Ok, let me ask you this, then. What would you answer to those questions, from your POV? If you were the one asking them, what would you say?

I can give an answer, though my position necessarily requires me to say that in other circumstances I might change the answer due to the circumstances.

What am I?
What is one?

I am a person. One is a person.

Why am I this, and not that?

No reason. We come from nothing and here we are -- there is no why.

Why am I one, and not many?

Because we like to think of ourselves as unitary.

Can one be many?
Can many be one?

Yes, to both.

How do you know, what one is?

I don't know what I am, at bottom. I have so many certainties, but these aren't necessarily knowledge-based certainties.

What are you, and what am I? Why am I not you? Why are you not me?
Why are we not them? Why are they not us?

What are they? What are we? What is one as many? What is many as one?
— Arcane Sandwich

I think these questions are asking after the difference between self and other -- and that's the sort of thing I often think about. What I don't think is that there's some criteria for the seperation -- there's a "why", but not a list of reasons.

Though with each question we could articulate more about this relationship my thought is that I still think about this relationship a lot. Almost like I like Levinas ;).

I don't know what I am, at bottom. — Moliere

Neither do I, that's the problem. I don't think anyone does, actually. I mean there's like, some guesses, but that's basically it: just guesses.

At the end of the day, this is what I call "political ontology". The term already exists, of course, I didn't invent it. But this is the only way that I can make any sense of such a notion.

One is a person. — Moliere

I'm not so sure that being a person is the end of the story here. One is an animal, I would argue. One is a subject. One is a creature. One is an organism.

But even more generally: One is something composed of subatomic particles. One is not reducible to those particles, but One is something that emerges, in a purely physical sense, from them. This is the part of One that is not social (I am not just a person), it is not biological (I am not just an animal), it is not chemical (I am not just a bunch of elements of the Periodic Table). I am all of that, but in a more fundamental sense, in a physical sense, I am something composed of subatomic particles. And so are you. And so are they, whatever they may be, even if they are just ordinary stones.

@unenlightened -- looks like we've come to a similar path you've described: that identity serves as a kind of "center" for philosophy at large.

I am all of that, — Arcane Sandwich

What's your feeling on Heidegger? The notion of Dasein seems to fit here as a place for thinking about this.

Well, I have to teach Heidegger to my students at the Uni every semester, so there's that. I don't have much use for Heidegger's philosophy, to be honest. There's too many points of philosophical disagreement. For example, in relation to One: he says that's just "impersonal existence" (das Man), it's not "authentic existence". Like, what's the actual argument here? Some phrases taken from ordinary language, such as "One must pay taxes as a good citizen should"? That kinda misses the mark. I thought we were talking about ontology here, as in metaphysics. What One is cannot be reduced to what people say about One, because One is not only a person, but also an animal, a collection of chemical elements, and a bunch of subatomic particles, without being reducible to any of these. The entire point of metaphysics is that one emerges in a way that is not reducible to the upper layers of Reality itself, precisely because one emerges as a physical object in Reality itself before emerging as a social subject in Reality itself.

EDIT: So I guess my point is, I don't agree with Heidegger in characterizing One as "impersonal exsistence" as opposed to "authentic existence". If anything, I'd say it's the other way around: One is better characterized as "authentic existence", while Dasein is just "impersonal existence". I'll say it even more recklessly: To be One is to be a stone, to be a Dasein is to be a Nazi. I'd rather be a stone, thank you very much.

↪Arcane Sandwich unenlightened -- looks like we've come to a similar path you've described: that identity serves as a kind of "center" for philosophy at large. — Moliere

Hmm. "Philosopher" is an identity that identifies itself as central. But then that goes for any old narcissist too. But that's ok with me, because I am happy to say that I am the real Donald Trump, or a 17thC French playwright, or a harvest mouse. I am any centre anywhere.

I am any centre anywhere. — unenlightened

Not really. When you move to one of the corners in a room, you're not a the center of the room. So, you're not the center of the room. But you could be. The problem in this case, is that the notion of center, in this context, is a relative notion: your centrality is relative to the room's centrality in that sense. They need not co-incide, they need not be co-located. One's centrality is therefore relative to one's surroundings or circumstances. But if there is a relative centrality, there can be an absolute centrality. And I would say, if only for the sake of argument, that one is not absolutely central, in any way, shape, or form.

EDIT: So I guess my point is, I don't agree with Heidegger in characterizing One as "impersonal exsistence" as opposed to "authentic existence". If anything, I'd say it's the other way around: One is better characterized as "authentic existence", while Dasein is just "impersonal existence". I'll say it even more recklessly: To be One is to be a stone, to be a Dasein is to be a Nazi. I'd rather be a stone, thank you very much. — Arcane Sandwich

My biggest doubt with respect to the existentialists is the emphasis on authenticity, and with respect to Heidegger especially, his use of "authentic" with respect to a metaphysical existence.

I definitely see the fascism in Heidegger -- it's really only because of Levinas that I take him seriously. I've said it before on this forum but I consider Levinas to be like the baptizer of Heidegger.

The entire point of metaphysics is that one emerges in a way that is not reducible to the upper layers of Reality itself, precisely because one emerges as a physical object in Reality itself before emerging as a social subject in Reality itself. — Arcane Sandwich

Would you accept that this is the entire point of a metaphysics?

I see metaphysics as subordinate to ethics; one chooses a metaphysic that fits with an ethical stance, at least historically speaking. i.e. Plato wrote a metaphysics that got along with his philosophy, as did Aristotle and Epicurus etc.

Hmm. "Philosopher" is an identity that identifies itself as central. But then that goes for any old narcissist too. But that's ok with me, because I am happy to say that I am the real Donald Trump, or a 17thC French playwright, or a harvest mouse. I am any centre anywhere. — unenlightened

What would a non-narcissistic philosophy look like, in your opinion?

What would a non-narcissistic philosophy look like, in your opinion? — Moliere

Lao Tzu.

Seems to me then you'd come out as a firm "no" on the OP's question?

We can't record it really, and the defense of poetics falls to the same narcissism as the defense of science.

Yeah? Or naw?

We can't record it really, and the defense of poetics falls to the same narcissism as the defense of science.

Yeah? Or naw? — Moliere

Yeah.
"The record that can be recorded is not the continuing record."
"Work is done and then forgotten; therefore it lasts forever."
ETC.

Cool. Glad that I understood you. "The dao that can be said is not the eternal dao" definitely popped to mind in asking my question.

Cool. Glad that I understood you. "The dao that can be said is not the eternal dao" definitely popped to mind in asking my question. — Moliere

Yeah but Laozi's entire point is that you shouldn't follow the Dao. Instead you should follow what the Dao follows: "what is natural".

Something mysteriously formed,
Born before heaven and Earth.
In the silence and the void,
Standing alone and unchanging,
Ever present and in motion.
Perhaps it is the mother of ten thousand things.
I do not know its name
Call it Tao.
For lack of a better word, I call it great.

Being great, it flows
I flows far away.
Having gone far, it returns.

Therefore, "Tao is great;
Heaven is great;
Earth is great;
The king is also great."
These are the four great powers of the universe,
And the king is one of them.

Man follows Earth.
Earth follows heaven.
Heaven follows the Tao.
Tao follows what is natural. — Laozi

My biggest doubt with respect to the existentialists is the emphasis on authenticity, and with respect to Heidegger especially, his use of "authentic" with respect to a metaphysical existence. — Moliere

It's "Nazism for Philosophers", at the end of the day.

I definitely see the fascism in Heidegger -- it's really only because of Levinas that I take him seriously. I've said it before on this forum but I consider Levinas to be like the baptizer of Heidegger. — Moliere

Because Levinas is a Husserlian before being a Heideggerian. And Heidegger himself is, at the end of the day, just one among many of Husserl's students. The most famous one, sure, not necessarily the best one.

Would you accept that this is the entire point of a metaphysics? — Moliere

Maybe, maybe not. Could there even be another metaphysics? If you mean that in the sense of "Well, Nietzsche had a metaphysics, Aristotle had a different metaphysics, Plato had his own metaphysics, etc.", then sure. Metaphysics are a dime a dozen.

But if you mean metaphysics in the Bungean sense, as general science, then I would say no: just as there is one biology, one chemistry, and one physics, there is also one metaphysics. And there is no reason to believe that the same is not true of the social sciences and the humanities, because if they become Deuterosciences, then there will be one history, one geography, one economics, one sociology, and so forth.

I see metaphysics as subordinate to ethics — Moliere

I see it the other way around: ethics is subordinate to metaphysics. This is exactly the topic that I had hoped to discuss elsewhere in this Forum, but there was no interest : P

one chooses a metaphysic that fits with an ethical stance — Moliere

I choose the Ethical stance that fits with my metaphysics.

at least historically speaking. i.e. Plato wrote a metaphysics that got along with his philosophy, as did Aristotle and Epicurus etc. — Moliere

Good for them. Doesn't mean that one has to do the same thing.

Here's another way to look at this, @Moliere and @unenlightened. Descartes famously said Cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I am.

I am something, and I am someone. To be one is to be something. But it does not follow from there that to be something is to be someone. For a stone is something, yet it is not someone.

And I am not everyone. I am only someone. Am I no one? I am someone. I cannot be everyone, and I cannot be no one. I will always be someone, not less, not more. But in being someone, I am something. I am something in the following sense:

∃x(x=a) - There exists an x, such that x is identical to Arcane Sandwich.
∃x(x=x) - There exists an x, such that x is identical to itself.

There is an "itselfness" to what I am, in addition to there being a selfness to who I am.

Descartes famously said Cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I am. — Arcane Sandwich

I think therefore I am whatever I think. I am the thought of myself. I am the result of the distinction I make between myself and the world. But this is obviously wrong. I am, therefore, whatever I mistake myself for.

But in being someone, I am something. I am something in the following sense:

∃x(x=a) - There exists an x, such that x is identical to Arcane Sandwich. — Arcane Sandwich

Will you say, "There exists an x, such that x is identical to a named hurricane."? We talk about them as objects for convenience, but we do not draw the boundaries or wonder where they go when they dissipate. The problem with formal logic is that it cannot deal with time.
Yesterday, there existed an x, such that was identical to unenlightened.
Today, there exists a y, such that y is now identical to unenlightened, but somewhat changed from x.
Tomorrow, who knows, there may exist a z such that z is then identical to the mortal remains of unenlightened, but is radically different from x and y in being lifeless. Or maybe z will be enlightened. :joke:

It's "Nazism for Philosophers", at the end of the day. — Arcane Sandwich

But it can be interpreted elsewise, yes?

Because Levinas is a Husserlian before being a Heideggerian. And Heidegger himself is, at the end of the day, just one among many of Husserl's students. The most famous one, sure, not necessarily the best one. — Arcane Sandwich

Which is the best, in your estimation?

Either way the reason I brought up Heidegger is his notion of disclosure, but with a twist that with a disclosure there is something passed over -- but by reworking what we think as possible a new disclosure appears, and passes over what we were thinking on before.

It's an ontological description of the epistemology of history that I've been arguing for.

But if you mean metaphysics in the Bungean sense, as general science, then I would say no: just as there is one biology, one chemistry, and one physics, there is also one metaphysics. — Arcane Sandwich

Oh here I disagree entirely. I see science as much more fractured than this.

But here I'm still ignorant with respect to Bunge, so all I can say is I see more than one of each of these -- even in physics we have classical and quantum mechanics. Even if at some point later we find some way to reconcile these it will still have been the case that there was a period of time when there were 2 physics, and I see no reason to disparage that -- they both work in their respective contexts.

Good for them. Doesn't mean that one has to do the same thing. — Arcane Sandwich

Well, you can attempt to do something else. And I think most people believe that metaphysics is prior to ethics -- but I can give an argument as to why I think it's the other way about.

If, in describing the world, we were purely descriptive then we'd never finish enumerating all the features of the world. However, we do finish, so there must be something which is not purely descriptive that we're doing.

In building knowledge we're eliminating irrelevant facts in favor of relevant facts that link up -- we make wild guesses and insecure inferences in peicing together the relevant facts. What guides this is what we want out of the science -- some people want a puzzle, some people want a medicine, some people want the truth (and they have some pre-theoretical notion of what "the truth" consists in). This "wanting" is all that ethics consists in; it's the guide which helps us navigate, and it's even pre-figured in our modes of knowledge-production. We are thrown into the norms which predate our existence, and it's only by following these social norms that knowledge gets produced at all.



Ahhh, the cogito rears its head once again!

All I can say there is what the cogito is in various capacities has been a recent uncertainty of mine. I see the cogito becoming relevant again and again even as philosophers attempt to overcome it.

This is part of why the phenomenological-existential tradition is interesting -- the outcomes may be weird, but I genuinely believe they've managed to at least advance the cogito philosophically: the cogito is composed of, part of, directed towards the world so there is no gap between self and world in the first place there.

I think therefore I am whatever I think. I am the thought of myself. I am the result of the distinction I make between myself and the world. But this is obviously wrong. I am, therefore, whatever I mistake myself for. — unenlightened

That gets along with what I'm thinking... there's certainly the sense of self that is continual from day to day, and yet...

We talk about them as objects for convenience, but we do not draw the boundaries or wonder where they go when they dissipate. The problem with formal logic is that it cannot deal with time. — unenlightened

The self does seem to be a fuzzy bundle that even changes what is part of the bundle as time goes on...

I think therefore I am whatever I think. — unenlightened

Hmmm... are you sure this is correct? It doesn't seem to be. I can think that I am a fish. That doesn't mean that I am a fish.

Edit:

Will you say, "There exists an x, such that x is identical to a named hurricane."? — unenlightened

Sure, why not? Humans and hurricanes have something in common: both of them are event-based objects, in Carmichael's (2015) sense of the term.

Edit 2:

The problem with formal logic is that it cannot deal with time. — unenlightened

Not really. Take a look:

∃x(Cxm ∧ Bxt) - There exist an x, such that x was a caterpillar on Monday, and it is a butterfly on Tuesday. You just need to treat Monday and Tuesday as individual constants, and "being a caterpillar" and "being a butterfly" as two-place predicates that relate an individual to a moment in time.

But it can be interpreted elsewise, yes? — Moliere

Can it?

Which is the best, in your estimation? — Moliere

Carlos Astrada.

It's an ontological description of the epistemology of history that I've been arguing for. — Moliere

Yes, I can see that.

I see science as much more fractured than this. — Moliere

Sure. It's the descriptive vs normative debate in philosophy of science.

We are thrown into the norms which predate our existence, and it's only by following these social norms that knowledge gets produced at all. — Moliere

That doesn't mean that the knowledge that gets produced is somehow 100% relative to those social norms.

I see the cogito becoming relevant again and again even as philosophers attempt to overcome it. — Moliere

Same here.

I can think that I am a fish. That doesn't mean that I am a fish. — Arcane Sandwich

Well that is a question of identity politics. Some people like to lay down the law about what are legitimate identities, but the recognised identities do seem to change over time and between cultures to an extent at least. Who knows if gill reassignment will or won't become an option?

Humans and hurricanes have something in common: both of them are event-based objects, in Carmichael's (2015) sense of the term. — Arcane Sandwich

Or to put it another way, they are both temporary, mutable, evolving objects. I'm all for a bit of common sense now and then. And depending on the time-scale, mountains continents and pretty much every object is temporary, mutable and evolving.

∃x(Cxm ∧ Bxt) - There exist an x, such that x was a caterpillar on Monday, and it is a butterfly on Tuesday. You just need to treat Monday and Tuesday as individual constants, and "being a caterpillar" and "being a butterfly" as two-place predicates that relate an individual to a moment in time. — Arcane Sandwich

Of course, one can account for these things, but in general, logic is mainly conducted in the present eternal tense, as it has been in this thread, and that is the practice I am criticising

I am unenlightened, but tomorrow I will be enlightened. No problem, but will anyone want to say that unenlightened is enlightened, even if they are willing to say tomorrow that enlightened was unenlightened. It can be made to work, but it isn't without difficulties.

I can think that I am a fish. That doesn't mean that I am a fish. — Arcane Sandwich


Well that is a question of identity politics. — unenlightened

Is it?

Who knows if gill reassignment will or won't become an option? — unenlightened

But if one wishes to conclude that one actually is whatever it is that one happens to think that one is, what is the underlying ontology here? Is it something like "Dream big, you can be whatever it is that you want to be"? Or is it instead something like "Reality Itself bends to our mere will, so that with a mere though you can instantly become a different creature, such that you have gills simply because you think so, and you can actually breathe underwater because you think you can".

Some people like to lay down the law about what are legitimate identities, — unenlightened

And some people like strawberry ice cream, yet I don't think that taste or aesthetic judgement is involved here in any meaningful way.

I'm all for a bit of common sense now and then. — unenlightened

That's what I'm saying, at some point, we just need to look at everything from the point of view of common sense. Why is there this idea that just because common sense is not infallible, we should throw it in the epistemological trash bin? That makes no philosophical sense to me.

logic is mainly conducted in the present eternal tense, as it has been in this thread, and that is the practice I am criticising — unenlightened

Why are you criticizing it, if I may ask? I'm curious.

I am unenlightened, but tomorrow I will be enlightened. No problem, but will anyone want to say that unenlightened is enlightened, even if they are willing to say tomorrow that enlightened was unenlightened. It can be made to work, but it isn't without difficulties. — unenlightened

Well, as far as logic goes, you can make anything work. There's para-consistent logics for example, there's formal systems for contradictions, or for the denial of the Principle of Excluded Middle, to mention another example. There's multi-valued logics (so that you don't have just "true" and "false", you have more options), there's fuzzy logic, etc. I personally stick to first-order predicate logic because I don't really need anything else in that sense, other than perhaps propositional logic here and there.

Can it? — Arcane Sandwich

Sure!

Derrida, Sartre, and Levinas aren't fascists but Derrida, in particular, credits Heidegger for his philosophy.

And thus far what I'm liking more about Sartre is it fits in with my materialist prejudices than Husserl did. He still uses Heidegger, but he also does his own thing.

It's in this sense that I mean we can interpret it differently -- it's not necessary to attend to Heidegger's intent or belief in making use of his philosophy (though I think it's worthy to note his fascism in approaching the philosophy as a contextualized historical product which Heidegger is offering to us to think through)

But almost any philosophy can be modified by disagreeing with one inference or adding an auxiliary hypothesis or entirely cutting out whole sections of thought and decontextualizing the concepts within to try them in new ways.

Carlos Astrada. — Arcane Sandwich

Cool. I'll keep him in mind as someone to investigate.

That doesn't mean that the knowledge that gets produced is somehow 100% relative to those social norms. — Arcane Sandwich

I agree. Similarly to Kant's notion "But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience." -- though all our knowledge is directed at facts by no means follows that knowledge arises out of the facts.

But then I also want to avoid things like things-in-themselves while preserving some of the insights which put a limit on metaphysics.

Same here. — Arcane Sandwich

Sweeeet

Is it something like "Dream big, you can be whatever it is that you want to be"? Or is it instead something like "Reality Itself bends to our mere will, so that with a mere though you can instantly become a different creature, such that you have gills simply because you think so, and you can actually breathe underwater because you think you can". — Arcane Sandwich

Well my ontology is that identity is a thought process and nothing else. To be hard-nosed for a minute, no fish ever thinks it is a fish, it does not identify itself at all, and therefore has no identity. Humans identify stuff including themselves and each other. Reality doesn't bend, it flows. Dreams remain dreams unless they are realised, just as as an architect's plans are fantasies until and unless a builder makes them a reality. Now we can argue about whether an architect whose plans are never built is a "real" architect or not, but identities as fantasies certainly have potential.

though all our knowledge is directed at facts by no means follows that knowledge arises out of the facts. — Moliere

I think that some knowledge arises out of the facts. And that sort of response allows you to solve the problem of Debunking Arguments about ordinary objects in a rather elegant way, from the point of view of Theory.

But then I also want to avoid things like things-in-themselves while preserving some of the insights which put a limit on metaphysics. — Moliere

I think that things-in-themselves exist, and they can be thought about (as Kant argues), and they can also be known (as Bunge argues).

Well my ontology is that identity is a thought process and nothing else. — unenlightened

We have an important disagreement here, at the level of ontology, then. I think that every object, creature, thing, artifact, etc., has an identity. And it has it in an ontological sense, whether we like it or not. It has nothing to do with identity politics, nor with politics in any sense.

To be hard-nosed for a minute, no fish ever thinks it is a fish, it does not identify itself at all, and therefore has no identity. — unenlightened

No fish ever thinks its a fish, I agree with you there. And it does not identify itself at all, I also agree with that. But I don't agree that this somehow entails that it has no identity. For it can have an identity even if it can't think of it. A stone has an identity, in my view, even though it doesn't even have a mind to begin with.

Humans identify stuff including themselves and each other. Reality doesn't bend, it flows. Dreams remain dreams unless they are realised, just as as an architect's plans are fantasies until and unless a builder makes them a reality. Now we can argue about whether an architect whose plans are never built is a "real" architect or not, but identities as fantasies certainly have potential. — unenlightened

Humans are the most recent creatures to have emerged on this planet, and they are the most recent ontological units to have emerged ever since the Big Bang. We're not exactly the protagonists here, in this vast and ancient Cosmos.

A stone has an identity — Arcane Sandwich

It is what it is. If that is all you mean, we have no disagreement. But to say it has something seems to hint at more... ?

I think that some knowledge arises out of the facts. — Arcane Sandwich

I'd say that insofar that it does the fact has to count as significant in the first place. When we falsify something, for instance, we have an idea what the measurement will entail one way or the other -- so there is a fact to the matter which decides a belief, but the facts had to already be important to us: there had to have been some guiding passion that brought the seeker or producer of knowledge to consider these facts.

It's because reality is abundant that I'm thinking our values is what aids us in picking out facts -- they can be epistemic values, such as honesty or integrity or consistency. Or even a thirst for truth itself.

I think that things-in-themselves exist, and they can be thought about (as Kant argues), and they can also be known (as Bunge argues). — Arcane Sandwich

Bold! :D

I obviously disagree there.

Would you say that human experience is a thing-in-itself?

Some funky thoughts on the exteriority of the Other:

Suppose we had this plug in our necks we could slot something into which would cause our total experience to become like the record rather than being directed towards the world around us. And let's suppose we have some recording device where I can record a day in the life of me and put it into the machine for others to play back.

More or less treating the brain like a VCR-Recorder, or perhaps it could be streamed across UV rays to various brain-transponders which generate experience, somehow.

The ineluctability of the Self before the Other would remain because it would still only be myself experiencing these things. They may have originated from some kind of wild science fiction machine, but even as I change identities I'd remain in my ipseity, the cogito.

The exterior isn't experienced, but lies outside the self. Since there is no gap between world and self the difference cannot be accounted for by our world -- it comes from the impossibility of ever being the Other.

But what we can do is imagine and encounter -- the encounter is beyond proof, like having hands doesn't prove anything. I think of the face-to-face relation as more an encounter than a strict logical relationship -- it's a phenomenon when one is made certain of the existence of the Other and the impossibility of knowing them the way you know your own ipseity and world.

All we have is language and charity, and the semi-mystical experience of being-with-others.

It is what it is. If that is all you mean, we have no disagreement. But to say it has something seems to hint at more... ? — unenlightened

Well, that's what I would call "The Hard Problem of Identity" in Metaphysics, and I mean that like "The Hard Problem of Consciousness" in the Philosophy of Mind.

One possible candidate for fully inclusive Identity (an Identity that applies to stones as well as humans) is spatiotemporal continuity of form under a sortal. What you get there is a sort of "essence" but in the tradition of Analytic Philosophy. Another possible candidate is the plurality of parts that compose the entity at any given time. The problem there is that not every entity is composite to begin with, some are just pluralities that compose no further object. That leads to the tripartite debate on van Inwagen's Special Composition Question. Etc. It's the Rabbit Hole of Ordinary Objects, a fascinating rabbit hole (to my mind, at least), in which I have some papers published (I mean that as a colorful datum about myself, not as an appeal to authority).

I obviously disagree there. — Moliere

Why? I'm curious to know your thoughts.

Would you say that human experience is a thing-in-itself? — Moliere

No, I would not. It's in-itself, sure, but it's not a thing in the technical sense. Human experience is not a res. Human experience is more like cogitans in that sense. I would say: there is a human (a res) that has human experiences (cogitans). In other words, we shouldn't think that the cogitans is purely "mental" or "rational", since it is also empirical.