Means toward the end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony." — Leontiskos

And how do you view this stipulated end as differing from Kant's Kingdom of Ends?

And how do you view this stipulated end as differing from Kant's Kingdom of Ends? — javra

It is the end that you stipulated. To minimize harm and maximize harmony is obviously not the same as treating everyone as an end in themselves.

Again, your "Kingdom of Ends" seems to be internally contradictory. You want to have a kingdom of ends in which not everyone is treated as an end. If you really think this is Kantian you will have to provide the quote from Kant, for it is prima facie implausible to think that Kant would hold that a "Kingdom of Ends" can justify the means of, say, violence. Kant's whole system is based on the idea that the end does not justify the means. Your whole system is based on the idea that the end justifies the means.

Your answer does not answer my question, but instead seeks to analyze Kant's true intentions.

There are quotes such as:

Act according to maxims of a universally legislating member of a merely possible kingdom of ends.
— Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

But the issue remains.

What is the difference between the end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony" and Kant's Kingdom of Ends?

What is the difference between the end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony" and Kant's Kingdom of Ends? — javra

As I have pointed out numerous times, Kant has no "Kingdom of Ends" in the way that you use that term. Kant is not a utopian who thinks that we need to resort to violence to bring about his utopia. This is, again, the opposite of what Kant thinks. Therefore your question makes no sense to me. You are taking a consequentialist maxim and trying to make it Kantian.

Therefore your question makes no sense to me. — Leontiskos

Got it.

And according to you in which way does Kant use the term Kingdom of Ends?

To minimize harm and maximize harmony is obviously not the same as treating everyone as an end in themselves. — Leontiskos

While I'm waiting for your reply: This quote addresses means, but not the stipulated end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony" which, as end pursued, would be more properly expressed as "a state of being wherein harm is minimal, if at all yet present, and harmony is maximal, if not ubiquitously applicable". An idealized future state of being as that intended which, by my best appraisals of your previous statements, you deem to be different in nature to that state of being Kant terms "the Kingdom of Ends". *

But again, I'm waiting to discern what you interpret Kant to mean by the term "Kingdom of Ends" ... such that it, as realm of being, is not equivalent to a realm wherein minimal harm and maximal harmony is actualized.

-----------
*

While I know this is in no way definitive, here is an online reference I picked up from Wikipedia which, in short, addressed Kant's Kingdom of Ends as the ultimate goal of humanity. Here is Wikipedia's summary of it:

In his writings on religion, Kant interprets the Kingdom of God as a religious symbol for the moral reality of the Kingdom of Ends. As such, it is the ultimate goal of both religious and political organization of human society.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Ends#Overview

That presented, potentially far more importantly, here are excerpts from the SEP article "Kant's Moral Philosophy; 14. Teleology or Deontology?". To keep things short, following are first sentences from the last three paragraphs of the section:

A number of Kant’s readers have come to question this received view, however. Perhaps the first philosopher to suggest a teleological reading of Kant was John Stuart Mill. In the first chapter of his Utilitarianism, Mill implies that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative could only sensibly be interpreted as a test of the consequences of universal adoption of a maxim. [...]

There are also teleological readings of Kant’s ethics that are non-consequentialist. Barbara Herman (1993) has urged philosophers to “leave deontology behind” as an understanding of Kant’s moral theory on the grounds that the conception of practical reason grounding the Categorical Imperative is itself a conception of value. Herman’s idea is that Kant never meant to say that no value grounds moral principles. [...]

It is of considerable interest to those who follow Kant to determine which reading — teleological or deontological — was actually Kant’s, as well as which view ought to have been his. A powerful argument for the teleological reading is the motivation for Herman’s proposal: What rationale can we provide for doing our duty at all if we don’t appeal to it’s being good to do it? [...] — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#TelDeo

My main point to these quickly produced references being, what you have taken to be "my view" is neither idiosyncratic nor original in its analysis of Kantian ethics.

(Still interested in what you interpret Kant's Kingdom of Ends to signify to Kant.)

While I'm waiting for your reply: This quote addresses means, but not the stipulated end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony" which, as end pursued, would be more properly expressed as "a state of being wherein harm is minimal, if at all yet present, and harmony is maximal, if not ubiquitously applicable". An idealized future state of being as that intended which, by my best appraisals of your previous statements, you deem to be different in nature to that state of being Kant terms "the Kingdom of Ends". * — javra

Sure, but this doesn't change the point I've made. I recognize that you are aiming for an end-state. I was not intending to say otherwise.

But again, I'm waiting to discern what you interpret Kant to mean by the term "Kingdom of Ends" ... such that it, as realm of being, is not equivalent to a realm wherein minimal harm and maximal harmony is actualized. — javra

The main problem with your interpretation is that none of the texts that you have provided support it, and this is because Kant is explicit that the "Kingdom of Ends" is only an ideal, or in your quote, "merely possible." If it were more than an ideal and it were—as you seem to conceive it—an actualizable utopia, then all of the problems I have pointed out would come to bear. In that case the utopian end-state would be liable to justify the sort of violence you have in mind, all in order to achieve it. That you think it is actualizable is obvious from the fact that you think we are required to resort to violence to bring it about (when that violence is a form of self-defense). You have even gone so far as to claim that "do not commit violence" entails using violence to ensure that there exist agents to not-commit violence ().

I actually don't see anything in Kant's ethical writings that tracks your idea. For Kant the Kingdom of Ends is an ideal, and where he probes its actuality he moves into theology and eschatology (which is a standard Christian move regarding such ideal realities). I grant that such a notion is, in a sense, teleological, but it is not meant by Kant to be the sort of end or goal that justifies things like acts of violence.

My main point to these quickly produced references being, what you have taken to be "my view" is neither idiosyncratic nor original in its analysis of Kantian ethics. — javra

According to your source such interpretations are certainly atypical, deviating from the received view. Still, none of the sources you cite are promoting your view that it is necessary to resort to violence to bring about a Kingdom of Ends. That strikes me as a grievous departure from Kant.

I would be interested to know how Kant justifies punishment or capital punishment or defensive war, but I can guarantee that it is not by appealing to a utopian end. He will inevitably say that such punishments do not fail to treat the individual as an end in themselves.

The main problem with your interpretation is that none of the texts that you have provided support it, and this is because Kant is explicit that the "Kingdom of Ends" is only an ideal, or in your quote, "merely possible." If it were more than an ideal and it were—as you seem to conceive it—an actualizable utopia, then all of the problems I have pointed out would come to bear. In that case the utopian end-state would be liable to justify the sort of violence you have in mind, all in order to achieve it. — Leontiskos

To address this first point you make that Kant's notion of a Kingdom of Ends is only (an inconsequential?) ideal, this parer, which I previously referenced, argues otherwise. An excerpt from "III. Politics and the Ultimate Goal of Human History":

A cursory reading of these essays is sufficient to reveal that Kant's interest in political his­tory was an in­tentional application of his overall Transcendental Perspective[17] to the final (i.e., ultimate) problem of the end or destiny of the human race. The essays rarely give an account or inter­pre­tation of any specific historical events. Instead, as their very titles suggest, they pose ques­tions about the necessary form of human history, such as: What was the "Conjec­tural Beginning of Human History"? (1786), "What is Enlighten­ment?" (1784), "...Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" (1798), and What is "The End of All Things"? (1794). Kant's goal, in other words, was to discover an "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective" (1784) which could bring "Perpetual Peace" (1795) to humanity through a full realization of the highest good. — Palmquist, Stephen (October 1994) 'The Kingdom of God Is at Hand!' (Did Kant Really Say That?). History of Philosophy Quarterly. 11 (4): 421–437. ISSN 0740-0675. JSTOR 27744641

I'm curious as to what references or arguments you have that dispel the argument this paper makes.

According to your source such interpretations are certainly atypical, deviating from the received view. Still, none of the sources you cite are promoting your view that it is necessary to resort to violence to bring about a Kingdom of Ends. That strikes me as a grievous departure from Kant. — Leontiskos

I find that you, inadvertently or not, have often strawmanned the arguments I've make. Which makes this conversation with you quite unpleasant. For example, I don't recall every saying "it is necessary to resort to violence" but only that the use of violence within certain contexts can be the right/good thing to do as a means of optimally approaching the Good - "necessity" having nothing to do with it. This in comments such as the following:

Again, given the exact same distal intent of, say, minimizing harm and maximizing harmony, the use of violence as means of obtaining this very same distal intent can be simultaneously right in proximal application (wherein far greater harm/disharmony is thereby avoided) and yet remain wrong in distal terms (for an absolute harmony cannot be of itself produced via violence); — javra

I am furthermore not in this thread regurgitating Kant's thoughts. But have instead made reasoned argument for oughts and ought nots given an intended proximity to the Good as ultimate end, for which Kant's notion of the Kingdom of Ends was intended to serve only as one possible example among others.

----------

You so far seem dead-set against the use of any measure of controlled violence in any context whatsoever, thereby, for example, condemning all police officers all all soldiers to immorality ... as though such ought to be viewed as evil rather than, at least on occasion, heroic. If I am, to what extent am I wrong in this appraisal?

The question at hand is whether your analogy is apt. Perhaps you should attempt to give an example of a non-moral decision. — Leontiskos

By "non-moral decision", I take you to mean the parallel of a "non-financial decision" to buy a phone, so, a "non-moral decision" which leads to a "moral judgement" being made. If we say that a "moral decision" is one based on what is right and wrong, moral or immoral, then a non-moral decision doesn't do that.

This is very common, and I'd argue normal in the context of morality, we don't start off believing something is "right" or "wrong", we start off with a non-moral motivation. It's interesting to look back in history and see how many of our customs developed. A simple example would be hygienic practices. A society can contain moral judgements about washing hands, bathing and so on which develop to stop the spread of diseases etc. I'm sure you need no help to think of other examples besides hygienic practices, as many of our moral ideas started this way. Is that a satisfactory answer?

If we say that a "moral decision" is one based on what is right and wrong, moral or immoral... — Judaka

To say that a moral decision is based on what is moral or immoral is tautological, and does not tell us anything. Beyond that, it simply ignores the way in which a moral act or a moral judgment is understood in the OP.

By "non-moral decision", I take you to mean the parallel of a "non-financial decision" to buy a phone, so, a "non-moral decision" which leads to a "moral judgement" being made. — Judaka

No, that is not even necessary, for I take it that the example is so disanalogous that even a decision which is non-moral simpliciter would suffice.

I would suggest sticking with Thesis 1 and leaving Thesis 2 to the side for the time being. There is of course an interesting question about whether the person who sits down on a bus without intending to render justice acts justly. If this truly interests you then have a look at Objection 4, where I provided a point of departure for an answer.

I find that you, inadvertently or not, have often strawmanned the arguments I've make. Which makes this conversation with you quite unpleasant. For example, I don't recall every saying "it is necessary to resort to violence" but only that the use of violence within certain contexts can be the right/good thing to do as a means of optimally approaching the Good - "necessity" having nothing to do with it. — javra

First, consider this quote:

"Do not commit violence" holds no meaning or significance in the complete absence of agents. In order for violence to not be committed, there must be agents present which do not commit violence. — javra

You use the word "must." <In order to follow the rule "Do not commit violence," there must be agents present which do not commit violence; therefore we must commit violence against those who would threaten our survival>. "Must" indicates necessity.

Beyond that, there is little difference, morally speaking, between saying, "It is necessary to commit violence," and, "It is right to commit violence" (in some circumstance). I don't see how this is a strawman given that if I used the term "morally right" instead of "necessary" all of my arguments would hold just the same.

I am furthermore not in this thread regurgitating Kant's thoughts. But have instead made reasoned argument for oughts and ought nots given an intended proximity to the Good as ultimate end, for which Kant's notion of the Kingdom of Ends was intended to serve only as one possible example among others. — javra

Good. Then I'm not sure why we are so interested in Kant. It is your theory that I am critiquing, not Kant's.

To address this first point you make that Kant's notion of a Kingdom of Ends is only (an inconsequential?) ideal — javra

I don't say it is inconsequential; I say it does not support the sort of things you have in mind. I think there is a good reason why Kant always qualified it as an "ideal."

At this point the conversation is dotted with unanswered counterexamples that I have given. Let's just revisit one of those instead of needlessly exegeting Kant:

Again, I see two ends, and in this case I think both are simultaneously aimed at:

1. Do not commit violence (because violence requires treating the object as a means)
2. Survive as a community

These are both involved in the goal to, "Arrive at a Kingdom of Ends."

But in this case it seems that (2) is given precedence over (1), and I'm not sure if it is possible to arrive at a "Kingdom of Ends" so long as (2) is given precedence over (1). When would you ever "get there"? Obviously the alternative would be strict pacifism: giving (1) precedence over (2).

Secondly, in light of (2) does (1) need to be revised to (1a): "Do not commit violence except in extremis"? It seems like this is the rule that is actually in play, although there is simultaneously a desire or telos towards (1). — Leontiskos

"Do not commit violence" holds no meaning or significance in the complete absence of agents. In order for violence to not be committed, there must be agents present which do not commit violence. So I again find the presented dichotomy of ends to be inappropriate.

Aside from which, as stated (1) gives the impression of an absolute commandment. ... Whose goodness or rightness as such would be itself justified in which manner?

Moreover, the "strict pacifism" mentioned would leave all peace aspiring people to die at the hands of violent people, thereby resulting in nothing but violence-loving people to populate the world in its entirety. How might this bring about or else be in the service of a "Kingdom of Ends"? — javra

On this reading you must think that the pacifist could not agree to the rule, "Do not commit violence," which is of course strange to say the least. "Do not commit violence" simply does not mean, "Do not commit violence unless your survival is threatened." People do not generally say, "In order to not-commit violence we must be alive, so therefore in order to obey the rule 'Do not commit violence' we must use violence against this aggressor who is trying to kill us." I don't think this is plausible at all. It strikes me as common sense that use of violence will be contrary to a rule against violence.

[...]

It was not absolute. The rationale was provided: "because violence requires treating the object as a means." The idea was <We are not to treat others as a means; violence treats others as a means; therefore we are not to use violence>. — Leontiskos

The point I made is that in order to accomplish (2), it may be necessary (or "morally right") to transgress (1) by using violence in self-defense. Hence the contradiction and the perplexity.

And in response you said something like, <Well there are not two ends; there is only one end; and therefore there can be no contradiction. The rule to commit-violence-in-extremis is implicitly contained within the rule to not-commit-violence>. Again, you have said that violence is prohibited because it treats another person as a means. My last, unanswered response, quoted here, explains why your response is inadequate. You never responded. If I am right and your response is inadequate then your account will involve contradiction and perplexity. If you wish to defend your account from contradictions, then you should answer the argument I gave to that effect.

Despite spending time on the forum, you’ve chosen to make your reply rather late. The weekend has now passed, and I now have real world duties in need of tending.

Some parting observations:

In proclamations such as

Again, you have said that violence is prohibited because it treats another person as a means. — Leontiskos

You are again freely strawmanning, inventing truths, putting words into my mouth that I've never spoken, spinning realities, whatever terminology best gets the point across. In this case, I only said that violence is a wrong in an ultimate sense from an ultimate vantage-point, but never that it is "prohibited". And I have neither the time nor the inclination to correct every strawman you've so far made.

In your primary counter, you are conflating the end aimed at of “the Good”, however you prefer to imperfectly exemplify it (you’ve so far alluded to it being an unobtainable utopia of no real consequence), with the means toward approaching it (this assuming one deems the Good as their primary purpose to begin with) as though the Good were somehow already obtained.

In your equating of right/good action to necessary action you, for example, remove all choice from the equation, which leads to a plethora of logical complications as regards moral issues. Yes, the words you put into other people’s mouths matter.

And you have chosen to ignore both of the following:

I'm curious as to what references or arguments you have that dispel the argument this paper makes. — javra

You so far seem dead-set against the use of any measure of controlled violence in any context whatsoever, thereby, for example, condemning all police officers all all soldiers to immorality ... as though such ought to be viewed as evil rather than, at least on occasion, heroic. If I am, to what extent am I wrong in this appraisal? — javra

… Which I can’t help but find intellectually dishonest.

Thanks again for an interesting debate.

Despite spending time on the forum, you’ve chosen to make your reply rather late. The weekend has now passed, and I now have real world duties in need of tending. — javra

Yes, I forgot and should have responded earlier. Sorry about that.

You are again freely strawmanning, inventing truths, putting words into my mouth that I've never spoken, spinning realities, whatever terminology best gets the point across. In this case, I only said that violence is a wrong in an ultimate sense from an ultimate vantage-point, but never that it is "prohibited". And I have neither the time nor the inclination to correct every strawman you've so far made.

[...]

… Which I can’t help but find intellectually dishonest. — javra

Ad hominem is what one often resorts to when they find themselves unable to address the arguments at hand. Clearly you've devolved into this state with abandon. You were doing much better towards the beginning of our conversation. Granted, the absurd things you claimed, which I have highlighted and specifically asked you to address, are indefensible, and so it's no coincidence that you refuse to defend them. But the intellectually honest person would simply retract such statements instead of playing the victim.

In your primary counter, you are conflating the end aimed at of “the Good”, however you prefer to imperfectly exemplify it (you’ve so far alluded to it being an unobtainable utopia of no real consequence), with the means toward approaching it (this assuming one deems the Good as their primary purpose to begin with) as though the Good were somehow already obtained. — javra

You keep rewriting your system without admitting it. My response to your first rewrite should suffice, "Now if you rewrite your system and say that you're only trying to..." ().

And again, Kant's "Kingdom of Ends" is not without consequence. It is meant to aid the moral actor's imagination in understanding how to act in the here and now, in approximately the exact opposite way that you utilize it. It is not meant to justify using other people as a means in order to arrive at the Kingdom. Kant does not fall into such contradictions.

In your equating of right/good action to necessary action you, for example, remove all choice from the equation — javra

Yours is the strawman. To say that "resorting to violence is necessary," is not to say that it is logically necessary in itself. That would be a very silly and incoherent claim. As context should have made abundantly clear, it means that violence is necessary in order to achieve the end, in this case the end of survival.

And you have chosen to ignore both of the following — javra

To the first: I am arguing with you, not with Kant, and if you can't even respond to the points I make in dialogue do not expect me to respond to the random papers you are Googling to try to support a strange thesis. If ignoring parts of posts is intellectually dishonest, then you would seem to be in a great deal of trouble. To the second: to my knowledge this was added in an edit, and was not ignored. Regardless, my answer is simple enough:

I am not a Kantian — Leontiskos

Good luck, then.

To say that a moral decision is based on what is moral or immoral is tautological, and does not tell us anything — Leontiskos

I have no clue what a "moral decision" is supposed to be, it's a term you brought up but isn't defined in the OP. I explained my assumption so it can be corrected.

No, that is not even necessary, for I take it that the example is so disanalogous that even a decision which is non-moral simpliciter would suffice. — Leontiskos

Suit yourself.

I would suggest sticking with Thesis 1 and leaving Thesis 2 to the side for the time being. — Leontiskos

Some questions
1) Are some "acts" subjective in their nature?

I'm particularly interested in what constitutes an act and their subjectivity. For example, if I'm rude towards someone, would that count as "acting rudely"?

2) Is It the acts that are Moral/Immoral?

In many doctrines of morality, it's not acts that are moral or immoral, it's their consequence. Common principles such as "do no harm" requires us to interpret whether an act caused harm. Meaning, there is no category of moral/immoral acts for acts to belong to. What is your position?

3) What's the Point of Thesis 1?

The common view is that some acts are moral, such as giving a starving man food or committing murder, and some acts are non-moral, such as taking one’s dog for a walk. — Leontiskos

At least in the West, this is not the common view, Western morality is centered around moral principles, not acts. Taking one's dog for a walk could be deeply immoral if it meant you were leaving a baby home alone. Feeding one's dog could be immoral if you were making the dog fat and causing it to suffer, etc.

Morality, in all its forms across history has always meant to be overriding of all other concerns or considerations, this is the norm, and it's not just acts. You can only defend your actions against moral criticism with moral justification. This was a topic I even made a thread on when I claimed "Morality was Coercive".

We don't consider acts moral/immoral, we consider principles moral/immoral and acts with no relevance to any moral principles are non-moral. Is that not your experience as well? I suppose I'm questioning whether the problem this thread aims to solve are real.

I have no clue what a "moral decision" is supposed to be, it's a term you brought up but isn't defined in the OP. I explained my assumption so it can be corrected. — Judaka

You are the one who introduced that term, hence my point.

Suit yourself. — Judaka

And my point was that you should provide an example, even though that example does not need to adhere to the financial parallel you have tried to set up.

We don't consider acts moral/immoral, we consider principles moral/immoral and acts with no relevance to any moral principles are non-moral. Is that not your experience as well? — Judaka

The OP asks you to spell out the difference between a moral principle and a non-moral principle. The contention is that you will not be able to do this, and because of this your moral theory will fail.

If you've no desire to speak to me, about this or in general, then tell me. It wastes both our time if you're just humouring me for the sake of it.

You are the one who introduced that term, hence my point. — Leontiskos

I did not.

And my point was that you should provide an example, even though that example does not need to adhere to the financial parallel you have tried to set up. — Leontiskos

It didn't appear you wanted to continue with the point I was making so I dropped it.

The OP asks you to spell out the difference between a moral principle and a non-moral principle. The contention is that you will not be able to do this, and because of this your moral theory will fail. — Leontiskos

I agree with you that Western conceptualisations of morality are confused and often incoherent. In my view, it's because the word "morality" has too many meanings and refers to similar but distinct concepts. It's impossible to clearly delineate the boundaries of morality because it's not a singular concept and it's too difficult to distinguish between the concepts contained under the word's umbrella.

I have my own personal moral framework and I can try to separate the concepts privately but these efforts do not and will not properly explain "morality" as a shared idea. My efforts reflect my worldview and ideas, much like your OP just reflects yours.

It isn't necessary that we distinguish between moral principles and non-moral principles to be able to use principles to determine right from wrong. If you ask the average person to define their moral framework, they'd first have to stop and think about what it is, and no matter how long you waited they still wouldn't be able to give you a proper answer.

If they could give you a proper answer, I'd be deeply sceptical of their answer. A significant part of how we determine "right" and "wrong" - or just what makes up part of what we refer to as "morality" are nature and nurture influences that we don't personally understand.

A person may find incest revolting and immoral, but is it because it's evolutionarily beneficial to find incest disgusting and it's now part of their nature or is it because of their moral principles? In my thread about the coercive nature of morality, I talked about our need to create valid arguments to justify our unreasonable feelings. "Incest, eww" is not a valid argument for why incest is wrong - even if that's one's real reason for despising it. There's an incentive to come up with a logical, well-reasoned argument even though it's bullshit. Which further complicates explaining what morality is. There are too many social and political influences at play. We can't tell what's real or just convenient - too much "fake data", if you like.

TLDR is that I don't have a moral theory that conveniently explains everything, I've decided that the word is a mess and that no such theory or explanation exists.

There's an incentive to come up with a logical, well-reasoned argument even though it's bullshit. Which further complicates explaining what morality is. There are too many social and political influences at play. We can't tell what's real or just convenient - too much "fake data", if you like. — Judaka

Given what you say here, I'm not sure how you would be able to engage the arguments of the OP. Beyond that, my time is getting short, so let's stop there. Take care.