• J
    647
    That might be too strong. The cogito does tell me that an aspect of myself manifests itself in the act of thinking. I may not be a "thinking thing" in some definitional or essential way, but thinking is something I do. That's not "nothing." It just may not be as informative as we would wish it to be.
  • Fooloso4
    6.1k
    Paul Ricoeur also raises this question of the nature of the "I" of the cogito -- whether what it is is self-evident as a consequence of the cogito.J

    In the second meditation Descartes says:

    Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.
  • J
    647
    Yes, exactly. Descartes has drawn what Ricoeur believes to be a false, or at any rate unwarranted, conclusion. In fairness, the idea that the self might be importantly different from the ego or the "conscious self" or the "false self" as criticized by Marx et al. was not really available to Descartes. You can see why it seemed natural to him to just seize on the "thinking thing" as constitutive of what he is. But I believe Ricoeur is right to question this.
  • Mww
    4.9k
    Why….frank

    Is there an answer that doesn’t just invite another question?

    Comprehension needs to be bestowed on something representing a particular accomplishment, iff one wishes to express himself in regard to it. The cognitive system, in and of itself, in its normal modus operandi, doesn’t require it, insofar as it just IS it.
    ————-

    …thinking is something I do. That's not "nothing."J

    Agreed. Thinking is something I do, and it does tell me something. It tells me there is a thinker and I am it. And I am….what, exactly? If I am that which thinks, I am conscious of that already. Even if it is that determines what it is to think, I still haven’t said what I am, other than I am a necessary condition for that which thinks, which is highly circular or abysmally tautological.

    Hence….psychologists. (Sigh)
  • J
    647
    It tells me there is a thinker and I am it. And I am….what, exactly?Mww

    Yes. When I first read philosophy, the cogito seemed a miracle of cleverness and reliability. What a great result! -- I've discovered not only that I exist, but what sort of thing I must be. It does take a lot of reflection, and getting comfortable with some of the traditions after Descartes, to realize that this result is much less complete than it seems. I think, and thinking can be a special item for epistemology (it allows me to learn that I exist), but to go from that to any further knowledge about the self is unwarranted. Regardless of how one feels about Freudians, Freud himself made a huge contribution here by showing us the importance of the unconscious, which we are so loath to acknowledge.
  • frank
    15.8k
    Is there an answer that doesn’t just invite another question?

    Comprehension needs to be bestowed on something representing a particular accomplishment, iff one wishes to express himself in regard to it. The cognitive system, in and of itself, in its normal modus operandi, doesn’t require it, insofar as it just IS it.
    Mww

    Right, there's experience, which is seamless, and then when we reflect on it, and go to say something about it, we automatically become dualists of some kind. To talk about it, we need to pull it apart:

    experience -- the one doing the experiencing.

    Does it just have to do with talking about it? Or maybe it's just the way consciousness turns back on itself, whatever you call that.
  • Mww
    4.9k
    any further knowledge about the self is unwarranted.J

    ….because for that knowledge, we must have recourse to empirical science. But then, how does one experiment for that which isn’t to be found? Which gets us to : we automatically become dualists…..
    ———-

    …..we automatically become dualists of some kind.frank

    ….or, we always were, and must necessarily be.
  • frank
    15.8k
    ….or, we always were, and must necessarily be.Mww

    I agree. The most fundamental duality is unity vs disunity. The Cogito points to the indubitability of the disunity part.
  • Mww
    4.9k


    How else would you say “disunity”? What other word carries similar implication?
  • frank
    15.8k
    How else would you say “disunity”? What other word carries similar implication?Mww

    Divided? Although it's more than that. As an idea, the self makes sense relative to its negation: the not-self, whatever that is. The Cogito signifies that I don't just blend into a monolithic universe. I arise out of it as a distinct thing.
  • Fooloso4
    6.1k
    Descartes has drawn what Ricoeur believes to be a false, or at any rate unwarranted, conclusion.J

    At the risk of being obtuse, what is the unwarranted conclusion? I agree that what he says falls short of the task of self-knowledge, but that is not Descartes' task. It does seem clear though that whatever he is in its fullness he doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, imagines, and senses.
  • Mww
    4.9k
    The Cogito signifies that I don't just blend into a monolithic universe. I arise out of it as a distinct thing.frank

    Ooooo….I like that.
  • Corvus
    3.3k
    what is the unwarranted conclusion?Fooloso4

    I recall debating on cogito some while ago. My point was cogito has some ambiguous parts. For example, when you say, I think therefore I am. Does it mean if you think, then does it automatically warrant existence? Where does that transition (from think to existence) come from?

    Is "I" extendable to other subjects such as he, she, you, it or they? Or is cogito strictly to "I" only? If it does, then could you say, "He thinks therefore he exists", or "It thinks, therefore it exists."?

    If it is only for "I", then wouldn't it be just a solipsistic utterance?
  • Fooloso4
    6.1k


    As I understand it, doubting entails existence. Existing is a necessary condition for doubting.

    Is "I" extendable to other subjects such as he, she, you, it or they?Corvus

    Whoever thinks, whoever doubts, whoever is subject to deception much exist.
  • Corvus
    3.3k
    As I understand it, doubting entails existence. Existing is a necessary condition for doubting.Fooloso4

    Thought and doubt have their objects or contents in their operation. The content or object could be anything. What if, the content of the thought was the negation of existence?

    I think I don't exist, therefore I exist.
    Wouldn't it be a contradiction in that case?
  • Corvus
    3.3k
    Whoever thinks, whoever doubts, whoever is subject to deception much exist.Fooloso4

    I doubt that I exist, therefore I exist.
    Doubting can also deny own existence, and when it does, it falls into a contradiction. And there is no rule, doubts cannot doubt its own existence or the acting of doubting.
  • Fooloso4
    6.1k
    What if, the content of the thought was the negation of existence?Corvus

    One must exist in order to think the negation of existence.

    I think I don't exist, therefore I exist.
    Wouldn't it be a contradiction in that case?
    Corvus

    A paradox but not a contradiction.
  • Corvus
    3.3k
    :up: Good answers. Thank you.
  • J
    647
    I would say the unwarranted conclusion has to do with an essential identity being attached to “thinking thing.” Again, Ricoeur’s criticism is coming through Nietzsche and Freud. Why may my self, my “I”, not just as well comprise the unconscious part of my being? Why assume that the thinking thing , and all its activities, is the most important and most characteristic part of being a subject? The cogito can’t say anything about that.
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