I really think I need to figure out how you are using the word "understand", because it's not making any sense to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said in a previous post I would say that to understand one's choices it to comprehend/recognize the nature of the choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to it.

So when the person decides to buy a used shirt only if it is 100% cotton, you call this a desire, and insist that it's not a choice, because it's not acted on, and the person's choice (act) is to buy the shirt of unknown fabric — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm not insisting that it isn't called a choice. I'm not worried whether it is called a choice or not. I don't think choosing one thing and then later on choosing something that goes against the goal expressed by that first choice implies misunderstanding of either choice. Also competing desires isn't the same thing as changing one's mind.

And would you agree that "understanding" and its contrary "not understanding", are terms used to describe a judgement against this medium process, thinking, decision making? "Understanding is a judgement of correctness, and "not understanding" is a judgement of incorrectness in the associated thinking process. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not entirely sure what you mean by this, particularly this last sentence. But, as mentioned above, I wasn't insisting on a specific choice of words here and how I am using "understand" in this context can be found earlier in this post.

I assume that in all cases of acting (choosing), there are competing desires, otherwise a desire would lead directly to an act, without any medium, and there would be no choosing. Do you agree? And would you agree that the medium, consisting of thinking, could be judged as either understanding or not understanding? — Metaphysician Undercover

No I wouldn't say that in all cases of acting there are competing desires, but again I wasn't using "competing desires" to mean a whole lot of extra stuff. So no, I don't think if you just want one thing and then choose to pursue that thing you have somehow not chosen.

Also no I don't think the process of thinking about a choice is itself the understanding or not understanding of that choice. Me deliberating on whether to make some chicken for dinner isn't the understanding of that choice, that understanding of that choice is the thing which allows me to engage in that deliberation.

Now, the important point, who would make this judgement? The judgement of whether the thinking process was correct or incorrect, understanding or not understanding, must be made by someone. We cannot say that the person engaged in the thinking process, making that choice, also makes the judgement of correct or incorrect, or else all cases would be judged as correct, because the person would not make the choice unless they thought it was correct. Their judgement would have to correspond with the thinking process, because the choice actually is that judgement. Therefore the distinction of understanding/not understanding would be meaningless. In all cases of making a choice, the person would understand the choice, and there would be no question of the possibility of not understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is all based on the false premise that there needs to be a judge in order for their to be a fact of the matter. This just isn't the case. The truth is not determined by the judgment of an observer. The truth simply is, and it is up to us to find it as best we can. Also, this all seems to come from you seeming to think that I was claiming a bunch of stuff that I wasn't.

Do you agree with this Dan? If not, tell me please what you mean by "understand" in the context of the principle "the ability to understand and make one's own choices". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't. As mentioned above, in that context I am using understanding one's choice in the sense of to comprehend the nature of the choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to it.

I think that if we say a person understands one's own choice, this is a judgement we pass on the person, not a judgement that a person would pass on oneself, because that would be meaningless. — Metaphysician Undercover

If we say it then yes, I suppose we are passing that judgement. But no, it wouldn't be meaningless for a person to say that they understand their own choice. For example, in cases of euthanasia, the person might need to affirm that they understand the choice to end their own life and they would, presumably, judge this for themselves.

When we ask the person "why did you do that?" what sort of guidelines ought we to follow in our judgement of whether it is a case of the person understanding the act or not understanding the act?. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Why did you do that" probably wouldn't be high on my list of questions in order to determine if they understand their own choices. I might ask them about the nature of the choice they are making, and try to ascertain their general level of mental competence. I might also check whether they are suffering from any delusions which lead to them not knowing what choice it is they are making.

But the examples I mentioned are cases of disallowing, i.e. preventing one's one actions. This is distinctly different from "allowing". So the difference I am talking about is the difference between acting and disallowing one's own actions. It is not a matter of "allowing" the actions of others, those are irrelevant. What is relevant is the choices (actions) of oneself, and the difference I am talking about is the difference between allowing oneself to act, and disallowing oneself to act. In the shirt case for example, adhering to the principle "I'll only buy a shirt if it is 100% cotton", is a choice (I believe it is a choice anyway), which would have disallowed action in the circumstances of the example. However, in the example the person allowed oneself to act. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does this have anything to do with whether or not there is a distinction between acting or allowing which I suggested is the reason consequentialism is the best approach to morality? I can engage with this if you want, but it appears to be divorced from what we were talking about.

You are really not helping me Dan. I really do not understand what you mean by understand. You provided a sort of definition, but when I gave an interpretation of your words, you claimed my interpretation is wrong. So I am continually left with nothing to go on.

This is all based on the false premise that there needs to be a judge in order for their to be a fact of the matter. This just isn't the case. The truth is not determined by the judgment of an observer. The truth simply is, and it is up to us to find it as best we can. Also, this all seems to come from you seeming to think that I was claiming a bunch of stuff that I wasn't. — Dan

We are not talking about "truth, "or "fact", we are talking about "understanding". Whether or not something is understood is a judgement which must be made, otherwise anytime someone thinks that they understand, and claims to understand, that would constitute understanding, even if the person really misunderstood.

I mean, you can say that there is an objective fact of the matter, of whether the person understands one's choice or not, but this is not relevant because we do not judge according to the fact of the matter, we judge according to what we think is the fact of the matter. So, we need some principles as to what constitutes "understanding", so that we can make the judgement as to whether one's ability to understand one's own choices is enhanced, or limited by specific factors.

This is where you and I have significant disagreement, as to which factors play an important role in one's ability to understand one's own choices.

As I said in a previous post I would say that to understand one's choices it to comprehend/recognize the nature of the choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to it. — Dan

So, as a demonstration of our disagreement, if I apply this definition which you provide above, to the shirt example, I think it is very obvious that the person in the example does not understand one's own choice. This is obvious, because the person has two contrary choices, (or a choice which is contrary to a desire if you wish to express it that way), and there is no reason given why one results in the selection rather than the other. Clearly that there is no reason, indicates that it is impossible to "apply one's rationality to it". When the choice that the person made is contrary to the desire that the person had, and there is absolutely no reason given for that choice, then we need to accept that there is no rationality to that choice either, and therefore the person did not understand one's own choice.

"Why did you do that" probably wouldn't be high on my list of questions in order to determine if they understand their own choices. I might ask them about the nature of the choice they are making, and try to ascertain their general level of mental competence. I might also check whether they are suffering from any delusions which lead to them not knowing what choice it is they are making. — Dan

Then why do you not accept that the shirt example is a case of a person not understanding one's own choice? The person has the desire to buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton, and then for no reason at all buys a shirt of unknown composition. If we ask the person "why did you do that?", there is no answer provided in the example. We can only conclude that the person did it on a whim or something. However, you deny that choosing on a whim is a case of not understanding one's choice. But "whim" is defined as "caprice", an unaccountable change of mind.

You say you want less from "understanding" than I do. In reality you want nothing from "understanding". Your principle is really "the ability to make one's own choice", and "understand" plays no role at all. So long as the person is capable of speaking and can give an answer to "why did you do that?", such as "I felt like it", this qualifies as "understanding" the choice, to you.

This is because you do not want to deal with all the real issues concerning "understanding" one's own choices which I've been bringing to your attention. These issues are the role of habit, education, deception, and things like that. Further, since your principle of "understanding" is to be able to "apply one's rationality", you would accept all different sorts of what is known as "rationalizing", and other specious forms of explanation as "understanding".

Do you think that if we asked the person why they bought the shirt, and they said because they thought it was 100% cotton, even though there was no tag or other indication, that would qualify as understanding one's own choice? And, if we asked the person why they thought it was 100% cotton, and they answered because that's what I wanted it to be, that would qualify as understanding, wouldn't it? This is because "applying one's rationality" does not mean the same as applying sound logic, nor does it even imply being "reasonable", as "rationalizing" indicates.

Does this have anything to do with whether or not there is a distinction between acting or allowing which I suggested is the reason consequentialism is the best approach to morality? — Dan

Yes, it's very relevant, that's what I've been explaining, and why I've been saying that you ought to reconsider your belief in consequentialism. The simple fact is that "allowing" does not require a choice. The vast majority of things which occur do not require any choice from me. Disallowing does require a choice, as does acting. So disallowing is classed with acting, and allowing is something completely different.

You can give many examples which create the appearance that allowing is a choice, but these are false for the following reason. All choices are personal. The choice to act is personal, something I do my self. The choice not to act is personal. The choice to allow something else, not of my choice, to occur is a choice not to act in an attempt to prevent it. So, like I explained a choice not to act is a choice of disallowing myself to act. So what you call "allowing" is really a choice of disallowing. "Allowing", in a true sense of allowing something to occur, is something completely different which is neither a chosen act nor a choice to disallow action. We can carry this principle to our personal selves, just like the others, to consider how we allow things like habit, impulse reaction, whimsical buying, etc.. These are personal actions which occur without real choice, nor are they disallowed by choice. They require a special category because they escape the reason which guides our choices which either disallow us from acting, or cause us to act. This type of action, the ones which are simply "allowed", can never be understood.

I mean, I gave a definition in the last post twice. What part are you having trouble with? Are you after a more formal definition?

Then why do you not accept that the shirt example is a case of a person not understanding one's own choice? The person has the desire to buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton, and then for no reason at all buys a shirt of unknown composition. If we ask the person "why did you do that?", there is no answer provided in the example. We can only conclude that the person did it on a whim or something. However, you deny that choosing on a whim is a case of not understanding one's choice. But "whim" is defined as "caprice", an unaccountable change of mind.

You say you want less from "understanding" than I do. In reality you want nothing from "understanding". Your principle is really "the ability to make one's own choice", and "understand" plays no role at all. So long as the person is capable of speaking and can give an answer to "why did you do that?", such as "I felt like it", this qualifies as "understanding" the choice, to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, "why did you do that" doesn't really factor into it. I might ask them if they know what choice they are making (in this case, giving up ownership of some money in exchange for a shirt) and what it means to make that choice (eg, if you give up this money, you won't have it in the future etc), but why they want the shirt is more or less beside the point (except in some niche cases where they think it will protect them from aliens that are chasing them because they are suffering from a delusion, or something to that effect).

This is because you do not want to deal with all the real issues concerning "understanding" one's own choices which I've been bringing to your attention. These issues are the role of habit, education, deception, and things like that. Further, since your principle of "understanding" is to be able to "apply one's rationality", you would accept all different sorts of what is known as "rationalizing", and other specious forms of explanation as "understanding". — Metaphysician Undercover

I would accept not applying one's rationality also. So long as the person understands the choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it if they choose to, then that is sufficient. If they then decide to do things for no reason or just because they felt like it or whatever, then that's fine.

The simple fact is that "allowing" does not require a choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are a great many things that we allow to happen which do require a choice. When bad things happen and we watch on with indifference when we could prevent them, we are allowing them to occur. I'm not suggesting that people are morally responsible for things they couldn't prevent (ought implies can and all that), rather I am suggesting that the whether you are actively doing something or simply letting it happen when you could easily prevent it doesn't make much of a difference.

You can give many examples which create the appearance that allowing is a choice, but these are false for the following reason. All choices are personal. The choice to act is personal, something I do my self. The choice not to act is personal. The choice to allow something else, not of my choice, to occur is a choice not to act in an attempt to prevent it. So, like I explained a choice not to act is a choice of disallowing myself to act. So what you call "allowing" is really a choice of disallowing. "Allowing", in a true sense of allowing something to occur, is something completely different which is neither a chosen act nor a choice to disallow action. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, it seems very odd to say that you choosing to walk on past rather than saving the drowning child is "disallowing yourself to act". Yes, allowing something to happen does seem to be choosing not to try to prevent it. My question is, why does any of this matter? Does any of this lead to us not being blameworthy for things we let happen? Does any of this make us more blameworthy for killing the one to save the five? What does this mean in terms of how we should live our lives? This would be my question generally, as quite often I will point out something wrong with your argument and you will respond by picking at a detail of the example that I didn't include because it wasn't relevant or a word I didn't define give a formal definition for. My question is, what are you claiming I am wrong about when it comes to evaluating moral decisions or giving moral guidance?

Like, I can disagree with all the things you've said and point out all the strange assumptions and dubious logic there, but I think it would be better to clarify what is actually being disagreed about clearly.

Again, "why did you do that" doesn't really factor into it. I might ask them if they know what choice they are making (in this case, giving up ownership of some money in exchange for a shirt) and what it means to make that choice (eg, if you give up this money, you won't have it in the future etc), but why they want the shirt is more or less beside the point (except in some niche cases where they think it will protect them from aliens that are chasing them because they are suffering from a delusion, or something to that effect). — Dan

The question is why did the person buy a shirt which they know is of unknown fabric, when the person's desire was to only buy a shirt if it is 100% cotton. Do you not see that the action as contrary to the person's desire? How can you claim that a choice which is contrary to the person's desire, is understood by the person?

I would accept not applying one's rationality also. So long as the person understands the choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it if they choose to, then that is sufficient. If they then decide to do things for no reason or just because they felt like it or whatever, then that's fine. — Dan

How does that make any sense to you? You are saying that the person understands the choice, even if the process of understanding it hasn't occurred yet. That makes no sense at all. You are allowing that the person can look back in time, after the fact, and say I did that for X,Y, and Z reasons, when those reasons really did not enter into the person's decision making process at all. This is nothing but allowing yourself to be lied to, and deceived by the person's rationalization.

The person can make up an excuse, after the fact, for acting in a specific way (what I called "rationalize" above), when the excuse does not at all represent the real thought process of the person at the time of making the choice, they are just applying their rationality to it after the fact. And you would accept this 'after the fact' rationalization which is really a false representation of what thoughts actually led to the act, as proof and justification that the person knew what they were doing at the time.

There are a great many things that we allow to happen which do require a choice. — Dan

That's exactly what I said, and very clear evidence that your claim that there is no distinction to be made between choosing to act, and allowing things to happen, is false. The claim that there is no distinction to be made is your reason for choosing consequentialism as an acceptable moral philosophy. Clearly, you need to revisit that choice.

I'm not suggesting that people are morally responsible for things they couldn't prevent (ought implies can and all that), rather I am suggesting that the whether you are actively doing something or simply letting it happen when you could easily prevent it doesn't make much of a difference. — Dan

But there is clearly a huge difference. The type of "understanding" employed in each of these two distinct types of situation is completely different. Do you not grasp the fact that watching something happen, "observation" only allows you to understand what has happened after it has happened? We can watch an act in process, extrapolate from principles of cause/effect, and make predictions about how it will play out, or end, but when these predictions involve the actions of a free agent they are extremely unreliable. On the other hand, when you are actively doing something, you can, and ought to apply these principles of cause/effect, and make such prediction prior to even beginning the act.

Do you not see the difference between having the time to understand, and make the required predictions prior to acting, and observing an act in process, with absolutely no prior knowledge about it, and having to make predictions concerning it 'on the fly'? This is an indication of why the nature of time is of the utmost importance to moral philosophy, but both you and @AmadeusD refused to accept this fact.

First, it seems very odd to say that you choosing to walk on past rather than saving the drowning child is "disallowing yourself to act". — Dan

Why do you say this? The natural human urge, or tendency, is to have compassion and sympathy for a crying child. It is an instinctual response. This is the evolutionary reason why the child cries, and the mother attends. It is also why big aid charities such as UNICEF used to play television commercials showing children in horrible conditions in an effort to get you to donate. To prevent yourself from responding to a child in need requires will power, control of one's emotions.

My question is, why does any of this matter? Does any of this lead to us not being blameworthy for things we let happen? — Dan

It matters because the thought process, the "understanding", which supports the disallowing of actions, (known as "will power"), and the thought process, the "understanding" which produces actions (choosing to act) is completely different. Furthermore, once you allow these two differences of thought processes, and come to recognize the distinction, you'll see the need to provide a third category, simply "allowing" oneself to act. And this type of action, is devoid of any real thought process. Therefore we cannot say that it is a choice which is understood. This type of choice is driven by things described by words like instinct, emotion, passion, urge, whim, habit, etc.. And, there is a vast multitude of them occurring all the time, they are morally relevant, so we need to be able to account for them in a moral philosophy.

This is the true representation of "things we let happen", that category of choices which we do not understand, things that we just happen to do, like buy the shirt. And, we must be blameworthy for such things if we want to be able curb the mistakes which often follow from such choices.

Your representation of "things we let happen" is really meaningless, because this type of situation you mention, is reducible to a reasoned, or understood, choice of not to act. Reasoned choices, whether to act or prevent acting, are always blameworthy or praiseworthy, so there is no question, or issue here.

There is simply a requirement for different principles of judgement to be applied due to the temporal reality of the nature of acts in general. As explained above, planning an act is prior to the act, and responding to an act is posterior to observation of an act in process. That is why there is a big difference between first, second, and third degree murder, for example.

My question is, what are you claiming I am wrong about when it comes to evaluating moral decisions or giving moral guidance? — Dan

As I've explained, your adherence to consequentialism is based in misunderstanding. This misunderstanding inclines you not to make a distinction between choosing (mental process) and acting (physical process). Further, your belief in libertarian free will inclines you to deny that mental processes are "the cause" of physical actions, and this reinforces your refusal to make a distinction between mental processes and physical processes.

So you have a vicious circle of unsound logic. There is a belief in libertarian free will, which denies the causation between mental processes and physical processes, but this is based in a false representation of causation. Then, your incoherency is to unite the mental choice with the physical act, making them one and the same, as if the physical act is a necessary effect of the mental choice, and this supports a unity of the two as simply a physical act. The mental choice is divorced from the physical act as 'not the cause of it' by actually uniting it to the physical act as 'one and the same', leaving the mental choice gone, irrelevant by that incoherency. Then, in your consequentialism you focus on the physical act only, having illogically shown the mental thought process as irrelevant. But this is a misunderstanding.

The question is why did the person buy a shirt which they know is of unknown fabric, when the person's desire was to only buy a shirt if it is 100% cotton. Do you not see that the action as contrary to the person's desire? How can you claim that a choice which is contrary to the person's desire, is understood by the person? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because people are capable of acting contrary to their own desires and/or having contrary desires. That really isn't what understanding a choice is about.

How does that make any sense to you? You are saying that the person understands the choice, even if the process of understanding it hasn't occurred yet — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am saying that the kind of understanding of a choice I am discussing here isn't about what reasons one has for a specific choice, it is about knowing what the choice is and what it means to make that choice such that one CAN respond to reasons regarding that choice. It is prior to what you are discussing.

Reasoned choices, whether to act or prevent acting, are always blameworthy or praiseworthy, so there is no question, or issue here. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think we are close to agreeing on a point here. Except that it's not just reasoned choices. The choice to act some way can be praiseworthy or blameworthy regardless of whether one has made a reasoned choice or acted out of habit or on a whim or what have you. Seems to me that you could do away with considering these differently at all and just look at the consequences.

I've explained, your adherence to consequentialism is based in misunderstanding. This misunderstanding inclines you not to make a distinction between choosing (mental process) and acting (physical process). Further, your belief in libertarian free will inclines you to deny that mental processes are "the cause" of physical actions, and this reinforces your refusal to make a distinction between mental processes and physical processes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah but you were wrong on both these counts. The second count also misrepresents me completely as I have not claimed that mental processes are not the cause of our physical actions. I would say that they definitely are. So everything further said on this can be directed at someone else as it certainly doesn't apply to me.



On a different note, I'm going away so expect no replies for a while.

Because people are capable of acting contrary to their own desires and/or having contrary desires. That really isn't what understanding a choice is about. — Dan

Yes it is what understanding a choice is about!

If a person goes out to the second hand store with the desire to only buy a shirt if it's 100% cotton, then comes home with a shirt of unknown composition, and can give no reason for making that choice which is contrary to the desire, clearly it is impossible that the choice is understood.

No, I am saying that the kind of understanding of a choice I am discussing here isn't about what reasons one has for a specific choice, it is about knowing what the choice is and what it means to make that choice such that one CAN respond to reasons regarding that choice. It is prior to what you are discussing. — Dan

Obviously, the person buying the shirt does not know "what it means to make that choice". They've made a choice to do something contrary to what they wanted to do, which they will likely regret in the future.

Being able to "respond to reasons regarding that choice" is irrelevant because such questioning is after the fact, and the person can make up any sort of fictional rationalization in that response. To "understand a choice" is to know the truth about the choice.

I think we are close to agreeing on a point here. Except that it's not just reasoned choices. The choice to act some way can be praiseworthy or blameworthy regardless of whether one has made a reasoned choice or acted out of habit or on a whim or what have you. Seems to me that you could do away with considering these differently at all and just look at the consequences. — Dan

I think the difference is that the reasoned choice is always either blameworthy or praiseworthy, but the non-reasoned choice does not necessarily fall into one of these two categories. When there are reasons for the choice we can judge the reasons, and we can always make a decision as to whether the choice was correct or incorrect, based on an interpretation of the reasons. (The fact that you and I might disagree as to that judgement is irrelevant, having the reasons simply enables a judgement.)

Without reasons for the choice, the choice may or may not be judgeable. Many instinctual responses are judgeable, many are not. The ones which are not, are generally not judgeable because the context by which a judgement could be made is not evident. The judgement of good or bad, correct or incorrect, is relative to the context of the act, the circumstances. When reasons for the act are available, the context is explicit. When there are no reason available, the context must be inferred. The problem is that there is two distinct types of context which one could consider. One is the physical conditions of the choice, the other is what is in the person's mind at the time of the choice, and this includes one's perception of the immediate physical circumstances, as well as the person's intentions, mental associations, and memories etc. And things like mental illness become a factor.

Now, what I believe is the important factor, and this seems to strike at the heart of our disagreement, is that the primary, and I'll say "correct" context for judgement of a choice, any choice, is what is in the person's mind. This is because that is what is evident to the person when making the choice. And, any perception of the immediate physical circumstances is subjective, so that limits the reliability of "the physical conditions" as the context. So when we go to judge the person's choice, and we put the person's choice into the context of "the physical conditions", this presumed context is a product of the judge's perception, not the choice maker's perception. That, in my belief, taints the judgement.

I think I can represent our disagreement in the following way. You think that the primary context of a choice is the physical conditions in which that choice is made, and I think that the primary context is the mental conditions in which that choice is made. So, when a decision is made, which is completely divorced from the current physical conditions, this choice will be completely irrelevant to you, yet it may prove to be extremely relevant to me.

Imagine, a person is sitting at home, thinking about going shopping tomorrow, and deciding to buy a used shirt only if it's 100% cotton. The next day the person is shopping, and buys a shirt of unknown fabric. For you, the context of this choice is the person walking around the store looking at shirts, deciding which one is comfortable, and buying that shirt. There is no issue of the decision which the person made yesterday, because it is not part of the physical context. For me however, the context is the mentalscape, and here, that contrary decision, even though it was made yesterday, is very relevant.

The second count also misrepresents me completely as I have not claimed that mental processes are not the cause of our physical actions. — Dan

Yes you did make that claim. You explicitly stated that your belief in libertarian free will excludes the possibility that choices or actions are "caused". And, the act of volition, which causes a choice, or a physical action, separates the mental processes of thinking from the physical acts. Therefore it is impossible that mental processes, thinking can cause physical actions. This is the means by which you separate decisions made yesterday (to buy a sort only if it's 100% cotton) from decisions made at the current time, as not relevant.

So you decided on the term "influence" instead of "cause". This is the root of your incoherency. You keep wanting to portray actions as united by necessity to choices, as if choice necessitates the action. However, your belief in libertarian free will does not allow that there is anything which necessitates the action. This inclines you to leave no separation between choice and action, such that volition constitutes a choice, which is one and the same thing as an action. Choice and action are the same, because you refuse a causal relation between them but you still need that necessity to uphold morality. But this places volition, the act of the free will, as separate from mental processes, thinking. And by your belief in libertarian free will it is impossible that the act of volition could have a cause, so mental processes, thinking, cannot be the cause of our physical actions.

The whole problem here is that your belief in libertarian free will does not allow you to understand causation in the terms of final cause, which allows that thinking is the cause of free will choices, in that sense of "cause".

I'm going away so expect no replies for a while. — Dan

Thanks for the notice Dan. It's been a pleasure.

This is an indication of why the nature of time is of the utmost importance to moral philosophy, but both you and AmadeusD refused to accept this fact. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whatever you're talking about has nothing to do with me. This is not a position i hold/deny/have had much thought about.

Since you've mentioned it, I agree. No f-ing clue how anything else came across. The problem with what you're saying is that its an empirical aspect of any given moral decision and cannot be a guiding, formal aspect of moral thinking in the abstract.

Still, you're not wrong. The literal stretch of time in which one can weigh up options bears heavy on any moral decisions (that are adequately considered, anyway).