Ok, I see. The wave-function is interpreted as an 'useful' fiction but at the same time the theory also adopts Counterfactual definiteness. How is non-locality handled in this interpretation? — boundless
Counterfactual definiteness? Yes, I guess; but again, when people talk about counterfactual definiteness, they are usually talking about the wavefunction and perhaps things like collapse. Stochastic interpretation would be talking about definiteness in regard to something else, so the concept has arguably changed. — Apustimelogist
Well, on the error point, I don't think someone like Berkeley has the same problem here. For Berkeley, we see the world as it is under normal conditions, although of course we see it from our individual perspective. Error is its own category. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The problem comes up only when it is assumed that it is impossible to see the world as it "really is," because such knowledge would require "knowing the world without a mind." The problem is not only that both experience under normal conditions and conditions of error share in unreality, but that we have no means of saying which is closer to "what things are really like." If the way things "really are" is inaccessible, if even space and time are the unique products of the mind, then there is no possible comparison of experience and reality. Correspondence is out. Nor will an identity theory work. We can't say that there is an identity shared by experience and reality—that, as Aristotle says in De Anima, the "mind (potentially) becomes all things," because this possibility is also excluded. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Now, if the intelligibility of things and the intelligibility of our experiences and our knowledge of things is the same, there is no problem. Reason is perhaps the glue that holds things together (rather than a sort of "bridge between them" that we must build). On this view, we are never separated. But on this view it isn't true that we don't see things as they are. To be sure, we don't see things perfectly. There is a difference between discursive human reason and simple divine apprehension of all truths. Truth, with being, is inherently bound up in intelligibility though (e.g. St. Thomas' disputed questions on truth). — Count Timothy von Icarus
For instance, if I cling to the expression 'the sun rises and sets' as some truth about 'how the world is' I would be in error. Still, in a sense, is a 'valid' statement: it correctly describes some experiences (but not all) and has some practical utility. The same goes for, say, newtonian mechanics. — boundless
The other problem is that of the "construction" of intelligibility…. — Count Timothy von Icarus
What's to say all minds don't construct radically different worlds? — Count Timothy von Icarus
But we are supposedly constructing all that understanding? — Count Timothy von Icarus
….what is contained in the construction cannot be said to be present in what it is constructed from. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The problem comes up only when it is assumed that it is impossible to see the world as it "really is," because such knowledge would require "knowing the world without a mind." — Count Timothy von Icarus
how exactly do you check that experience corresponds to what is outside experience? — Count Timothy von Icarus
How can I have a certain/true knoledge** of them? — boundless
the idea of “constructing” intelligibility, that intelligibility is something constructed. I find nothing to suggest Kant’s philosophy, or, indeed anyone else’s, is about that, and in particular following from it, this notion of constructing the intelligibility of things. — Mww
You are making the common mistake of equating knowledge with certainty. Certainty has no place in empirical knowledge, only in math and logic. Your over restrictive "true knowledge" limits knowledge to the latter. I suggest you abandon the obsession with certainty. — hypericin
….the metaphysical foundations of science has him constructing nature from intelligence…. — Gregory
There has to be something "out there" that wasn't phenomenal or spiritual from which intelligence can bounce its intuitions off of. — Gregory
The "I" posits itself. Why? For the reason that it can. It's a strange loop. — Gregory
The statement 'the Sun and the stars revolve around Earth and they move from east to west' is, if taken literally (i.e. as an accurate description of 'what really happens in the external world'), false. — boundless
but yes I would say that in order to be 'true knowledge' (and not a 'provisional', 'pragmatic', 'transactional' or even an 'approximate' one) it must be unmistaken. Do you think that a false (but reasonable) belief can be said to be knowledge? — boundless
But at the same time if we interpret the same statement in a non-literal way, in some sense is true. — boundless
The statement 'the Sun and the stars revolve around Earth and they move from east to west' is, if taken literally, perfectly true, as anyone can attest*. What is unclear is the honorific 'what really happens in the external world'. — SophistiCat
"Unmistaken" is not "certain". To be knowledge, a belief must be true. That means for empirical beliefs we can never be totally sure that our beliefs are knowledge or not. And that is ok. — hypericin
I feel you are muddling things here. Statements are only true or false wrt an interpretation. Given the same statement, some interpretations may be true, others may be false. This just demonstrates that uninterpreted statements, "statements in themselves", don't have truth values.
Only interpretations do. — hypericin
Here is my commentary….. — Gregory
He wanted to establish a very fact upon which all philosophy could be based. Was this just the cogito? — Gregory
if taken literally, perfectly true, as anyone can attest*. — SophistiCat
However, if you think Kant coukd have refuted Fichte, it would be interesting to see how. — Gregory
consciousness is nothing more than the qualitative state of the human subject — Mww
Not sure if you are disagreeing with me or not. If by 'taken literally' one means that it correctly describes the appearances then, yes, I agree that it can be said to be 'literally true'.
On the other hand, the 'geocentrists' believed that our experience was totally veridical: the Earth was at the center of the universe and didn't move and the Sun revolved around it. It wasn't a mere 'it appears as if' but 'it appears because it is so'. In other words, they were extremely naive realists. — boundless
Are implying that there is a world beyond appearances that can somehow be known? — SophistiCat
It seems to me consciousness is not a quality — AmadeusD
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