Some of his quotes, like, the avoidance of pain will lead to being content in life, is still something I live by. — Shawn

As a rule, I only take life advice from people who I would actually want to be. Arthur Schopenhauer does not fall within that category. I don't think he ever loved. IIRC he was deeply resentful of women and wished it was better for him to have never been born. Why would I take life advice from someone like that?

I'll listen to his insights on philosophy and he was surely brilliant with his syncretism, but not someone who I would want to model my life after. Very much open to hearing his insights on religions and the nature of reality though.

Or is it utterly absent and there is only will and Representation, and will is not a being but a drive? — ENOAH

It seems inescapable logically, that if everything In itself is basically Will and not material (as Schopenhauer asserted) then being must be equated/ confated with Will.

But Kant, who completely and irresponsibly neglected the issue for which the terms φαινομένα and νοούμενα were already in use, then took possession of the terms as if they were stray and ownerless, and used them as designations of things in themselves and their appearances.

It seems to me that this ignores the distinction between things-in-themselves and 'things-in-themselves' as thought. To be sure the thing in itself is thought, although it is not thought as thought, but as unknowably real; I understand the thinking of things in themselves as being noumenal, not the (unknowable, unthinkable) real things in themselves as such

then being must be equated/ confated with Will. — Janus

Confounded, if you ask me. But that's weirdly my limit reached with Schopenhauer. Everything "before" this Will, (that he on some levels "maligns") is Ultimate Reality or Being (because at least K had the decency to bow out), I cam stand behind, albeit with minor modifications. But not that.

not the (unknowable, unthinkable) real things in themselves as such — Janus

I understand. What are the real things in themselves? Are they just that? Real? Is it plural, as you suggested?

If we "designate" the idea of God as noumenal because we cannot know God, is then God, independent of our knowing, Real? And would that apply to all so called noumena?

Is the real not utterly inaccessible to knowledge, and that's why Kant was "right" to keep his distance?

Of course I hope you read what I said under the caveat "for Schopenhauer". I was basically asserting it to be a logical concomitant in Schopenhauer, not merely an interpretation of Schopenhauer.

Of course I hope you read what I said under the caveat "for Schopenhauer". I was basically asserting it to be a logical concomitant — Janus

Yes, I was agreeing, and hinting that this necessary conclusion is my problem with Schopenhauer, whether he meant it or not. But I can't believe he fully meant it. Not judging his genius. Obviously. More his context, historical, and otherwise.

I'm just interested in your take on this. Same with my second "reply". I agree with you, insofar as the word fits; more like, you're enlightening me to more perspectives

I understand. What are the real things in themselves? Are they just that? Real? Is it plural, as you suggested?

If we "designate" the idea of God as noumenal because we cannot know God, is then God, independent of our knowing, Real? And would that apply to all so called noumena?

Is the real not utterly inaccessible to knowledge, and that's why Kant was "right" to keep his distance? — ENOAH

Not exactly: I'm saying the things in themselves are thought as real, but of course that for us they are noumenal, that is they are not real but merely thought.

So, the idea of God, for us, would be noumenal, but God, if real, would not be noumenal as such, because the latter term applies to things insofar as they are artefacts of thought. I think it would apply to all noumena, that, if they are real, they are not merely thought, even though they may not be able to be anything but thought for us.

Yes, I was agreeing, and hinting that this necessary conclusion is my problem with Schopenhauer, whether he meant it or not. But I can't believe he fully meant it. Not judging his genius. Obviously. More his context, historical, and otherwise. — ENOAH

Cool, I will just say that I have very little regard for the concept of genius, or at least for the notion of the authority of genius. So, I believe he did mean to equate Will with Being,,,the fundamental reality. Just my opinion of course. Genius or not, we are all historically and culturally situated, although it doesn't necessarily follow that we can comprehensively understand that situation.

I'm just interested in your take on this. Same with my second "reply". I agree with you, insofar as the word fits; more like, you're enlightening me to more perspectives — ENOAH

I like to think we can all enlighten each other to something more with our perspectives. We are all unique, after all.

sorry, last of the choppy replies.

I.e., is Kant not saying noumena, the "idea" of "things" not accessible to the senses, is as far as we go. Anything beyond noumena, any "thing" as it is "in itself" so to speak, independent of our ideas and perceptions, is inaccessible, be that a so called "apple" from the phenomenal "view" or so called God from the noumenal point of view. The limit of knowledge in its pursuit of Truth is idea (of Truth) ?

I'm saying the things in themselves are thought as real, but of course that for us they are noumenal, that is they are not real but merely thought. — Janus

Yes. Understood

I think it would apply to all noumena, that, if they are real, they are not merely thought, even though they may not be able to be anything but thought for us. — Janus

Ok, and I see this position commonly in various forms. I respect it and desire it. But why? Why is it that "object" referenced as noumena necessarily (if that's what you're
saying) exist beyond thought? And they must, you already accept we cannot know their form. So we are speculating about both their existence and form. We might as well resign ourselves to the fact that idea is as far as we go. If there is a reality it is utterly other than any idea we have.

Perhaps, according to Kant, there could be no accessibility. I would take this to mean "no discursive accessibility", but I don't know what Kant thought about it. I am pretty sure he denied the possibility of "intellectual intuition" as proposed by Spinoza and revived by Hegel. Absent that possibility, then it would seem to come down to a "leap of faith" (per Kierkegaard).

Ok, and I see this position commonly in various forms. I respect it and desire it. But why? Why is it that "object" referenced as noumena necessarily (if that's what you're
saying) exist beyond thought? And they must, you already accept we cannot know their form. So we are speculating about both their existence and form. We might as well resign ourselves to the fact that idea is as far as we go. If there is a reality it is utterly other than any idea we have. — ENOAH

I agree, yet I think the idea of the radically transcendent is of great import and meaning in human life, precisely as "the great indeterminable" that overarches our existence. To acknowledge this is to give an honest, realistic assessment of our situation, insofar as we can understand it, or least so I think.

If enlightenment is possible, then it must be experienced directly and could mean nothing to those who have not experienced it, in the sense that they could have no idea what it means, but they certainly could imagine many things.

yet I think the idea of the radically transcendent is of great import and meaning in human life, precisely as "the great indeterminable" — Janus

No disagreement from me, to that whole paragraph.

If enlightenment is possible, then it must be experienced directly and could mean nothing to those who have not experienced it — Janus

Might even be, as in Kierkegaard's knight of faith, imperceptible to those who have not.

If enlightenment is possible, then it must be experienced directly and could mean nothing to those who have not experienced it, in the sense that they could have no idea what it means, but they certainly could imagine many things. — Janus

It’s worth recalling the origin of ‘enlightenment’. It was used by the Pali Text Society to translate ‘bodhi’ from the Buddhist texts. Elsewhere that word is translated as ‘wisdom’ which doesn’t carry the same rather portentous connotations. I suppose that the idea of ‘conversion’ - something like a Road to Damascus experience - is then also imputed to it. But perhaps in reality it is something rather more prosaic. That is more like the Sōtō Zen attitude of ‘ordinary mind’.

(Here, I’m actually reminding myself.)

That is more like the Sōtō Zen attitude of ‘ordinary mind’. — Wayfarer

If enlightenment is possible, then it must be experienced directly — Janus

Just sitting in Zazen is Enlightenment. "Ordinary mind," is bodily aware-ing "freed" from the displacement of projecting mind.

That's what I took Janus to mean. And that's why Schopenhauer "failed" when he misapplied some of the projections to the Will (given that the Will, for him, is ultimate reality)

Yes, perhaps it is an altered, yet 'ordinary', state of consciousness...like a 'flow' state or "being in the zone".

Just sitting in Zazen is Enlightenment. "Ordinary mind," is bodily aware-ing "freed" from the displacement of projecting mind.

That's what I took Janus to mean. And that's why Schopenhauer "failed" when he misapplied some of the projections to the Will (given that the Will, for him, is ultimate reality) — ENOAH

That seems right to me...it is simply being without getting caught up in conceptual notions of "ultimate reality". I guess the point is that ideas can never be reality, because they are inherently dualistic. Easier said than done, though.

Easier said than done, though. — Janus

Totally

@ENOAH @Wayfarer, You might enjoy this. It's an old paper (1911), but its intro condenses Schopenhauer's ideas well in a few paragraphs:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/27900310?seq=1

That seems right to me...it is simply being without getting caught up in conceptual notions of "ultimate reality". I guess the point is that ideas can never be reality, because they are inherently dualistic. Easier said than done, though. — Janus

Reality for Schopenhauer, if it's based on Kant's framework, can never be "known" except the appearance of a thing on our cognitive apparatus...Schopenhauer posited that we can infer that there is Will based on our own subjective aspect which is will manifest in ourselves, through construct of a subject-for-object, with the appearance/representation/phenomenon the aspect of subject-object mediated through the subject's faculties of space, time, and causality imposed upon the object.

we can infer that there is Will based on our own subjective aspect — schopenhauer1

Ok, yes "infer" based on our subjective. He too admits to not "knowing" the "ultimate".

Thank you for that link. 1911! Looking forward to reading it.