When you say that "something" is a logical possibility at time t, this can be interpreted in a specific way that is perfectly intelligible but that is clearly not how you mean it. This "something" must have the form of a predicate such that it may be true at some time and not at other times. For instance, some specific apple's being ripe would be such a predicate. This could be written R(...), where the argument place is a time variable. Then, saying that the apple's being ripe is a logical possibility at time t means that R(t) is logically possible. — Pierre-Normand
. . . may be logically possible or logically impossible depending on whether or not there happens to be human beings in the temporal and/or spatial vicinity of the apple. — Pierre-Normand
and it is absolutely not required by the thesis that logic is human dependent, in a pragmatic or Kantian sense. — Pierre-Normand
The relevant sense of human dependence does't require that the objects thought about be in the spatial or temporal vicinity of the human beings — Pierre-Normand
since our cognitive reach isn't limited to the present or to the surface of the Earth, say. — Pierre-Normand
Again, that P is logically possible is only the case to some S at some specific time, because of what logic is--namely, a way of thinking about the world. That doesn't imply that S can't think about the world when he does so that he thinks that P(t). But that doesn't imply that at t P(t) is true. It's not. It's only true to S, at the time that S thinks it. — Terrapin Station
What it is to be logically possible or logically impossible is for some individual to think about things a particular way. There's nothing else to it.
There is what seems to be an excellent explanation on the Free will determinism debate here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vCGtkDzELAI
I understand the concepts much better now - much clearer. The next video on Compatibilism was also very helpful. — FreeEmotion
I just watched both videos and they are quite good — Pierre-Normand
I'm glad we agree on this. Of course there are the simplifications and errors that you pointed out, however for my purposes it served me quite well.
The initial question was why does determinism rule out free will. From what I understand from the videos, determinism holds the view that we live in a clockwork universe where events follow a set course. The idea of free will is that we are not machines, and we are 'something else' agents or whatever, not reducible to mechanical or biological machines. This other thing, the mind or the soul or whatever it may be cannot be defined in physical terms, it is assumed, so is not part of the deterministic process.
The video also emphasizes the fact the we feel we have free will, which plays an important part in this debate. I am a little puzzled by the fear that a belief in determinism will lead people to stop taking responsibility for their actions. — FreeEmotion
It's important to not see the debate as being between (1) materialism or physicalism and (2) an ontology that posits nonphysical things. One can be both a physicalist and a free will advocate, as I am. How? Simply by not buying the view that physical things are wholly deterministic, not buying the view that physical things operate in that "clockwork" way through and through. On this view, we are machines, so to speak, but machines are not completely deterministic. — Terrapin Station
Is free will compatible with random causation, e.g. A could cause either B or C to happen, or with spontaneity, e.g. B (or C) happened without a cause? — Michael
I'd say it's compatible with both, although the latter is a different idea than folks usually talk about. — Terrapin Station
So prior physical events randomly causing me to behave in this way counts as free will but prior physical events determinately causing me to behave in this way doesn't? — Michael
Keep in mind that "random causation" need not be B or C happening with a 50/50 chance. — Terrapin Station
Yes. That's a difference between freedom and determinism. — Terrapin Station
The task is to formulate a conception of human action that leaves agents valuable; but what is the problem? First, that determinism seems incompatible with such a conception; if our actions stem from causes before our birth, then we are not the originators of our acts and so are less valuable. (We shall look later at what assumptions about value underlie this reasoning.) There is an incompatibility or at least a tension between free will and determinism, raising the question: given that our actions are causally determined, how is free will possible?
Some would deny what this question accepts as given, and save free will by denying determinism of (some) actions. Yet if an uncaused action is a random happening, then this no more comports with human value than does determinism. Random acts and caused acts alike seem to leave us not as the valuable originators of action but as an arena, a place where things happen, whether through earlier causes or spontaneously.
Clearly, if our actions were random, like the time of radioactive decay of uranium 238 emitting an alpha particle, their being thus undetermined would be insufficient to ground human value or provide a basis for responsibility and punishment. Even the denier of determinism therefore needs to produce a positive account of free action. On his view, a free action is an undetermined one with something more. The problem is to produce a coherent account of that something more. Once that account is formulated, we might find it does all the work, and that it is compatible with determinism and sufficient for our value purposes; in that case, the something more would become the whole of the account of free will.
How is free will possible? Given the tension between causal determination and randomness on the one hand, and valuable agent-hood on the other, how is valuable agenthood possible? — Philosophical Explanations, 1981
Hmm. I thought randomness involved equiprobability. Could you explain? — numberjohnny5
The task is to formulate a conception of human action that leaves agents valuable — Philosophical Explanations, 1981
Events could be non-randomly probabilistic, too. That's why I put "random causation" in quotation marks by the way. — Terrapin Station
Nozick would disagree: — Michael
The video also emphasizes the fact the we feel we have free will, which plays an important part in this debate. I am a little puzzled by the fear that a belief in determinism will lead people to stop taking responsibility for their actions. — FreeEmotion
. The problem is to produce a coherent account of that something more. Once that account is formulated, we might find it does all the work, and that it is compatible with determinism and sufficient for our value purposes; in that case, the something more would become the whole of the account of free will.
How is free will possible? Given the tension between causal determination and randomness on the one hand, and valuable agent-hood on the other, how is valuable agenthood possible? — Philosophical Explanations, 1981
Yes, the problem for libertarian free will that Nozick raises is this passage is the luck objection. I had mentioned this objection as well as the closely related 'intelligibility problem' and the issue of 'agent control' in this post.
It is somewhat unusual to cast this problem as a threat to the value of human life in the way Nozick does. Terrapin Station's dismissal of it on the ground that values are subjective isn't really to the point.
Also, allowing agents to somehow gain indeterministic control over their actions through there existing a bias in the probabilities of the different courses of action that they can possibly follow doesn't seem to ensure that they have the ability to do otherwise that underscores personal responsibility. For, in that case, while the agent who *might* have achieved an unintended result (when she actually intended to achieve the most probable result) doesn't thereby possess an ability to do so. It's just something that could happen, just as the ability to hit bullseye may fail to be realized when a shooter misses. But if she had missed in circumstances where she was aiming at the center of the target, she wouldn't thereby have freely exercised an ability to miss.
One way out of the problem of luck for the libertarian is to posit that the indeterministic branching occurs immediately before the time of the mental "volition", or the formation of the intention. But such accounts then run into the intelligibility problem, and the problem of agent control. — Pierre-Normand
You don't have to accept that any stance on free will versus determinism has any particular implication re moral responsibility. — Terrapin Station
Of course, one big reason for this is that there are no facts re moral responsibiilty.
One can be both a physicalist and a free will advocate, as I am. How? Simply by not buying the view that physical things are wholly deterministic, not buying the view that physical things operate in that "clockwork" way through and through. On this view, we are machines, so to speak, but machines are not completely deterministic. — Terrapin Station
"Radioactive decay is a stochastic (i.e. random) process at the level of single atoms, in that, according to quantum theory, it is impossible to predict when a particular atom will decay..."
Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, becoming, existence or reality, as well as the basic categories of being and their relations. — Wikipedia
Precisely what would be taking responsibility for anything in a deterministic world? The inanimate quanta? In other words, how does the concept of responsibility arise? If we play the deterministic game, we play it to the hillt. Nothing means anything anymore and every concept magically arises out of quanta. — Rich
If there were an universe which was inhabited by completely deterministic beings — FreeEmotion
but isn't' science based totally on that view? Quantum mechanics may be the exception, is this your "way out"? — FreeEmotion
I view humans as intelligence. This intelligence makes choices. It is responsible for its choices despite the issue that outcomes are always unknown until they manifest. But there is an intelligence making choices (this is more or less the Bergson model). — Rich
Now, compare this to the deterministic model. There is no choice, it is an illusion. There is no responsibility, it is an illusion. There is not even a being, since that must also be an illusion. (Let us put aside for the moment the Miracle that out of nowhere created all these illusions, a Miracle that puts all if Genesis to shame). — Rich
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