That might be too strong. The cogito does tell me that an aspect of myself manifests itself in the act of thinking. I may not be a "thinking thing" in some definitional or essential way, but thinking is something I do. That's not "nothing." It just may not be as informative as we would wish it to be.

Paul Ricoeur also raises this question of the nature of the "I" of the cogito -- whether what it is is self-evident as a consequence of the cogito. — J

In the second meditation Descartes says:

Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.

Yes, exactly. Descartes has drawn what Ricoeur believes to be a false, or at any rate unwarranted, conclusion. In fairness, the idea that the self might be importantly different from the ego or the "conscious self" or the "false self" as criticized by Marx et al. was not really available to Descartes. You can see why it seemed natural to him to just seize on the "thinking thing" as constitutive of what he is. But I believe Ricoeur is right to question this.

Why…. — frank

Is there an answer that doesn’t just invite another question?

Comprehension needs to be bestowed on something representing a particular accomplishment, iff one wishes to express himself in regard to it. The cognitive system, in and of itself, in its normal modus operandi, doesn’t require it, insofar as it just IS it.
————-

…thinking is something I do. That's not "nothing." — J

Agreed. Thinking is something I do, and it does tell me something. It tells me there is a thinker and I am it. And I am….what, exactly? If I am that which thinks, I am conscious of that already. Even if it is that determines what it is to think, I still haven’t said what I am, other than I am a necessary condition for that which thinks, which is highly circular or abysmally tautological.

Hence….psychologists. (Sigh)

It tells me there is a thinker and I am it. And I am….what, exactly? — Mww

Yes. When I first read philosophy, the cogito seemed a miracle of cleverness and reliability. What a great result! -- I've discovered not only that I exist, but what sort of thing I must be. It does take a lot of reflection, and getting comfortable with some of the traditions after Descartes, to realize that this result is much less complete than it seems. I think, and thinking can be a special item for epistemology (it allows me to learn that I exist), but to go from that to any further knowledge about the self is unwarranted. Regardless of how one feels about Freudians, Freud himself made a huge contribution here by showing us the importance of the unconscious, which we are so loath to acknowledge.

Is there an answer that doesn’t just invite another question?

Comprehension needs to be bestowed on something representing a particular accomplishment, iff one wishes to express himself in regard to it. The cognitive system, in and of itself, in its normal modus operandi, doesn’t require it, insofar as it just IS it. — Mww

Right, there's experience, which is seamless, and then when we reflect on it, and go to say something about it, we automatically become dualists of some kind. To talk about it, we need to pull it apart:

experience -- the one doing the experiencing.

Does it just have to do with talking about it? Or maybe it's just the way consciousness turns back on itself, whatever you call that.

any further knowledge about the self is unwarranted. — J

….because for that knowledge, we must have recourse to empirical science. But then, how does one experiment for that which isn’t to be found? Which gets us to : we automatically become dualists…..
———-

…..we automatically become dualists of some kind. — frank

….or, we always were, and must necessarily be.

….or, we always were, and must necessarily be. — Mww

I agree. The most fundamental duality is unity vs disunity. The Cogito points to the indubitability of the disunity part.

How else would you say “disunity”? What other word carries similar implication?

How else would you say “disunity”? What other word carries similar implication? — Mww

Divided? Although it's more than that. As an idea, the self makes sense relative to its negation: the not-self, whatever that is. The Cogito signifies that I don't just blend into a monolithic universe. I arise out of it as a distinct thing.

Descartes has drawn what Ricoeur believes to be a false, or at any rate unwarranted, conclusion. — J

At the risk of being obtuse, what is the unwarranted conclusion? I agree that what he says falls short of the task of self-knowledge, but that is not Descartes' task. It does seem clear though that whatever he is in its fullness he doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, imagines, and senses.

The Cogito signifies that I don't just blend into a monolithic universe. I arise out of it as a distinct thing. — frank

Ooooo….I like that.

what is the unwarranted conclusion? — Fooloso4

I recall debating on cogito some while ago. My point was cogito has some ambiguous parts. For example, when you say, I think therefore I am. Does it mean if you think, then does it automatically warrant existence? Where does that transition (from think to existence) come from?

Is "I" extendable to other subjects such as he, she, you, it or they? Or is cogito strictly to "I" only? If it does, then could you say, "He thinks therefore he exists", or "It thinks, therefore it exists."?

If it is only for "I", then wouldn't it be just a solipsistic utterance?

As I understand it, doubting entails existence. Existing is a necessary condition for doubting.

Is "I" extendable to other subjects such as he, she, you, it or they? — Corvus

Whoever thinks, whoever doubts, whoever is subject to deception much exist.

As I understand it, doubting entails existence. Existing is a necessary condition for doubting. — Fooloso4

Thought and doubt have their objects or contents in their operation. The content or object could be anything. What if, the content of the thought was the negation of existence?

I think I don't exist, therefore I exist.
Wouldn't it be a contradiction in that case?

Whoever thinks, whoever doubts, whoever is subject to deception much exist. — Fooloso4

I doubt that I exist, therefore I exist.
Doubting can also deny own existence, and when it does, it falls into a contradiction. And there is no rule, doubts cannot doubt its own existence or the acting of doubting.

What if, the content of the thought was the negation of existence? — Corvus

One must exist in order to think the negation of existence.

I think I don't exist, therefore I exist.
Wouldn't it be a contradiction in that case? — Corvus

A paradox but not a contradiction.

:up: Good answers. Thank you.

I would say the unwarranted conclusion has to do with an essential identity being attached to “thinking thing.” Again, Ricoeur’s criticism is coming through Nietzsche and Freud. Why may my self, my “I”, not just as well comprise the unconscious part of my being? Why assume that the thinking thing , and all its activities, is the most important and most characteristic part of being a subject? The cogito can’t say anything about that.

I would say the unwarranted conclusion has to do with an essential identity being attached to “thinking thing.” — J

What does this mean? Is it unwarranted to conclude that he is a thing that thinks? Isn't thinking essential to being human?

Again, Ricoeur’s criticism is coming through Nietzsche and Freud. — J

How much of the problem of consciousness can be found in Descartes?

Why may my self, my “I”, not just as well comprise the unconscious part of my being? — J

Where does Descartes discuss the problem of consciousness and the unconscious? Or is the problem that he does not discuss this? An analysis of consciousness is not his concern. That he is conscious suffices.

Why assume that the thinking thing , and all its activities, is the most important and most characteristic part of being a subject? — J

The thinking thing is the most important part for his purposes - to displace the authority of the Church with the authority of the thinking/reasoning subject.

In general, I agree that Descartes's project can be accepted on its own terms -- he wasn't using the concepts of 20th century philosophy, and he wasn't asking the same questions. But the passage you quoted:

Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.

does suggest that Descartes believed that being a thing that thinks was an identity. It is the answer to his self-posed question, "Well, then, what am I?" Perhaps Ricoeur would answer the question this way: "I do not know what I am, on the basis of the cogito. I identify a number of activities I can perform as a conscious ego (doubting, understanding, et al.) and am at the same time aware of many other aspects of myself that lie hidden. Maybe the question 'What am I?' will prove unanswerable, or maybe I will discover that I have an essence. But either way, the cogito shows me nothing pro or con."

So,

Is it unwarranted to conclude that he is a thing that thinks? Isn't thinking essential to being human? — Fooloso4

As to the first question, it's unwarranted if the "is" of "he is a thing that thinks" is construed as an essence or identity. (It doesn't have to be. To say "I am thinking" seems quite warranted, because it leaves open the further question, "Ah, but what am I?") As to the second: No, we have no basis in the cogito for concluding anything about what is essential to being human. Or, more liberally, thinking may be one of the essential items, but we have no way of knowing if there are not others equally essential. The cogito's epistemological value as a guarantor of existence doesn't extend that far, into ontology.

to displace the authority of the Church with the authority of the thinking/reasoning subject. — Fooloso4

He wouldn't have needed to displace the authority of the Church if that was his agenda. He could have just left and gone to live in Protestant territory.

Why assume that the thinking thing , and all its activities, is the most important and most characteristic part of being a subject? — J

One of the reasons I tend to stay out of cogito-ergo-sum threads is that I never read Descartes and am only passingly familiar with it. I find the topic interesting, though, and this line is a good lead in for a problem I've always had with the response to this line.

You see, I came across this line in my childhood. I already knew enough Latin to parse the line, so I must have been between twelve and fourteen, not quite a teen yet. And for a long while this has been (a) intuitive, (b) banal, and (c) rhetorically witty. I quite liked the line. Only later did I learn that my intuition may not have aligned with Descarte's, and it certainly didn't align with a lot of other people's.

So on to your quote: according to my intuition, the thinking thing's importance is contextual. While I doubt (a form of cogitating), I can't doubt that I doubt. It's like a plug. A moment of certainty. As soon as I pull back only slightly, out comes the plug and life flows back in. Which is why "thinking thing" is a rhetorical stand-in. At the moment of "cogito-ergo-sum" you're certain of your existence, but nothing else. It's a holiday from doubting, but little else. Nothing can follow from it, since at that point no other interest can be cogitated about. You gained certainty at the expense of your worldview. No meaning is left. Cogito-ergo-sum is a dead end. You can pull back, but you can't take your certainty with you. But you, the radical doubter, have a place of rest. However the you-that-needs-such-rest only exists by virtue of its connection to a world full of doubt, and you take back that feeling and rationalise it. For example:

The Cogito points to the indubitability of the disunity part. — frank

Pulled back too far, but if that's the way you make sense of it...

What does this mean? Is it unwarranted to conclude that he is a thing that thinks? Isn't thinking essential to being human? — Fooloso4

Pulled back too far, but if that's the way you make sense of it...

And so on. (There are many more examples in this thread, I just picked two from the page I'm currently on.)

I did come across a take on Descartes that resonated with my intuition once, but I forget what it was (a vague memory of "you can be certain you have a toothache, but not that you have teeth"). I want to say it's Ortega y Gasset, but I really am not sure. In any case, the collapsing of a world-view into the cogito and the reconstruction of the world-view in daily praxis feels quite compatible with phenomenology as I understand (which is not as far as some others on this board - I'm not a well-read philosopher).

Not sure I made much sense here, given that I'm not sure how compatible I've ever been with Descartes or his reception, but that's where I've always been.

When it comes to justification, I think you are missing the distinction between there being beliefs which are felt to be justifiable based on personal experience and the foundational requirement in the empirical context that justification be somehow definitively intersubjectively corroborable, at least in principle.

For example, you might understandably feel justified in believing in God based on powerful mystical experiences, but those experiences of yours can never constitute justification for anyone else to believe in God, even if the telling of them is powerful and compelling enough to convince others of the existence of God.

As I understand it, doubting entails existence. Existing is a necessary condition for doubting. — Fooloso4

Thinking and doubting and feeling is going on therefore something exists. What is that something?

what is the unwarranted conclusion? — Fooloso4

Is "I" extendable to other subjects such as he, she, you, it or they? Or is cogito strictly to "I" only? If it does, then could you say, "He thinks therefore he exists", or "It thinks, therefore it exists."?

If it is only for "I", then wouldn't it be just a solipsistic utterance? — Corvus

Just realised that you have not answered to this question. What's your thought on this point?

One must exist in order to think the negation of existence. — Fooloso4

But the simple logical reflection seems to suggest otherwise.

If I think, then I exist.
I think
Therefore I exist. (Valid and ambiguous)

Cogito must have been induced from the MP above which looks valid. But when you try negating the premise,

If I don't think, then I don't exist.
I don't think
Therefore I don't exist. (Valid but definitely unsound)

I don't exist is untrue (not from cogito, but from my sensory perception), therefore it implies cogito is untrue as well. Agree?

At the moment of "cogito-ergo-sum" you're certain of your existence, but nothing else. It's a holiday from doubting, but little else. — Dawnstorm

Yes, we agree.

does suggest that Descartes believed that being a thing that thinks was an identity. — J

In the sixth meditation he says:

Nature also teaches me, through these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I (a thinking thing) am not merely in my body as a sailor is in a ship. Rather, I am closely joined to it – intermingled with it, so to speak – so that it and I form a unit.If this were not so, I wouldn’t feel pain when the body was hurt ...

As to the first question, it's unwarranted if the "is" of "he is a thing that thinks" is construed as an essence or identity. — J

The essence of something is its nature. He says:

... nature or essence...

... nothing else belongs to my nature or essence ...

About the concept of nature he says:

... I have been using ‘nature’ ... to speak of what can be found in the things themselves

and:

... my own nature is simply the totality of things bestowed on me by God.

On the one hand:

I know that I exist and that nothing else belongs to my nature or essence except that I am a thinking thing

but on the other:

... the nature of man as a combination of mind and body ...

If nature is what is essential and in the things themselves, and among the things bestowed on him by God is his body, then it would seem that the nature of the self is to be both mind and body.

And yet he says:

I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.

He distinguishes between his nature or essence and the nature of man, just as he distinguishes between a badly made clock which:

... conforms to the laws of its nature in telling the wrong time.

and a clock that work badly:

... a clock that works badly is ‘departing from its nature’

In the first case he is talking about the nature of a particular clock, a badly made one, while in the second he means the nature of clocks, that is, what it is to be a clock.His nature as a particular man is not the same as the nature of man. We might say of someone, for example that it is his nature to be timid or gregarious. It is Descartes' own nature to be a thinking thing. In this he aligns himself with an idea of the philosopher that goes back at least to Plato's Phaedo.

But there is another aspect to this. What he seems to be hinting at is made more clear when we take note of the fact that what he calls the mind is what the theologians call the soul. In the sixth meditation he says:

my whole self insofar as I am a combination of body and mind ...

My sole concern here is with what God has given to me as a combination of mind and body.

All of this makes it clear that, despite God’s immense goodness, the nature of man as a combination of mind and body is such that it is bound to mislead him from time to time.

If the nature or essence of man is a combination of mind or soul and body, then the theological teaching that the soul is what is essential and Descartes claim that he is a thinking thing, to the extent it disregards the body, is like a badly made clock and its maker a poor craftsman.

But the idea that the self or I is a soul persists. If, however, the soul is the mind then it is given the kind of agency that may be missing from the concept of soul. Thinking for Descartes is not fundamentally contemplative or meditative but constructive. Thus he sought foundations on which to build. Although a lot of attention is paid to his epistemology it was the groundwork for a science that would change the course of nature. We might say, of his nature to find the Archimedean point from which to move the earth.

He wouldn't have needed to displace the authority of the Church if that was his agenda. He could have just left and gone to live in Protestant territory. — frank

But Descartes' concern was not simply personal. It was to displace the authority of the Church from the mind of the thinking man,