Seems a bit goofy to me. — Moliere
You could get around all this notion of suffering simply by noting, or adhereing to, a duty to preserve life, suffering or no. — Moliere
I think a hedonic ethic or a utilitarian ethic or a consequentialist ethic will serve AN better. Not that you couldn't put AN into deontology -- here you are doing it -- but others will have different maxims from you, and part of deontology is respecting others' choices. — Moliere
You want an ethic that lets you tell when others are wrong, but deontology is more about the self choosing actions, I think. It's only in the eyes of God that we could tell if someone is right or wrong, but we only have the eyes of a human. — Moliere
Could just be a turn of phrase…. — Moliere
….it's the individual, rather than the group, that's more important in thinking through whether a maxim can be universalized, or an act is moral. — Moliere
Nothing super direct comes to mind, other than "treating them as an end unto themselves" and noting how individual freedom is central -- as in a category of reason -- for moral thinking in Kant.
Since I can choose my ends, I have to recognize that others can do so as well.
Also, something Rawls points out, deontology is a literal lack of a goal: so to treat someone so that they fulfill a goal would be to violate them. — Moliere
For Kant you cannot use someone as a mere means even if they consent to being used as a mere means. — Leontiskos
And if you say, it is, but they are not merely using someone, how is that not a slippery slope? — schopenhauer1
That is to say, to create someone who will suffer unnecessarily is to use them as a means for something other than the person. As the person wasn't even there to begin with. — schopenhauer1
That, however, is a far cry from having children at all schopenhauer1 -- I think utilitarianism, and psychological hedonism would be better friends to you than deontology, at least if you want to universalize anti-natalism (I did admit some conditions where I could, and even in my own life I can see, where having children isn't a good choice -- but the universal program is a bit much for me) — Moliere
Seems a bit goofy to me. — Moliere
The problem occurs if this is a valid argument:
1. Suppose every living human being is guaranteed a pinprick of pain followed by 80 years of pure happiness.
2. [Insert Benatar's antinatalist argument here]
3. Therefore, we should never procreate
Are you starting to see the reductio? The reductio has force because we know that any (2) that can get you from (1) to (3) is faulty argumentation. — Leontiskos
It is goofy, and schopenhauer1 is ignoring arguments in the antinatalism thread whilst arguing antinatalism in a thread on Kant. — Leontiskos
The fact that "the person wasn't even there to begin with" is what makes the whole antinatalist project so logically out of kilter. — Leontiskos
Are you starting to see the reductio? The reductio has force because we know that any (2) that can get you from (1) to (3) is faulty argumentation. — Leontiskos
Okay, then I am more comfortable in my claim that you are misinterpreting Kant. From my edit: — Leontiskos
As far as I recall, Kant follows Christianity in claiming that one can fail to treat oneself as an end in oneself, and this would seem to undo the autonomy thesis. If it were just a matter of autonomy then treating oneself poorly would be impossible. — Leontiskos
The key here is that it is not legitimate to reduce "treat them as an end in themselves" to "treat them as an ends-maker." Those are not the same thing for Kant. The latter does not exhaust the former. Just because we are treating someone as an ends-maker does not mean that we are treating them as an end in themselves. The specific emphasis on autonomy and ends-making comes later, and I would argue that if taken too far is a strong deviation from Kant.
(Hence, in the arranged marriage, the parents are failing to treat the betrothed as ends-makers, but they are not necessarily failing to treat them as ends in themselves.)
Granted, which is why I think the freedom to choose is part of deontological considerations. — schopenhauer1
That's interesting. I had never put together that freedom could act as a kind of limit to practical reason, just as metaphysics is a limit for theoretical reason. Though I'm not sure it's strictly Kant as this point, it's still an interesting parallel! — Moliere
Excellent dialectical theme you’ve created here; I appreciate the thought-provoking aspect, even without total mutual accord.
Isn't Kant's philosophy predicated on a "free will"? So that being said, having the maximum playing field to enact one's will freely, would seem to be entailed for this to be played out, no? — schopenhauer1
Also, my deontology isn't strictly Kantian-based, though I think most modern deontology is inspired by his framework... Intent/autonomy/rights/dignity/not being used, etc.. — schopenhauer1
Oh it wouldn't be the first time ;). And it wouldn't surprise me that my memories are off -- I through this in the lounge for that reason. I didn't feel like doing the deep work :D -- but I wanted to think through the ethics a bit. — Moliere
My memory on that claim is that it was with respect to masturbation, which always made me kind of shrug at that claim -- though, yes, that definitely fits with his Christian heritage. It may be here that this is what previously was raising feathers : I can acknowledge the Christian heritage, but at what point are we talking about Kant, the man, and Kant's philosophy, as intended, and Kant's philosophy, as written.
That was one of his examples I always sort of put to the side as worthless, though I could see the case being made for, say, substance abuse -- I don't think that's respecting yourself as an end (not sure if it would be a universalizable maxim, that one) — Moliere
Though respecting someone as an ends-maker wouldn't entail, I don't think, that autonomy makes right or something -- rather, it is right to respect autonomy. — Moliere
And that's where it gets hard to really apply the ethic to others. How can you reflect for someone else whether they are following a maxim? — Moliere
One thing I don't think the ethic handles well is disparity in power. Kant doesn't really talk about children at all -- are they born with the categories? Do the categories become more apparent as they develop? When are they rational beings? — Moliere
Makes it unique, but not out of kilter. — schopenhauer1
It does not follow that my action is moral or permissible just because it does not treat another as a mere means. — Leontiskos
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