So what did the first person who talked about free will mean by the term? — Michael
It would be silly to frame the whole thing around the "could have done otherwise" phrase. You can just state it as "there is more than one possibility that has a >0 probability of obtaining." — Terrapin Station
Re freedom, the debate was originally about whether given some antecedent state, A, was there more than one immediately following, incompatible consequent state, at least B or C, that had a >0 probability of obtaining. (And then re free will, whether this was the case in conjunction with will phenomena, especially with respect to whether will could at all direct or influence the consequent state that did obtain.)
The determinist side, on the other hand, originally said that given some antecedent state, A, only one immediately following state, B, has a non-zero probability--namely a 100% probability--of obtaining. — Terrapin Station
The faculties model of the will has its origin in the writings of ancient philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, and it was the dominant view of the will for much of medieval and modern philosophy [see Descartes (1998) and the discussion of Aquinas in Stump (2003)]. It still has numerous proponents in the contemporary literature. What is distinct about free agents, according to this model, is their possession of certain powers or capacities. All living things possess some capacities, such as the capacities for growth and reproduction. What is unique about free agents, however, is that they also possess the capacities for intellection and volition. Another way of saying this is that free agents alone have the faculties of intellect and will. It is in virtue of having these additional faculties, and the interaction between them, that agents have free will.
The intellect, or the rational faculty, is the power of cognition. As a result of its cognitions, the intellect presents various things to the will as good under some description. To return to the case of Allison contemplating walking her dog, Allison’s intellect might evaluate walking the dog as good for the health of the dog. Furthermore, all agents that have an intellect also have a will. The will, or the volitional faculty, is an appetite for the good; that is, it is naturally drawn to goodness. The will, therefore, cannot pursue an option that the intellect presents as good in no way. The will is also able to command the other faculties; the will can command the body to move or the intellect to consider something.
I can credit them with seeing the blind spots of both libertarians and compatibilists, whereas those two traditional opponents usually only see each other's blind spots, not realizing that they themselves are paying too high a cost. — Pierre-Normand
Confusing. I think compatibilism is an off-road to nowhere. — Mongrel
The discussion of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) has been central to the debate about free will and determinism for decades and it isn't silly at all. — Pierre-Normand
Do you have a source for this? The IEP offers this account of free will: — Michael
No, I'm not. I'm saying that there's not the possibility in any sense. If you say that the possibility obtained, you're not a determinist. Hence not a compatibilist. — Terrapin Station
Sure, there is a sense of possibility that applies to unactualized dispositions (or unexercised powers or abilities). This is the sense that is captured by a conditional analysis such as those of G. E. Moore, David Lewis or their 'new dispositionalist' sucessors, and it is perfectly consistent with determinism. — Pierre-Normand
You didn't seem to understand my comment. I'm saying that hinging the whole thing on that particular linguistic characterization is silly. — Terrapin Station
I disagree. It is not consistent with determinism. — Terrapin Station
What are you referring to as "that particular linguistic characterization"? — Pierre-Normand
You are not disagreeing with the analyses of dispositions that I have mentioned being consistent with determinism, are you? — Pierre-Normand
If anything, those analyses are tantamount to the recasting of power ascriptions to specific kinds of objects as statements of universal deterministic laws that link the actualization of those powers to triggering circumstances. — Pierre-Normand
Yes. If you posit any possibility other than one, it's inconsistent with determinism. — Terrapin Station
The analysis is meant as a conspicuous definition that captures how we talk about dispositions of ordinary things. — Pierre-Normand
And according to this, "As a theory-neutral point of departure, then, free will can be defined as the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in the manner necessary for moral responsibility". Therefore, if one believes in causal determinism but also in moral responsibility then one is a compatibilist rather than a hard determinist. — Michael
What would an analysis of how we talk have to do with an ontological discussion? — Terrapin Station
often loses touch with the 'possibilities' that figure as putative open option from the perspective of the rational practical deliberation of agent (conceived by them as powers that they have). — Pierre-Normand
Paying attention how 'possibilities' likewise are involved in our conceptions of the powers of ordinary objects can alert us to the manner in which they are often misconstrued within a Humean metaphysics of event-causation. — Pierre-Normand
The actual causal structure of anything (at least under determinism) is a deterministic processes that is causal-chains of physical events, by the way. (There's no need for invoking supervenience or "underlying" there.)the actual causal structure of rational agency. — Pierre-Normand
But that "misconstrual" is what the debate is tradtionally about. — Terrapin Station
The actual causal structure of anything is a deterministic processes that is causal-chains of physical events, by the way. (There's no need for invoking supervenience or "underlying" there.) — Terrapin Station
I haven't the faintest idea what this is saying. — Terrapin Station
This is a category error. A causal structure isn't a process of any kind. — Pierre-Normand
two different sorts of possibilities, — Pierre-Normand
Couldn't disagree with you more here. There's nothing extant that's not a process. — Terrapin Station
Forms of causation, or "causal structures" as I meant the phrase, are abstracta. — Pierre-Normand
What two different sorts of possibilities are you positing? — Terrapin Station
In my ontology there are no real abstracts. Abstracts only exist as dynamic states in individuals' brains. In other words, they're particular mental content — Terrapin Station
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