So, without observers, nothing is related to anything whatever. That is the thrust of the OP — Wayfarer

It seems to me that the OP is about how the mind explains the world.

A sub-topic is about does the mind explain the world using mathematical necessity or causal contingency.
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As per above, this question can be asked not only of patterns, but of phenomena generally..........................There are patterns that appear in inorganic nature, in crystals, snowflakes, larva formations etc. — Wayfarer

I agree with the introduction to Pinter's book Mind and Cosmic Order

The book’s argument begins with the British empiricists who raised our awareness of the fact that we have no direct contact with physical reality, but it is the mind that constructs the form and features of objects. It is shown that modern cognitive science brings this insight a step further by suggesting that shape and structure are not internal to objects, but arise in the observer.

I read this as saying that patterns exist in the mind, not the world.

↪Philosophim What a cromulent response! :smile:

This just pushes the question back a level -- why is it effective? — J

Ha ha, glad you got the reference! It is accurate because it is not contradicted by reality, and that's it. If I can hold a word, phrase, or set of built up claims that are not contradicted by reality, then I have 'accuracy'. Meaning that accuracy is not about capturing 'what really is'. Its about creating a representation of the world that isn't contradicted by 'what really is'. If we use deduction, and the steps that lead to knowledge I noted in the paper, its the most reasonable way to think about the world, and the closest we can ever get to capturing 'what really is'.

But we can have multiple terms and viewpoints of the world that are effective. For example, we can use math in base 2,3,4 or any really. They're all 'accurate'. This is where the other two points I made come into play. The most likely reason we use base ten is because we have ten fingers, which are great tools to start counting with. And that's really it. We use base two in logic gates, because there are only two states for a gate "on or off". We use hexadecimal for memory, as it turns out to make more sense when you combine several binary gates together for functionality.

Wouldn't it make more sense for you (if I've understood your thinking here) to abandon any talk of accuracy or truth? — J

No, accuracy is still extremely important, and should be the ideal goal of knowledge. Accuracy doesn't mean necessarily that you've discovered what is true, but it does mean that you're not in contradiction with what is true. Truth of course being, 'What is'.

Religion is a good example of holding a set of terms that may be both accurate and useful depending on culture and a lack of other terminology. Lets say you don't have an objective morality, but common people who till fields all day need a guide. You know that government isn't well liked by people, after all, they take your money with taxes. People like to have a greater purpose then just living. We need people to treat each other right to build a society. The idea of a "God" that can answer complicated questions that these types of people do not have the education, or real need to consider, can be incredibly useful.

Why should I not steal from my neighbor? Because God, your creator who loves you/will kill you has deemed it so. Its part of a greater plan then yourself. When you die, you'll go to heaven/hell based on your performance here. So be happy that tilling the fields is fulfilling Gods plan, don't lust after your neighbors hot body when you're already married, raise your kids well, and treat people right.

"God" in this case is not necessarily contradicted by reality. "Why can't I see God?" "God is all around us, but you can't see or hear him." "How do I know there's an afterlife." "Have faith, don't you feel it inside of you?"

Of course, increased education like neuroscience and epistemology start to reveal that "God" is simply a plausible invention of the mind, not a real applicable reality. But for a common person tilling fields, "God" may actually give them greater purpose, and answers the basic life and moral questions that one might think of while plowing a field at 2 in the afternoon. Satisfaction with their lot in life generates good work, and a life that feels fulfilled. It can create a common ideology the village can gather around that isn't government. It can give a sense of freedom and personal worth.

Suppose bleen is "green and "first observed" during or before 2004," or "blue and 'first observed' after 2004." Could you go walk around where you live and determine what was grue or bleen? — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you understood the essential properties and context of what grue and bleen is, then yes. Notice I say context, because the context of what grue is to a scientist who studies light waves and a local and colloquial understanding of grue can be different. The important part is to first establish what the definition is in context. Only then can you go about applying that definition to confirm or deny its match.

Suppose there is a famous green landmark in your town and it got flattened by a tornado in 2006. It was rebuilt with largely with materials salvaged from the original, but has a substantial amount of new material. Is it bleen or grue? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Same response.

What if only small parts of it were replaced each year since 2004? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Seems a bit Theseus here, so why don't we go to the source?

Really the same situation applies. What does the culture think is Theseus ship? There might be a society that believes ownership only happens for five years, and after five years the original thing has changed so much that it is something completely knew and it needs to be registered with the state again.

We can have another culture that believes ownership is tied with purchase and then use. So as long as he uses the ship, its his no matter the part replacements. But if he abandons it for a year, its no longer his.

Its all about "What are the definitions in the context?" Once you have that, then you do applied knowledge. The problems often come in thinking that applied knowledge happens, then we wonder what the definitions are. That's an improper use of knowledge. That's when we're discovering what the definitions should be.

In the case of grue and blue, we're not asking what the definitions should be, we already know what they mean. Our decision is then, "should we use grue or blue"? And I mentioned earlier, as long as both are accurate to the point they are not contradicted by reality, its really a personal choice. It may be as simple as, "I like one word more than another" or as complicated as, "Those dirty grueians are a stupid people that I find inferior. Blue is obviously superior and the 'right' way to identify a color."

A theorem (as opposed to an equation that's given a real-world interpretation) isn't described as effective, it's described as true, or at least provable in L. — J

It depends on your definition of 'true'. If you mean 'true and false' as logically valid, that's not the same as 'true means what is real'. 'Real' being, "What exists despite our knowledge".

Do you want to abandon that way of talking? If a correspondence theory of truth demands that we do so, I'd argue that it represents a reductio ad absurdum and should be rejected on that ground. — J

In the case of 'truth as reality', there is no correspondence theory of truth. The end result is, "Knowledge is the best logical process we have to understand reality, but it cannot prove that it is a 100% accurate comprehension of truth. That is beyond human limits"

And it all comes down to the fact that 'reality' does not care what we think. Tomorrow we could discover physics is wrong. Does that mean we didn't know physics? Of course not. Today with all we can reason, physics is what is known. So we go with that until shown otherwise. Maybe physics is a 100% accurate representation of truth. Maybe one day we'll discover that its not. But logically, its the best thing we have right now.

If a correspondence theory of truth demands that we do so, I'd argue that it represents a reductio ad absurdum and should be rejected on that ground. — J

Very harsh. The word "true" has different meanings in different contexts.

As regards the equation ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$, i) I can say that it is true, meaning that it works, ii) I can say that it is true, meaning that it has the correct structure of an equation, iii) I can say that it is true, meaning that it is important to me, as in a true friend, iv) I can say we don't know whether it is true or not, as we don't know what obtains in the world, v) I can say I don't know if it is true or not, as I don't know what the symbols represent.

The scientist can use meaning i) for "truth" and the philosopher can use meaning iv) for "truth".
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What would be the point of limiting ourselves in this way? — J

Yes, the correspondence theory does not tell us about things like pain, which, I believe, doesn't exist in the world.

In the proposition "it is true that I feel pain", what purpose does the word "true" have, in that the proposition says no more than "I feel pain"

It seems that "truth" only arises in the correspondence between the mind and the world.

If you understood the essential properties and context of what grue and bleen is, then yes

You can tell when things were created down to the year just by looking at them? When you drive through a neighborhood you know the year each house was built just as readily as the the color it is painted?

the case of grue and blue, we're not asking what the definitions should be, we already know what they mean. Our decision is then, "should we use grue or blue"? And I mentioned earlier, as long as both are accurate to the point they are not contradicted by reality, its really a personal choice. It may be as simple as, "I like one word more than another" or as complicated as, "Those dirty grueians are a stupid people that I find inferior. Blue is obviously superior and the 'right' way to identify a color."

This seems like "because difference is not a logical contradiction it is arbitrary."

"Personal preference," isn't uncaused anyhow, people prefer things because how the world is. Human languages distinguish between shape and color for reasons other than arbitrary social convention for instance. One can feel shape but not color.

There is variance in how disparate cultures that developed in relative isolation cut up the world. At the same time, there isn't nearly the variance we should expect if this was entirely arbitrary.

Likewise, it is not purely in virtue of arbitrary social convention that "leap year biology," "a chemistry of odd numbered days," and a physics for each sex are not used as divisions of the sciences. If someone argued that chemistry should be split into chemistry done by people with blue eyes and chemistry done by people with other colored eyes, or argued that we should divide chemistry into pre and post 1990 chemistries, or a chemistry of federally recognized holidays, they would be rebuffed for non-arbitrary reasons. This might be filtered through "personal preference," but personal preference doesn't spring from the aether uncaused and neither do our concepts and languages.

If you understood the essential properties and context of what grue and bleen is, then yes

You can tell when things were created down to the year just by looking at them? When you drive through a neighborhood you know the year each house was built just as readily as the the color it is painted? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I misunderstood the question then. To tell the age that a house was built, you need verifiable records and trust in their accuracy.

This seems like "because difference is not a logical contradiction it is arbitrary." — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, I'm not saying that. It is arbitrary in terms of 'accuracy'. It is not arbitrary in terms of individuals or cultures. As I noted, language can be a matter of preference and power in addition to accuracy. Preference and power are arbitrary in relation to accuracy, if the only thing one cares about is accuracy. But people often care more about things other than accuracy. Would I elevate these differences to the same level as 'intelligent decisions"? No.

Human languages distinguish between shape and color — Count Timothy von Icarus

This would be about accuracy. Saying, "That feels like the color red" is something only a person with synthesia would experience. So we people without synthesia don't view the above sentence as having any accuracy.

If someone argued that chemistry should be split into chemistry done by people with blue eyes and chemistry done by people with other colored eyes, or argued that we should divide chemistry into pre and post 1990 chemistries, or a chemistry of federally recognized holidays, they would be rebuffed for non-arbitrary reasons. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, like the idea that 'slaves shouldn't read'. Such a division is about cultural power over others, not anything accurate to the nature of being a slave.

This might be filtered through "personal preference," but personal preference doesn't spring from the aether uncaused and neither do our concepts and languages. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I never implied that it did. I'm just noting that personal preference can override why one would use a term over another if you had two terms that accurately described the same situation under consideration. And in some cases, personal preference can override accuracy. Of course, the accurate term will be much more likely to accurately reflect the world, but if one is not interested in that, then it is dismissed.

three kids who want to play with the same toys — Leontiskos

Common solutions: we introduce other toys so that everyone gets something (not an option in our example); no one gets it (not allowed in our example); they each get the whole thing because they will play with it together (not helpful for consumables, as in our example, which is why we split them); we divvy up not the toy but the time playing with it, take turns, and we can even measure the duration of those and make them equal-ish.

(My youngest son used to come to me brandishing minor premises like this: "Dad, don't you think Andy has been on the computer a long time?" Andy is his older brother. Just look at the beautiful deviousness of this, the command of rhetoric ― how young they master the dark arts of persuasion.)

I go to the car dealership and I am offered whole cars. They don't let me buy a half car for half the money. — Leontiskos

You know what would be cool? What if you could give them part of the price and someone else, say a bank, gave them the rest, and you got to take the whole car right now. Then you could have an arrangement with the bank where you pay them back over time, a little each month, and the bank could charge interest to compensate them for the risk they're taking. I think that could catch on! I think that could end up being the way almost everyone buys a car.

See also.