Like, why is there is stereotype that scientists wear a lab coat 24/7? — Arcane Sandwich

Hah! Movies, probably. I agree that scientists are human beings, and I don't mean to target scientists in saying "scientism"

"Scientism" is a pejorative -- no one actually calls themselves that way unless they want to challenge some notion that people who use it as a pejorative have.

Everyone can, in their off hours, investigate something else.

I think "scientism" has more to do with a particular appeal or argument -- that because a scientist wrote it in their scientific capacity it ought be treated as superior to other forms or expressions of writing.

Crudely: there's an academic hierarchy of two slots, and the sciences are on top.

"Scientism" is a pejorative -- no one actually calls themselves that way unless they want to challenge some notion that people who use it as a pejorative have. — Moliere

Well Mario Bunge uses that term in a positive sense, in many different texts, for example in his article titled In Defense of Realism and Scientism.

I use the word "scientism" myself in a positive way. It's a word that started out with a negative connotation, but then some people (like Bunge) started to use it in a positive way.

Think of it like an ethic slur or a racial slur that has been appropriated in an positive way by the community that it initially targeted.

Looks like I have more to learn.

Good!

Access to the paper you linked will be restored upon going back to work ;)

I use it in the pejorative way with respect to what I said:

that because a scientist wrote it in their scientific capacity it ought be treated as superior to other forms or expressions of writing.

Crudely: there's an academic hierarchy of two slots, and the sciences are on top. — Moliere

that because a scientist wrote it in their scientific capacity it ought be treated as superior to other forms or expressions of writing.

Crudely: there's an academic hierarchy of two slots, and the sciences are on top. — Moliere

Sure, but that's just like, a state of affairs. It doesn't really tell me how we should "go about it" in any meaningful way. Should there be an academic democracy in the sense that the two slots are next to each other, horizontally, instead of hierarchically? Or should literature dethrone science, so to speak, so as to preserve the hierarchy, but inverting the terms occupying those slots? Should there be slots to begin with? Is there an academic continuum, so to speak, between literature and science, or is there an exact cut-off that marks the difference between science and non-science, or between poetry and non-poetry?

It doesn't really tell me how we should "go about it" in any meaningful way. Should there be an academic democracy in the sense that the two slots are next to each other, horizontally, instead of hierarchically? — Arcane Sandwich

That's basically what I think about all social structures, but I'll admit I'm an odd-ball here. (EDIT: I mean, we should be horizontal, always)

Or should literature dethrone science, so to speak, so as to preserve the hierarchy, but inverting the terms occupying those slots?

I don't think so.

Sometimes science, sometimes poems -- unfortunately we have to decide ourselves when is what.

Should there be slots to begin with?

No.

Is there an academic continuum, so to speak, between literature and science, or is there an exact cut-off that marks the difference between science and non-science, or between poetry and non-poetry?

Presently in the United States, at least, I believe there is -- my own mentor has been fighting for his tenure after being "let go" due to forces which basically prefer STEM, because they believe it relates more to industry, over humanities, because they believe it makes poor people dissatisfied with work and would prefer people to just learn how to do their jobs.{

But intellectually? No, no way. It's political, not conceptual.

I mean, we should be horizontal, always — Moliere

Hmmm... Ok, I'll bite. We shouldn't be hierarchical, ever? A hierarchy is just an arrangement, objectively speaking. It's just an organizational instrument or tool. By itself, as a concept, it doesn't really mean anything to me. If humans are arranged hierarchically, will the top group always oppress the bottom group? Is there no such thing as horizontal oppression in that sense? Would peer pressure count as oppression in a horizontal sense? I think it would. I'm curious to know your thoughts on such conceptual topics.

If humans are arranged hierarchically, will the top group always oppress the bottom group? — Arcane Sandwich

Yup. Not intentionally, of course.

But human nature is to seek out what you want, and even if not everyone does it some people will take advantage of people who have less power in order to further their own ends such that it effects our social arrangements -- i.e. class is a real thing, and I do not think it ought be a real thing.

But this is much more political than metaphysical on my part. If you're talking about hierarchy in a mathematical sense, for instance, I'm not really talking about concepts here -- concepts can be organized hierarchically just fine because concepts aren't human beings.

Yup. Not intentionally, of course. — Moliere

Ok, let me see if the following analogy holds up, then. When looking at a bee colony, we usually point to a very large individual bee, which is clearly different from the rest just in purely morphological terms, and we say "that's the Queen". But that's an inaccurate thing to say. There is a hierarchy in a bee colony, but the Queen isn't the one running the show. The Queen bee is something like the "reproducer" of the colony, that is her function. She exists only to create the next generation of bees. She does not tell the other bees what to do, the other bees do their tasks without the Queen telling them to do those tasks (i.e., find nectar, bring it back, make honey, construct more wax cells for the colony, etc.). There is no hierarchical oppression in this scenario, even though there is a hierarchy. Or would you like to challenge the idea that there is a hierarchy in a bee colony?

You can also say "bees are not human beings". Ok. In that case, let me mention, as an example, the sport of Bazilian Jiu Jitsu. In BJJ, there is a hierarchy of belts. That doesn't mean that the black belts are oppressing the white, blue, purple and brown bets. Or would you like to challenge the idea that BJJ black belts are not oppressing the lower ranked belts?

- i.e. class is a real thing — Moliere

But it's not the only real thing. Biological sex is a real thing, sexual orientation is a real thing, racial discrimination is a real thing, etc.

I do not think it ought be a real thing.

But this is much more political than metaphysical on my part. — Moliere

But that's my point. In a classical Marxist analysis of society, for example, or a classical Webberian analysis of society (or just pick whichever sociological theory you happen to agree with), where do you place King Charles? Where do you place Lady Di? Where do you place the Pope? Where would one place the Rolling Stones, or Lionel Messi? Are they oppressing the poor in any meaningful way, if any?

Ok, let me see if the following analogy holds up, then. When looking at a bee colony, we usually point to a very large individual bee, which is clearly different from the rest just in purely morphological terms, and we say "that's the Queen". But that's an inaccurate thing to say. There is a hierarchy in a bee colony, but the Queen isn't the one running the show. The Queen bee is something like the "reproducer" of the colony, that is her function. She exists only to create the next generation of bees. She does not tell the other bees what to do, the other bees do their tasks without the Queen telling them to do those tasks (i.e., find nectar, bring it back, make honey, construct more wax cells for the colony, etc.). There is no hierarchical oppression in this scenario, even though there is a hierarchy. Or would you like to challenge the idea that there is a hierarchy in a bee colony?

You can also say "bees are not human beings". Ok. In that case, let me mention, as an example, the sport of Bazilian Jiu Jitsu. In BJJ, there is a hierarchy of belts. That doesn't mean that the black belts are oppressing the white, blue, purple and brown bets. Or would you like to challenge the idea that BJJ black belts are not oppressing the lower ranked belts? — Arcane Sandwich

I'm not sure that I'm even challenging these ideas as much as using "hierarchy" differently. That's kind of what I was getting at with the notion that this is a more political than metaphysical statement -- I'm not talking about bees or the mastery of a craft, but power relations between human beings (which are largely defined by decision-making-power, in my mind)

I agree that calling the Queen Bee the Queen is a misnomer since bees are much more collectivist than human beings are. At least, from the outside -- it's not like I know how to read bee poetry.

But it's not the only real thing. Biological sex is a real thing, sexual orientation is a real thing, racial discrimination is a real thing, etc. — Arcane Sandwich

I agree here. I'm not a reductionist marxist type person -- just a marxist in the sense that I read him and respect his ideas and utilize his ideas in understanding the world around me because it's mostly worked so far.

But that's my point. In a classical Marxist analysis of society, for example, or a classical Webberian analysis of society (or just pick whichever sociological theory you happen to agree with), where do you place King Charles? Where do you place Lady Di? Where do you place the Pope? Where would one place the Rolling Stones, or Lionel Messi? Are they oppressing the poor in any meaningful way, if any? — Arcane Sandwich

I'd say that a Marxist analysis of society doesn't look to place individuals within the hierarchy in a general sense -- it depends upon the "concrete conditions", and so the truth of placing people in a hierarchy isn't something decided in a conversation of contemplation at all. It's more "scientific", but less scientific in terms of norms -- in a marxist analysis it's class oppression, and not individual oppression, that matters. The concrete conditions could be likened to when we have to actually do something in the now -- who has the decision-making power? who has the money? what do we do to accomplish.....? -- rather than some criteria which will always hold such that we can say "King Charles does 78 oppressions per day", or anything so specific or general as that.

I'm not sure that I'm even challenging these ideas as much as using "hierarchy" differently. That's kind of what I was getting at with the notion that this is a more political than metaphysical statement -- I'm not talking about bees or the mastery of a craft, but power relations between human beings (which are largely defined by decision-making-power, in my mind) — Moliere

Right, but, look at the point I'm making here, for a sec. It seems to me (and I could be wrong here) that you're mixing up the topic of politics with the topic of power. Political power is not the only kind of power. There is such a thing as physical power. That is what we study and apply in Brazilian Jiu Jitsu as a martial art, not a sport (thought it's both, really). The notion here is, if you choke me, for example, and I can't escape the choke, and you don't let go, then I go unconscious. And if you don't release the choke after I become unconscious, I will die. That, is some sort of power, and yet it is not a political power. And, to learn those powers, in the context of a BJJ academy, a clear hierarchy is needed, which is why belts exist in the first place. A belt is just a symbol, you could use some other criteria, such as how many medals have you won at tournaments, or how many trophies, which is what happens in the world of sports.

I agree that calling the Queen Bee the Queen is a misnomer since bees are much more collectivist than human beings are. At least, from the outside -- it's not like I know how to read bee poetry. — Moliere

I think that bees are fascist in that sense. They seem awful to me. The workers are running the show in a bee colony, all of them are females, there is only one reproductive female (the so-called "Queen"), and there is a caste of lazy, non-working males whose only function is to reproduce with the Queen. If anyone steps out of line, the female worker bees kill that individual. They've been known to kill Queens, males, and other female worker bees. And there are records of this. In short, bee society sucks. Fuck them. I'd rather be a human. And I have the "ontological-political right" to say that because I'm just as much of a living being as them.

I agree here. I'm not a reductionist marxist type person -- just a marxist in the sense that I read him and respect his ideas and utilize his ideas in understanding the world around me because it's mostly worked so far. — Moliere

Yeah but I do that with a lot of philosophers and you seem to do the same thing, that's what I'm saying. Everyone seems to do that. No one sticks to "just one philosopher". I mean, everyone has their favorite, or their favorites, but it's not like we're ignorant of the fact that other philosophers exist.

I'd say that a Marxist analysis of society doesn't look to place individuals within the hierarchy in a general sense -- it depends upon the "concrete conditions", and so the truth of placing people in a hierarchy isn't something decided in a conversation of contemplation at all. It's more "scientific", but less scientific in terms of norms -- in a marxist analysis it's class oppression, and not individual oppression, that matters. The concrete conditions could be likened to when we have to actually do something in the now -- who has the decision-making power? who has the money? what do we do to accomplish.....? -- rather than some criteria which will always hold such that we can say "King Charles does 78 oppressions per day", or anything so specific or general as that. — Moliere

I don't know what to say here, my friend, so I'll just blurt out an intellectually reckless claim that I'm willing to argue for, even if I'm just shooting from the hip here: Marxism, by the epistemological standards of the 21st Century, is less scientific than contemporary physics. That's just a fact.

I don't know what to say here, my friend, so I'll just blurt out an intellectually reckless claim that I'm willing to argue for, even if I'm just shooting from the hip here: Marxism, by the epistemological standards of the 21st Century, is less scientific than contemporary physics. That's just a fact. — Arcane Sandwich

I agree!

It's something that bugs me, actually -- but building the science is a lot harder than being bugged by it.

Yeah but I do that with a lot of philosophers and you seem to do the same thing, that's what I'm saying. Everyone seems to do that. No one sticks to "just one philosopher". I mean, everyone has their favorite, or their favorites, but it's not like we're ignorant of the fact that other philosophers exist. — Arcane Sandwich

True.

I think that bees are fascist in that sense. They seem awful to me. The workers are running the show in a bee colony, all of them are females, there is only one reproductive female (the so-called "Queen"), and there is a caste of lazy, non-working males whose only function is to reproduce with the Queen. If anyone steps out of line, the female worker bees kill that individual. They've been known to kill Queens, males, and other female worker bees. And there are records of this. In short, bee society sucks. Fuck them. I'd rather be a human. And I have the "ontological-political right" to say that because I'm just as much of a living being as them. — Arcane Sandwich

Oh yes I have no desire to live in bee-society. For human beings, at least, bees are too collectivist -- we'd suffocate in that society.

I'm a collectivist, but it's not like I want to emulate the ants or bees. That's insane.

Right, but, look at the point I'm making here, for a sec. It seems to me (and I could be wrong here) that you're mixing up the topic of politics with the topic of power. Political power is not the only kind of power. There is such a thing as physical power. That is what we study and apply in Brazilian Jiu Jitsu as a martial art, not a sport (thought it's both, really). The notion here is, if you choke me, for example, and I can't escape the choke, and you don't let go, then I go unconscious. And if you don't release the choke after I become unconscious, I will die. That, is some sort of power, and yet it is not a political power. And, to learn those powers, in the context of a BJJ academy, a clear hierarchy is needed, which is belts exist in the first place. A belt is just a symbol, you could use some other criteria, such as how many medals have you won at tournaments, or how many trophies, which is what happens in the world of sports. — Arcane Sandwich

Please tell me if I'm missing something in this response because I feel like I'm repeating myself -- so I must be missing something. But I'll write more in an effort to see if something else snags.

I could be mixing up topics -- I do it all the time, and would be appreciative if I can see how I'm doing it now (not your job, of course, but mine -- just would be appreciative)

"Power" is a funny word -- Bertrand Russell tried to write a science of power by listing the various categories of power and suggesting it could be measured somehow. I think this is a common misconception of power -- that it's something like Kinetic or Potential Energy, and the greater force wins.

That's a simplification that works, but is basically false. There is no unit of "Power" in terms of political power.

By "craft" I meant the sort of thing you're talking about here -- one can become better at something, and a school can use a hierarchy to indicate to students the path they are meant to take. I can see the conflict with what I'm saying, and I'm not sure how to resolve it.

I think in the ideal ideal world I'd prefer it if somehow persons could meaningfully choose to participate in such hierarchies. It's not like learning is bad, and human beings can benefit from that.

It's that human nature is such that even those benevolent hierarchies are abused -- in various dark ways that we need not go into.

Oh yes I have no desire to live in bee-society. For human beings, at least, bees are too collectivist -- we'd suffocate in that society.

I'm a collectivist, but it's not like I want to emulate the ants or bees. That's insane — Moliere

Right, but you wanna know why bees are like that and we're not? This is a curious biological fact that I learned when I was working on my doctoral thesis, which was about the history and philosophy of biology. Check out my explanation of it. Bees have eusociality, and the species Homo sapiens does not have eu-sociality, we only have socialty. Now, what is "eusociality", you might ask? It's a word that biologists use, and it means something like True sociality:

Eusociality (Greek εὖ eu "good" and social) is the highest level of organization of sociality. It is defined by the following characteristics: cooperative brood care (including care of offspring from other individuals), overlapping generations within a colony of adults, and a division of labor into reproductive and non-reproductive groups. The division of labor creates specialized behavioral groups within an animal society, sometimes called castes. Eusociality is distinguished from all other social systems because individuals of at least one caste usually lose the ability to perform behaviors characteristic of individuals in another caste. — Wikipedia

It's a biological division of labor, or division of labor at the biological level. Bees are not collectivists. They are the worst form of social organization that can ever exist, it is extremely oppressive to the individual bee. We, human beings, would not want to live like that, if we experienced it in person. Or would you disagree with me (on something specific or on everything in general)?

I could be mixing up topics -- I do it all the time, and would be appreciative if I can see how I'm doing it now (not your job, of course, but mine -- just would be appreciative) — Moliere

It seems to me (and I could be wrong here) that you are mixing them up (here, in this conversation) at the level of the concepts themselves, like, you're mixing them in an almost "mathematical", purely formal way. Metaphorically, it's like you're mixing up Geometry with Algebra in some sense.

"Power" is a funny word -- Bertrand Russell tried to write a science of power by listing the various categories of power and suggesting it could be measured somehow. I think this is a common misconception of power -- that it's something like Kinetic or Potential Energy, and the greater force wins.

That's a simplification that works, but is basically false. There is no unit of "Power" in terms of political power. — Moliere

Ok, but could there be one? It's just math, at the end of the day, in that sense. For example, you can use Goolge Ngram to look for statistical trends on this and that. For example, right now it has the following three search terms: Albert Einstein,Sherlock Holmes,Frankenstein. Right now, the trend is 1) Frankenstein, 2) Sherlock Holmes, 3) Albert Einstein. So what would we say about that, from the POV of Theory? I would say something like the following: currently, people seem to pay more attention to fictional characters than to real people, though that was not always the case in the past.

Agree or disagree? And to what percentage? Don't just say "Agree, 100%"

: )

By "craft" I meant the sort of thing you're talking about here -- one can become better at something, and a school can use a hierarchy to indicate to students the path they are meant to take. I can see the conflict with what I'm saying, and I'm not sure how to resolve it. — Moliere

Me either : (

I think in the ideal ideal world I'd prefer it if somehow persons could meaningfully choose to participate in such hierarchies. It's not like learning is bad, and human beings can benefit from that.

It's that human nature is such that even those benevolent hierarchies are abused -- in various dark ways that we need not go into. — Moliere

100%, Agree.

Or would you disagree with me (on something specific or on everything in general)? — Arcane Sandwich

Nope! I agree with this.

I rarely use the word "insane", because it doesn't have any real referent. But if someone really and actually wanted to become bee or ant like I'd say they are out of their mind.

I'd feel like I'm being misunderstood if people began to wonder if they ought be like bees or ants.


Also, thanks for teaching me about eusociality.

It seems to me (and I could be wrong here) that you are mixing them up (here, in this conversation) at the level of the concepts themselves, like, you're mixing them in an almost "mathematical", purely formal way. Metaphorically, it's like you're mixing up Geometry with Algebra in some sense. — Arcane Sandwich

Cool, thanks. I'll think about it, but obviously if I'm mixing them up now it's not the time to disentangle.

Ok, but could there be one? It's just math, at the end of the day, in that sense. For example, you can use Goolge Ngram to look for statistical trends on this and that. For example, right now it has the following three search terms: Albert Einstein,Sherlock Holmes,Frankenstein. Right now, the trend is 1) Frankenstein, 2) Sherlock Holmes, 3) Albert Einstein. So what would we say about that, from the POV of Theory? I would say something like the following: currently, people seem to pay more attention to fictional characters than to real people, though that was not always the case in the past.

Agree or disagree? And to what percentage? Don't just say "Agree, 100%"

: ) — Arcane Sandwich

There could be one, but I think it's so far out there that any suggestion will probably be false.

Someone could trip across the right answer, as we've done before. I don't like to cut off ideas in principle -- and really, if I'm a marxist, there ought be a way to do this scientifically.

I just doubt that there is at the moment, and through my experience with doing union politics, at least, I've sort of come around to thinking there is no scientific analysis of political power -- it's a historical, rather than scientific, phenomena.

I'd feel like I'm being misunderstood if people began to wonder if they ought be like bees or ants. — Moliere

But this actually does come up every now and then, in political conversations. Like, I've heard fascists make the argument that human society should be more like an ant society or a bee society precisely because eusocial insects are similar to fascists. As for myself, I can only describe such deluded beliefs (for that is what they are) as a metaphysical and political attempt to erase the very concept of individuality in a social sense. And I say that as objectively and as respectfully as possible.

But then again, I've also heard hippies make the argument that we should be like bees (not ants, mind you) because bees produce honey, and it is well known that Ambrosia (i.e., honey) is the "Food of the Gods", whatever that means.

Also, thanks for teaching me about eusociality. — Moliere

It's just a useful reference, nothing more.

Cool, thanks. I'll think about it, but obviously if I'm mixing them up now it's not the time to disentangle. — Moliere

I can't make that decision for you. Nor would I want to.

There could be one, but I think it's so far out there that any suggestion will probably be false. — Moliere

Well, in my honest opinion, this is because the social sciences in general are not as scientific as the natural sciences, at least not currently. If we wanna bring up the social sciences so that they are on a par with the natural sciences, then we kinda need to place our bets on scientism, right? Anti-scientism won't get that particular job done. See where I'm commin' from, partner?

Someone could trip across the right answer, as we've done before. I don't like to cut off ideas in principle -- and really, if I'm a marxist, there ought be a way to do this scientifically. — Moliere

Exactly. It's actually really simple, at the end of the day. Right? I could be wrong about that though, I mean, it is technically a very, very complicated point to make. Just look at this conversation. It's too abstract, in some sense. Like, we need to be a bit more materialistic, here. And yeah, I just say it like that, I just blurt that sort of thing out. Doesn't mean that I don't believe in it.

I just doubt that there is at the moment, and through my experience with doing union politics, at least, I've sort of come around to thinking there is no scientific analysis of political power -- it's a historical, rather than scientific, phenomena. — Moliere

Well, then, what you're alluding to right there is the following question: "Is historiography a social science?" "Is it a science to begin with, or is it one of the "Humanities" or "Humanistic studies"? And I just don't think that it's a productive discussion at the end of the day, even though people love to discuss it. Like, let's just all come out of the scientism closet: we all believe in scientism at the end of the day, let's not fool ourselves about that. Right? Or do you disagree?

Well, in my honest opinion, this is because the social sciences in general are not as scientific as the natural sciences, at least not currently. If we wanna bring up the social sciences so that they are on a par with the natural sciences, then we kinda need to place our bets on scientism, right? Anti-scientism won't get that particular job done. See where I'm commin' from, partner? — Arcane Sandwich

As always it depends upon how we understand the terms in the first place.

To my understanding I don't think we need to place bets either way. If neither literature nor social science nor physical science are in some sense superior to each other then there's no need to argue which one is going to win. We can engage in each at our whim.

Well, then, what you're alluding to right there is the following question: "Is historiography a social science?" "Is it a science to begin with, or is it one of the "Humanities" or "Humanistic studies"? And I just don't think that it's a productive discussion at the end of the day, even though people love to discuss it. Like, let's just all come out of the scientism closet: we all believe in scientism at the end of the day, let's not fool ourselves about that. Right? Or do you disagree? — Arcane Sandwich

I certainly don't believe in scientism -- I don't see science as superior to other forms of knowledge. I see it as one of the ways we can go about our world. And sometimes it's a foolish way to go about our world.

With respect to history in particular I think this is true. This would be where I begin to part ways with Orthodox Marxism.

Generally speaking I don't think all phenomena fit the same methodological bill -- and which is better at a time has much to do with what we're talking about in the first place. I wouldn't want the historical record of a particular cannon ball in figuring out where it will land when given such and such an amount of energy. I also would not break out thermodynamical models to explain the causes of World War 1.

These are just different ways of knowing.

Oh, also, I tried to track down access to the particular paper you linked and failed. I found some papers by Bunge, but not that.

As always it depends upon how we understand the terms in the first place.

To my understanding I don't think we need to place bets either way. If neither literature nor social science nor physical science are in some sense superior to each other then there's no need to argue which one is going to win. We can engage in each at our whim. — Moliere

But then some things will be more difficult and/or they'll take more time, such as the construction (or discovery) of a way to meaningfully quantify oppression, or political power. To be sure, it's possible to quantify exploitation, but there is no comparable metric for oppression or political power (I mean, there are some proposals, but they're sort of flimsy and questionable from a methodological POV).

I certainly don't believe in scientism -- I don't see science as superior to other forms of knowledge. — Moliere

Depends on what you want to know. If you want to know what the interior of the Earth is like, you'll probably arrive at a more sensible result reading what geologists have to say than reading Jules Verne. It's fun to entertain the idea that there might be living dinosaurs inside the Earth's core, but in all likenesses there's just a lot of inorganic stuff at a very high temperature there, even though no one has ever seen it. Why would we approach history any differently?

And sometimes it's a foolish way to go about our world. — Moliere

Sure, if you're reading "Journey to the Center of the Earth" and you get mad at Jules Verne because he says that there are living dinosaurs inside the Earth's core, you kinda missed the point of the book.

With respect to history in particular I think this is true. This would be where I begin to part ways with Orthodox Marxism. — Moliere

Is there a particularly important reason why non-Orthodox Marxism can't support scientism?

Generally speaking I don't think all phenomena fit the same methodological bill -- and which is better at a time has much to do with what we're talking about in the first place. I wouldn't want the historical record of a particular cannon ball in figuring out where it will land when given such and such an amount of energy. I also would not break out thermodynamical models to explain the causes of World War 1. — Moliere

Sure. But you wouldn't approach the invention of the cannon or World War 1 as academic topics just from the point of view of poetry. That history isn't physics doesn't necessarily entail that it's non-scientific tout court.

Oh, also, I tried to track down access to the particular paper you linked and failed. I found some papers by Bunge, but not that. — Moliere

Feel free to send me a PM and I'll see if I can do something about that.

Is there a particularly important reason why non-Orthodox Marxism can't support scientism? — Arcane Sandwich

Can't? No. But this is the very point that I begin to question Marx on -- whether history even can be treated scientifically, or more to the point, whether it should be done.

In some cases, sure -- I see a lot of advantage to being able to predict the flows of the economy, for instance, but I wonder if the economy is more a historical rather than a scientific entity. In which case the notion of models and empirical evidence and all that kind of goes out the window -- it's too close to home for us to make predictions about because we care too much about it. As soon as we have a model which works people will adapt to that model and the model will have to change in order to be true.

Whereas science emphasizes reproducibility and explanatory power history emphasizes the moment and the narrative.

Sure. But you wouldn't approach the invention of the cannon or World War 1 as academic topics just from the point of view of poetry. That history isn't physics doesn't necessarily entail that it's non-scientific tout court. — Arcane Sandwich

I think that treating history like science is overly broad on the part of science.

And also, historians do reference poems and novels from time periods they're interested in. This is because they are historical records unto themselves if they were produced at that time and capture something of the era.

With respect to human experience I think poetry is an important record.

Can't? No. But this is the very point that I begin to question Marx on -- whether history even can be treated scientifically, or more to the point, whether it should be done. — Moliere

Why not? There's a lot of quantitative content in history, already. We have numbers for the centuries, for the years, even days and the minutes and seconds of each day. Not that you'll take all of those into account when you write or read about, I don't know, the French Revolution, but it's like, there are some numbers here already, about a ton of stuff. What was the price of bread in the months leading up to the French Revolution? How many people lived in France at that time? How many in Paris, specifically? How many guards were at the Bastille? Etc. And then you can study larger phenomena, like, the first World War. How many countries were involved in that conflict? When did it start? When did it end? How many combatants, on each side? What was the death toll? Etc. All of this is quantifiable. Why wouldn't you then look for statistics, trends, correlations, etc.?

I wonder if the economy is more a historical rather than a scientific entity. — Moliere

Probably both. Why not? It's "a human thing" that has numbers, isn't it?

Whereas science emphasizes reproducibility and explanatory power history emphasizes the moment and the narrative. — Moliere

But think of the physicists that study the Big Bang. It only happened once. And it's not reproducible. It's not like you're going reproduce the Big Bang in a lab. Plus, physicists can explain everything that happened immediately after the Big Bang, but as for the Big Bang itself, in the strict sense,there's only speculation.

I think that treating history like science is overly broad on the part of science. — Moliere

Or perhaps history already is a science, just not a very sophisticated one in comparison to physics.

And also, historians do reference poems and novels from time periods they're interested in. — Moliere

So do some physicists, when they quote Borges in one of their papers, for example.

With respect to human experience I think poetry is an important record. — Moliere

It is, but historians aren't doing poetry when they're working, just as mathematicians are not playing chess when they're working.

Why not? There's a lot of quantitative content in history, already. We have numbers for the centuries, for the years, even days and the minutes and seconds of each day. Not that you'll take all of those into account when you write or read about, I don't know, the French Revolution, but it's like, there are some numbers here already, about a ton of stuff. What was the price of bread in the months leading up to the French Revolution? How many people lived in France at that time? How many in Paris, specifically? How many guards were at the Bastille? Etc. And then you can study larger phenomena, like, the first World War. How many countries were involved in that conflict? When did it start? When did it end? How many combatants, on each side? What was the death toll? Etc. All of this is quantifiable. Why wouldn't you then look for statistics, trends, correlations, etc.? — Arcane Sandwich

"Shouldn't" because the phenomena isn't a scientific one, but historical. So while we can draw up statistics and trends and correlations this won't be what decides how a history is told, or at least we'll be missing out on a huge part of the history of all we do is look at measurables and ignore stories.

There's even a whole theory of writing history dedicated to exactly that -- it's the multiplicity of stories and causes and perspectives on an event which fills out an understanding of the event, rather than a unifying theory or the necessity for agreement or universality, though. I think both disciplines look at time and causation in different ways such that you can do a history of science or a science of history, but when you try to do a science of history you don't really get any unifying theory whereas if you do a history of science you get a multi-faceted narrative that doesn't give you a Method or Theory of Science, but gives you some ideas about how to go about doing science some of the time.

Quantitation is acceptable, of course. Numbers of people, hectares of agriculture, year Franz Ferdinand is shot are part of history.

But that doesn't make it a science. (Shop keeping requires mathematics, but running a shop is not doing science)

Probably both. Why not? It's "a human thing" that has numbers, isn't it? — Arcane Sandwich

Because it's a political entity and so all statements about it will themselves be political statements rather than statements of fact that can be assessed from some intersubjective objectivity.

Unlike biology economics will have a class-character.

So do some physicists, when they quote Borges in one of their papers, for example. — Arcane Sandwich

That's different, though -- the physicist can't quote Emily Dickenson as a record of physics, whereas the historian can.

That's because they're doing different things entirely. I think of them as orthogonal to one another, and it's only because history is more permissive -- rather than superior to science -- that there can be a history of science but no science of history.

They have different goals in mind, though, so this isn't a problem.

It is, but historians aren't doing poetry when they're working, just as mathematicians are not playing chess when they're working. — Arcane Sandwich

Well, they aren't doing poetry as the poets do poetry, though in the sense of the difference I'd keep between science and history -- they are in a sense doing two different kinds of poetry with different rules and thereby different outcomes. The poetry is more rigid than what we usually associate with "poetry", but the narrative character of both history and science is what I mean by the "poetics".

Consider the difference between the Big Bang and World War 1, to use your example. (other historical sciences, like geology and biology etc. will likewise count here as a point of comparison):

And it's not reproducible. — Arcane Sandwich

What's reproducible with the Big Bang are the results of the experiments which the scientists generated using such-and-such methods, rather than the Big Bang itself. Likewise I don't need to witness the entire evolution from RNA to homo sapiens re-occur to still have reproducible results.

However, such reproducibility is not the point of delving into the causes of World War 1. Everyone will acknowledge that there are many causes, and there will often be a handful of causes that all historians agree upon. What will differ is which causes get more emphasis and "what it all means" -- the marxist historian will emphasize material conditions and internal conflicts, the progressive historian will situate world war 1 as a terrible lesson we can grow from, etc.

And even within a particular theory individual historians will disagree on the exact narrative.

Do yo usee the difference?

Do yo usee the difference? — Moliere

Of course. I've debated this topic before, though not with you : )

Your position on this topic, I believe (and I could be wrong) confuses history with storytelling. It's a sort of "history from a storytelling POV". Allow me to illustrate what I mean by that, by answering some specific points that you discuss, starting with the following:

"Shouldn't" because the phenomena isn't a scientific one, but historical. — Moliere

This, is the root of our disagreement, IMHO. Having identified that, let's proceed:

while we can draw up statistics and trends and correlations this won't be what decides how a history is told, — Moliere

History is not storytelling, I would say, if I had to say such a thing as a slogan.

at least we'll be missing out on a huge part of the history of all we do is look at measurables and ignore stories. — Moliere

Again, I'll just blurt out the slogan: history is not storytelling.

There's even a whole theory of writing history dedicated to exactly that -- it's the multiplicity of stories and causes and perspectives on an event which fills out an understanding of the event, rather than a unifying theory or the necessity for agreement or universality, though. I think both disciplines look at time and causation in different ways such that you can do a history of science or a science of history, but when you try to do a science of history you don't really get any unifying theory whereas if you do a history of science you get a multi-faceted narrative that doesn't give you a Method or Theory of Science, but gives you some ideas about how to go about doing science some of the time. — Moliere

Sure. But there are other theories of writing history. How are we to settle which one is preferable? I don't think that's a purely political matter. It's a scientific matter as well. There is such a thing (I believe) as writing history in a more scientific way.

Quantitation is acceptable, of course. Numbers of people, hectares of agriculture, year Franz Ferdinand is shot are part of history.

But that doesn't make it a science. (Shop keeping requires mathematics, but running a shop is not doing science) — Moliere

I don't think that history is like shop keeping. It's more like physics. The difference between a shop keeper and a physicist (and by extension, a historian) is that the former is running a business while the later is doing basic and applied research. Historians are scientists because they do research, like the physicist does, not because he is running a business, like the shopkeeper is.

Because it's a political entity and so all statements about it will themselves be political statements — Moliere

It's an ontological entity before being a political entity. And ontology is more scientific than politics, is what I would say. Consequently, not all statements about it will be political statements. Some will, but others will be non-political (i.e., they will be aesthetic statements, meta-scientific statements, ethical statements, etc.)

Unlike biology economics will have a class-character. — Moliere

Not necessarily, because class is not the only concept that is used in economics and in the social sciences more generally. Or, in Ontologese: class exists as much as sex, gender, and ethnicity does, among other sociological variables.

That's different, though -- the physicist can't quote Emily Dickenson as a record of physics, whereas the historian can. — Moliere

Can the historian quote Jorge Luis Borges in the same sense that he can quote Emily Dickinson? If so, then he has something in common with the physicists.

it's only because history is more permissive — Moliere

How do you know it's not the other way around? Maybe physics is more permissive than history. That's another way to look at it.

What's reproducible with the Big Bang are the results of the experiments which the scientists generated using such-and-such methods, rather than the Big Bang itself. Likewise I don't need to witness the entire evolution from RNA to homo sapiens re-occur to still have reproducible results.

However, such reproducibility is not the point of delving into the causes of World War 1. Everyone will acknowledge that there are many causes, and there will often be a handful of causes that all historians agree upon. What will differ is which causes get more emphasis and "what it all means" -- the marxist historian will emphasize material conditions and internal conflicts, the progressive historian will situate world war 1 as a terrible lesson we can grow from, etc. — Moliere

The Marxist would be leaving out a lot of important sociological variables in that case, and the progressive historian would be arriving at a somewhat simplistic conclusion when he tries to formulate "the moral of the story".

And even within a particular theory individual historians will disagree on the exact narrative. — Moliere

Do I need to just say my slogan in here as well? : )

Of course. I've debated this topic before, though not with you : ) — Arcane Sandwich

Cool. Insofar that you have some intuitive sense of what I'm on about that's enough for me.

Sure. But there are other theories of writing history. How are we to settle which one is preferable? I don't think that's a purely political matter. It's a scientific matter as well. There is such a thing (I believe) as writing history in a more scientific way. — Arcane Sandwich

This might be the in-a-nutshell version of our differences as I see it, at least: Not only are there other theories of writing history, it is not the historians job to settle which theory of writing history is preferable. The best the historian can do is choose a consistent perspective and tell a history, and it's the multiplicity of historical theories that gives a more well-rounded character to an event, whereas a scientist would prefer a singular theory which gives an account of many of the same kinds of events.

Usually the reason a historian chooses a perspective to write from is because it resonates with the way they see history, but not always -- one can purposefully use the concepts of another theory to write a history. What moores this storytelling is that it must be based upon evidence.


...


Actually, this is a better example for the difference between history and science, using the Big Bang.

In science the big bang happened billions of years ago

In history the big bang happened in the 20'th century -- there are no documents to reference in writing a history of the time before human beings. If one's ontology were defined by this historical reality, rather than by science, then we'd say that right now it appears that the Big Bang happened billions of years ago, but by the documentation it didn't exist until much more recently.

I don't think that history is like shop keeping. It's more like physics. The difference between a shop keeper and a physicist (and by extension, a historian) is that the former is running a business while the later is doing basic and applied research. Historians are scientists because they do research, like the physicist does, not because he is running a business, like the shopkeeper is. — Arcane Sandwich

I agree these are closer -- shopkeeper example is meant to point out that numeration is common to many human endeavors, even outside of the academy, and so can't serve as a basis for separating out what makes science, science.

(Also, for what it's worth, I don't think there is a solution to the problem of the criterion)

Can the historian quote Jorge Luis Borges in the same sense that he can quote Emily Dickinson? If so, then he has something in common with the physicists. — Arcane Sandwich

Not something relevant, though. The relevant difference is that for the historian the poem can reasonably be considered evidence in some circumstances, whereas with the physicist it can't: there is no circumstance in which a poem will count as evidence for a scientific belief.

How do you know it's not the other way around? Maybe physics is more permissive than history. That's another way to look at it. — Arcane Sandwich

Study. ;)

Also, "more permissive" can be challenged -- ultimately they're just different, and those differences are what account for why we can have a history of science and not a science of history rather than some sort of fight for the top or a superior discipline with respect to reality.

I take 20th century philosophy of science has having demonstrated the failure of a science of science: without an answer to the problem of the criterion there can be no way to ascertain if what we're talking about is scientific proper, and thereby we can never classify a knowledge which is the knowledge of knowledge: science is more a thematic unity than a methodological unity which leads one closer to truth.

It forces agreement, but it smothers out difference in the process -- and this is a good thing for what it's doing.

History allows more differences than science to count as significant in the construction of a history.

The Marxist would be leaving out a lot of important sociological variables in that case, and the progressive historian would be arriving at a somewhat simplistic conclusion when he tries to formulate "the moral of the story". — Arcane Sandwich

Exactly! And yet, in order to bring any sort of coherence to an odd collection of records, one must have some idea of the structure of history before writing a particular monograph.

So the historiographical move is to allow this multiplicity since to rely upon only one would necessarily ignore very important things.

Do I need to just say my slogan in here as well? : ) — Arcane Sandwich

Yes lol.

If it's not story-telling, then what is it? What else is research than the telling of stories?

Seems to me that they're just different forms of literature that go towards different purposes. I know history isn't story-telling in the sense that Tolkien is a storyteller, and I know that the storytelling parameters of history are different from the storytelling parameters of science, but even in science, when you communicate your findings, the important part -- and the part that often gets fought over -- is how the story gets told.

So even this storytelling isn't what excludes science from history. I think it's really just that they aren't doing the same thing.

Let's look at this from another angle if you don't mind, @Moliere.

I notice that you give quite a lot of importance to events. Why? Events are arguably just the crest of the wave, as Fernand Braudel used to say. Histoire événementielle, as he liked to call it, "history of events". But events are not the wave itself. Historical phenomena that occur more slowly, which have a longue durée, are far more "structural" than mere, ephemeral events. From a scientific standpoint, I don't care about the poem that some French intellectual wrote months prior to the French Revolution. I want to know what the price of bread was, among other sociological variables. That doesn't mean that I don't care about the poem in question at all, it might be an awe-inspiring work of poetic brilliance, but history is not storytelling. We're not at the literary café or the art museum when we're doing history. We're at the "history lab", if you will. I'm aware that sounds dry, and cold. Well, what can I say? Welcome to the world of scientism. Warmth is for the Art Room. When we're in the Science Room, we're cold, heartless, down-to-earth tax lawyers.

True, there's been a lot of Theory done after Braudel, by historians such as Jacques Le Goff, or Roger Chartier. And I'm aware of the theoretical contributions of the British Marxist historians, such as Eric Hobsbawm and Edward Palmer Thompson. And I'm aware of the post-structuralist critique of structuralist historians like Braudel. Still, it makes no sense to me, in 2025, to say that Montaillou and The Cheese and the Worms are somehow historiographically preferable to what Braudel did in The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II.

I take 20th century philosophy of science has having demonstrated the failure of a science of science: without an answer to the problem of the criterion there can be no way to ascertain if what we're talking about is scientific proper, and thereby we can never classify a knowledge which is the knowledge of knowledge: science is more a thematic unity than a methodological unity which leads one closer to truth. — Moliere

We're not in the 20th century anymore, are we? A lot has happened ever since Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, and the like. The refreshing originality of such approaches to philosophy of science and history of science has worn off by now, and their epistemological relativism has, pun intended, gotten really old by the epistemic (and even political) standards of 2025.

If it's not story-telling, then what is it? — Moliere

It's science. It's no different in kind than physics. That's why there's no conceptual hierarchy to begin win. The only hierarchy between physics and history currently, is that the former is more scientific than the latter. It's not as if physics and history had different essences. They are indeed branches of the same tree, not fruits from different species of plants.

What else is research than the telling of stories? — Moliere

The telling of information. To tell a story is not the same thing as to tell information. They are different "speech acts", if you will.

even in science, when you communicate your findings, the important part -- and the part that often gets fought over -- is how the story gets told. — Moliere

That beetles are arthropods is a fact even if there were no human beings to communicate stories. If humanity went extinct tomorrow, it would still be true that the French Revolution happened in the 18th century. How a story gets told, how any story gets told, has nothing to do with history. It has to do with politics. But history is not politics, and politics are not history.

Controversial thing to say at the end, I know.

(Slightly edited)

Do you think it's possible to record the individual human experience?

By that I mean, what each of us go through every second of our lives? The inputs to our senses, the thoughts that pass by, the emotions we feel? — Ayush Jain

There was a syfy movie 20 or 30 years ago where criminals would commit crimes and record everything going on in their head (their feelings and visions and sounds etc) while committing them and then sell the tapes to rich people to sit in their living rooms and relive it.

Not possible yet, but if you record continuous brain scans and use AI to segment out the signals from each your five senses, it may be possible to record, but accurate playback would be impossible except for in the brain that originally recorded it. Thoughts would remain unrecorded and emotions would have to be strong enough to produce a brain sensed physiological effect to get recorded.

I notice that you give quite a lot of importance to events. Why? — Arcane Sandwich

No reason that I can think of.

When you say...

Historical phenomena that occur more slowly, which have a longue durée, are far more "structural" than mere, ephemeral events. — Arcane Sandwich

I don't know how I'd differentiate between the two. Similarly so with the histories you list -- I've read none of them, but on their face I don't see why I'd prefer the history of the mediterranean over the microhistories -- arguably the microhistories are more accurate than the grand narratives. But, really, I think they complement one another. (similar move to what I've been saying with respect to science and history -- there isn't a better or worse, they're just different)

We're not in the 20th century anymore, are we? A lot has happened ever since Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, and the like. The refreshing originality of such approaches to philosophy of science and history of science has worn off by now, and their epistemological relativism has, pun intended, gotten really old by the epistemic (and even political) standards of 2025. — Arcane Sandwich

We're not, but I haven't seen an adequate response to Feyerabend as much as a shrug.

People don't like the conclusions so they go on to try something new. All well and good.

But it's not their freshness or originality which draws me to their philosophies. Rather, I just read them and they appeal to me and my experience of science; they have good lessons for reflecting on the beast science, and really I think their relativisms are overhyped.

Feyerabend and Kuhn, in particular, are often overhyped as some kind of arche-relativists, but if you just take them at their word they are nothing of the sort.

They poke holes in some pet theories of science, but that's more the philosophy of science than the science itself.

And of course we've absorbed some of those lessons over the course of time. But Feyerabend still strikes me as particularly relevant since people will reject Popper, but then still try to define science by its methods -- that is, find a different criterion or structural description of science that Feyerabend isn't addressing, but totally missing the point that a whole cadre of philosophers and scientists have already tried to build a science of science and failed at it.

For me to take the idea seriously I'd have to know what it is about this science of science that is superior to Popper's theory, which is pretty well articulated.

@Moliere here's another angle to consider, in relation to the topic that you and I are currently discussing (physics and history): positivism and scientism are not the same thing. Postivism is a 19th century thing, it's the sort of sociology that Comte favored. Scientism, as Mario Bunge understands it, is way, way, waaaaay past that point by now. The analogy here would be: Think of Positivism as if it were comparable to Marxism. If that's so, Scientism is comparable to Post-Marxism. Scientism is, in a way, Post-Positivism.

Is it Popperian, in the sense of Karl Popper? Of course not. It's Bungean, in the sense of Mario Bunge. So what does Bunge have to say about that? The following, among other things:

Developmental stages of science

Bunge stated that protoscience may occur as the second stage of a five-stage process in the development of science. Each stage has a theoretical and empirical aspect:

1. Prescience has unchecked speculation theory and unchecked data.
2 Protoscience has hypotheses without theory accompanied by observation and occasional measurement, but no experiment.
3. Deuteroscience has hypotheses formulated mathematically without theory accompanied by systematic measurement, and experiment on perceptible traits of perceptible objects.
4. Tritoscience has mathematical models accompanied by systematic measurements and experiments on perceptible and imperceptible traits of perceptible and imperceptible objects.
5 Tetartoscience has mathematical models and comprehensive theories accompanied by precise systematic measurements and experiments on perceptible and imperceptible traits of perceptible and imperceptible objects. — Wikipedia

With that in mind, I would say that physics stands today as Tetartoscience (Stage 5). History, I would say, stands today as a Protoscience (Stage 2). It has already surpased Stage 1, it is no longer a Prescience.

In other words, the "science of science" which you speak about already exists. It's called Metascience. And I quote:

Metascience (also known as meta-research) is the use of scientific methodology to study science itself. Metascience seeks to increase the quality of scientific research while reducing inefficiency. It is also known as "research on research" and "the science of science", as it uses research methods to study how research is done and find where improvements can be made. Metascience concerns itself with all fields of research and has been described as "a bird's eye view of science".[1] In the words of John Ioannidis, "Science is the best thing that has happened to human beings ... but we can do it better." — Wikipedia

That being said, I believe that I've made quite a case for:

-History as one of the Sciences
-Some differences between the Art Room and the Science Room
-Marxism and Post-Marxism
-Positivism and Scientism
-A Stage-Theoretical Philosophy of Science, and
-An explanation of what Metascience is.

So, what other questions might you have about these topics?

EDIT: And another thing, what you're trying to do, when you connect History with Poetry (with Emily Dickinson, for example) is a semi-conscious (perhaps even "unconscious", if one were to believe in such things) attempt to turn History into a Stage 3 Science: a Deuteroscience, a True Science.

You think you're doing storytelling, but you don't realize that the very attempt to optimize your storytelling indicates that what you are doing has something in common with science, for the sciences also seek to optimize. However, here you go astray when you compare physics or history to shopkeeping, just because all of them use math. Yes, they all do, but to do science is to do basic and applied research. The shopkeeper is just running a business. And science is not a business.

Controversial statement at the end, I know. I kinda have that style. I think it suits me. What do you think?

In this response I'm going to try and loop back to the OP -- not that the conversation isn't interesting, only that I feel we're beginning to lose the OP.

With respect to scientism, though, I want to be clear: I have no problem with scientists trying it all over again. It's only that it's failed before and I don't have high hopes for a real unifying theory of science. Furthermore, I tend to think we don't even need one -- there's too much out there to want to investigate to build some kind of theory of making theories. Just make shit up and see what works; it is no grander than that.

So, what other questions might you have about these topics? — Arcane Sandwich

Do any of these record human experience?

That was my initial reason for using poetry as a record -- because we have nothing better than poetry to capture human experience. Novels, poems, bank-statements, government records, attendance sheets, newspaper articles, reports, letters, oral interview are the records of human experience, and this is what history deals in.

It's because history is perspectival that there isn't one way to tell it. You only get the full sense of history by hearing all the sides, some of which contradict.

Human experience is contradictory.

You think you're doing storytelling, but you don't realize that the very attempt to optimize your storytelling indicates that what you are doing has something in common with science, for the sciences also seek to optimize — Arcane Sandwich

Like numeration, optimization is not a criteria for the sciences -- actors optimize their acting to fit a scene, and aren't doing science for all that.

However, here you go astray when you compare physics or history to shopkeeping, just because all of them use math. Yes, they all do, but to do science is to do basic and applied research. The shopkeeper is just running a business. And science is not a business. — Arcane Sandwich

The point of the shopkeeper example was to demonstrate that your criteria of numeration could not differentiate science from not-science. Similarly so with the above on optimization. I don't think that shopkeeping is either science or history -- but numeration is used by all three and so this can't be a criterion which differentiates science from not-science.

Controversial statement at the end, I know. I kinda have that style. I think it suits me. What do you think? — Arcane Sandwich

I love it! :D

Gives me something to think on and through.

Do any of these record human experience?

That was my initial reason for using poetry as a record -- because we have nothing better than poetry to capture human experience. Novels, poems, bank-statements, government records, attendance sheets, newspaper articles, reports, letters, oral interview are the records of human experience, and this is what history deals in.

It's because history is perspectival that there isn't one way to tell it. You only get the full sense of history by hearing all the sides, some of which contradict.

Human experience is contradictory. — Moliere

Ok, then I'll just copy and paste what I just posted in another thread, so that we may take a look at it here, from the point of view of your storytelling theory. I submit that the following text, which I just wrote a few minutes ago, can be classified as a poem as well as a short piece of philosophical text:

I am.
Therefore, something exists.
What am I?
What is one?

Why am I this, and not that?
Why am I one, and not many?
Can one be many?
Can many be one?

How do you know, what one is?
What are you, and what am I? Why am I not you? Why are you not me?
Why are we not them? Why are they not us?

What are they? What are we? What is one as many? What is many as one? — Arcane Sandwich

Will you accept this as an example of a poem, yes, no, or sort of?

Will you accept this as an example of a poem, yes, no, or sort of? — Arcane Sandwich

As long as its intended as such, sure. But sometimes poem-looking writing can be intended otherwise, and vice-versa -- the proem.

That is, there's not a textual criteria for counting as a poem that I can think of that's universal universal.

Well, then what you do make of it, then? The poem that I just shared, that is. What human experience does it record?

My best guess is it captures questioning -- it's a much more literal poem than people usually mean by "poem", but all the same. I feel confusion throughout because the questions are about big concepts and seem almost nonsensical without something more to interpret, but also this is a common experience in thinking through philosophy so it's not exactly like the poem needs more.

Poems, and art generally, are created between a creator and an audience -- it requires an expression and an interpretation.

Though I ought note that just because a poem is the best way (EDIT: at present) to record human experience that does not then mean that all poems record human experience -- some are structured for different purposes, or on strictly formal phonetic and syntactical terms.