Ok, I see. The wave-function is interpreted as an 'useful' fiction but at the same time the theory also adopts Counterfactual definiteness. How is non-locality handled in this interpretation? — boundless

Counterfactual definiteness? Yes, I guess; but again, when people talk about counterfactual definiteness, they are usually talking about the wavefunction and perhaps things like collapse. Stochastic interpretation would be talking about definiteness in regard to something else, so the concept has arguably changed.

Regarding non-locality? In the most up to date formulations of the stochastic interpretation, it should be as non-local/local as orthodox quantum theory. There should be no statistical signalling statistically, there is no collapse and measurements do not have any causal influence on each other across space or time. Obviously, there must be non-local correlations and stochastic laws between separated particles but it doesn't seem to me that this implies some kind of causal signalling. At the end of the day, stochastic systems are capable of producing non-local correlations from some unremarkable assumptions regardless of whether the stochastic interpretation is correct or not.

Sure, you can do that if you can compare the territory with the map. But now what is to be done when the territory is unobservable by definition?

This is precisely why Fichte and Hegel take Kant in a radically new direction.

This is a world map from 1892. This perspective of the world was unobservable in a time without spaceships and satellites. While there are obvious distortions, I think they managed to do a pretty good job of inferring the major features and their relationships from the evidence they had.

I think this is a pretty good analogy with our relationship with the external world, which is unobservable as it is (as the concept is incoherent), but about which we can know quite a bit inferentially from evidence and conceptual modelling.

This is fair! A kind of dualist then?

:up: You can see it like provided you don’t fall into the trap of ‘objectifying’ mind.

I agree with your sentiment. It makes sense on the view that the "external" world is intelligible in itself. It does not, however, make sense on the view that the external world is unintelligible.

I mean, re your example, per Kant space is a creation of the mind. So you can't make maps of the noumena in this way. Obviously Kantians aren't going to argue against your point, that we can make accurate phenomenally accessible maps of phenomenally accessible territories. Consider that there were very, very many ways to confirm that maps corresponded to the world before the first satellites. Now how exactly do you check that experience corresponds to what is outside experience? Can you step outside experience to check?

Counterfactual definiteness? Yes, I guess; but again, when people talk about counterfactual definiteness, they are usually talking about the wavefunction and perhaps things like collapse. Stochastic interpretation would be talking about definiteness in regard to something else, so the concept has arguably changed. — Apustimelogist

No, CFD (counterfactual definiteness) simply implies that physical quantities have definite values at all times. de Broglie Bohm's interpertation is a perfect example of an interpetation which has CFD. MWI violates CFD because it assigns multiple values to hypothetical measurements, so it can be realistic and 'local' (although in a weird sense... after all, what is more nonlocal than a 'universal wavefunction' split at each measurement?).

If your stochastic interpretation accepts that there is a definite configuration of particles at all times, then how can you explain Bell's experiments without non-locality? In de Broglie-Bohm's interpretation, in the case of entangled particles, the velocity of each entangled particle (which always has a definite value) depends instantaneously on the positions (which always have a definite value) of the other entangled particles. That's how the interpretation 'explains' (or at least 'gives a description of') Bell's experiments.
But this implies that you need some kind of 'simultaneity' (a long time ago, I read of some versions of this interpretation which are Lorentz invariant. So, I guess that this kind of 'simultaneity' doesn't necessarily imply a rejection of special relativity. I don't remember however the details)

So, in your view, if the particle configuration is definite at all times, how can you describe non-local correlations without a non-local dynamics/kinematics which involves some notion of simultaneity?

Well, on the error point, I don't think someone like Berkeley has the same problem here. For Berkeley, we see the world as it is under normal conditions, although of course we see it from our individual perspective. Error is its own category. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ok, Berkeley was an ontological idealist, so yeah, I agree with this. After all, ontological idealism is actually more similar to realism than some forms epistemic and transcendental idealism, skepticism, phenomenologies etc. After all, ontological idealism is, well, a metaphysical theory of 'how things really are'.

The problem comes up only when it is assumed that it is impossible to see the world as it "really is," because such knowledge would require "knowing the world without a mind." The problem is not only that both experience under normal conditions and conditions of error share in unreality, but that we have no means of saying which is closer to "what things are really like." If the way things "really are" is inaccessible, if even space and time are the unique products of the mind, then there is no possible comparison of experience and reality. Correspondence is out. Nor will an identity theory work. We can't say that there is an identity shared by experience and reality—that, as Aristotle says in De Anima, the "mind (potentially) becomes all things," because this possibility is also excluded. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But note that if one accepts that experience is the starting point of knowledge and if one accepts that experience is also the way we 'validate' our judgments, then corrispondence is difficult to maintain.
I can infer something about the 'external world' from my experiences but how can I 'prove' that my inferences are correct? How can I have a certain/true knoledge** of them?
Induction is not compelling. Even if all my experiences were to be consistent with some of my inferences about 'how the world out there should be', then I would still not have a certain, true knowledge. All I can have is a 'best guess'.

But I can still detect errors in judgments. I can still determine that some of my inferences are incorrect if they contradict some of my experience. In other words, while I cannot determine 'truth', I can determine (at least some) 'falsity'. Induction might not be a solid foundation for truth but it is still able to determine the falsity of some judgments.

But of course, this validation that we get from experience doesn't give us true knowledge and so it is not enough for truth (I reject 'coherence theory of truth', because a judgment that is coherent with all experiences is not enough to be called 'true'). So what? I think that, at least philosophically, we should 'suspend judgment' about the 'external world', i.e. the world outside experience. There is no denial here about the 'external world', or how it might be.

For instance, if I cling to the expression 'the sun rises and sets' as some truth about 'how the world is' I would be in error. Still, in a sense, is a 'valid' statement: it correctly describes some experiences (but not all) and has some practical utility. The same goes for, say, newtonian mechanics.

On the other hand, I believe if you actually think that we can have true knowledge about 'how the world is' that we can discover by inference from our experience, we need some other assumption which is IMO unprovable.

Personally, I think I am closer to Pyrrhonism than Kantianism in epistemology.

Now, if the intelligibility of things and the intelligibility of our experiences and our knowledge of things is the same, there is no problem. Reason is perhaps the glue that holds things together (rather than a sort of "bridge between them" that we must build). On this view, we are never separated. But on this view it isn't true that we don't see things as they are. To be sure, we don't see things perfectly. There is a difference between discursive human reason and simple divine apprehension of all truths. Truth, with being, is inherently bound up in intelligibility though (e.g. St. Thomas' disputed questions on truth). — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you say that 'we can get true knowledge, at least in principle, from inferences from our experiences because the world is intelligible' this is IMO an assumption. It might be correct but we cannot prove it.

@Count Timothy von Icarus

For instance, if I cling to the expression 'the sun rises and sets' as some truth about 'how the world is' I would be in error. Still, in a sense, is a 'valid' statement: it correctly describes some experiences (but not all) and has some practical utility. The same goes for, say, newtonian mechanics. — boundless

To expand on this...

I believe that 'the sun rises and sets' might be called a 'provisional truth'. It is valid in some contexts but if we cling at is it were a 'true description of the world', what we might call an 'ultimate truth' about the 'external world', we would be in error.
So, in a sense, yes, we can make 'true judgments' in the sense they are coherent, at least in some contexts.
But at the same time, 'experiences and inferences from experiences' alone cannot give us true knowledge. Provisional, pragmatic 'truths' yes, but these 'truths' are not truths in the 'classical' philosophical sense. Accepting these 'provisional truths' is not really the problem, the problem seems to be clinging about them.
Without additional assumptions we are not justified that we can know 'truths' which are 'higher' than 'provisional truths'. And IMO it is up to who upholds these additional assumptions to give a justification of them. BTW, I am not saying that such assumptions cannot be 'reasonable', so to speak, but 'reasonableness' might not be enough to be a philosophical justification, in the sense that of a rationally compelling justification. And, also, as our progress in science revealed to us is that even the most 'reasonable' ideas human beings have had about the world turned out to be incorrect, incoherent with observations (which ultimately are experiences, after all, if one thinks about it). And these 'reasonable ideas' were supported by equally 'reasonable assumptions', which themselves were found incorrect.
Note that I am not saying that all our reasonable assumptions are necessary false and will necessarily be found false but simply that we seem not to be able to justify them in a 'rationally compelling' sense and also that clinging about them have been a source of mistakes.

BTW, actually more than Pyrrhonism, my view of knowledge is mostly inspired by some versions of the 'theory of two truths' that I encountered in some schools of Indian philosophies/religions (especially some Buddhist schools). At the same time, similar ideas are also present in some western thinkers and philosophical schools, e.g. Pyrrhonism, which maybe is actually close to my own views on epistemology as I don't make any claim about 'ultimate truth' (after all, even in Indian philosophies/religions, positive claims about the 'ultimate truth' were made in a religious context and often had a religious 'justification', not a philosophical one, at least not completely philosophical one. But I am digressing...).

The other problem is that of the "construction" of intelligibility…. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yeah, I suppose that’s my problem here: the idea of “constructing” intelligibility, that intelligibility is something constructed. I find nothing to suggest Kant’s philosophy, or, indeed anyone else’s, is about that, and in particular following from it, this notion of constructing the intelligibility of things.

What's to say all minds don't construct radically different worlds? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Nothing at all; sometimes a mind does create….determine….a radically different world. Subsequently, if enough other minds come to the same judgement, that radically different world comes to be. Like….stop using leeches in medicine; let’s wipe out indigenous cultures in order to satisfy some conceived greater need.

But we are supposedly constructing all that understanding? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Understanding is a merely speculative faculty of human intelligence, which is itself that which constructs. The use of personal pronouns helps to facilitate whatever conversations arise from intelligence, but intelligence in and of itself, in its natural activity, has no use for them.

….what is contained in the construction cannot be said to be present in what it is constructed from. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Correct. From a philosophical point of view, human intelligence is a speculative procedural system, in that the end (that which is contained in the construction, re: experience/knowledge) is not present in the means, or, that which the ends are constructed from (phenomenal and conceptual representations).
————-

The problem comes up only when it is assumed that it is impossible to see the world as it "really is," because such knowledge would require "knowing the world without a mind." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, such an assumption would be more than a problem; it would be an irrational venture into absurdity. Thankfully, no one of sufficient reason has ever been guilty of it.

It remains conclusive, that is impossible to see….sense, intuit, comprehend, cognize, judge, experience….the world as it really is, but not because of the absence of a mind, but merely because that which does all that stuff, re: theoretical reason, is not part of what that stuff is done to, re: existential Nature.
————

how exactly do you check that experience corresponds to what is outside experience? — Count Timothy von Icarus

That isn’t how it works. The checking, which is not the construction but presupposes it necessarily, is done by the congruency of one experience with another antecedent to it.

Fun stuff, donchathink?

How can I have a certain/true knoledge** of them? — boundless

You are making the common mistake of equating knowledge with certainty. Certainty has no place in empirical knowledge, only in math and logic. Your over restrictive "true knowledge" limits knowledge to the latter. I suggest you abandon the obsession with certainty.

the idea of “constructing” intelligibility, that intelligibility is something constructed. I find nothing to suggest Kant’s philosophy, or, indeed anyone else’s, is about that, and in particular following from it, this notion of constructing the intelligibility of things. — Mww

This is how Fichte interpreted Kant. Kant's book on the metaphysical foundations of science has him constructing nature from intelligence in link with the noumena. There has to be something "out there" that wasn't phenomenal or spiritual from which intelligence can bounce its intuitions off of. Fichte has us creating ourselves (and probably even the noumena, although he went back and forth on this and probably on purpose) the same way Schopenhauer has it. The "I" posits itself. Why? For the reason that it can. It's a strange loop. (A strange loop has its place outside the world but makes less sense within the world, as does creation from nothing) A human would be responsible even for his birth for Fichte and Schopenhauer, as Buddhism had for so many years before proposed

You are making the common mistake of equating knowledge with certainty. Certainty has no place in empirical knowledge, only in math and logic. Your over restrictive "true knowledge" limits knowledge to the latter. I suggest you abandon the obsession with certainty. — hypericin

I would not say that this kind of certainty is the same as the one found in math and logic, but yes I would say that in order to be 'true knowledge' (and not a 'provisional', 'pragmatic', 'transactional' or even an 'approximate' one) it must be unmistaken. Do you think that a false (but reasonable) belief can be said to be knowledge?

If we grant a 'fallible knowledge' the status of a 'true, unmistaken knowledge', then our ancestors that believed that the Sun and the stars revolved around Earth would correctly claim 'I know, based on observation, that the Sun and the stars revolve around Earth and they move from east to west'. If this is taken as a statement of 'knowing how the world really is', then we know that is mistaken.

But of course the same statement 'I know, based on observation, that the Sun and the stars revolve around Earth and they move from east to west' can also be considered correct, if it describes the apparent motion of these celestial objects. Also, it is correct if it is taken to be a claim of provisional or pragmatic knowledge. The problem arises when one clings to such a statement as an affirmation of 'how the external world really is'.

To conclude, I am not sure I disagree with you, actually. If 'knowledge' is taken to mean as a reasonable belief then I think we agree. If 'knowledge' is taken as meaning an unmistaken belief, then no.
IMO the distinction between 'provisional truth' and 'ultimate truth' that I made in my previous posts doesn't by itself denote an obsession for certainty. It can also denote an 'open minded perspective' that doesn't consider our beliefs based on empirical evidence and inference from such evidence as unmistaken beliefs.

Also, it's possible to consider the issue in another way.

The statement 'the Sun and the stars revolve around Earth and they move from east to west' is, if taken literally (i.e. as an accurate description of 'what really happens in the external world'), false.
But at the same time if we interpret the same statement in a non-literal way, in some sense is true.

Clearly, the truth of this statement is provisional, pragmatic - not 'ultimate'. The mistake of those who believed in the accuracy of the statement was that they took it literally. You can take these statements seriously (i.e. as statements of provisional, pragmatic truths) even if you don't take them literally (for instance, I can say 'I want to have the sunlight in my room in the morning, so I should have windows that face the east because the Sun moves from east to west during the day' is a valid inference even if my reasoning is based on a geocentric model, which is used in a practical way. I can use such a model even if I do not take it literally).

So, we can say that it is a 'pragmatic, provisional knowledge' but not a 'true knowledge'. IMO the distinction between these two concepts is important.

….the metaphysical foundations of science has him constructing nature from intelligence…. — Gregory

He constructs an understanding of Nature in accordance with a specific kind of intelligence. I don’t understand that project as “constructing” intelligibility, when such must already be given in order for an intelligence of any kind to fathom anything at all from that to which it is directed.

There has to be something "out there" that wasn't phenomenal or spiritual from which intelligence can bounce its intuitions off of. — Gregory

Agree, and from that arises the notion that, no matter what that something out there happens to be, its intelligibility must given in order for a judgement to be determinable with respect to it. If a thing is intelligible in us as this or that thing, its intelligibility as becoming this or that must already inhere in the thing as a condition of it. That it is a thing is conditioned by its extension in space; that it is this or that thing is conditioned by its intelligibility.

The "I" posits itself. Why? For the reason that it can. It's a strange loop. — Gregory

Yeah, I suppose. “Strange loop” a euphemism for the intrinsic circularity of pure reason herself, insofar as it is necessarily the clandestine use of reason by which reason becomes comprehensible enough to express as a speculative intellectual system. That there is that which thinks, is itself a thought.

Thanks for bringing up Fichte in juxtaposition to Kant, but I still don’t see the constructing of intelligibility in either of them. Not that there it isn’t there, just that I’m not familiar with it as such.

The statement 'the Sun and the stars revolve around Earth and they move from east to west' is, if taken literally (i.e. as an accurate description of 'what really happens in the external world'), false. — boundless

The statement 'the Sun and the stars revolve around Earth and they move from east to west' is, if taken literally, perfectly true, as anyone can attest*. What is unclear is the honorific 'what really happens in the external world'.

* Unless you are dead-set on some privileged reference frame, in which case you must be going through life in chronic confusion, unable to understand simple directions like "left" or "east".

but yes I would say that in order to be 'true knowledge' (and not a 'provisional', 'pragmatic', 'transactional' or even an 'approximate' one) it must be unmistaken. Do you think that a false (but reasonable) belief can be said to be knowledge? — boundless

"Unmistaken" is not "certain". To be knowledge, a belief must be true. That means for empirical beliefs we can never be totally sure that our beliefs are knowledge or not. And that is ok.

But at the same time if we interpret the same statement in a non-literal way, in some sense is true. — boundless

I feel you are muddling things here. Statements are only true or false wrt an interpretation. Given the same statement, some interpretations may be true, others may be false. This just demonstrates that uninterpreted statements, "statements in themselves", don't have truth values.
Only interpretations do.

Here is my commentary on the Stanford Encyclopedia's article on Fichte.

First to note, Fichte famously did away with the thing-in-itself early in his career. He wanted to establish a very fact upon which all philosophy could be based. Was this just the cogito?

*The published presentation of the first principles of the Jena Wissenschaftslehre commences with the proposition, “the I posits itself”; more specifically, “the I posits itself as an I.” Since this activity of “self-positing” is taken to be the fundamental feature of I-hood in general, the first principle asserts that “the I posits itself as self-positing.”*

So the I is in some sense prior to itself, hence the strange loop.

*Unfortunately, this starting point is somewhat obscured in Part I of the Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre by a difficult and somewhat forced attempt on Fichte’s part to connect this starting point to the logical law of identity, as well as by the introduction of two additional “first principles,” corresponding to the logical laws of non-contradiction and sufficient reason...*

I think this is more important that it seems. The I is necessary AS intelligent. The law of identity, non contradiction, and sufficient reason are part of the fabric of the "I posit" as if the I flows logically from it's own nature. The I can only posit an intelligent self that thinks

*"To posit” (setzen) means simply “to be aware of,” “to reflect upon,” or “to be conscious of”; this term does not imply that the I must simply “create” its objects of consciousness.*

Not "simply create" but create in a sense that there is no thing in itself. But the empirical I does not do this. The I of the body is IN the world as born and living

"The principle in question simply states that the essence of I-hood lies in the assertion of ones own self-identity, i.e., that consciousness presupposes self-consciousness (the Kantian “I think,” which must, at least in principle, be able to accompany all our representations). Such immediate self-identify, however, cannot be understood as a psychological “fact,” no matter how privileged, nor as an “action” or “accident” of some previously existing substance or being. To be sure, it is an “action” of the I, but one that is identical with the very existence of the same.*

Fichte was in a pickle. He didn't want to "say" we create the world or ourselves, but he puts himself in between saying we do and we don't in such a carefully balanced act that his philosophy must fall to one side. Everyone seems to agree he was an idealist. The encyclopedia is pointing out his hesitation on this

*In Fichte’s technical terminology, the original unity of self-consciousness is to be understood as both an action and as the product of the same: as a Tathandlung or “fact/act,” a unity that is presupposed by and contained within every fact and every act of empirical consciousness, though it never appears as such therein.

This same “identity in difference” of original self-consciousness might also be described as an “intellectual intuition,” inasmuch as it involves the immediate presence of the I to itself, prior to and independently of any sensory content.*

The difference between the empirical I and the transcendental I!

*To be sure, such an “intellectual intuition” never occurs, as such, within empirical consciousness; instead, it must simply be presupposed (that is, “posited”) in order to explain the possibility of actual consciousness, within which subject and object are always already distinguished. The occurrence of such an original intellectual intuition is itself inferred, not intuited...*

As bodies we are not aware of our source of consciousness directly

*A fundamental corollary of Fichte’s understanding of I-hood (Ichheit) as a kind of fact/act is his denial that the I is originally any sort of “thing” or “substance.” Instead, the I is simply what it posits itself to be, and thus its “being” is, so to speak, a consequence of its self-positing, or rather, is co-terminus with the same*

If it was a substance it could not create itself in any sense whatsoever. It would just "be". As an act which establishes itself, it can "be" prior to itself. Being prior to itself, it can be self conscious by reflecting on the I it is prior to

The statement 'the Sun and the stars revolve around Earth and they move from east to west' is, if taken literally, perfectly true, as anyone can attest*. What is unclear is the honorific 'what really happens in the external world'. — SophistiCat

Not sure if you are disagreeing with me or not. If by 'taken literally' one means that it correctly describes the appearances then, yes, I agree that it can be said to be 'literally true'.
On the other hand, the 'geocentrists' believed that our experience was totally veridical: the Earth was at the center of the universe and didn't move and the Sun revolved around it. It wasn't a mere 'it appears as if' but 'it appears because it is so'. In other words, they were extremely naive realists.

The 'honorific' simply means that it was taken as 'a correct description of (external) reality as it is'

"Unmistaken" is not "certain". To be knowledge, a belief must be true. That means for empirical beliefs we can never be totally sure that our beliefs are knowledge or not. And that is ok. — hypericin

Well, by 'unmistaken' I meant without error, i.e. correct. To me this is 'certain', unless by 'certainty' we mean the certainty of, say, a logical deduction or a mathematical proof. I think we agree.

However, if by 'knowledge' we mean a 'true belief' we need to understand what 'true' means. IMO, believing that 'Sun moves from east to west' can be considered a kind of provisional/pragmatic knowledge. But of course if the same statement is interpreted, as you correctly point out, as a 'correct description of external reality' is false.

I feel you are muddling things here. Statements are only true or false wrt an interpretation. Given the same statement, some interpretations may be true, others may be false. This just demonstrates that uninterpreted statements, "statements in themselves", don't have truth values.
Only interpretations do. — hypericin

Ok, point taken. We need to establish some kind of criteria before be able to assign a truth value to a statement. I think that a 'doctrine of two truth' is able to do that.

To use the same example:

• "The Sun moves from west to east" is false pragmatically/provisionally (it contradicts the appearances) and false ultimately (it isn't a correct description of the 'external reality as it is')
• "The Sun moves from east to west" is true pragmatically/provisionally (it correctly describes the appearances) and it is false ultimately (it isn't a correct description of the 'external reality as it is')

So, I would say that I agree that the truth value of a statement is dependent on the interpretation. This also means that there are different types of knowledge.

Here is my commentary….. — Gregory

….and quite well done, I must say. I don’t feel it is my place to argue your position, even while I wouldn’t have any problem at all arguing Kant against Fichte. Which isn’t that big a deal; each successor wants more from his own philosophy than on whomever’s it is based, and a third-party arbiter can pick out the differences.

He wanted to establish a very fact upon which all philosophy could be based. Was this just the cogito? — Gregory

Kant, positing the “I” that thinks as a transcendental idea, contradicts himself by attempting to make the cogito a fact; thus, it must remain a mere logically necessary condition in a speculative metaphysical philosophy.

Do you think Fichte was successful in making the cogito a fact?

Yes because the "act/fact" for Fichte is freedom. Descartes and Kant had a priori structures and innate ideas as the source of consciousness while Fichte had yourself as the source of consciousness. This is how freedom comes about. Freedom is the being responsible for the ones' being(s) and acts. As pointed out, Buddhism seems to imply this same position as well. Schopenhauer kept the Platonic realm as after the will (to act/exist) and it seems this realm is where Descartes and Kant got stuck. I don't think they went as deep as he did

Trying to put Kant, Fitche, Spinoza, Einstein and Schopenhauer together, i recently made this progression of how human consciousness emerges:

1) nothingness > 2) emptiness > 3) imagination > 4) will > 5) personhood > 6) collective unconsciouss > 7) consciousness as intellect

I don't know if i'd swear by it but it feels accurate to me. However, if you think Kant coukd have refuted Fichte, it would be interesting to see how. It's also interesting to ask why Kant didn't do this while alive; maybe he was just getting old

if taken literally, perfectly true, as anyone can attest*. — SophistiCat

I can't see the * comment, but this is plainly a misuse of 'literally'. If taken 'literally' it is, after investigation, entirely false. If taken as a description of appearances (i.e not to be taken literally) then it goes through.

However, if you think Kant coukd have refuted Fichte, it would be interesting to see how. — Gregory

I didn’t say anything about refutation; I said I could argue one against the other, which is easy because they go in different directions from a common transcendental origin.

I’m not a fan of emergent consciousness. It is enough, that consciousness is nothing more than the qualitative state of the human subject. Parsimony: be as simple as possible without being so simple further explanation invites self-contradiction.

consciousness is nothing more than the qualitative state of the human subject — Mww

Hmm. It seems to me consciousness is not a quality and cannot be conceptualised as a quality (so, in turn, a "qualitative state" is also inapt. It is the basis for quality to enter into experience). Consciousness is a quantity which instantiates qualities (it seems), so while your approach is logically pragmatic it seems to both not capture what we understand about htese phrases for ourselves, and doesn't deliver us any clarity.

Not sure if you are disagreeing with me or not. If by 'taken literally' one means that it correctly describes the appearances then, yes, I agree that it can be said to be 'literally true'.
On the other hand, the 'geocentrists' believed that our experience was totally veridical: the Earth was at the center of the universe and didn't move and the Sun revolved around it. It wasn't a mere 'it appears as if' but 'it appears because it is so'. In other words, they were extremely naive realists. — boundless

I wasn't talking about geocentrists, I was commenting on the plain facts about the rising and setting of the sun and the stars. This is the stuff of astronomy textbooks, not to mention thousands of years of observations by people all around the world. I don't know what is not veridical about that. Yes, this is a description of appearances. Are implying that there is a world beyond appearances that can somehow be known? Is that what you are referring to by the honorific 'a correct description of (external) reality as it is'?

Are implying that there is a world beyond appearances that can somehow be known? — SophistiCat

A "world beyond appearances" in this case, is just the world. It is not veridical to claim the stars and Sun orbit the Earth. It is a cheap and cheerful heuristic - probably to ensure correct directionality when reading stars. We now have telescopes, and better thinking. Does this mean it was true then, but not now?

It seems to me consciousness is not a quality — AmadeusD

Never said it was; qualitative measure belongs to or describes the state of the subject, and represents not that he is conscious of uniting all his representations under one conception, but that the unity is possible in him. In effect, in Kant, consciousness is the precursor to the synthesis of conceptions in a judgement; in order for that synthesis to be possible, there must be that by which synthesis itself is possible, and that resides in the self, as opposed to judgement which belongs to understanding, as unity between the self and all representations of which the self is conscious. And it is quality not quantity, because the number of representations is irrelevant with respect to the “conjunction” of any one of them with any other, hence the self’s consciousness of it, which just is the quality of his state.

Or not. Take your pick.

Never said it was; — Mww

self’s consciousness of it, which just is the quality of his state. — Mww

This is a circle my guy. Not uncommon in Kant, it seems. Onward..

Are you saying the self is a substance or not?



You seem to be taking the self in a more than pragmatic self but the the world in simply a pragmatic sense. Could it be that both have more than "meets the eye"?

Could it be that both have more than "meets the eye"? — Gregory

Certainly could., and I personally don't quite have positions on those. "The self" to me needs to align with identity, which i essentially do not think is coherent (in terms of 'persons'). Tricky to say...