts that are susceptible to moral scrutiny is coextensive with the set of moral acts, but in another way it is false. Consider Immanuel Kant and his Categorical Imperative. For Kant every act must take heed not to violate the Categorical Imperative, and therefore all acts are susceptible to moral scrutiny. Even practically we can see that it is common for someone to mistakenly believe that they have not violated Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Nevertheless, for Kant the morally praiseworthy act must do more than fail to violate the Categorical Imperative; it must in some sense flow out of respect for the Categorical Imperative itself. So for Kant taking the dog for a walk is in principle susceptible to moral scrutiny and yet it is not a moral act. For Kant only one part of life is moral, and morality does not extend to all of life in the way that it does for Aristotle or Aquinas. This is because Kant is—despite himself—fashioning a solution to a problem occasioned by Hobbesian cultural intuitions.* Those Hobbesian intuitions present the problem of achieving peaceful coexistence between autonomous individuals, and because this problem affects only one part of life, so too does Kant’s solution. In approximately the same way that Libertarians view the limited role of government, so too does Kant view the limited role of morality.

Not so for those coming from the tradition of Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas. Kant addresses the end of peaceful coexistence, and peaceful coexistence is not the whole of life; therefore the morality of Kant does not directly affect the whole of life. But for Aristotle and Aquinas the end is individual and communal happiness, not merely peaceful coexistence. Because they see happiness as the ultimate end of all of human life, the normative science of happiness will be coextensive with all of human life. All human acts are moral acts, because all human acts involve non-hypothetical ought-judgments ordered to happiness. The scope of one’s non-hypothetical ought-judgments will extend as far as one’s normative end(s) extend(s). The breadth of one’s moral sphere will depend on what they conceive of as the end of their life and perhaps of all human life. Still, it seems to me that Aristotle conceived of this end and its scope rightly.

* See especially "Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble," by Peter L. P. Simpson

Leontiskos

-Reserved for future use-

Bob Ross

↪Leontiskos

I commend you for the thoughtfulness which is exemplified in your OP, as it is well-written, succinct, and substantive. By-at-large, I agree with your assessments and agree with your two theses; and I also share in the suspicion that separating human acts into amoral vs. moral categories either (1) is confused (at best) or (2) downright manipulative (at worst). The classical example, in my mind, is the common idea in modern society that 'morality' is personal, and that one should not mix their morals with what they vote into law: it is all a load of nonsense that, at worst, is deployed as a moral deception to silence moral views.

There only two areas that I would disagree with you, and that is (1) the credence that you give to the idea that "morality is nothing more than justice" (which also implies, to me, that you are giving credence to the idea that ~"morality is nothing more than the study of good vs. bad human acts") and (2) what you qualify as within moral scrutiny.

With respect to #1, Morality is the study of intrinsic goodness and what is intrinsically good: both components are necessary to capture what ethics is about. If one simply analyzes what can be predicated as good, then they miss the important metaethical step of analyzing what the property of goodness even is; and if they only analyze the property (and things which relate thereto, such judgments), then they completely miss what actually can be said to be good.

This definition, that I have given here, of morality is broader than just acts (let alone deliberate human acts). Firstly, it includes metaethical questions that don't solely relate to actions---e.g., the nature of moral properties, judgments, etc. I don't think metaethics as a whole fits well into an ethical theory that defines ethics as solely about actions. Secondly, an analysis of what can be predicated as good, does not solely pertain to actions: it pertains to essences, effects, and intentions.

Before explaining that further, I must segue quickly into #2: an action is the synthesis, at least, of an intention, an effect, and an essence. One can validly scrutinize an effect independently of the intention of an action; and this is missing from your kind of viewpoint. I can say that a person is not morally culpable for a consequence of their action while simultaneously recognizing that the consequence (i.e., the effect) is immoral (i.e., morally bad). To take your "kicking the doctor" example, just because I am not morally culpable for kicking the doctor (because it was not deliberate) does not take away from the fact that we can moral scrutinize the effect, which in this case is wrong. We can say that kicking people is generally wrong, for example, because it produces consequences which violate our morals (whatever they may be); and so the act of kicking the doctor was still wrong, although we wouldn't hold the person, in this case, responsible for it. Moreover, an action can be analyzed not solely in terms of the intention (behind it) nor its effects, but, rather, its nature. The intention to rape someone is immoral, because the nature of rape is immoral; and the nature of rape is immoral not because of its particular effects in any given instance but, rather, because the very essence of the act is morally bad.

Likewise, sometimes we understand that the intention behind an act was good, but the effect was bad; and this demonstrates that both deliberate and accidental effects are within the sphere of moral discourse. A great example is the one you gave: negligence. I think that if you really hold that only deliberate, human acts are within moral scrutiny, then human negligence cannot be within the sphere of moral scrutiny. Your position, being that you hold sometimes negligence is wrong (and thusly within the sphere of moral scrutiny), seems internally incoherent on this point. I think that negligence (1) is within moral discourse (even if the instance of it does not contain any culpability on the person) and (2) some instances do legitimately contain culpability on the person; but this can only be so if not just deliberate acts are within the sphere of moral scrutiny.

Ok, back to #1. Actions which are not deliberate, can still be analyzed, to some extent, in terms of their effects and essences, being that it is a synthesis of intention and effect. For example, other species cannot, for the most part, be meaningfully considered deliberately acting (like humans) so we don't really consider their intentions within moral scrutiny, but we do still analyze the effects and natures of the acts that they perform. If morality is just about justice or, more generally, human acts, then we lose this valid aspect of the study.

Likewise, analyzing essences does not pertain solely to acts; for example, is the essence of a human (morally) good or bad? This is not something we merely look at the actions of humans to determine: we analyze their whole nature.

Bob

Leontiskos

I commend you for the thoughtfulness which is exemplified in your OP, as it is well-written, succinct, and substantive. — Bob Ross

Thank you, although it turned out to be less succinct than I had hoped. :lol:

I also appreciate your thoughtful reply. :up:

The classical example, in my mind, is the common idea in modern society that 'morality' is personal, and that one should not mix their morals with what they vote into law: it is all a load of nonsense that, at worst, is deployed as a moral deception to silence moral views. — Bob Ross

Yes, good point. I hadn't thought of that one.

Let me begin by focusing on the part of your post that deals with volition and "susceptibility," for volition is a complicated moral topic. The OP only skims the surface of volition, and I saw this as unfortunate but necessary.

...but [negligence can only be moral] if not just deliberate acts are within the sphere of moral scrutiny. — Bob Ross

There are actually two objections here. The first is that negligence involves an omission, not an act. I grant this, and I said, "Morality is therefore not only about what someone does or considers. It is also about what they fail to do or fail to take into consideration."

The second objection says that culpable negligence is not deliberate. This is where things get especially complicated in the realm of volition (and Book III of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is a standard text for a study of volition). First we should note that ignorance is capable of excusing, particularly in the case of what we now call "invincible ignorance." If someone neglects to do something with invincible ignorance, then they are not culpable for their "negligence" because their omission is not in any way deliberate. More precisely, they are not culpable because their omission is in no way traceable to their will. For example, suppose I am driving 55 mph on an unmarked road. A police officer pulls me over and tickets me for driving 55 when the speed limit is 45. I tell him that I did not know the speed limit was 45 mph because there are no speed limit signs. Did I neglect to drive the speed limit?

There only two areas that I would disagree with you, and that is (1) the credence that you give to the idea that "morality is nothing more than justice" — Bob Ross

To clarify, I don't agree that morality is nothing more than justice, but I declined to disagree with Objection 1 because the form of moral realism which reduces morality to justice is not really what my OP is concerned with. Beyond that, this dispute can end up being merely terminological, for there is a legitimate use of the word "moral" in terms of justice.

morality is broader than just acts — Bob Ross

I agree, and in footnote 1 I stated, "For the sake of simplicity I will speak about acts, but the logic of this thread is not restricted to acts."

With respect to #1, Morality is the study of intrinsic goodness and what is intrinsically good: both components are necessary to capture what ethics is about. — Bob Ross

I agree that morality involves a study of goodness, but in the OP I am focusing on the question of the breadth of the moral sphere. The idea is that we determine how far the moral sphere extends by comparing the set of all acts to the set of moral acts. My contention is that all human acts are moral acts, not merely some subset of them. I am not here directly interested in the question of what the science of ethics studies, except insofar as this overlaps with concrete things in human life that can be called moral.

Now, I did add Objection 5, and perhaps this is what you are concerned with? I want to say that ideas of goodness, normativity, and weighting are all implicit in the idea of ought-judgments, and I assume this will be teased out as the thread goes on.

an action is the synthesis, at least, of an intention, an effect, and an essence — Bob Ross

So the OP leaves some things unsaid, for I was not trying to write a textbook on ethics. :wink: I too think acts are a "synthesis," and in an early draft I laid out Aquinas' theory, but I removed that when I realized that it detracted from the focus of the OP and made it too long.

For an entry point into some of what you say, let's consider this part of your post:

We can say that kicking people is generally wrong, for example, because it produces consequences which violate our morals (whatever they may be); and so the act of kicking the doctor was still wrong, although we wouldn't hold the person, in this case, responsible for it. — Bob Ross

How would Aquinas respond to this?

K1: If something is not a human act, then it is not a moral act
K2: Only moral acts are moral or immoral, right or wrong
K3: Therefore, if something is not a human act, then it is not moral or immoral, right or wrong
K4: A reflex-kick at the doctor's office is not a human act
K5: Therefore, a reflex-kick at the doctor's office is not moral or immoral, right or wrong

Why is a reflex-kick at the doctor's office not a human act? Because it is not something that the person did. Similarly, if you are sleeping with your dog at your feet, and I take your foot and slam it into the dog, have you performed a human act? Have you kicked the dog? Do we say, "Well, kicking dogs is wrong, but in this case we won't hold you responsible for it"? Of course not. You didn't kick the dog.

Ok, back to #1. Actions which are not deliberate, can still be analyzed, to some extent, in terms of their effects and essences, being that it is a synthesis of intention and effect. For example, other species cannot, for the most part, be meaningfully considered deliberately acting (like humans) so we don't really consider their intentions within moral scrutiny, but we do still analyze the effects and natures of the acts that they perform. If morality is just about justice or, more generally, human acts, then we lose this valid aspect of the study. — Bob Ross

If the acts of species which cannot "be meaningfully considered deliberately acting" are not "within moral scrutiny," then "the effects and natures of the acts that they perform" are not a subject of moral study. For example, when we study the effects of earthworms we are not engaged in ethics.

The effects of human acts are moral insofar as they touch on volition. Suppose the lake is perfectly still and you decide to hit a golf ball into the water. You tee off, and just before your ball hits the water a diver pops out his head, gets hit, and drowns. In court they will determine your responsibility by deciding how this effect of your action relates to your will. "Did he do it on purpose?" "Did he know there was a diver there?" "Was he being reckless?" "Is he aware that divers are commonly found in this lake?" If they find that you are "invincibly ignorant" then the effect of your action will not be attributed to you and you will not be punished.

wonderer1

A human act is any act that we do on purpose; any act that proceeds from a deliberate will. Objection 3 to the first article gives the complement of human acts, “But man does many things without deliberation, sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on something else.” In his reply to objection 3 Aquinas says, “Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the proper principle of human actions.” — Leontiskos

Perhaps creating a dichotomy between acts which are and are not human (when considering the behavior of humans) is a miss when it comes to carving reality at the joints?

Bob Ross

↪Leontiskos

I said, "Morality is therefore not only about what someone does or considers. It is also about what they fail to do or fail to take into consideration."
…
If someone neglects to do something with invincible ignorance, then they are not culpable for their "negligence" because their omission is not in any way deliberate.

Fair enough. I think your idea of “invincible negligence” clarified quite a bit of my contentions; and I am inclined to agree with you.

I agree that morality involves a study of goodness, but in the OP I am focusing on the question of the breadth of the moral sphere. The idea is that we determine how far the moral sphere extends by comparing the set of all acts to the set of moral acts.

I think I understand what you are going for, but it doesn’t seem correct to depict it as about “the breadth of the moral sphere”: that would imply that you are discussing and analyzing what can be constituted as ‘moral’ whatsoever, and not about particularly what set of [human] acts can be constituted as ‘moral’ (which is what I believe you are trying to discuss).

As long as it is acknowledged that the breadth of the moral sphere is not limited to acts; then I am content.

Now, I did add Objection 5, and perhaps this is what you are concerned with?

I don’t buy objection 5, because it conflates “importance” with a high degree thereof. All human acts can be said, to some degree, to be important.

• K1: If something is not a human act, then it is not a moral act
• K2: Only moral acts are moral or immoral, right or wrong
• K3: Therefore, if something is not a human act, then it is not moral or immoral, right or wrong
• K4: A reflex-kick at the doctor's office is not a human act
• K5: Therefore, a reflex-kick at the doctor's office is not moral or immoral, right or wrong

I see what Aquinas means here, although I must admit I am not well-versed in Thomism (so I can’t substantively discuss about it), and partially agree. It seems likely moral discourse is being conflated with discourse about culpability (although perhaps I am reading too much in between the lines): for example, I think it is perfectly valid to analyze whether or not a tornado is inherently immoral or not, and I see that, although a reflex-kick would not render a person culpable, a reflex-kick that is to the detriment of an innocent person is still wrong—it seems like, and correct me if I am wrong, Acquinas is trying to limit the sphere of moral discourse to just "human acts".

If all that is being conveyed here is that only acts which a person performs that is deliberate, or traced back to some deliberation prior, can be validly called a ‘human act’ in the sense of an act that would bind the person with responsibility for it, then I agree.

The effects of human acts are moral insofar as they touch on volition

This is the conflation I am talking about (between moral discourse and discourse about culpability): morality is not just the study of culpability and responsibility. We can say, just like when analyzing a tornado, that a foot + leg kicking another (innocent) person is bad, without conceding that the person that performed the action is culpable for it; which is an eliminated possibility if I take the above quote seriously. A tornado is inherently (morally) bad, but we wouldn't say it is culpable for its effects (or 'actions' in a loose sense of the word).

Bob

180 Proof

I am a moral ~~realist~~[naturalist] who disagrees with both theses — Leontiskos

:up:

Thesis 1 and thesis 2 represent two categorical claims:

All human acts are moral acts
All interpersonal acts are justice acts

I don't think these statements make sense or are useful (re: if "all" x = y, then ~x = y).

What is the breadth of the moral sphere?

In the metaethical framework of moral naturalism, I think "the moral sphere" consists of natural creatures (i.e. any sentient species) which can suffer from – fears of – arbitrary harm (or injustice), especially, though not exclusively, moral agents which are also moral patients.

Anyway, my objections:

Some human acts are not moral acts

In the normative framework of negative utilitarianism, I think only judgments/conduct which (actively or passively) (a) prevents or reduces harm or (b) inflicts or increases harm are moral; however, those activities which are neither (a) nor (b) are non-moral (e.g. phatic, instrumental, involuntary) so that most "human acts", in fact, are non-moral.

Some interpersonal acts are not justice acts

In the applied framework of negative consequentialism, I do not think "interpersonal acts are justice acts" because "justice" pertains to impacts on individuals by institutional or group practices (i.e. policies) and not "interpersonal" – what happens between individuals.

Count Timothy von Icarus

This is a good thread. I will just point out a few things.

First, an additional argument that might help out with these claims can be found in the part of the Summa Contra Gentiles in the section On The Human Good. There, St. Thomas points out that we must have some ends in order to explain action. If we have no ends, then we will not have any reason to act one way rather than another, nor any reason not to simply be passive. When people say acts have no moral valence, what they often imply if that they are done for no particular ends.

Not all ends are concious. We do not generally breathe because we have the end of staying conscious and comfortable in mind, but we can clearly infer this is the end of the activity.

His argument to a final end is perhaps a bit more shakey, but it is worth pointing out. If there is no final end, then it seems motion requires an infinite regress of ends. (It is too long here to really lay out in detail, IIRC this discussion is from chapter 25-30 to somewhere in the early 40s).

This of course conflicts with how teleology is generally seen today, e.g., in terms of constraints in physics and function in biology. But I think drawing a parallel is probably still possible.

Second:

A popular view would hold that acts exist on a moral spectrum, such as the following:

| Heroically virtuous | Mildly good | Neutral | Mildly bad | Heinous |

According to this objection the “neutral” acts are not moral acts.

There are a number of places where Plato talks about normative measure, most notably in the Statesman. In Plato's Statesman: A Philosophical Discussion, Michelle Barney has a really good article on this. The rub is that people, including Socrates in the earlier dialogues (particularly the Protagoras) often want to put normative measure on a scale of reference where there are clear rankings of "greater than" and "less then," akin to the number line or the ranking above.

The point Plato pulls out is that normative measure often doesn't work this way. In particular, he does this with a clever bit of self-reference by having the Eleatic Stranger ask if his speech on weaving has been "too long."

Well, how do we know when a speech, movie, play, etc. has been "too long?" It really depends on what the end of the speech, etc. is. Certainly, a speech can be too long, but it's not the sort of thing we can determine on a scale like a number line. Some speeches can be very long and still be "too short," depending on their topic.

But in the modern view, we seem to want to reduce everything to quantitative measure that can be placed on a scale like the number line, where we can point to "more is better," or "variance from this point is worse." It's clear that this isn't always the case in normative measure. Plato makes a similar point in the Phaedrus when he has Socrates discuss what would happen if he claimed to be a doctor because he had all sorts of medicines, but then has no clue "how much" he should give to a person.

Normative measure is filtered through practices, which are socially established, even if they relate to non-social phenomena. MacIntyre has a good section on how practices are established and how they define "internal goods," in After Virtue. For an example, being "a good chess player," is established by a social practice, although it is fairly objective. Someone who cheats to win chess pursues a good external to the practice, since you cannot "play a good game of chess," while cheating.

The point here is that I think part of what trips people up in ethics is the way in which the good is often filtered through practices that help us define our ends. These practices are socially constructed, but they are not arbitrary. They relate to "how the world is," prior to any practice existing and evolve according to things other than social practice. However, it seems impossible to reduce them to things outside social practices, and the human good is certainly quite bound up in practices and normative measure.

Practices relate to internal and external goods, and are situated within the pursuit of the higher human good. Without a "human good," it is impossible to explain how practices evolve. Practices make determining goodness difficult if we don't take account of them because they will seem arbitrary if we look at them in isolation, without their relevance to the human good. And they give us trouble because they are not easy to quantize into a model like the number line.

Hume famously denies this sort of good exists. However, I think he essentially just begs the question here. It isn't trivial question begging because he shows what follows from an attempt to reduce everything to the mathematical physics of his day, but it still assumes that oughts aren't observable in the way facts are. Obviously, for Aristotle, the human good is observable, and there are fact statements about (which entail ought statements.) This interacts with normative measure in an indirect way, in that Hume's view seems to end up denying normative measure if it isn't careful, even though it obviously exists. No one goes out to buy a car or house without any idea of what would make them
good in mind.

In the thread I had on bugs in computer games, instances where "canonical rules are 'wrong,'" the issue seems partly to lie in violations of multiple interelated levels of normative measure (e.g. what makes for coherent rules, what makes for a good game, etc.), as well as a violation of the human good (reducing pleasure and introducing frustration). When people have a hard time seeing how this relates to "goodness" overall, I'd argue that part of the problem is following the thread through multiple interlocking levels of practice, each with their own standards of normative good which are based on, but not reducible to, the human good.

Leontiskos

It seems likely moral discourse is being conflated with discourse about culpability (although perhaps I am reading too much in between the lines): for example, I think it is perfectly valid to analyze whether or not a tornado is inherently immoral or not, and I see that, although a reflex-kick would not render a person culpable, a reflex-kick that is to the detriment of an innocent person is still wrong — Bob Ross

I would follow Aquinas in saying that morality and culpability go hand in hand, but whereas all discourse about culpability is also moral discourse, not all discourse about morality is necessarily about culpability. Culpability talk is only one kind of moral talk.

So the claim is that if culpability does not, even in principle, pertain to tornadoes or reflex-kicks, then these are not moral realities. If it is impossible to ever hold X responsible or culpable, then X is not a moral agent. Because of this "wrong" cannot be applied to tornadoes, for "wrong" is a moral predicate.

it seems like, and correct me if I am wrong, Acquinas is trying to limit the sphere of moral discourse to just "human acts". — Bob Ross

Basically, yes. More precisely, Aquinas would say that anything that is capable of deliberate action is a moral agent.

If all that is being conveyed here is that only acts which a person performs that is deliberate, or traced back to some deliberation prior, can be validly called a ‘human act’ in the sense of an act that would bind the person with responsibility for it, then I agree. — Bob Ross

That's basically it, but don't you think this also accounts for why a tornado is not a moral agent?

This is the conflation I am talking about (between moral discourse and discourse about culpability): morality is not just the study of culpability and responsibility. We can say, just like when analyzing a tornado, that a foot + leg kicking another (innocent) person is bad, without conceding that the person that performed the action is culpable for it; which is an eliminated possibility if I take the above quote seriously. A tornado is inherently (morally) bad, but we wouldn't say it is culpable for its effects (or 'actions' in a loose sense of the word). — Bob Ross

In moral philosophy a tornado is a natural evil, not a moral evil. Not all evil (i.e. bad things that happen) is moral.

Fair enough. I think your idea of “invincible negligence” clarified quite a bit of my contentions; and I am inclined to agree with you. — Bob Ross

Okay, good.

I think I understand what you are going for, but it doesn’t seem correct to depict it as about “the breadth of the moral sphere”: that would imply that you are discussing and analyzing what can be constituted as ‘moral’ whatsoever, and not about particularly what set of [human] acts can be constituted as ‘moral’ (which is what I believe you are trying to discuss).

As long as it is acknowledged that the breadth of the moral sphere is not limited to acts; then I am content. — Bob Ross

When I say that moral realities are not limited to acts, I am thinking about things like habits, intentions, societies, etc. I am not thinking about tornadoes. I hold the uncontroversial view that tornadoes are not moral realities.

Leontiskos

In the metaethical framework of moral naturalism, I think "the moral sphere" consists of natural creatures (i.e. any sentient species) which can suffer from – fears of – arbitrary harm (or injustice), especially, though not exclusively, moral agents which are also moral patients. — 180 Proof

Okay great, this is useful. :up:

I don't think these statements make sense or are useful (re: if "all" x = y, then ~x = y). — 180 Proof

I don’t follow your objection.

In the normative framework of negative utilitarianism, I think only judgments/conduct which (actively or passively) (a) prevents or reduces harm or (b) inflicts or increases harm are moral; however, those activities which are neither (a) nor (b) are non-moral (e.g. phatic, instrumental, involuntary) so that most "human acts", in fact, are non-moral. — 180 Proof

Okay, that makes sense. I think this succeeds as a coherent alternative. I think traditional utilitarianism would favor the broader scope that I outlined, but your negative version is clearly different.

In the applied framework of negative consequentialism, I do not think "interpersonal acts are justice acts" because "justice" pertains to impacts on individuals by institutional or group practices (i.e. policies) and not "interpersonal" – what happens between individuals. — 180 Proof

First, it seems to me that the impact of a group on an individual is interpersonal given that the group is composed of individual persons. In no way do I mean to exclude this sort of interaction as impersonal.

Second, this is the first time I have heard anyone define justice in a way that excludes interactions between individuals. Usually we would say, for example, that stealing an old lady’s purse or murdering a spouse is an unjust act.

tim wood

Cannot all of this be said more simply? It seems to me that whatever anything is, it is by reference to other things, whatever they may be. Thus whatever morality is, it is, ultimately, by agreement. Can agreement be compelled? Again, by what criteria?

The conclusion, inescapable, is that there is no such thing as morality-in-itself-as-it-is-in-itself. Is morality still a meaningful notion? Of course it is, but to be found not, so to speak, in nature, but in the kinds of agreements that constitute it, ground it, and underlie it. So I agree with this:

A moral act is an act that involves a moral judgment, or an act that is susceptible to moral judgment. — Leontiskos

And in flavors of all kinds, sweet, to sour, to bitter. What flavors? For primitives probably the example of nature. Socrates, truth. For Plato, finding nature imperfect, the prefect forms. Aristotle, the telos. Christians, God. Kant, the logic of the thing. Mill, utility. And so forth, with many variations on these themes and more.

Finally, that leaves my-morals and your-morals, where they conflict, and how those conflicts are resolved. Resolutions being variously appeals to emotion, logic, and ad baculum.

These, it seems to me, the facts of the matter. The virtues of which resolved in moral discussion.

Leontiskos

Cannot all of this be said more simply? It seems to me that whatever anything is, it is by reference to other things, whatever they may be. Thus whatever morality is, it is, ultimately, by agreement. — tim wood

Well, one could of course argue that morality is defined in terms of agreement…

What flavors? For primitives probably the example of nature. Socrates, truth. For Plato, finding nature imperfect, the prefect forms. Aristotle, the telos. Christians, God. Kant, the logic of the thing. Mill, utility. — tim wood

...But given that none of the classic examples you provide would seem to accept your idea that morality is grounded in agreement (or consensus, or contracts), it would seem to follow that the claim that morality is a kind of agreement has no prima facie force or intuitive appeal. If this is right then one would truly need to argue that morality is a kind of agreement. Unless perhaps you meant "agreement" in some other way?

Fooloso4

Moral bivalence is immoral. It is antithetical to the dialectic of moral deliberation.

Leontiskos

This is a good thread. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks!

First, an additional argument that might help out with these claims can be found in the part of the Summa Contra Gentiles in the section On The Human Good. There, St. Thomas points out that we must have some ends in order to explain action. If we have no ends, then we will not have any reason to act one way rather than another, nor any reason not to simply be passive. When people say acts have no moral valence, what they often imply if that they are done for no particular ends. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, this is a good point. Aquinas says that agents act for ends, and so the debate could take the form of asking whether every human act is for an end.

I think we need to understand the difference for Aquinas between a moral end and a natural end. Aristotelians hold that there are teleological principles in all of nature, but not that this teleology is necessarily mental or intentional. Yet for humans, we act for ends intentionally, through the power of our will. See especially ST I-II.12.5.

But in the modern view, we seem to want to reduce everything to quantitative measure that can be placed on a scale like the number line, where we can point to "more is better," or "variance from this point is worse." It's clear that this isn't always the case in normative measure. Plato makes a similar point in the Phaedrus when he has Socrates discuss what would happen if he claimed to be a doctor because he had all sorts of medicines, but then has no clue "how much" he should give to a person. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and Aristotle gets at a related idea when he talks about virtue:

...but to be thus affected at the right times, and on the right occasions, and towards the right persons, and with the right object, and in the right fashion, is the mean course and the best course, and these are characteristics of virtue. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.vi

A similar idea holds with Aristotle's mean which is not merely quantitative and varies depending on circumstances. I think this idea that right action requires more than one reference point is often lost in modern culture. "Monomaniacal."

The point here is that I think part of what trips people up in ethics is the way in which the good is often filtered through practices that help us define our ends. These practices are socially constructed, but they are not arbitrary. They relate to "how the world is," prior to any practice existing and evolve according to things other than social practice. However, it seems impossible to reduce them to things outside social practices, and the human good is certainly quite bound up in practices and normative measure. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, but given that a "social construct" is often used to refer to something that has no underlying basis, I am wary of calling such practices "socially constructed." I agree that they are partly socially constructed. A classic example is the indeterminacy of certain aspects of positive law, such as which side of the road to drive on. In the U.S. we drive on the right side of the road and in the U.K. they drive on the left side of the road, but it does not follow that such determinations are entirely socially constructed. (It is interesting to debate which model was safer for a society that uses manual transmission cars.)

Practices relate to internal and external goods, and are situated within the pursuit of the higher human good. Without a "human good," it is impossible to explain how practices evolve. Practices make determining goodness difficult if we don't take account of them because they will seem arbitrary if we look at them in isolation, without their relevance to the human good. And they give us trouble because they are not easy to quantize into a model like the number line. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and I think liberalism has made it hard for us to see the higher good shining through our practices.

Hume famously denies this sort of good exists. However, I think he essentially just begs the question here. It isn't trivial question begging because he shows what follows from an attempt to reduce everything to the mathematical physics of his day, but it still assumes that oughts aren't observable in the way facts are. Obviously, for Aristotle, the human good is observable, and there are fact statements about (which entail ought statements.) This interacts with normative measure in an indirect way, in that Hume's view seems to end up denying normative measure if it isn't careful, even though it obviously exists. No one goes out to buy a car or house without any idea of what would make them good in mind. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, good.

Bob Ross

↪Leontiskos

Culpability talk is only one kind of moral talk.

So the claim is that if culpability does not, even in principle, pertain to tornadoes or reflex-kicks, then these are not moral realities.

How is this not incoherent? You first say there exists a moral talk that is not culpability talk, and then say that all moral realities are culpability realities. Unless ‘reality’, as opposed to ‘talk’, is doing some heavy-lifting here that I am not following, this is incoherent.

I think what you are trying to note, which I agree with, is merely that only actions, out of all possible actions, which are deliberate or derivable back to an action that is deliberate are within the sphere of culpability talk—but this does not mean that actions which do not meet those requirements are outside of the sphere of moral talk.

You seem to use ‘moral’ as synonymous with ‘culpable’ in some sentences, and then use them as distinct in others.

If it is impossible to ever hold X responsible or culpable, then X is not a moral agent. Because of this "wrong" cannot be applied to tornadoes, for "wrong" is a moral predicate.
…
That's basically it, but don't you think this also accounts for why a tornado is not a moral agent?

That something is a moral agent, is not relevant to if something can be predicated as doing something wrong or right. By being a moral agent, you are referring to the agent being culpable for their actions, which is clearly not the case for a tornado, but by ‘moral predicate’ you are referring to anything within the sphere of moral discourse—not discourse about culpability.

I don’t disagree that the only moral agents are those which can be held responsible for their actions (or some subset of them); but this in no way implies that amoral agents are not doing morally bad nor good things.

In moral philosophy a tornado is a natural evil, not a moral evil. Not all evil (i.e. bad things that happen) is moral

This is interesting, because I would say that natural evil is immoral, which is why it is called ‘evil’. I think, though, this is just a disagreement in semantics; because, here, you are referring by ‘moral’ to ‘culpable’ and not what you refer to as ‘moral’ before (when saying ‘moral’ in “Culpability talk is only one kind of moral talk”).

When I say that moral realities are not limited to acts, I am thinking about things like habits, intentions, societies, etc. I am not thinking about tornadoes. I hold the uncontroversial view that tornadoes are not moral realities.

I understand and agree with you, if I strip out the misuse of the adjectives, but it is worth mentioning that you should be saying “realities of culpability” (or something like that) and not “moral realities”. The adjective ‘moral’ refers to anything which can be validly denoted within the sphere of moral discourse, or something which agrees with what is (morally) good—not just what contains some degree of responsibility or duty.

Bob

Fooloso4

Yes, and I think liberalism has made it hard for us to see the higher good shining through our practices. — Leontiskos

It is, rather, that the assumption that there is this higher good shining through is our practices has been called into question. Imagined the existence of a higher good is not to ascertain it. This question doe not begin with liberalism. It informs the inquiries of Socrates and the works of Plato and Aristotle. The desire for what is good does not mean that the good will be found in our practices. What the good is remains highly problematic.

Reading Aristotle as if his work is not dialectical makes it hard to see that he is guided by unanswered questions rather than dogmatic answers.

Leontiskos

How is this not incoherent? You first say there exists a moral talk that is not culpability talk, and then say that all moral realities are culpability realities. Unless ‘reality’, as opposed to ‘talk’, is doing some heavy-lifting here that I am not following, this is incoherent. — Bob Ross

The sentence prior to the one you quoted elucidated this.

For example, cars and fuel go hand in hand. All cars run on fuel, and therefore to talk about something that has no relation to fuel is not to talk about a car. Nevertheless, not all car talk is fuel talk. We can talk about things like steering, brakes, or tires without talking about fuel.

To be culpable is to be responsible for doing something wrong. Not all moral acts are wrong, but all moral acts can, in principle, be wrong. You are trying to talk about things that cannot be wrong or immoral even in principle, such as tornadoes. If something cannot be wrong even in principle then it is not a moral reality.

That something is a moral agent, is not relevant to if something can be predicated as doing something wrong or right. — Bob Ross

It certainly is. Note that the things I am stating are not in any way controversial, so you may need to brush up on moral philosophy.

By being a moral agent, you are referring to the agent being culpable for their actions, — Bob Ross

No, I have never said such a thing. In fact the word "culpable" appears only once in my OP. I'm not sure how you are drawing all these conclusions from that one sentence. They certainly don't follow.

I don’t disagree that the only moral agents are those which can be held responsible for their actions (or some subset of them); but this in no way implies that amoral agents are not doing morally bad nor good things. — Bob Ross

Read the bolded part of that sentence back to yourself. You are positing that amoral agents can be moral. This is a straightforward contradiction. Similarly, to agree that "the only moral agents are those which can be held responsible for their actions," is to agree that anything which cannot be held responsible for its actions is not a moral agent.

ToothyMaw

↪Leontiskos

Your OP is brilliant and everyone should read it. It will undoubtedly inform my own views on ethics, so if you were shooting for changing people's minds, you've changed at least one. :up:

Bob Ross

↪Leontiskos

For example, cars and fuel go hand in hand. All cars run on fuel, and therefore to talk about something that has no relation to fuel is not to talk about a car. Nevertheless, not all car talk is fuel talk. We can talk about things like steering, brakes, or tires without talking about fuel.

Agreed. So:

For example, morality and culpability go hand in hand. All things relevant to culpability rely on morality, and therefore to talk about something that has no relation to morality is not to talk about culpability. Nevertheless, not all culpability talk is moral talk. We can talk about things like good/bad effects, natures, and intentions without talking about culpability.

All our disagreement boils down to, is that by ‘moral’ you are referring to moral talk that is culpability talk—you are discussing a subsector of moral talk—whereas I am referring to moral talk in general. A tornado is not culpable for its actions, and thusly is not ‘moral’ in the sense of being a moral agent, but is still the embodiment of something immoral (hence why it is called natural evil).

Note that the things I am stating are not in any way controversial, so you may need to brush up on moral philosophy.

Neither is mine. I am NOT denying that only agents which can be held responsible for their actions are moral but, rather, that the actions, effects, and intentions of agents that CAN’T are still capable of moral evaluation insofar as one can determine whether or not the act is moral or immoral (irregardless of the fact the agent is not culpable for their actions). Please read that again, because you missed it in my response.

When a dog rapes another dog, we don’t say the dog can be held morally responsible and thusly, to your point, is not a moral agent; HOWEVER, we do still admit that the act of rape the dog committed is immoral.

No, I have never said such a thing. In fact the word "culpable" appears only once in my OP. I'm not sure how you are drawing all these conclusions from that one sentence. They certainly don't follow.

I say this, based off of your responses and not the OP. By ‘moral agent’, you clearly mean an agent which is culpable for their actions (to the extent that their actions are deliberate); and by ‘moral talk’ you clearly don’t mean just culpability talk.

I don’t disagree that the only moral agents are those which can be held responsible for their actions (or some subset of them); but this in no way implies that amoral agents are not doing morally bad nor good things. — Bob Ross

Read the bolded part of that sentence back to yourself. You are positing that amoral agents can be moral

Your interpretation, being false, is the source of this contradiction. All you found, as far as contradictions go, is that amoral agents != moral agents—I was never denying this. Take the dog rape example: the dog is not moral agent, but the dog’s action was immoral. This is not controversial; so I am surprised you deny this, but perhaps I am missing something.

Leontiskos

For example, morality and culpability go hand in hand. All things relevant to culpability rely on morality, and therefore to talk about something that has no relation to morality is not to talk about culpability. Nevertheless, not all culpability talk is moral talk. — Bob Ross

Ah, you've mixed this up, and part of the problem is that the analogy limps insofar as things other than cars also run on fuel. Using the same format, this is what I am saying:

"Morality and culpability go hand in hand. All moral realities relate, at least indirectly, to culpability (just as all car realities relate, at least indirectly, to fuel), and therefore to talk about something that has no relation to culpability is not to talk about a moral reality. Nevertheless, not all moral talk is culpability talk."

For example, if I talk about the praiseworthy-ness of a moral act I am also talking about an act to which culpability could, in principle, apply (even though it does not apply in this case). If I am talking about a tornado this does not hold.

All our disagreement boils down to, is that by ‘moral’ you are referring to moral talk that is culpability talk — Bob Ross

Nope, I'm not. I've told you this multiple times. You are the one focused on culpability. I have only mentioned it once apart from your inquiries into it.

If you honestly believe that this thread is primarily focused on culpable agents or immoral acts then you need to go back and read the very first paragraph of the OP, where I made it very clear that I am not talking about such a thing. Not all acts that could be immoral are immoral, and not all acts that could be moral (in the sense of praiseworthy) are moral, just as not all boats that could be blue are blue.

When a dog rapes another dog, we don’t say the dog can be held morally responsible and thusly, to your point, is not a moral agent; HOWEVER, we do still admit that the act of rape the dog committed is immoral. — Bob Ross

This is incoherent. If the dog is not a moral agent that can be held responsible then it cannot commit immoral acts. You can't say that the dog is simultaneously non-moral and immoral. You are committing contradictions.

By ‘moral agent’, you clearly mean an agent which is culpable for their actions... — Bob Ross

At this point I'm getting impatient because you're not even reading my responses. I even defined culpability for you, "To be culpable is to be responsible for doing something wrong. Not all moral acts are wrong, but all moral acts can, in principle, be wrong." Thus someone who does something right (and not wrong) is a moral agent who is in no way culpable, and therefore it is flatly false to claim that moral agents are necessarily culpable. Maybe you need to look up "culpability" in the dictionary.

the dog is not moral agent, but the dog’s action was immoral. This is not controversial — Bob Ross

More than being controversial, it is incoherent. Things which are not moral agents do not act morally or immorally. That's basically the definition of a moral agent: something that is capable of moral acts. Tornadoes cannot commit immoral acts because they are not moral agents. The same holds for dogs on the premise that they are not moral agents.

Non-moral (or "amoral") realities do not engage in moral or immoral acts.
A tornado is a non-moral reality
Therefore, a tornado does not engage in immoral acts.

See also: SEP | Origins of Evil: Moral and Natural

Or:

Evil in the broad sense has been divided into two categories: natural evil and moral evil. Natural evils are bad states of affairs which do not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents. Hurricanes and toothaches are examples of natural evils. By contrast, moral evils do result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents. Murder and lying are examples of moral evils. — SEP | The Concept of Evil

Leontiskos

Your OP is brilliant and everyone should read it. It will undoubtedly inform my own views on ethics, so if you were shooting for changing people's minds, you've changed at least one. :up: — ToothyMaw

Thanks Toothy, I appreciate that. :smile:

Bob Ross

↪Leontiskos

At this point I'm getting impatient because you're not even reading my responses.
…
Thus someone who does something right (and not wrong) is a moral agent who is in no way culpable, and therefore it is flatly false to claim that moral agents are necessarily culpable.

That's basically the definition of a moral agent: something that is capable of moral acts

Which one is that you mean to convey? These are incoherent taken together. Either a ‘moral agent’ is an agent capable of moral scrutiny (of moral acts) or an agent which does the right thing. I have been understanding you to mean the former, but now it seems like you may mean the latter.

This is incoherent. If the dog is not a moral agent that can be held responsible then it cannot commit immoral acts. You can't say that the dog is simultaneously non-moral and immoral. You are committing contradictions.

I need a bit of clarification on this one: do you NOT think rape is wrong, if it is committed by a dog? I seriously doubt that is what you are trying to convey, but that seems (to me) to be the implication of the above quote.

All I think you mean to convey, is that the dog isn’t a moral agent; which wasn’t ever in contention in the first place. I am saying that the act of rape that the dog committed is wrong, and the dog is not a moral agent (in the sense that the dog is not capable of being held responsible for their acts).

1. Non-moral (or "amoral") realities do not engage in moral or immoral acts.
2. A tornado is a non-moral reality
3. Therefore, a tornado does not engage in immoral acts.

What do you mean by “engage” here? I would say that a tornado does not “engage” in immoral or moral acts insofar as it is not culpable for the acts its commits but NOT that the tornado cannot perform what is an immoral or moral act (although it isn’t deliberate).

We may be at an impasse though, because I suspect you are going to find all of this unsatisfactory. You seem to distinguish between moral badness (like evil) and moral ‘moralness’ (like intentionally raping someone) that I don’t accept: evil is a description of something which is being emphasized as morally bad, and immoral acts refers, to me, to any action which itself is morally bad.

I am interested to hear if you do consider rape amoral IF a dog commits it—that will be a very interesting take. I see your point to a certain extent, that you distinguish natural and moral evil; but this use of ‘evil’ just seems circular: isn’t that just a reference to something that is immoral?

Just so we can find common ground, let’s forget semantics for a second. I agree with you that there is a difference between ‘evil’ (i.e., moral badness) which is done by indeliberate (i.e., natural) vs. deliberate (i.e., what you call “moral”) actions/events. I would merely add that the action/event is still ‘evil’ (i.e., morally bad: what I call ‘immoral’) if it is natural. I think, stripping the semantics out, you can agree with that.

I hate semantics just as much as the next guy (;

Bob

180 Proof

I don’t follow your objection. — Leontiskos

What I mean is this: to say that "all human actions are moral actions" (dogma) in effect negates itself (dialectically) by entailing that there are no non-moral actions to distinguish from, and thereby identify, "moral actions". Thus, for me at least, your OP's premises are incoherent.

Also this, Leontiskos ...

The desire for what is good does not mean that the good will be found in our practices. What the good is remains highly problematic.

Reading Aristotle as if his work is not dialectical makes it hard to see that he is guided by unanswered questions rather than dogmatic answers. — Fooloso4

:fire:

Bob Ross

↪Leontiskos

Another way of thinking about it, that just crossed my mind, is that:

If natural evil is not moral evil, then some evil is not immoral.

My interpretation of your view, and correct me if I am still misunderstanding, is that you mean to denote a subtype of immorality (i.e., of evil) which is the realm of these 'moral realities' that you refer to; and in that sense I have no problem with it. The semantics just seem weird to me.

Leontiskos

What I mean is this: to say that "all human actions are moral actions" in effect negates itself by entailing that there are no non-moral actions to distinguish from, and thereby identify, "moral actions". — 180 Proof

Ah, I see. In the OP I distinguish human acts from what Aquinas calls actions "of a man," such as stroking one's beard absentmindedly, or having one's leg kick when the doctor checks their reflexes. More broadly, they are distinguished from the actions of things like tornadoes, which Bob Ross mistakenly holds to be moral entities. So in that sense it is like saying that all wolves are mammals, where "wolf" is a subset of "mammal."

Regarding your negative utilitarianism, I am wondering how this deviates from Objection 1. Is harm thought to be synonymous with injustice? Or can harm occur which is not unjust? For example, if someone enters your house with a gun and you sneak up behind them and knock them unconscious in order to incapacitate them, would the negative utilitarian say that you have harmed them? If this does not count as harm, then it is presumably because the act is not unjust, and in that case injustice (in the classical sense) would be coextensive with harm (in the negative utilitarian sense). I am wondering how you would view this.

180 Proof

Is harm thought to be synonymous with justice? — Leontiskos

No. However, injustice is a kind of harm perpetrated by a group (i.e. its institutional functionaries) against individuals.

For example, if someone enters your house with a gun and you sneak up behind them and knock them unconscious in order to incapacitate them, would the negative utilitarian say that you have harmed them? If this does not count as harm ...

Not if "incapacitating" the gunman is the only or least harmful way to prevent the gunman from doing greater, perhaps lethal, harm (e.g. like surgically removing a malignant tumor or severing a foot caught in a bear trap or terminating an unwanted pregnancy before viability (or an unviable pregnancy that is more likely than not to kill the pregnant woman)).

Leontiskos

Not if "incapacitating" the gunman is the only or least harmful way to prevent the gunman from doing greater, perhaps lethal, harm — 180 Proof

Okay, this makes good sense. Thanks for introducing this idea of "negative utilitarianism," as I believe it succeeds in answering the OP's challenge to present a coherent moral system. In addition, it laudably captures common intuitions. :up:

Chet Hawkins

Introduction

What is the breadth of the moral sphere? The common view is that some acts are moral, such as giving a starving man food or committing murder, and some acts are non-moral, such as taking one’s dog for a walk.1 You should immediately notice that by “moral” I do not mean morally good; by “moral” I am not talking about the opposite of immoral. — Leontiskos

This is incorrect as a disclaimer. Even by your ensuing description you ARE talking about moral goodness. The word moral effectively means, good. If you assert otherwise, it would make no sense (to me).

Instead, when I use the term “moral act” I am referring to an act that belongs to the species of moral-and-immoral-acts; or an act that belongs to the species of good-and-bad-acts. More simply, I am referring to an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny, evaluation, or judgment. A moral act is an act that can be legitimately (and, thus, morally) judged good or bad; a non-moral act is an act that cannot. — Leontiskos

Exactly. So this explanation refutes your own assertion from before that you do not mean morally good. You DO mean that as explained here by you, just now.

There are two theses that I am prepared to defend regarding the breadth of the moral sphere. Both of them will clash with modern language and intuitions, for I am convinced that modern thinking about the moral sphere is confused and perhaps even incoherent. — Leontiskos

All thinking is incoherent. That is not the relevant point. The relevant point is intent. Indeed moral scrutiny should be applied to all choices, past and present. The consequential patterns of the past that lead to the various states of now are informative to new intents. Consequentialism is a dangerous lie. Deontological morality is the only thing that makes any sense.

Thesis 1: All human acts are moral acts

For Aristotle, virtue and teleology permeate all aspects of life. For Aquinas, any act that flows from intention is a moral act.2 In order to understand why all human acts are moral acts we must understand the difference between applying scrutiny to an act and applying moral scrutiny to an act, for above I noted that a moral act is an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny. Or in other words, we must attempt something that very few are willing to attempt: we must attempt to define the moral. — Leontiskos

There is no difference.

Despite the delusions of all people, morality is the only thing going on. Morality is objective and true. All acts are only of course moral acts in that they SHOULD be judged morally. There is no act, no substantive state, that is not merely a succession of choices amid free will. This universe is alive. It emerges life as a natural law. The seeds of life exist as choice down to the sub-atomic level. Choice is effectively the only act thing in the universe. States are all the consequential arrangements of matter and energy and we will say consciousness as well. Really though we could JUST say consciousness because matter and energy are both just forms of consciousness.

Defining the moral and acting morally is the entire purpose of the universe. Perfection is the end goal, and the good is the only right path to get there. That path is objective from any point in intent space.

Before we do that, what is meant by a “human act”? — Leontiskos

This question is ridiculous. The happenstance that allows us to take conceit in the moral agents in the universe with the greatest known scope of moral awareness is indeed humans. But to argue in any way that this situation is special is foolish and indeed conceited. The entire universe is alive and other moral agents across the universe are highly probably more advanced morally than even humans are. But even still, that matters not at all.

The GOOD is objective. So, human choice and choice of animals and indeed choice of rocks are all flawed by poor choice. Nonetheless the call of desire towards perfection is the guiding light as well as the genuine happiness that resonates from choices with more and more such happiness the closer those choices are to the path leading directly to the objective GOOD.

those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man. — Leontiskos

This is only nonsense. There is no need whatsoever to separate acts by chooser type. That has no relevance to moral content or strength.

moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as human acts.
— Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, Q. 1, A. 1 & A. 3 — Leontiskos

I agree

A human act is any act that we do on purpose; any act that proceeds from a deliberate will. — Leontiskos

This is a fine thing to say. But I think when you say it you are not meaning it the right way and most people will also fail to mean it the right way.

What does 'deliberate will' mean? Is just living an act of deliberate will? If not then no, your definition is wrong. I say living itself is an act of deliberate will and that death in fact only happens because that will is immorally insufficient.

All weakness of any kind is immoral. It does not matter if this is offensive. The truth is often offensive to people that refuse it. So be it. Not being perfect is immoral. This state of delusional immorality is why, sensing the extant truth of perfection as reflected in the emotion of desire, evolution happens. All efforts towards perfection are finally about choosing to eliminate weaknesses.

Objection 3 to the first article gives the complement of human acts, “But man does many things without deliberation, sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on something else.” In his reply to objection 3 Aquinas says, “Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the proper principle of human actions.” — Leontiskos

This is nonsense.

My model helps me to understand. Fear, anger, and desire are all three consciousness. They are all three involved in choice. The choice to be, anger, is still a choice. The choice to comply with instantiated patterns, involuntary acts, as you just gave an example for, are indeed still choices.

The power of choice is effectively infinite. But a weak will (desire in general) is hard pressed to carry out 'deliberate' acts that violate the tendencies of the weak current state. We are slowly evolving into more capable moral agents. That is a law of the universe. It is happening everywhere and it is, from what we can determine so far, reasonably rare that what we call life happens. As mentioned, that is a misunderstanding. The call of desire, the existence of nothing but consciousness in the universe, empowers free will for every particle in existence. The STATE of that particle determines the difficulty of choice. So it is nigh unto impossible for a rock to play poker for example. But that is only nigh and not finally actually impossible. Understanding and accepting these extremely rare cases of truth delving is a better way than what most people have of being aware what is going on.

Most people will not be comfortable discussing rocks that choose. But any other assertion is more than just incoherent. Everything in this universe is choosing constantly. And moral scrutiny DOES apply to rocks as well as humans. I realize I am probably alone in this assertion. No worries.

So what does it mean for something to be moral?3 In keeping with the foregoing, I will define morality by reference to a definition of moral judgments. A moral judgment isdf a non-hypothetical ought-judgment. — Leontiskos

That is incorrect.

All morals are forced to be hypothetical ought-judgments. We cannot know. So all beliefs are effectively hypotheses.

Strictly speaking, a moral act is an act that involves a moral judgment, but for the pedagogical purposes of this thread I am primarily thinking of a moral act as, “an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny, evaluation, or judgment” (see above). — Leontiskos

Which is every single act in the universe that has happened, is happening, or will happen. No narrowing down of the scope occurred here. If you think it did, you are only deluding yourself and those that believe you.

Admittedly, there is a difference between an act that involves a moral judgment and an act that is susceptible to moral judgment, especially on non-Aristotelian theories. This difference should be largely irrelevant, although I will tease out some of the implications as we go.4 — Leontiskos

There is no difference.

For clarity:

A moral act is an act that involves a moral judgment, or an act that is susceptible to moral judgment.
A moral judgment is a non-hypothetical ought-judgment. — Leontiskos

I disagree as mentioned.

What then is a non-hypothetical ought-judgment? An ought-judgment is simply a judgment about what to do, past, present, or future. For instance, “He should have done that; she oughtn’t do this.” But what does it mean to say that some ought-judgment is non-hypothetical? It means:

He ought to do X if he wants Y.
(including:)
He ought to do X because he wants Y.

A judgment that is non-hypothetical is not therefore a judgment that is necessarily non-instrumental. “He ought to do X because he wants Y,” is instrumental but it is not hypothetical, for it involves no hypo-thesis. — Leontiskos

That is blatantly incorrect on the surface of the issue. The ought word means the ought statement is by its very nature hypothetical.

The objective nature of morality cannot be known by us. We are left with hypotheticals only, belief.

A variant of this sort of judgment could be written, “He ought to do X because he ought to want (or attain) Y.” A non-hypothetical ought-judgment is a judgment in the simplest sense, a judgment “all things considered.” A hypothetical ought-judgment merely presents one consideration that is intended to influence the inevitable all-things-considered judgment which will eventually take place. — Leontiskos

These distinctions are not relevant, is my assertion. The one consideration is itself a belief. So, it is already hypothetical, meaning all consequences are also hypothetical, even after they occur. They are all hypothetical because we may experience them and they may be objective, but, we cannot know them objectively, so we are left adding hypotheticals to hypotheticals. There is nothing else going on.

Let’s take an example:

You ought to fix your car. (non-hypothetical)
You ought to fix your car if you want to travel to work. (hypothetical)
You ought to fix your car because you need to travel to work. (non-hypothetical) — Leontiskos

Incorrect. Both 'ought' and 'if' are instances of word use that show the hypothetical state.

Let’s focus on the latter two examples in this set of three. These two judgments are not saying the same thing. The non-hypothetical judgment involves a secondary judgment that traveling to work is necessary, and the hypothetical judgment prescinds from this secondary judgment. Only non-hypothetical grounds can result in non-hypothetical conclusions. The statement, “You ought to fix your car if you want to travel to work,” is hypothetical because the antecedent of the conditional is not being asserted. Therefore it is not a judgment about “what to do” simpliciter (all things considered). Instead of saying, “This is what should be done,” it says, “This is something you should take into account when deciding what should be done.” — Leontiskos

This whole process is messy and covered in errors to me. The definitions of need and want should be addressed. For example your second proposition should be reworded to say, 'you ought to fix your car because you ought to travel to work. There is no such thing as a need to travel to work. We speak incorrectly in so many ways that language is becoming a barrier to understanding in this case. We employ SO MUCH DELUSION on a regular basis that many and most here will rise up against me just for pointing out how insanely silly it is.

If you want to travel to work, then you should fix your car.
You want to travel to work.
Therefore, you should fix your car. — Leontiskos

Is it you that is fixing the car? Or would it be better to say, 'have your car fixed'?

The non-hypothetical judgment includes (1), (2), and (3). The hypothetical judgment affirms (1) but not (2) or (3). Those who are paying attention may recognize that on this account moral acts are bound up with normative ends. — Leontiskos

Moral acts are all acts, not just normative ones, but yes, all of those are included.

Note that this is a logical analysis, not a linguistic analysis. Sometimes in everyday speech people will equivocate between, “He ought to do X if he wants Y,” and “He ought to do X because he wants Y.” Tone of voice, for example, often indicates whether the locution is hypothetical. — Leontiskos

I think this is intentional semantic blather. The because of ... phrasing does not in any way remove the nature of the statement as hypothetical. The state transition from now to any future may have causes, but those causes are themselves hypothetical because understanding them as causes can be in error (and is always in error to some degree). You may prefer not to answer to my post because it is too disintegrating of many of the assumptions not mentioned that went into this entire formulation. I understand, but, presumably, we are after truth, hunting it, here.

Note that a non-hypothetical judgment is not the same thing as a categorical imperative. We could say that all categorical imperatives are non-hypothetical judgments, but not all non-hypothetical judgments are categorical imperatives. For example, “You should fix your car,” is not a categorical claim because it only holds given certain circumstances. — Leontiskos

Just more semantic blather.

What clearly stated to you determines a non-hypothetical state? I promise you there is not one. To any experience of any chooser, any act past or present is hypothetical only.

Acts and regrets are non-hypothetical

Following in the footsteps of Philippa Foot, many are accustomed to claim that morality is merely a matter of hypothetical judgments, or that non-hypothetical judgments are rare. — Leontiskos

Yeah they are rare alright. They don't exist.

5 To give an indication of how gravely mistaken this opinion is, consider the fact that acts and regrets are all non-hypothetical. Each time we concretely choose and act we are making a non-hypothetical, all-things-considered judgment. — Leontiskos

We have zero chance to make any all-things-considered judgements. We are weak and immoral in so many ways that all beliefs and acts are flawed in many ways at the same time. One of those ways that is always true is that we cannot consider all things, ever. So saying that, using that phrasing, is foolish.

As soon as I decide whether to fix my car all of the previously-hypothetical considerations become non-hypothetical, and this is a large part of what it means “to make a decision” or “to decide.” To make a decision is to gather up all the hypothetical considerations and render an all-things-considered judgment. — Leontiskos

This is nonsense. Choices all involve failure, and all states involve the failures of other previous choices. No state is known. Known means 'in its entirety'. Only an objectively perfect being, 'God' could know anything. So to us moral agents that are not perfect every act is hypothetical even after decisions are made and a new state is formed. We do not know the past. We do not know the present state. We do not know the future. All of it is hypothetical.

Similarly, when we regret some act we are also making a non-hypothetical judgment. — Leontiskos

No, we are not. There is no such thing as a belief that is held at or with 100% certainty. So even the holding of the belief is hypothetical, let alone the belief itself and holding a belief is an act.

To say that one regrets an act is to judge that they should not have carried out that act, — Leontiskos

No it is not. You can still regret an act and still believe that you should have carried it out. This is just all too messy.

and this sort of judgment is never hypothetical; it never means, “I should not have done that if…” Such a hypo-thesis would undermine the regret itself, placing it in limbo. Therefore the idea that one can get along in life with only hypothetical judgments is absurd. — Leontiskos

Welcome to limbo.

What are examples of non-moral acts?

As noted above, the only non-moral acts are acts that do not flow from rational deliberation, such as absentmindedly stroking one’s beard. Or if the doctor hits your knee to check your reflexes and you kick him, you are not morally culpable because the kick did not flow from rational deliberation; it did not flow from you. The difference in these cases is that I am not choosing to act in any way. My body is doing something of its own accord, and these things do not count as moral acts. “Deliberation” is not for Aquinas something that must involve taking time in premeditation. The split-second braking to avoid a pedestrian is therefore a moral act, an act which flows from our humanness, our rational and intentional nature. — Leontiskos

These are all moral acts and choices. Even unconscious acts are a choice, finally. The fact that we immorally allow the structure of the body to carry them out without our consent is a lie. We consent to live therefore we consent to all these acts. It is still choice.

I will stop with Thesis 1 to see how this is received.

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪Chet Hawkins

Despite the delusions of all people, morality is the only thing going on. Morality is objective and true. All acts are only of course moral acts in that they SHOULD be judged morally. There is no act, no substantive state, that is not merely a succession of choices amid free will. This universe is alive. It emerges life as a natural law. The seeds of life exist as choice down to the sub-atomic level. Choice is effectively the only act thing in the universe. States are all the consequential arrangements of matter and energy and we will say consciousness as well. Really though we could JUST say consciousness because matter and energy are both just forms of consciousness.

These and other seemingly absolute statements seem sort of at odds with your prior claims that no one can know anything and that any pretension to knowledge is a sort of delusion/vainglory, no?

That is incorrect.

All morals are forced to be hypothetical ought-judgments. We cannot know. So all beliefs are effectively hypotheses.

But I take it you don't actually know if what you've just. claimed is true or not. Is it only a hypothesis? Weren't you saying something about how people shouldn't speak/write in such a way that they seem certain about things, but instead should always piously acknowledge their ignorance. But then...

Consequentialism is a dangerous lie. Deontological morality is the only thing that makes any sense...

The good is objective.

Etc.

look like knowledge claims.

All thinking is incoherent.

You should have led with this.

Aside from the piety of declaring ignorance, you might want to consider not being so rude lol.

Leontiskos

I will stop with Thesis 1 to see how this is received. — Chet Hawkins

Let me distill your 1500 word post: "Hello Leontiskos, my name is Chet Hawkins. I'm very rude and dumb. Would you like to have a conversation with me?"

No, thanks. I put you on ignore. Good luck with whatever you take yourself to be doing, and I would suggest practicing your introductions. They could use some work.

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