I don't so far find justification for this claim. But groovy all the same. Then, please enlighten me as to what we all know "mind" to be in the ordinary sense. — javra

We know what we mean when we say such things as "I changed my mind", "I made up my mind", "I don't mind", " I did that task mindfully", "mind your step" and so on...there are countless examples. They suggest that what we understand as mind is really minding, a verb not a noun, an activity not an object. Of course this is not to say that reification of that activity does not often set in.

I'll start here: What aspect of what we are aware of will not be an aspect of our own minds? — javra

Everything in the so-called external world is not an aspect of our own minds. Of course our perception of those things is a form of minding, but it does not follow that the things are forms of minding. It seems impossible to make sense of the idea that they could be. If the tree I see and the tree you see are forms of our respective mindings then how is that we obviously see the same tree? That we see the same tree suggests that the tree is mind-independent.

And to address the OP, it does make a difference what we believe regarding the question of realism vs anti-realism simply because different beliefs will lead to different dispositions and hence to different actions, affiliations and cultures.

That said, I agree there is also a sense in which it doesn't make a fatal difference as the example of very good theistic scientists, to cite just one example, shows. (Note: I am not suggesting that theism is necessarily aligned with either realism or idealism).

Some folk need there to be only two genders — Banno

Some folk need there to be more than two genders. Let's do philosophy instead of polemics. The question is whether beliefs have an impact on behavior.

Let's do philosophy instead of polemics. — Leontiskos

I thought you decided not to read my posts. Sure, beliefs have an impact on behaviour. And behaviours have an impact on belief. My point is that how to count genders is a decision, not an observation.

I don't so far find justification for this claim. But groovy all the same. Then, please enlighten me as to what we all know "mind" to be in the ordinary sense. — javra


We know what we mean when we say such things as "I changed my mind", "I made up my mind", "I don't mind", " I did that task mindfully", "mind your step" and so on...there are countless examples. They suggest that what we understand as mind is really minding, a verb not a noun, an activity not an object. Of course this is not to say that reification of that activity does not often set in.

I'll start here: What aspect of what we are aware of will not be an aspect of our own minds? — javra


Everything in the so-called external world is not an aspect of our own minds. Of course our perception of those things is a form of minding, but it does not follow that the things are forms of minding. It seems impossible to make sense of the idea that they could be. If the tree I see and the tree you see are forms of our respective mindings then how is that we obviously see the same tree? That we see the same tree suggests that the tree is mind-independent. — Janus

None of which provides a justifiably true belief of what demarcates mind from non-mind. This so as to address the question asked. For example, that mind is a process rather than a thing says nothing about this demarcation between mind and non-mind within any viable process theory. But I don't want to start playing devils advocate, irrespective of how much you or some others might, maybe, want me to. Repetition of unjustified affirmations such as that "we all know what 'mind' is in the ordinary sense" does not make the affirmation true - knowledge last I checked not being equivalent to a gut feeling - notwithstanding the emotive pleading that might hew the affirmations. As to these questions:

If the tree I see and the tree you see are forms of our respective mindings then how is that we obviously see the same tree? That we see the same tree suggests that the tree is mind-independent. — Janus

By what means do you conclude that trees and insentient, as in not able to perceive things such as gravity and light in their own non-animal based ways? One would then uphold the reality of insentient life-forms, which would be a novelty for me. Otherwise, if they are deemed in some way sentient, then via what reasoning are they then concluded to necessarily be devoid of any form of mind? Not endowed with anything like our human mind clearly, but devoid of any type of mind whatsoever? Plant cognition is not an unjustified position.

As to how a tree, and ant, and human can all sense, act, and react in relation to the same rock, for example, this greatly parallels what I was entertaining in "The Mind-Created World" thread - which you hint at dispelling in preference of physicalism.

At any rate, yours still remains an unjustified claim that "we all know what a mind is in ordinary senses of the term". This would then entail that we all know - rather than having gut feelings regarding - what of what we are aware of is not an aspect of our own individual mind. Needless to add, no one would then need to deny the position of solipsism (only one self or mind exists) for we all would then have knowledge - justified true belief - that solipsism is false.

But since I, again, don't want to play devil's advocate, I'll do my best to leave you to it in turn.

I puzzle as to, if you do not know what a mind is, how will you be able to tell that your definition is correct?

Akin to asking, if you do not know how a word is spelled, then how might a dictionary be of any help?

I'll leave you to it. — Banno


Some other time maybe. — javra

None of which provides a justifiably true belief of what demarcates mind from non-mind. — javra

It's not a matter of justified true belief but rather of the common usage of a word which demonstrates a certain range of understandings. We have no reason to impute mind to those things the experience of which gives us no reason to impute mind to them.

Repetition of unjustified affirmations such as that "we all know what 'mind' is in the ordinary sense" does not make the affirmation true — javra

I didn't say that we all know what mind is in the ordinary sense I said that we know what we mean when we say things which reflect an ordinary common understanding. You are trying to morph what I say into something you feel you can argue against rather than addressing it as it is it seems.

By what means do you conclude that trees and insentient, as in not able to perceive things such as gravity and light in their own non-animal based ways? — javra

Again I haven't said anything whatsoever about whether trees are sentient and the question has no bearing that I can tell on the question of their mind independent existence.

But since I, again, don't want to play devil's advocate, I'll do my best to leave you to it in turn. — javra

I haven't asked you to leave me to io it. On the contrary I was hoping for a sensible discussion. But you seem disinclined to address what I say on its own terms with reasoned counterpoints, and you always seem to be very ready to "leave me to it" when questions that present difficulties for your view are posed.

:up: A good coherently nonsensical oldie!

2. The boundary between mental & extra-mental objects is blurry even if we accept this distinction. Pick any object X you regard as extra mental with following features a,b,c..etc. Its conceivable that I can alter all the features you perceive of X by changing your brain chemistry or neural structuring. In which case, the object X would just be some empty "thing in itself" with no inherent features to it, If we still establish an identity across change. Apply this argument to all objects in the world and you will end up reducing the entire world to one substance, which is neither mental nor extra-mental, since it cannot be grasped via concepts or experience. We have arrived at a contradiction. The boundary between extra mental and mental objects belongs to neither camps. Kant ran into this problem and there hasn't really been any satisfactory response to it.

Your post seems to be assuming something like representationalism, then knocking it down to prove an "anti-metaphysical" position. This sort of argument has been done a lot. I think the realist counterpoint is generally going to be to point out that we are under no obligation to accept representationalism, let alone the idea of "objective knowledge," as a "view from nowhere," or modern subject/object dualism for that matter.

Particularly, the account of perception above is going to be rejected. No doubt, if we were radically different, we would experience differently. As the old Scholastic adage goes, "everything is received in the manner of the receiver." But you are elevating potency over act in your analysis, such that hypothetical science fiction brain manipulation technology bordering on magic is being used to make a blanket pronouncement about perception, epistemology, and metaphysics.

Yet how we experience the world isn't arbitrary. And, on any scientific account of perception, the content on the senses isn't arbitrarily related to what we perceive (Matrix-style science fiction examples notwithstanding). No human has ever perceived anything in a vacuum. A human being in a vacuum will be a corpse, as will a human being placed in the vast majority environments that prevail in the universe (e.g. the bottom of the sea, inside the Earth's mantel, on the surface of a star, etc.). Experience occurs in a very narrow range of environments. The environment is not irrelevant to perception such that we can speak simply of "neurons" in a vacuum.

Thus , a weakness in the claim here is that it relies on an inappropriate reduction and separation. Of course if we say "perception is just neurons," then we can vary the environment as much as we want in our thought experiments, allowing perception to drift arbitrarily far from whatever is perceived. But show me the evidence of anyone having experiences once their brain has been removed from their body, or in a vacuum.

Sense awareness is the result of a physical system whose locus is the body of the perceiver, but that body is not an isolated system cut off from the world, the system responsible for any meaningful interval of perception extends outside the body of the perceiver. It takes a constant exchange of energy and causation across the boundary of the body to sustain conciousness and life.





Right, moral realism seems like another very obvious example.

What aspect of what we are aware of will not be an aspect of our own minds? — javra

Awareness is detachable in ways that what we are aware of is not.

For example, we can easily detach our visual awareness from the marks of this text by shutting our eyes. As soon as we open our eyes, the awareness is resumed.

Awareness is also dependent on what we are aware of.

For example, if I change some of these marks to bold or CAPITAL, we don't continue being aware of regular marks as if nothing changed. What we are aware of are these very marks, and their visible features determine our visual awareness of them.

Awareness is causally self-reflexive: we're aware of x, because x is the case, and the fact that x, causes our awareness of x.

Epistemological anti-realism seems to be based on mistaking awareness and its objects. As if these marks were made of our awareness of them, or of our socially constructed ways to use words such as 'mark'. 'letter', 'word', etc. Thus omitting the biological nature of awareness.

When you take your coffee cup and put it in the dishwasher, does it still exist? — Banno

I think it's important to recognise the distinction between intension and extension.

As an example; if the monarchy in the UK is abolished, does King Charles still exist? Under an intensional reading he doesn't because there are no kings but under an extensional reading he does because the man – Charles – is still alive and kicking (assuming we haven't emulated the French).

This is also where it's important to distinguish between phenomenalism and non-phenomenalist anti-realism (e.g. Kant's transcendental idealism or Putnam's internal realism).

The phenomenalist will argue that under both an intensional and extensional reading "the cup exists (when I don't see it)" is false.

The non-phenomenalist anti-realist will argue that under an intensional reading "the cup exists (when I don't see it)" is false but that under an extensional reading "the cup exists (when I don't see it)" is true.

And of course the realist will argue that under both an intensional and extensional reading "the cup exists (when I don't see it)" is true.

Speaking very roughly, just to get started, realism holds that ...stuff... is independent of what we say about it; anti-realism, that it isn't. — Banno

Haven't you said the exact opposite of this in the past? Sorry to play spot-the-contradiction, I'm sure you can clear it up. I can't remember where, but haven't you said that what there is is determined by our words for them? Not our perceptions of them (that would be idealism), but our words, or perhaps the way we use language?

(For the record, you write interestingly, if ad nauseum, on this topic, and it's interesting because I am undecided)

EDIT: maybe @Michael stuff on intensional and extensional can help

Awareness is also dependent on what we are aware of. — jkop

Is it possible (conceptually) to be aware of your own awareness, and nothing else?

Pick any object X (…) with following features a,b,c..etc. It’s conceivable that I can alter all the features you perceive of X by changing your brain chemistry or neural structuring. In which case, the object X would just be some empty "thing in itself" with no inherent features to it, — Sirius

If it is the case that all “features a, b, c, etc” of any object are prescribed to it by the subject himself, but are not perceived in it as such, and if the means by which those features are prescribed, change…..why wouldn’t the subject merely think he perceived a different object, Y?

In which case, the object X would just be some empty "thing in itself" with no inherent features to it, if we establish identity across change. — Sirius

Given that we have established identity across change in that object X has become object Y because the features by which I cognize it have changed, why should that identity change be sufficient reason to cause object X revert to anything? Nothing about the thing has changed; only my own means for determining what the thing is. Or, in truth, you’ve forced me to alter how that thing appears to me.

The boundary between extra mental and mental objects belongs to neither camps. Kant ran into this problem and there hasn't really been any satisfactory response to it. — Sirius

Boy howdy!!: he did run into the problem, he did respond to it, but the response may not be all that satisfactory. I mean….transcendental object? That is the name given to whatever ensues transitionally between the input to the sensory device, re: appearance of a thing, and the output of each of them, re: sensation of the effect which represents a thing. Which isn’t quite right still, in that the boundary between is neither one or the other, but the transcendental object here is certainly mental yet just stands for what isn’t, all in the interest of methodological continuity, however speculative that may be.

And…YIKES..…The “Principle of the Succession of Time According to the Law of Causality” as explanation? But ya know, considering this….

“…..what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made….”

….already conditions the subject himself not to bother with what he cannot know, with that which he is not even equipped to know. So why would Everydayman care that “the boundary between mental & extra-mental objects is blurry”? What has he lost by not knowing?

The distinction isn’t useless or wrong, it’s just…..superfluous?

Regardless of whether idealism or realism is true, our phenomenological experience of the world would remain unchanged. — Sirius

This reminds me of the issue raised (most recently by David Chalmers in "Reality+") about virtual worlds. There are some strong arguments to the effect that, if simulated universes are possible, then we are almost certainly living in one. For reasons that are roughly similar to the ones you give about idealism and realism, this shouldn't make any phenomenological difference. Yet this insouciance is extremely difficult to believe. If I did come to accept that the world in which I exist was simulated by a powerful but non-deistic intelligence, perhaps somewhere in the future, I think I'd be rocked to the core. I think I would indeed question every basic assumption I have. And yet . . . on the merits, it shouldn't make a difference to a single thing. This is an example of how philosophy can pose a stark choice: Either I am deeply mistaken about what does make a difference, and must revise my ideas accordingly, or philosophy is wrong in believing it's shown me that the difference between X and Y doesn't matter. This could all apply the realism/idealism question as well.

Is it possible (conceptually) to be aware of your own awareness, and nothing else? — bert1

No, but you can acquire knowledge of your awareness, and be aware of what you know.

Moore made the claim that "Here is a hand". On a forum such as this, we might instead point out that you are now reading this post. Now if you find it difficult to doubt that you are now reading this sentence, then you might also grant things such as that there is a language in which it is written, that someone wrote it, that there are screens and devices and networks linking you to that writer, and so on. — Banno

I’m not sure whether or not you are making the same mistake Wittgenstein argued Moore did, by confusing a grammatical proposition with an empirical assertion. Let’s see if you are. The ‘certainty’ of ‘here is a hand’ is not the certainty of an empirical fact, but the relative certainty that a stable system of practices (language game , form of life) provides. If an alien species from another planet saw Moore with his raised hand, they might be just as certain as Moore that something with a specific meaning was taking place, but within their alien language game the sense of the event would be entirely different that it is for Moore. It would not be a question of doubting Moore’s assertion, but of his assertion being irrelevant to their perspective.

When you take your coffee cup and put it in the dishwasher, does it still exist? A realist might say that it either exists or it doesn't, and since we have no reason to think it has ceased to exist, then we can reasonably maintain that it still exists. On this view, there are at least two things in the world, the cup and the dishwasher.

On the other hand, the anti-realist might suppose that since the cup is in the dishwasher we cannot perceive it, and so cannot say for sure if it exists or not. They might conclude that at best we can say that it is neither true nor false that the cup exists. They would conclude that there is at least only one thing, the dishwasher — Banno

Someone who rejects both realism and anti-realism, as I believe Wittgenstein did, would say that a scheme of interconnected practices of meaning provides the intelligibility of the realist’s assumptions, that the cup’s persisting ‘reality’ only makes sense within this scheme, and that such schemes are potentially infinite.

I think it's important to recognise the distinction between intension and extension. — Michael

That strikes me as ad hoc - introducing a needless distinction in order to maintain a position that has been shown errant.

The topic is the truth of "the cup is in the dishwasher", understood extensionally as being about the cup. We might, separately and distinct from this conversation, talk about the suitability of the use of the word "cup" to talk about the cup before us as distinct from and the cup in the dishwasher. Just as we might talk about the suitability of "King Charles" to refer to Camilla's husband if he had been deposed.

The question at hand is not about the suitability of certain descriptions, but the truth of "the cup is in the dishwasher".

Unless you can show that these are somehow the very same question.

but haven't you said that what there is is determined by our words for them? — bert1

"Determined" doesn't sound right. We can name things in different ways, to different ends. But excluding the word "cup" from our vocabulary will not make the cup disappear, except perhaps from our conversation.

Someone who rejects both realism and anti-realism, as I believe Wittgenstein did... — Joshs

Quite. The choice between realism and anti-realism is not a choice of realities, but a choice of language games. If asked "where is the cup", which answer is to be preferred - "It is in the dishwasher" or "I don't know"?

That strikes me as ad hoc - introducing a needless distinction in order to maintain a position that has been shown errant.

The topic is the truth of "the cup is in the dishwasher", understood extensionally as being about the cup. We might, separately and distinct from this conversation, talk about the suitability of the use of the word "cup" to talk about the cup before us as distinct from and the cup in the dishwasher. Just as we might talk about the suitability of "King Charles" to refer to Camilla's husband if he had been deposed.

The question at hand is not about the suitability of certain descriptions, but the truth of "the cup is in the dishwasher".

Unless you can show that these are somehow the very same question. — Banno

Take two questions:

1. Is the king in the palace?
2. Is the cup in the dishwasher?

Do we understand (1) extensionally as being about Charles, such that the answer to the question is "yes" if Charles is in the palace, even if the monarchy has been abolished? Or is the answer "there is no king"?

As you say in your profile:

Statements are grammatical combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition.

Anti-realists simply extend this reasoning to a greater class of nouns. Maybe they're wrong to, but at least we're able to address their actual position and not some strawman that treats all anti-realisms as phenomenalism.

Revising all one's beliefs is not perfectly easy.

I said changing a societal belief from X to Y would have radical implications. You replied that "one could believe" Y without moving into those implications. This is a modal notion which is quite foreign to reality. Beliefs have implications, just as knowledge does, and changes in belief will involve changes in behavior.

But the whole point of confirmation holism is any change in a single set of belief will invariably change the rest of your beliefs. Your knowledge isn't constructed as a building but like a spider's web.

You have to show why a meta metaphysical disposition (realism vs anti realism) can change your behavior towards the world ? Is this change in behavior neccesary ? I doubt it. I can perfectly imagine 2 realist & anti realist on ethical, religious, aesthetic issues behaving similarly.

It is important to note that there is a difference in logic sitting behind the distinction between realism and anti-realism. Realists supose that a proposition is either true or it is false, and that there are no alternatives. Their attitude towards truth is binary. On the other hand, anti-realists are happy to admit at least a third possibility, that a proposition might be neither true nor false, but have some third value. Anti-realism became more prominent towards the end of last century with the development of formal paraconsistent and many-valued logics.

I think a large part of the difference between realism and anti-realism can be explained by making use of Anscombe's notion of direction of fit. This is the difference between the list you take with you to remind yourself of what you want to buy and the list the register produces listing the things you actually purchased. The intent of the first list is to collect the things listed; of the second, to list the things collected. The first seeks to make the world fit the list, the second, to make the list to fit the world. So perhaps anti-realism applies to ethics and aesthetics because we seek to make the world as we say, while realism applies to ontology and epistemology because we seek to make what we say fit the world.

I don't think this is true because the correspondence theory of truth to which you alluded is compatible with breaking both the law of non contradiction and the law of excluded middle. Here's what it would look like


Without law of excluded middle :

"X" is neither true nor false if and only if not X corresponds to reality and not X does not corresponds to reality

Without the law of non contradiction :

"X" is true & false if an only if X corresponds to reality and not X corresponds to reality

Graham Priest has shown non classical logic is compatible with all sorts of theory of truths you find. So we cannot distinguish metaphysical realism or anti realism based on theory of truth via its commitment
to classical or non classical logic.

As for Anscombe's distinction. I don't see where the boundary really lies between your beliefs and their content & the world which its supposed to reflect. It seems they are both located within each other without any duality. I objected to this view in my 3rd point when I mentioned folk psychology. A lot of philosophy is mired in conceptual confusion which stems from dualism of all sorts, thing in itself vs appearance, subject vs object, facts vs reality, realism vs irrealism, platonism vs nominalism etc. The main reason people refuse to embrace non dualism is it forces one to claim the truth is somewhat ineffable. Philosophy & religion become useless here.

Take two questions:

1. Is the king in the palace?
2. Is the cup in the dishwasher?

Do we understand (1) extensionally as being about Charles, such that the answer to the question is "yes" if Charles is in the palace, even if the monarchy has been abolished? Or is the answer "there is no king"?

Is monarchy mind independent or mind dependent ? Both. Or none exclusively. There would be no monarchy without everyone accepting this social institution and this social institution does have this characteristic that even if you manage to abolish it in your mind, it doesn't automatically become true that there is no monarchy.

So I agree with semantic externalism in so far as the meaning & truth commitment is somewhat external to our mind , but this does not imply we must be accept realism. Its possible that the external determinant of meaning/truth condition etc happen to be other minds (people & God).

As for the cup in the dishwasher, only someone commitment to solipsism would deny that. But non realism isn't reducible to that. A Berkeleyan idealist for eg would say the cup is in the dishwasher since that's how God perceives it, even if no human being does. Both the realist and anti realist have the same answer here.

Anti-realists simply extend this reasoning to a greater class of nouns. Maybe they're wrong to, but at least we're able to address their actual position and not some strawman that treats all anti-realisms as phenomenalism

I don't believe an anti realist goes around saying such and such statement is neither true nor false, anymore than a realist. Every theory of truth is compatible with realism vs anti realism, both classical & non classical logic are likewise compatible with realism & anti realism. In other words, they are of no help here.

Can you cash out non realism in a way that doesn't invoke idealism or phenomenonalism etc ? I don't think so.

As for the cup in the dishwasher, only someone commitment to sophism would deny that. But non realism isn't reducible to that. A Berkeleyan idealist for eg would say the cup is in the dishwasher since that's how God perceives it, even if no human being does. Both the realist and anti realist have the same answer here. — Sirius

Just as being a king is not a property/condition that is reducible to mere material composition and location in space and time it can be argued that being a cup is not a property/condition that is reducible to mere material composition and location in space and time.

If we abolish the monarchy then it is not the case that those people who were kings no longer exist but it is the case that they are no longer kings, and so no kings exist.

And so one can argue that if we don't see or use anything as a cup then it is not the case that those things which were cups no longer exist but it is the case that they are no longer cups, and so no cups exist.

I don't believe an anti realist goes around saying such and such statement is neither true nor false, anymore than a realist. Every theory of truth is compatible with realism vs anti realism, both classical & non classical logic are likewise compatible with realism & anti realism. In other words, they are of no help here.

Can you cash out non realism in a way that doesn't invoke idealism or phenomenonalism etc ? I don't think so. — Sirius

The term "anti-realism" was coined by Michael Dummett to refer to those positions which reject "semantic realism, i.e. the view that every declarative sentence in one's language is bivalent (determinately true or false) and evidence-transcendent (independent of our means of coming to know which)".

It is certainly the case that phenomenalism (and some idealisms) are anti-realist, but it's not the case that all anti-realisms are phenomenalism (or idealism).

Just as being a king is not a property/condition that is reducible to mere material composition and location in space and time it can be argued that being a cup is not a property/condition that is reducible to mere material composition and location in space and time.

If we abolish the monarchy then it is not the case that those people who were kings no longer exist but it is the case that they are no longer kings, and so no kings exist.

And so one can argue that if we don't see or use something as a cup then it is not the case that those things which were cups no longer exist but it is the case that they are no longer cups, and so no cups exist.

It's good you brought up space and time. It's one of the facet of reality which physics has reasonable shown to be both relational and substantival. It does not even make sense to talk of an absolute present, located as a spacetime point. Those who held a relational view of space & time (like Leibniz) were very likely to be anti realist about it and those who held the substantival view (like Newton) were very likely to be realist about it. But to the surprise of everyone, both are right in their own way. I don't see how one can be realist or anti realist about time or space.

Now someone may claim relations exist extra mentally & this is what constitutes the substance of space & time, but this will force us to refine substance in such a radical manner that it will no longer be recognizable. In order for such a person (ontic structuralist) to avoid the label of idealism (which sounds very silly in the context of science) , he must dissolve this distinction completely.

Let's suppose an non realist comes to the conclusion that there are no cups. Then it should have some implications for his behavior (language is after all very much determined by norms & behaviors). He should not be able to say "Fetch me the cup over there". Does this happen ? Never. Why doesn't he just say "bring me that existent over there" , which he has just concluded in a philosophical argument ? It would be completely useless and vague. This in of itself shows that person still considers "cup" to be a part of useful vocabulary to navigate the world of facts. This goes back to my first point. We should not disconnect language/facts from behavior/attitudes/life forms, or in Wittgenstein's terms "showing" from "saying".

The term "anti-realism" was coined by Michael Dummett to refer to those positions which reject "semantic realism, i.e. the view that every declarative sentence in one's language is bivalent (determinately true or false) and evidence-transcendent (independent of our means of coming to know which)".

Definitions are good if they establish nice boundaries. This doesn't seem to be the case here. Historically speaking, there have been many theologians or philosophers who for eg claim the principle of bivalence does not apply to God or Ultimate Reality at all. They regard the laws of logic to be a contingent feature of reality. One good example is "The attributes of God are neither God nor other than God". None of them would accept the claim that God or attributes don't actually exist. As for the distinction between knowledge acquired through means or independent of it, why can't the means be transcendent themselves and vice versa ?
Many eastern philosophers regard the highest form of knowing to be non derivative or independent of means but also regard the means to be truth. The doctrine of 2 truths in Buddhism is very important here. You cannot search for the truth or recognize it without already possessing it. The means of knowing the truth don't imply you never had it in the first place, because they carry the truth along with them.

Let's suppose an non realist comes to the conclusion that there are no cups. — Sirius

Not all anti-realists claim that.

This is the sort of argument that an anti-realist might make:

P1. A cup exists if and only if there exists some X such that X is a cup
P2. For all X, X is a cup only if X is being seen or used as a cup
C1. Therefore, a cup exists only if there exists some X such that X is being seen or used as a cup

The truth of "a cup exists" (and so the existence of a cup) depends (in part) on an object being seen or used as a cup; its truth conditions are not (entirely) mind-independent.

Note that nothing here entails idealism or phenomenalism; it's perfectly consistent with physicalism and scientific realism.

Sure. As I said,

If asked "where is the cup", which answer is to be preferred - "It is in the dishwasher" or "I don't know"? — Banno

This question also applies to . It is rather hard to see how "a cup exists only if there exists some X such that X is being seen or used as a cup" counts as scientific realism. I supose it's quantum?

Graham Priest has shown non classical logic is compatible with all sorts of theory of truths you find. So we cannot distinguish metaphysical realism or anti realism based on theory of truth via its commitment
to classical or non classical logic. — Sirius

I don't follow this. Non-classical logic is one way to defend anti-realism, but that does not rule out others. So Kripke's theory of truth is arguably classical, in that it only assigns "true" or "false" to any proposition, just not to all of them.

It is rather hard to see how "a cup exists only if there exists some X such that X is being seen or used as a cup" counts as scientific realism. — Banno

I explained it quite clearly in that post:

P1. A cup exists if and only if there exists some X such that X is a cup
P2. For all X, X is a cup only if X is being seen or used as a cup
C1. Therefore, a cup exists only if there exists some X such that X is being seen or used as a cup

Much like a king exists only if there exists some X such that X is [insert necessary social conditions here].

Do you believe that the argument is invalid, or do you reject one or both premises?

This has nothing to do with scientific realism, which only claims that the entities described by our scientific theories (e.g. the particles of the Standard Model) exist mind-independently (and behave as our models say they do).

Science says nothing about what it means to be a king or what it means to be a cup.

I explained it quite clearly in that post: — Michael

Not so much, perhaps, since "This has nothing to do with scientific realism" yet " it's perfectly consistent with physicalism and scientific realism". But thanks for clarifying.

P2. For all X, X is a cup only if X is being seen or used as a cup — Michael

I gather this is intensional, as opposed to extensional.

Not so much, perhaps, since "This has nothing to do with scientific realism" yet " it's perfectly consistent with physicalism and scientific realism". — Banno

"John is a man" being true is consistent with but has nothing to do with "Jane is a woman" being true.

I gather this is intensional, as opposed to extensional. — Banno

I'm not sure how that distinction applies to that premise.