When you say that "something" is a logical possibility at time t, this can be interpreted in a specific way that is perfectly intelligible but that is clearly not how you mean it. This "something" must have the form of a predicate such that it may be true at some time and not at other times. For instance, some specific apple's being ripe would be such a predicate. This could be written R(...), where the argument place is a time variable. Then, saying that the apple's being ripe is a logical possibility at time t means that R(t) is logically possible. — Pierre-Normand

I'm just repeating myself over and over basically here.

Again, that P is logically possible is only the case to some S at some specific time, because of what logic is--namely, a way of thinking about the world. That doesn't imply that S can't think about the world when he does so that he thinks that P(t). But that doesn't imply that at t P(t) is true. It's not. It's only true to S, at the time that S thinks it.

. . . may be logically possible or logically impossible depending on whether or not there happens to be human beings in the temporal and/or spatial vicinity of the apple. — Pierre-Normand

What it is to be logically possible or logically impossible is for some individual to think about things a particular way. There's nothing else to it.

and it is absolutely not required by the thesis that logic is human dependent, in a pragmatic or Kantian sense. — Pierre-Normand

I don't know or remember exactly what the "pragmatic" or "Kantian sense" of logic being dependent on humans would be, but I can almost guarantee that it's not the same as my view.

The relevant sense of human dependence does't require that the objects thought about be in the spatial or temporal vicinity of the human beings — Pierre-Normand

Right, so if that's the "pragmatic" or "Kantian sense" it definitely is NOT my view. It's a fact that logic depends on individual humans thinking as they do. Thus there are specific spatio-temporal locations.

since our cognitive reach isn't limited to the present or to the surface of the Earth, say. — Pierre-Normand

Which ignores that under my view, logic is ONLY a way of thinking about the world. It's not what we're thinking about, in the sense that we might be thinking about a particular rock, say, because there's no external-to-minds correlate.

Again, that P is logically possible is only the case to some S at some specific time, because of what logic is--namely, a way of thinking about the world. That doesn't imply that S can't think about the world when he does so that he thinks that P(t). But that doesn't imply that at t P(t) is true. It's not. It's only true to S, at the time that S thinks it. — Terrapin Station

This is indeed exactly how I understood your position.

What it is to be logically possible or logically impossible is for some individual to think about things a particular way. There's nothing else to it.

But you are claiming something else. You are claiming that for something to be logically possible or logically impossible at time t there must not only be some individual who thinks about it, or be able to think about it (at some time or other), but, in addition to that, this individual must be thinking about it at time t.

This is strange, but, coming to think more about it, it doesn't appear to be inconsistent. I still prefer the view that operators of logical possibility, just like operators of alethic, metaphysical or nomological possibility (but unlike operators of temporal or epistemic possibility) are tenseless. The view that they have truth values only at the time when they are thought about strikes me as somewhat idealistic or solipsistic rather than pragmatic. It also introduces a strange disconnect between logic and natural laws, as if natural laws weren't also pragmatic abstractions. But, again, nothing much hinges on this. At least I have come to see that your view may be consistent. So, let us agree to disagree.

There is what seems to be an excellent explanation on the Free will determinism debate here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vCGtkDzELAI

I understand the concepts much better now - much clearer. The next video on Compatibilism was also very helpful.

There is what seems to be an excellent explanation on the Free will determinism debate here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vCGtkDzELAI

I understand the concepts much better now - much clearer. The next video on Compatibilism was also very helpful. — FreeEmotion

I just watched both videos and they are quite good. Of course, they're introductory and very condensed, so many more subtle distinctions are glossed over, and there are a few inaccuracies. (Some of the inaccurate statements are very widespread, though, even within the recently published literature.)

The doctrine of determinism is glossed as the idea that every event has a cause. But many philosophers will rightfully separate this idea (the principle of universal causation) from the different idea, more properly called determinism (or nomological determinism), that the state of the universe at one time, together with the laws of physics, jointly determine uniquely the state of the universe at any other times. Also, the Oedipus cases, as narrated in the video, seems to illustrate the idea of fatalism, or of the possibility of foreknowledge. Fatalism doesn't necessarily imply determinism, and neither does fatalism imply determinism. And finally, many philosophers have argued that the possibility of the foreknowledge of an agent's future actions (divine omniscient foreknowledge, for instance) doesn't imply fatalism or determinism either.

Another simplification was the equation between libertarianism and the belief in the possibility of agent causation. Many contemporary philosopher now endorse varieties of 'agent causation' and also are compatibilists (and determinists). And there are also proponents of agent causation who take agent causation to be incompatible with universal determinism but who nevertheless accept the idea that every event has a cause. They reject the idea that agents have the "contra-causal" power to initiate new causal chains of physical events -- as explained in the first video -- (though actions may be construed as initiations of causal chains of other sorts, which supervene on the physical but aren't identical with physical events).

Also, the discussion of 'Frankfurt cases' and of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) makes it sound like compatibilists all believe this principle to be incompatible with determinism, and hence believe free will not to require it. But quite a few contemporary philosophers, dubbed 'new dispositionalists' by their critics, endorse both compatibilism and PAP. They have, in other words, an account of what it means to say that an agent could have done otherwise than what she actually did, and their account is specifically designed so as to make possession of this ability (and therefore also PAP) consistent with determinism.

There'd be more to say about what appears to me to be a misconception pertaining to the way agent-control relates to responsibility and free will in Patricia Churchland's account. But her views are very widespread and they are accurately reported in the video.

I just watched both videos and they are quite good — Pierre-Normand

I'm glad we agree on this. Of course there are the simplifications and errors that you pointed out, however for my purposes it served me quite well.

The initial question was why does determinism rule out free will. From what I understand from the videos, determinism holds the view that we live in a clockwork universe where events follow a set course. The idea of free will is that we are not machines, and we are 'something else' agents or whatever, not reducible to mechanical or biological machines. This other thing, the mind or the soul or whatever it may be cannot be defined in physical terms, it is assumed, so is not part of the deterministic process.

The video also emphasizes the fact the we feel we have free will, which plays an important part in this debate. I am a little puzzled by the fear that a belief in determinism will lead people to stop taking responsibility for their actions.

I'm glad we agree on this. Of course there are the simplifications and errors that you pointed out, however for my purposes it served me quite well.

The initial question was why does determinism rule out free will. From what I understand from the videos, determinism holds the view that we live in a clockwork universe where events follow a set course. The idea of free will is that we are not machines, and we are 'something else' agents or whatever, not reducible to mechanical or biological machines. This other thing, the mind or the soul or whatever it may be cannot be defined in physical terms, it is assumed, so is not part of the deterministic process.

The video also emphasizes the fact the we feel we have free will, which plays an important part in this debate. I am a little puzzled by the fear that a belief in determinism will lead people to stop taking responsibility for their actions. — FreeEmotion

It's important to not see the debate as being between (1) materialism or physicalism and (2) an ontology that posits nonphysical things. One can be both a physicalist and a free will advocate, as I am. How? Simply by not buying the view that physical things are wholly deterministic, not buying the view that physical things operate in that "clockwork" way through and through. On this view, we are machines, so to speak, but machines are not completely deterministic.

It's important to not see the debate as being between (1) materialism or physicalism and (2) an ontology that posits nonphysical things. One can be both a physicalist and a free will advocate, as I am. How? Simply by not buying the view that physical things are wholly deterministic, not buying the view that physical things operate in that "clockwork" way through and through. On this view, we are machines, so to speak, but machines are not completely deterministic. — Terrapin Station

Is free will compatible with random causation, e.g. A could cause either B or C to happen, or with spontaneity, e.g. B (or C) happened without a cause?

Is free will compatible with random causation, e.g. A could cause either B or C to happen, or with spontaneity, e.g. B (or C) happened without a cause? — Michael

I'd say it's compatible with both, although the latter is a different idea than folks usually talk about.

Keep in mind that "random causation" need not be B or C happening with a 50/50 chance.

I'd say it's compatible with both, although the latter is a different idea than folks usually talk about. — Terrapin Station

So prior physical events randomly causing me to behave in this way counts as free will but prior physical events determinately causing me to behave in this way doesn't?

So prior physical events randomly causing me to behave in this way counts as free will but prior physical events determinately causing me to behave in this way doesn't? — Michael

Yes. That's a difference between freedom and determinism. Free will is ontological freedom in conjunction with will phenomena.

Keep in mind that "random causation" need not be B or C happening with a 50/50 chance. — Terrapin Station

Hmm. I thought randomness involved equiprobability. Could you explain?

Yes. That's a difference between freedom and determinism. — Terrapin Station

Nozick would disagree:

The task is to formulate a conception of human action that leaves agents valuable; but what is the problem? First, that determinism seems incompatible with such a conception; if our actions stem from causes before our birth, then we are not the originators of our acts and so are less valuable. (We shall look later at what assumptions about value underlie this reasoning.) There is an incompatibility or at least a tension between free will and determinism, raising the question: given that our actions are causally determined, how is free will possible?
Some would deny what this question accepts as given, and save free will by denying determinism of (some) actions. Yet if an uncaused action is a random happening, then this no more comports with human value than does determinism. Random acts and caused acts alike seem to leave us not as the valuable originators of action but as an arena, a place where things happen, whether through earlier causes or spontaneously.
Clearly, if our actions were random, like the time of radioactive decay of uranium 238 emitting an alpha particle, their being thus undetermined would be insufficient to ground human value or provide a basis for responsibility and punishment. Even the denier of determinism therefore needs to produce a positive account of free action. On his view, a free action is an undetermined one with something more. The problem is to produce a coherent account of that something more. Once that account is formulated, we might find it does all the work, and that it is compatible with determinism and sufficient for our value purposes; in that case, the something more would become the whole of the account of free will.
How is free will possible? Given the tension between causal determination and randomness on the one hand, and valuable agent-hood on the other, how is valuable agenthood possible? — Philosophical Explanations, 1981

Hmm. I thought randomness involved equiprobability. Could you explain? — numberjohnny5

If you use the term to denote things that are equiprobable, then it would be a false dichotomy to say that events are either determined/deterministic or random. Events could be non-randomly probabilistic, too. That's why I put "random causation" in quotation marks by the way.

From A as an antecedent state, it can be the case that:

(1) B has a 100% probability of immediately following and C has a 0% probability - this would be determinism

(2) B has a 50% probability of immediate following and C also has a 50% probability - this would be random on a narrow usage of that term

(3) B has somewhere between a 0.00000...1% probability and a 99.999999...% probability, as does C, though where we're excluding a 50% probability - this would be non-(narrow-usage)-randomly/non-deterministically probabilistic.

The task is to formulate a conception of human action that leaves agents valuable — Philosophical Explanations, 1981

Value is subjective, of course. Different people value different things, and they can't be wrong (or right) about what they value.

Events could be non-randomly probabilistic, too. That's why I put "random causation" in quotation marks by the way. — Terrapin Station

I see. Thanks for explaining.

Nozick would disagree: — Michael

Yes, the problem for libertarian free will that Nozick raises is this passage is the luck objection. I had mentioned this objection as well as the closely related 'intelligibility problem' and the issue of 'agent control' in this post.

It is somewhat unusual to cast this problem as a threat to the value of human life in the way Nozick does. Terrapin Station's dismissal of it on the ground that values are subjective isn't really to the point.

Also, allowing agents to somehow gain indeterministic control over their actions through there existing a bias in the probabilities of the different courses of action that they can possibly follow doesn't seem to ensure that they have the ability to do otherwise that underscores personal responsibility. For, in that case, while the agent who *might* have achieved an unintended result (when she actually intended to achieve the most probable result) doesn't thereby possess an ability to do so. It's just something that could happen, just as the ability to hit bullseye may fail to be realized when a shooter misses. But if she had missed in circumstances where she was aiming at the center of the target, she wouldn't thereby have freely exercised an ability to miss.

One way out of the problem of luck for the libertarian is to posit that the indeterministic branching occurs immediately before the time of the mental "volition", or the formation of the intention. But such accounts then run into the intelligibility problem, and the problem of agent control.

The video also emphasizes the fact the we feel we have free will, which plays an important part in this debate. I am a little puzzled by the fear that a belief in determinism will lead people to stop taking responsibility for their actions. — FreeEmotion

Precisely what would be taking responsibility for anything in a deterministic world? The inanimate quanta? In other words, how does the concept of responsibility arise? If we play the deterministic game, we play it to the hillt. Nothing means anything anymore and every concept magically arises out of quanta.

. The problem is to produce a coherent account of that something more. Once that account is formulated, we might find it does all the work, and that it is compatible with determinism and sufficient for our value purposes; in that case, the something more would become the whole of the account of free will.
How is free will possible? Given the tension between causal determination and randomness on the one hand, and valuable agent-hood on the other, how is valuable agenthood possible? — Philosophical Explanations, 1981

Not at all. The universe is filled with habits or repetitive memory that is constantly being refashioned by choices. I may get up around 8 o'clock every day, but not precisely. My mind decides (or an alarm clock that my mind sets) on a slightly different time or maybe very much different time (all within a probabilistic range) which changes the habits.

The thing about determinism is that without a scintilla of evidence of any sort that such a thing exists, there are humans who prefer this description of their life. I find this the most interesting of all. It would be an interesting discussion as to why people choose (for they are surely choosing) this view of their life.

Yes, the problem for libertarian free will that Nozick raises is this passage is the luck objection. I had mentioned this objection as well as the closely related 'intelligibility problem' and the issue of 'agent control' in this post.

It is somewhat unusual to cast this problem as a threat to the value of human life in the way Nozick does. Terrapin Station's dismissal of it on the ground that values are subjective isn't really to the point.

Also, allowing agents to somehow gain indeterministic control over their actions through there existing a bias in the probabilities of the different courses of action that they can possibly follow doesn't seem to ensure that they have the ability to do otherwise that underscores personal responsibility. For, in that case, while the agent who *might* have achieved an unintended result (when she actually intended to achieve the most probable result) doesn't thereby possess an ability to do so. It's just something that could happen, just as the ability to hit bullseye may fail to be realized when a shooter misses. But if she had missed in circumstances where she was aiming at the center of the target, she wouldn't thereby have freely exercised an ability to miss.

One way out of the problem of luck for the libertarian is to posit that the indeterministic branching occurs immediately before the time of the mental "volition", or the formation of the intention. But such accounts then run into the intelligibility problem, and the problem of agent control. — Pierre-Normand

You don't have to accept that any stance on free will versus determinism has any particular implication re moral responsibility.

Of course, one big reason for this is that there are no facts re moral responsibiilty.

You don't have to accept that any stance on free will versus determinism has any particular implication re moral responsibility. — Terrapin Station

The relevance comes from the Kantian 'ought implies can' formula according to which you can't hold responsible someone for having done something that she could not possibly not have done (i.e. didn't have the power to refrain from doing, or didn't have an opportunity to so refrain). But it is true that this requirement can be satisfied by both (some) compatibilist or incompatibilist accounts of free will. Some philosophers (e.g. Alfred Mele or John Martin Fischer) are semi-compatibilists; they hold moral responsibility to be compatible with determinism although it isn't precluded by the lack of abilities to do otherwise. They would thus deny the validity of the 'ought implies can' formula. (So called 'Frankfurt cases', popularized by Harry Frankfurt, constitute alleged counter-examples to the formula.)

Myself, I think the mere self-conscious ability to reflect on one's own rational responsibility for the authorship of one's own past, present and foreseen actions, choices and intentions is the source of the 'ought implies can' formula (and the PAP principle); and the application of this formula to specifically moral considerations just is a dramatic but special application of this rather profound metaphysical fact about rational agency. (I also hold morality to be an integral part of rationality rather than its being extraneous as a mere source of extra-rational conative attitudes, but that is a separate matter).

Of course, one big reason for this is that there are no facts re moral responsibiilty.

It's possible that you are an agency incompatibilist, like Helen Steward. You would thus hold the core issue regarding the problem of free will and determinism to be an issue for animal agency in general. But even agency incompatibilists usually recognize that free will is best construed as a special form of agency that only rational creatures enjoy and that makes then responsible for their actions in a way animals who can't help but behave in accordance with their own natures (however non-deterministically) aren't.

One can be both a physicalist and a free will advocate, as I am. How? Simply by not buying the view that physical things are wholly deterministic, not buying the view that physical things operate in that "clockwork" way through and through. On this view, we are machines, so to speak, but machines are not completely deterministic. — Terrapin Station

One can be a physicalist and a free will advocate? OK. Not subscribing to the view that physical things operate as "clockwork". Well you may not subscribe to that view, but isn't' science based totally on that view? Quantum mechanics may be the exception, is this your "way out"?

What is the theory behind machines that are not totally deterministic? Is the decay of an radioactive substance random?

"Radioactive decay is a stochastic (i.e. random) process at the level of single atoms, in that, according to quantum theory, it is impossible to predict when a particular atom will decay..."

"Free will is ontological freedom in conjunction with will phenomena."

I am not sure I understand this concept.

Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, becoming, existence or reality, as well as the basic categories of being and their relations. — Wikipedia

Indeed. These are importance questions. I sense however, a great deal of intellectual nervousness about discussing the topic of determinism without any reference to moral responsibility. The 20th century has its share of intellectual disasters, I would imagine or "Frankensteins Monsters" of thought, where a particular school of thought led to wars and worse. For example Darwin's book was entitled "The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection: The Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life." It could be argued that this idea fostered imperialism.

I don't see why each of the theories of morality is incompatible with determinism, except the maybe (4) and (5)

http://home.sandiego.edu/~baber/gender/MoralTheories.html

Precisely what would be taking responsibility for anything in a deterministic world? The inanimate quanta? In other words, how does the concept of responsibility arise? If we play the deterministic game, we play it to the hillt. Nothing means anything anymore and every concept magically arises out of quanta. — Rich

I find this line of reasoning somewhat puzzling. I sometimes use the device of thought experiment in the form of 'if there were an universe where.." to sufficiently remove me from any uncomfortable conclusions relating to the world we live in, and to make it easier to conceptualize.

If there were an universe which was inhabited by completely deterministic beings, either biologically or mechanically, ie robots, would they not have a word for responsibility? Could such a society survive without the same sort of communal ethics or groupthink morality that some earthly societies had? Responsibility can be seen as one assuming oneself to be the first cause of something. Why cannot this be assumed?

http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/taxonomy.html

If there were an universe which was inhabited by completely deterministic beings — FreeEmotion

Exactly, precisely what is a "deterministic being"?

I view humans as intelligence. This intelligence makes choices. It is responsible for its choices despite the issue that outcomes are always unknown until they manifest. But there is an intelligence making choices (this is more or less the Bergson model).

Now, compare this to the deterministic model. There is no choice, it is an illusion. There is no responsibility, it is an illusion. There is not even a being, since that must also be an illusion. (Let us put aside for the moment the Miracle that out of nowhere created all these illusions, a Miracle that puts all of Genesis to shame).

So all we have is a universe of entangled quanta spontaneously, by some magic, manifesting all of these illusions (I guess quanta is some sort of god). Exactly what (not who) is responsible for anything? The Big Bang?

but isn't' science based totally on that view? Quantum mechanics may be the exception, is this your "way out"? — FreeEmotion

Science is all about approximations that are practical for all purposes (an idea proposed by John Bell). It is not exact. Never was. Never will bless. Everything, it's quanta and to be absolutely precise in any prediction one must be able To precisely predict the quanta. Physics says this is impossible. This science must live with imprecise measurements that are still usable, which is why Newton's equations are still used even though they yield imprecise results. The results are good enough.

As I mentioned earlier, there is not a scintilla of a scintilla piece of evidence that supports determinism. It is a religion but the adherents of this idea are so enchanted by it, they don't care that there is zero evidence. They might as well swap determinism forces for God. The two are equivalent.

As far as compatibilism it's concerned, in the article you linked to, if there is but a singular choice made anywhere at any time, determinism is broken.

I view humans as intelligence. This intelligence makes choices. It is responsible for its choices despite the issue that outcomes are always unknown until they manifest. But there is an intelligence making choices (this is more or less the Bergson model). — Rich

OK, say I agree to this:

Now, compare this to the deterministic model. There is no choice, it is an illusion. There is no responsibility, it is an illusion. There is not even a being, since that must also be an illusion. (Let us put aside for the moment the Miracle that out of nowhere created all these illusions, a Miracle that puts all if Genesis to shame). — Rich

I see what you mean. It is not out of the question for robots to assign responsibilities to themselves. However, assuming the situation where I exist as a being, and acknowledge I have responsibilities as a free agent, as a soul or something that cannot be determined in material terms alone, then it will be difficult to say that clockwork robots can have the same properties. There are some unstated assumptions involved I think. But no matter, I get the model.

Are these the possible chains of causation we are discussing? Just to clarify.

a) (Beginning?) Unknowable quantum event > Unknowable quantum event > (End?)

b) (Beginning?) First Cause > Resultant Causes > Resultant Causes > Resultant Causes > End

Note: all events are not knowable.

c) God as first cause > > Resultant Causes > Resultant Causes > Resultant Causes > End

All events, causes known by God 'in advance' and in retrospect therefore God knows in advance everything that will happen, and this has to be limited to one set of events, which in turn means it is deterministic.(Theistic Determinism?)