Good question. You're right to notice that "good" and "ought" aren't automatically the same.
There's a missing layer most systems skip: why value exists at all.

One approach (Synthesis) argues that value only exists because life exists.
Without life, there's no perception, no judgment, no meaning, nothing to call anything "good" or "bad."

So why ought one do good?
Because to affirm good is to affirm life - and to deny it is to sabotage the very conditions that allow "ought" to even exist.
In that sense, "Life = Good" becomes the baseline, not by obligation, but by recognition.
Choosing good is choosing to live, choosing to be.

No external force needed, it's woven into existence itself.

You can find the formal paper HERE

I agree with the thought, "I don't think that good is synonymous with, "something one ought to do".
I think "good" is doing what gives you positive energy. Generally, you don't get positive energy from killing and stealing and whatnot, we're kinda hardwired that way.

Good question. You're right to notice that "good" and "ought" aren't automatically the same.
There's a missing layer most systems skip: why value exists at all. — James Dean Conroy

No, they are perfectly synonymous. Good is what one ought to do and what one ought to do is good. How can what one ought to do be bad and how are bad things what one ought to do?

Why should one do that which is good? No, I don't think that good is synonymous with, "something one ought to do". For example, most people would agree that selling all your worldly possessions and donating the money to charity is something that would be good. However, that doesn't mean that one is obligated to do so. Please input into this conversation with your own takes. — Hyper

The problem is that 'good' is a matte of perspective. The tacit assumption that is made in the OP and which is the heart of the problem is that there is some independent 'good', one ought to do in each and every situation. Selling all of your wordly belongings might well be good in some respect, say because you feed a starving child with it. However, it is bad for you yourself. We can try to weigh these goods and indeed if push comes to shove and you can rescue someone from certain death, the right thing to do might indeed be sell your worldly belongings. See here :
The problem is situations are never that clear cut. Moreover the equation is not that easy to make. You might have special obligations to persons near you. You may legitimately prioritize your own good ahead of the good of others if the difference is not exceedingly large. It is not that ought and good are not synonymous it is just hard t determine what the good is since good is a matter of tradeoffs and perspectives.

No, they are perfectly synonymous. Good is what one ought to do and what one ought to do is good. How can what one ought to do be bad and how are bad things what one ought to do? — Tobias

They're not synonymous - even by definition.

Good (adj.): morally right or beneficial.
Ought (verb): used to indicate duty or correctness.

You can say something is good without saying someone ought to do it. Plenty of things are good but not obligatory. The Synthesis view builds from this: good describes alignment with life; ought arises from recognising that alignment as meaningful. They're connected, but not the same.

The problem is always in the definition of good. You ought to do good. It does not mean that you ought to do every good thing. That would of course be impossible. 'That which is good' is an abstraction, a good thing is a particular. In abstracto it is true that one ought to do that which is good. However, particular things are never purely good or bad.

You ought to do good. — Tobias

This is axiomatic. What James, I think, is getting at is that this axiom is by no means fundamental and so cannot support a brute reading such as this.

I do not understand you. I indeed think it is axiomatic, and so it is uninformative. If you ask me "What ought I to do?" and I tell you "That which is good", I am indeed not being very helpful.

In abstracto it is true that one ought to do that which is good. — Tobias

How is this true? would get us a bit further...

It is a simple analytic truth. What other option is there, that one ought to do what is bad? Or a certain action is good but one ought not to do it. Seems contradictory to me.

No, it isn't. Something can be good and one ought not do it largely because there is absolutely no reason to think 'ought' holds any water whatsoever without a stated goal but also ecause the term 'good' is extremely ambiguous. If your use of that word leads to that conception, fine.

No, they are perfectly synonymous. — Tobias

Which sentences are synonymous? Surely not "X is good" and "I ought do X" because ought implies can but "X is good" does not seem to imply "I can do X".

It is an issue of legality and social integration. The evil, illegality, does produce anti-social and anti-economic behavior. We have to intend the good as what is legal and the evil as what is illegal.

but also ecause the term 'good' is extremely ambiguous. — AmadeusD

Yes, that is what I said. Indeed, the same with ought. Without making it concrete it does not mean anything.

Which sentences are synonymous? Surely not "X is good" and "I ought do X" because ought implies can but "X is good" does not seem to imply "I can do X". — Michael

I do not know if ought implies can. If it does you have a point of course. We ought to end world poverty, no, even though it is impossible to do so for anyone in particular.

The evil, illegality, does produce anti-social and anti-economic behavior. We have to intend the good as what is legal and the evil as what is illegal. — Ludovico Lalli

Not at all. Legality simply means sanctioned by law. Reporting enemies to Hitlers regime was not only legal under Nazi German law, it was illegal not to do so. Was it good to report enemies to Hitler's regime? Of course it was not. Ought we to report enemies to Hitler's regime, of course not.

We ought to end world poverty, no, even though it is impossible to do so for anyone in particular. — Tobias

So it's not that I ought to end world poverty, only that we ought to end world poverty. That's a pertinent distinction.

Perhaps, then, "X is good" is not synonymous with "I ought do X" but is synonymous with "we ought do X"?

But we're still missing something from which to derive a personal obligation. How do we get from "we ought do X" to "I ought do X"? The example of ending world poverty perhaps shows that the former does not logically entail the latter.

So it's not that I ought to end world poverty, only that we ought to end world poverty. That's a pertinent distinction. — Michael

I do not see the distinction. You should end world poverty. The only problem is you cannot do it alone, so you need to find people to work with. One question is what should you do, well, you ought to do good. The other question is how you should do it.

Perhaps, then, "X is good" is not synonymous with "I ought do X" but is synonymous with "we ought do X"? — Michael

It is synonymous with ''X' should be done', I guess.

But we're still missing something from which to derive a personal obligation from "X is good". — Michael

In your example, you are part of the 'we' right? Even by definition, the I is first person singular and the 'we' first personal plural. If we ought to end world poverty than I have to aid in that cause. So if we ought to do good, than I ought to contribute to that doing of good. Since good is totally unspecified, we can just as well say" I ought to do good".

I do not see the distinction. — Tobias

Well, "I" and "we" mean different things, so "I ought end world poverty" is not synonymous with "we ought end world poverty". That’s the (semantic) distinction.

It is synonymous with ''X' should be done', I guess. — Tobias

But does "X should be done" logically entail "I ought do X"?

In your example, you are part of the 'we' right? — Tobias

Perhaps, perhaps not. It's certainly not the case that the pronoun "we" necessarily includes every human, else a phrase like "we're going on holiday" would mean "every human is going on holiday".

So you need to clarify what you mean when you say "we ought end world poverty". Do you mean "every human ought end world poverty"?

So if we ought to do good, than I ought to contribute to that doing of good. Since good is totally unspecified, we can just as well say" I ought to do good". — Tobias

This seems to equivocate. You've been claiming that "good" is in some sense synonymous with "ought", in which case the claim "I ought do good" is synonymous with the claim "I ought do that which I ought do", which is admittedly a truism but also vacuous.

I think that we want "I ought do good" to mean more than just "I ought do that which I ought do", in which case we want "good" to not be synonymous with "ought", even if the one does entail the other.

But how can we get "good" and "ought" to each entail the other without being synonymous?

Well, "I" and "we" mean different things, so "I ought end world poverty" is not synonymous with "we ought end world poverty". So there is a semantic distinction. — Michael

I do not claim they are the same thing. I just do not see how that matters. We are discussing 'ought' and 'good'. The distinction between 'I' and 'we' is one you made and one I do not buy.

So "X is good" is synonymous with "X should be done". But does "X should be done" logically entail "I ought do X"? — Michael

Well, at least that you should not hinder X. My actions should support the coming of X into being.

Perhaps, perhaps not. It's certainly not the case that the pronoun "we" necessarily includes every human, else a phrase like "we're going on holiday" would mean "every human is going on holiday". — Michael

No, of course not, but if you state that 'we should do X', it does not make sense to say 'we', but not 'I'. I would be puzzled if you would say "We are going on holiday, but I am not".

This seems to equivocate. You've been claiming that "good" is in some sense synonymous with "ought", in which case the claim "I ought do good" is synonymous with the claim "I ought do that which I ought do", which is admittedly a truism but also vacuous. — Michael

Yes exactly and that is precisely what I told the OP and Amadeus. The mistake in the OP is that it asks for a justification for this vacuity, but it cannot be given because it is a truism.

I think that we want "I ought do good" to mean more than just "I ought do that which I ought do", in which case we want "good" to not be synonymous with "ought", even if the one does entail the other. — Michael

I do not know what 'we want' or whether it 'should' mean anything more. My point is exactly to show the statement is insufficient. It may sound good, but has no meaning. The opposite statement, the one the OP asks, is equally meaningless, without any concretization. That is what the analysis shows I think.

My post may sound dismissive, but I think there is a lot of interesting stuff in here, the meaning of 'we' for instance and I think that uncovering a truism is also interesting. The nature of obligation is also interesting, that is why I referred to Peter Singer. However, for the OP to start if meaningful discussion more work should be done.

I do not claim they are the same thing. I just do not see how that matters. — Tobias

If "X is good" is synonymous with "we ought do X" and if "we ought do X" is not synonymous with "I ought do X" then "X is good" is not synonymous with "I ought do X".

So we're missing a step that gets us from "X is good" to "I ought do X". That's why it matters.

No, of course not, but if you state that 'we should do X', it does not make sense to say 'we', but not 'I'. I would be puzzled if you would say "We are going on holiday, but I am not". — Tobias

You made the claim “we ought end world poverty”, not me. Did you mean to include me in that claim?

And this is where the claim "ought implies can" comes into play. If "we ought do X" implies "I ought do X" and if "I ought do X" implies "I can do X" then "we ought do X" implies "I can do X", and so "we ought end world poverty" implies "I can end world poverty". Therefore, if "I can end world poverty" is false then "we ought end world poverty" is false.

I think we need to disambiguate the claim "we ought do X". Consider these two claims:

1. Each person ought X
2. Humanity ought X

The phrase "we ought X" could mean either (1) or (2), but (1) and (2) do not prima facie mean the same thing, e.g. "humanity weighs 390 million tons" does not mean "each person weighs 390 million tons".

So even if "I ought X" follows from (1) it does not prima facie follow from (2). If it doesn't follow, and if "we ought X" only means (2), then "I ought X" does not follow from "we ought X".

Yes exactly and that is precisely what I told the OP and Amadeus. The mistake in the OP is that it asks for a justification for this vacuity, but it cannot be given because it is a truism. — Tobias

But a previous comment of yours hints at "I ought to do good" not being a vacuous truism:

"So if we ought to do good...".

The conditional here is telling. You don't seem to be saying "So if we ought to do that which we ought to do".

The fact that "good" is subjective is well addressed. "Good" for whom? is an even larger question that demands an answer before "ought" can be brought to bear.

If "X is good" is synonymous with "we ought do X" and if "we ought do X" is not synonymous with "I ought do X" then "X is good" is not synonymous with "I ought do X".

So we're missing a step that gets us from "X is good" to "I ought do X". That's why it matters. — Michael

Purely trivial. It is synonymous with X ought to be done.

First person plural or singluar does not matter at all.

You made the claim “we ought end world poverty”, not me. Did you mean to include me in that claim? — Michael

Yes, you should also strive to end world poverty.

And this is where the claim "ought implies can" comes into play. If "we ought do X" implies "I ought do X" and if "I ought do X" implies "I can do X" then "we ought do X" implies "I can do X", and so "we ought end world poverty" implies "I can end world poverty". — Michael

But it does not imply that you can. You ought to save your daughter from a burning house. Perhaps you cannot and you will fail, but that des not imply you should not have tried. Likewise, in many case we do not know the outcome of our actions. We simply do not know if doing X is possible or impossible. We can therefore not say a priori that ought implies can because we only know a posteriori what we can or cannot do.

1. Each person ought X
2. Humanity ought X

The phrase "we ought X" could mean either (1) or (2), but (1) and (2) do not prima facie mean the same thing, e.g. "humanity weighs 390 million tons" does not mean "each person weighs 390 million tons". — Michael

'Humanity' does not weigh anything. Only if you imply with humanity 'all human beings', I would not make that equation. Each person indeed ought to end world poverty. Not that each person can and certainly not on his or her own, but each person should indeed strive to end world poverty. If of course we think that ending world poverty is good, but apparently we are on the same page there.

But a previous comment of yours hints at "I ought to do good" not being a vacuous truism:

"So if we ought to do good...".

The conditional here is telling. You don't seem to be saying "So if we ought to do that which we ought to do". — Michael

Let me see where I wrote that, because it may well have been sloppy on my part, let's see...

I see this phrase: "So if we ought to do good, than I ought to contribute to that doing of good. Since good is totally unspecified, we can just as well say: "I ought to do good". Here I might have added: "If we ought to do good, and good is indeed what we ought to do, than I ought .... There also may be a problem with you substituting 'X' for good. The question is not if we need to do a specific X, the question is whether we need to do good (or: 'good ought to be done' or 'I ought to do good'). This is important. Helping an elderly person cross the road may well be considered good, but if in the meantime the house holding a couple of children is burning than not taking care of this first is not good. That is because taking care of those children is a greater good, and so should have priority. Substituting a concrete X for the abstract 'good', misses that point.

Purely trivial. It is synonymous with X ought to be done. — Tobias

Is “X ought to be done” synonymous with “I ought to X”?

But it does not imply that you can. — Tobias

Then that’s the issue of contention. According to Kant, “for if the moral law commands that we ought to be better human beings now, it inescapably follows that we must be capable of being better human beings. The action to which the ‘ought’ applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions.”

As a practical example, “I ought breastfeed my child” must be false because I am incapable of breastfeeding.

Perhaps you cannot and you will fail, but that des not imply you should not have tried. — Tobias

So you’ve changed it slightly. It’s no longer the case that “X is good” means “X ought be done” but “X ought be tried”?

the question is whether we need to do good (or: 'good ought to be done' or 'I ought to do good'). — Tobias

Again, your own wording suggests that these two mean different things:

1. Ought I do good?
2. Ought I do that which I ought do?

The second isn't in question; it's a vacuous truism that I ought do that which I ought do. So if the first is in question then it isn't synonymous with the second.

Swings and roundabouts boys. No one can clearly put forth any reason to do anything but preference. Nice.

Is “X ought to be done” synonymous with “I ought to X”? — Michael

I do not really care about the exact relation. X ought to be done implies you ought to at least not hinder X being done. You should not oppose X, you should strive for the fulfillment of X. But again, the problem stems from your substitution of X for the unqualified, inconcrete universal 'Good'. Indeed, you should not oppose the good, you should strive for the fulfillment of good and good ought to be done. Indeed, all of these are true and all of these are also trivial because 'the good' is that which should be done. Substitute any given goal for 'the good', and ask a person why this goal should be achieved. In the end the person has nothing else but saying 'well it is good'. For Kant doing one's duty was good, for Aristotle being virtuous was good and for a utilitarian maximizing happiness is good.

“for if the moral law commands that we ought to be better human beings now, it inescapably follows that we must be capable of being better human beings. The action to which the ‘ought’ applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions.”

As a practical example, “I ought breastfeed my child” must be false because I am incapable of breastfeeding. — Michael

No, breastfeeding is naturally impossible so you cannot breastfeed, but assuming breastfeeding is good, you should not thwart it either. You should make it possible. Against all odds? Of course not, because there are things that may outweigh the good of breastfeeding.

You again substitute again a particular kind of good, for 'good' by the way. That is problematic because any particular good is not the good in itself.

So you’ve changed it slightly. It’s no longer the case that “X is good” means “X ought to be done” but “X ought to be tried”? — Michael

X ought to be pursued, yes. So indeed X ought to be done, if possible, but might not be done. My pursuing X (if X is the same as 'good', an abstract universal indicating an unqualified state of 'goodness', whatever that may amount to) might fail.

Again, your own wording suggests that these two mean different things:

1. Ought I do good?
2. Ought I do that which I ought do?

The second isn't in question; it's a vacuous truism that I ought do that which I ought do. So if the first is in question then it isn't synonymous with the second. — Michael

They seem different, but upon analysis they are not different at all. The second is a tautology, but the first one also is. Putting it in question is equally meaningless. the OP does that and I criticized the OP for it.

In fact it seems to me that it is just a case of 'pros hen'. You think of kinds of goods, I think of 'the good'.

Swings and roundabouts boys. No one can clearly put forth any reason to do anything but preference. Nice. — AmadeusD

What kind of reasons to do things would you like? There are many.

I'm unsure why you'd ask.

Coherent preference. That's all we have. Groups do it, and so we have morality. Swings and roundabouts.

I do not think I'd disagree ncessarily, but is there a way to discern between preferences? Are the preferences of say a criminal gang of equal value as the preferences of a congregation of peaceful monks?

That's certainly the rub. I can't think of any way other than an appeal to collective preferences. What, in the West, we consider a criminal gang is not that way framed in say the Mid East or North Africa.

What is good? Many actions that are deemed good turn out to have long term harm.
I see many people who think they are good parents and I would differ vehemently on their opinion.
I try and live a good life but I'm sure many would judge me not that good at all.

Take the following exchanges:

Exchange 1
Michael: Why ought I give money to charity?
Tobias: Because giving money to charity is good.

Exchange 2
Michael: Why ought I give money to charity?
Tobias: Because you ought give money to charity.

Are these exchanges equivalent? I think prima facie they're not; the first appears to provide a reason why one ought give money to charity, whereas the second doesn't. So the suggestion that "X is good" is synonymous with "I ought X" doesn't seem to be consistent with how we actually understand moral language.

Carrying on from Exchange 1, the implicit syllogism is:

A1. Giving money to charity is good
A2. If giving money to charity is good then I ought give money to charity
A3. Therefore, I ought give money to charity

The problem is that if A2 is a tautology then A1 begs the question, assuming A3, and so the argument commits an informal fallacy. It would be equivalent to the following syllogism:

B1. I ought give money to charity
B2. If I ought give money to charity then I ought give money to charity
B3. Therefore, I ought give money to charity

Which returns us to Exchange 2.

I think that the uselessness of this second syllogism and of Exchange 2 shows that "good" and "ought" are not synonymous, even if there is a connection between the two, and so it's reasonable to ask for a justification for A2 (and for the more general and simplified "I ought do good").

Tobias That's certainly the rub. I can't think of any way other than an appeal to collective preferences. What, in the West, we consider a criminal gang is not that way framed in say the Mid East or North Africa. — AmadeusD

I am not too sure, or at least not that relativist yet. There are of course grey areas where for instance a group is considered a legitimate armed resistance while others call it a terrorist group. However, I do think that in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, the concept of legitimate and illegitimate use of force exist. In the end some appeal to 'just' violence is made. We might all judge differently, but the appeal to justice seems similar enough to me. I all countries, lobbing someone's head of without a reason is not ok. We might differ in whether the reason is good or not, but without any reason at al, that is unacceptable to all. Some thin moral like-mindedness exists, I think.

Are these exchanges equivalent? I think prima facie they're not; the first appears to provide a reason why one ought give money to charity, whereas the second doesn't. So the suggestion that "X is good" is synonymous with "I ought X" doesn't seem to be consistent with how we actually understand moral language. — Michael

I agree, prima facie they are not. However, when you enquire further the first is just as meaningless as the second one. Just saying giving money to charity is good begs the question, 'why is it 'good'? You might say you saying something more, but in fact you do not. You might think it provides for a reason, but what kind of reason is it? At least, it leaves me none the wiser as to why I should give money to charity.

It seems like exchange 1 is somehow informative but it is not. It simply tells you that you ought to give to charity because it is good. In fact it seems informative because you have already an implicit sense of what 'good' is, namely something you ought to do. Other then that it tells you nothing so it is a tautology, but dressed up differently.

In fact, you already have an inkling of this problem.

I think prima facie they're not; the first appears to provide a reason why one ought give money to charity, whereas the second doesn't. — Michael

Notice your use of 'I think', 'prima facie' and 'appears'. Indeed, it appears to do something, but does not. The dialectic shows us that the abstract universal 'good', disappears and only forces one to become more concrete. I will only grant you this, the second type of exchange is more obvious and therefore does not give rise to such a dialectic. In that sense, you may say it does something different. The only difference is that it takes analysis to see that 'good' is the same as 'ought to', whereas 'ought to' and 'ought to', the tautology, does not force such an analysis. It should not distract from the fact that the question asked in the OP is equally unreasonable. It is not "reasonable to ask for a justification for A2", simply because 'good' is empty, it has no significance beyond 'that which one ought to do'.