I referred to metaphysics. This is about the lack of fixity our ideas have at the basic level. — Constance
Ideas' meanings are derived from the contexts in which they are found. But contexts are determinative or finite. "The world" possesses in its meaning "that which is not contextual" I am arguing. — Constance
...This is the metaphysical ground of ethics, where ethics, and therefore religion, acquires its foundation. — Constance
The narrative account in question refers to the religious narrative that is the stuff that sermons are made out of, and all the bad metaphysics. Not about narrative as such. — Constance
The assertion "Philosophy wants to know what things are at the most basic level of inquiry" is attributing wants to things that are incapable of forming/having them. I'd charge anthropomorphism; however, humans are not the only creatures capable of wanting things.
Philosophy is something that is practiced. Practices are not the sort of things that 'want to know' anything. Practitioners are.
— creativesoul
"Attributing wants to things"? A bit left fieldish. — Constance
We move through life never questioning these engagements in a culture, and as a result, we never realize our "true" nature. — Astrophel
You are close when you say "It may refer to the fact that no one chooses the socioeconomic circumstances they are born into." Right. But when one does choose, she is already IN a lifestyle, a language, a body of meaningful institutions. This is one's throwness. — Astrophel
If you're attempting to equate ethics with "being thrown into disease, and countless miseries, as well as the joys, blisses, and the countless delights" then I'll have to walk. That makes no sense whatsoever.
— creativesoul
Just ask, what IS ethics? This is not to ask Kant's question, or MIll's, but it is a question of ontology; not what should one do, but what is the very nature of the ethical and therefore religious imposition. So, if you take no interest in such a thing, then you probably should, as you say, walk. — Constance
Nah. It did not begin by thinking about thinking practices as subject matters in their own right. — creativesoul
How do you know without knowing what "the basic level" includes? — creativesoul
Assertion, not argument. — creativesoul
As if all religion is existentially dependent upon a fairly recent philosophical practice we've named metaphysics? — creativesoul
Bullshit.
The narrative in question was all narrative. — creativesoul
They don't get to choose so it makes no sense whatsoever to say otherwise... — creativesoul
Who needs goalposts anyway?
Ethics is not equivalent to spinoffs and extrapolations from/of Heiddy's thought. — creativesoul
Philosophy wants to know what things are at the most basic level of inquiry, and the narrative account is the first thing to go. — Astrophel
How do you know without knowing what "the basic level" includes?
— creativesoul
One discovers the basic level through inquiry. — Constance
Religion is about metaphysics...
— Astrophel
Nah. It did not begin by thinking about thinking practices as subject matters in their own right. — creativesoul
Nah. It did not begin by thinking about thinking practices as subject matters in their own right.
— creativesoul
But metaphysics is not about thinking practices. — Constance
...religion is about the dimension of our existence called value. Religion is about metavalue, metaethics, metaaesthetics. — Constance
Metaethics is discovered IN the analysis of mundane ethics. — Constance
Religion is about metavalue, metaethics, metaaesthetics. — Constance
"States of people's minds" suggests that you are either a relativist or a subjectivist. Or have I misunderstood? I do agree, however, that the binary classification between objective and subjective is most unhelpful when applied to ethics. — Ludwig V
There is something of a battle going on at the moment between belief and knowledge as the appropriate category. The (mistaken) idea that the difference between belief and knowledge means that saying one believes in God implies some sort of uncertainty, so people who strongly believe in God want to claim to know, while people who don't believe in God (or don't believe that belief in God can be rationally justified) cannot possibly concede that. It's very confusing. — Ludwig V
I always resist labels. They are supposed to be shorthand for complex views, but in practice they enable people to pigeon-hole where they have arguments prepared. It saves thought, which is almost always a bad thing. The objective/subjective distinction is another example of the same kind.As best i can bring myself to adopt a label, its emotivism. — AmadeusD
That seems paradoxical. But if one believes on faith, especially in the case of religious belief, one may well believe that what one believes cannot be known, on the assumption that knowledge requires evidence and proof.There is nothing coherent about claiming a belief and not knowledge unless you also claim the thing cannot be known — AmadeusD
I would say that a belief must be capable of being true and most people think that religious doctrines are true or false. — Ludwig V
You may not be able to apply a certain framework to the claim, but I "believe" there's a Yule log in my fridge, it's because I have sufficient reason to believe so. That is, on the personal level, knowledge. — AmadeusD
Our minds do not—contrary to many views currently popular—create truth. Rather, they conform to the truth of things given in creation. And such conformity is possible only as the moral virtues become deeply embedded in our character, a slow and halting process. We have "lost the awareness of the close bond that links the knowing of truth to the condition of purity.” That is, in order to know the truth we must become persons of a certain sort. The full transformation of character that we need will, in fact, finally require the virtues of faith, hope, and love. And this transformation will not necessarily—perhaps not often—be experienced by us as easy or painless. Hence the transformation of self that we must—by God’s grace—undergo “perhaps resembles passing through something akin to dying.”
Here is a statement from a highly-regarded Catholic philosopher, Joseph Pieper, with whom I have only passing familiarity:
Our minds do not—contrary to many views currently popular—create truth. Rather, they conform to the truth of things given in creation. And such conformity is possible only as the moral virtues become deeply embedded in our character, a slow and halting process. We have "lost the awareness of the close bond that links the knowing of truth to the condition of purity.” — Wayfarer
I'm happy to agree that religious beliefs, on the whole, are not empirical - although Christ's Resurrection is often claimed (isn't it?) to be a historical (empirical) fact. But the idea that believing them requires certain qualities of character looks like an empirical claim to me.The difficult point about religious doctrines, in particular, is that they generally demand certainly qualities of character. — Wayfarer
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.