1. Regardless of whether idealism or realism is true, our phenomenological experience of the world would remain unchanged. We would still believe in the existence of the same number of objects. In other words, the idealist and realist would live life behaving in similar manner. — Sirius
To take a common issue, realism or anti-realism with respect to sex or gender will have radical societal implications
Hence, as this one of many examples tries to illustrate, the very notion of "mind-independence" is thoroughly contingent on what one understands by the term "mind". Via at least certain interpretations, there is no reason to deny a reality independent of each and every individual non-effete mind (yours, mine, etc.) to which we all conform that is nevertheless of itself an effete mind and, hence, mind-dependent.
I don't think this is true. Let's take someone who holds my view expressed above & also happens to believe in biological essentialism. He can still believe its possible to divide the essence of "male" or "female" or any other gender into different combination of biological essences. — Sirius
"Can still believe" is not a good test. For example, someone who does not believe that humans have greater dignity than animals "can still believe" that human rights trump animal rights, but it is a helluva lot harder.
It's perfectly & easily feasible to believe the bones of dinosaurs were placed by Satan to trick creationists into believing in evolution. You just need to revise all your beliefs. — Sirius
Once again. Harder according to whom ? — Sirius
I don't think this is quite right. I'll use an example I've used to the point of tedium here about. When you take your coffee cup and put it in the dishwasher, does it still exist? A realist might say that it either exists or it doesn't, and since we have no reason to think it has ceased to exist, then we can reasonably maintain that it still exists. On this view, there are at least two things in the world, the cup and the dishwasher.Regardless of whether idealism or realism is true, our phenomenological experience of the world would remain unchanged. We would still believe in the existence of the same number of objects. — Sirius
Kant ran into this problem and there hasn't really been any satisfactory response to it. — Sirius
This might be right. But it is worth noting that there are things that you know, believe or are certain. Moore made the claim that "Here is a hand". On a forum such as this, we might instead point out that you are now reading this post. Now if you find it difficult to doubt that you are now reading this sentence, then you might also grant things such as that there is a language in which it is written, that someone wrote it, that there are screens and devices and networks linking you to that writer, and so on.I take it that we cannot justify all of our beliefs ad infinitum. — Sirius
There is, actually, curtesy of Wittgenstein's beetle in a box argument. We can say nothing about the supposed thing-in-itself, so it cannot have a use in the conversation. It's a useless notion that can be set aside.
Unfortunately folk continue to say quite a bit about it. — Banno
Kant probably would have agreed with Wittgenstein. — Banno
It isn't, it's irrelevant, and takes up far too much time and effort. — Banno
Sure. Folk want to talk about stuff about which they can't say anything. Off-topic, but be my guest. — Banno
Perhaps it's about joining up the stuff we can talk about in a coherent fashion.
Of course, you can show stuff as well as say it. — Banno
↪javra
I don't see as we need the mysticism. — Banno
The will is shown in the doing. — Banno
:cool:Nice. — Tom Storm
Hence, as this one of many examples tries to illustrate, the very notion of "mind-independence" is thoroughly contingent on what one understands by the term "mind". Via at least certain interpretations, there is no reason to deny a reality independent of each and every individual non-effete mind (yours, mine, etc.) to which we all conform that is nevertheless of itself an effete mind and, hence, mind-dependent. — javra
The problem is that we all know what we mean by 'mind' in the ordinary context. — Janus
What aspect of what we are aware of will not be an aspect of our own minds? — javra
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