My only claim is that two specific forms of causal explanations don't reduce to one another — Pierre-Normand

I don't at all agree with that claim though.

Re your two different types of possibilities, I'd say that (2) is simply a subset of (1) . . . Unless I'm not understanding something there, and I'd say that whether something is possible in way way rests on an observer.

Actually, (2) sounds like you might be saying that x is possible just in case S believes that x is possible, but surely that's not right.

Re your two different types of possibilities, I'd say that (2) is simply a subset of (1) . . . — Terrapin Station

It's the opposite since there is only one possibility from the external non-interventionist Laplacean perspective (1) whereas that are typically several mutually incompatible options (powers conjoined with opportunities) from the perspective of an agent (2). So. (1) is a subset of (2).

Unless I'm not understanding something there, and I'd say that whether something is possible in way way rests on an observer

I agree that the fact that most options are impossible from the Laplacean perspective (and that the only one that is possible is thereby necessary) while several options are typically possible from the perspective of the agent boils down to... a difference in perspective. But only the Laplacean perspective is the perspective of an observer. The perspective of the agent is radically different, since the way she knows what will happen has nothing to do with her knowledge (or lack thereof) of the antecedent causes of her action (including her own character or states of mind -- those are enablers of her rational capacities, not premises of her practical deliberation). She merely decides what is best to do, by her own lights (rational and/or moral considerations) and forms the intention to do it. She thereby knows what she will do or is doing. Knowledge acquired through practical deliberation, and the formation of an intention, is what Elizabeth Anscombe called practical knowledge. You know what will happen through deciding what will happen, and you thereby know the reason why it happens: which is that it ought to happen by your own lights (and that it is hopefully in your power to accomplish it).

In a way, the Laplacean observer is more knowledgeable than you yourself are, as an agent, since he knows in advance what it is that you are going to do (or, at least, how it is that your body will move, although those motions may be unintelligible to him if he hasn't figured out what they mean in high-level intentional terms). But in another sense, you are more knowledgeable than the Laplacean observer is for, except in cases of self-delusion, you always know what meaningful and purposeful action your bodily motions are realizing, since the controlling intention is the outcome of your own rational deliberation. Thus, you know something that the Laplacean observer may be badly situated to know, which is that the bodily motions that he predicted would necessarily occur happen to be realizing some specific intention not by accident, but for a reason. This reason, which is the 'rational-cause' of your bodily motions coming to realize non-accidentally some intentional action that you may have an objective reason to do, by your own lights, explains why it occurred as the intentional action that it is. (The way in which the intelligible cause of your action -- i.e. the reason why you are doing it by your own lights -- explains why the underlying low-level neurophysiological processes and bodily motions that realize it precisely realize this specific sort of high-level intentional action is a typical instance of 'downward-causation', by the way. There is also a form of causation that runs in the opposite direction, but it is non-determinative; your neurophysiology enables your learned agential powers and rational abilities to operate. In that sense, the causal power of the low-level processes are enabling causes of your agency. They make things 'possible' for you, in the second sense previously discussed.)

Why must you type such long responses regardless of how short my replies are? Is it some sort of psychological inability to keep things short as if you're having a conversation? If there's anything I hate about this board it's that. It's like a friggin disease that disables folks from keeping things concise/focused and conversational.

I'm not about to read all of that (and if you haven't noticed, I haven't read the majority of the content in the posts of yours I'm responding to).. I'm responding to one thing at a time.

(1) whereas that are typically several mutually incompatible options (powers conjoined with opportunities) from the perspective of an agent

Okay, and these obtain by virtue of what? The agent simply thinking that they're possibilities?

Why must you type such long responses regardless of how short my replies are? Is it some sort of psychological inability to keep things short as if you're having a conversation? — Terrapin Station

Because those are complex issues and there is no point is repeating almost verbatim the same seductive albeit simplistic (and flawed) arguments that have already been expounded uncritically 10,000 times previously in very similar threads.

If you don't want to think deeply about the issue, and prefer twitter-like superficial exchanges, you are of course free to ignore my long responses. I produce them for my own benefit as well.

Because those are complex issues and there is no point is repeating almost verbatim the same seductive albeit simplistic (and flawed) arguments that have already been expounded uncritically 10,000 times previously in very similar threads.

If you don't want to think deeply about the issue, and prefer twitter-like superficial exchanges, you are of course free to ignore my long responses. I produce them for my own benefit as well. — Pierre-Normand

If you can't communicate like you're having a conversation rather than someone with some sort of logorrheic disorder there is something wrong with you. It's not indicative of "deep thought" that you type a lot, especially when a lot of it has been unfocused, gobbledy-gooky word salad.

So how about a straightforward, conversational answer to "Okay, and these obtain by virtue of what? The agent simply thinking that they're possibilities? "

Okay, and these obtain by virtue of what? The agent simply thinking that they're possibilities? — Terrapin Station

No. The agent may mistakenly think that he has the power to do something and not have it. He may not be strong enough to lift the suitcase, say. He may also believe wrongly that he has an opportunity. The bus left the station earlier than expected, say. But when the agent has both the power, and a corresponding opportunity to exercise this power, and know that he has both, then that makes up an open option for him. And there typically are several such open options in each particular deliberative context. What then determine which one of those possibilities will become actual is the agent herself, through deciding what she has a good reason to do.

In the post that you elected not to read, I explained why there being thus several options that all are open (and hence possible) for the agent is compatible with the fact of there being only one of them that is possible from the perspective of an external observer.

If you can't communicate like you're having a conversation rather than someone with some sort of logorrheic disorder there is something wrong with you. It's not indicative of "deep thought" that you type a lot, especially when a lot of it has been unfocused, gobbledy-gooky word salad. — Terrapin Station

The best I can do is keep explaining as best as I know how what it is that you think is unclear and ignore the gratuitous insults. I can't do any better. I've already explained why twitter-style discussion isn't an option for me.

In the post that you elected not to read, I explained why there being thus several options that all are open (and hence possible) for the agent is compatible with the fact of there being only one of them that is possible from the perspective of an external observer. — Pierre-Normand

Your exeternal observer is an external ideal observer, right?--Hence Laplacean. So how can it be the case that both there is only one possibility to the Laplacean observer but really and not just mistakenly from a phenomenal/belief perspective, more than one possibility open to the agent? How is that not contradictory? Are you arguing something like consciousness being a "separate realm" somehow?

The laws of nature, as discovered in science, are inviolable and immutable over time and spac — TheMadFool

This appears to be one of the many beliefs upon which determinism is founded. There is no reason to believe this actually is so, especially since everything is constantly changing. In any case, current understanding of quantum physics (probably the closest we can come to a fundamental understanding of nature and this time) pretty much undermines determinism.

we want our dialogues to be meaningful, we must accept both free will and determinism. — Mariner

What you are asking for is a totally new description of the problem, which it's reasonable. But to say that a person had the ability to choose and at the same time everything is determined (even the choice) sorry if leaves the problem in midair and doesn't advance understanding. There must be some concrete understanding of the problem so that it can be practically applied to life. Knowing that I have the ability to choose actually provides meaning to life, hence it's a practical philosophy.

Your exeternal observer is an external ideal observer, right?--Hence Laplacean. So how can it be the case that both there is only one possibility to the Laplacean observer but really and not just mistakenly from a phenomenal/belief perspective, more than one possibility open to the agent? How is that not contradictory? — Terrapin Station

It would be contradictory if both senses of "possible" were the same. But I've already taken care of distinguishing them.

The agent who deliberates among several open options ('possible-2') knows that only one of them will eventually become actual. What it is that determines which one will become actual is the reason this agent will disclose, through practical deliberation (which may include a process of rational assessment of her own conflicting desires, values and prior commitments), for making this intelligible choice. It is true that the 'ideal' Laplacean observer is able to foresee the necessity of just one among those outcomes being realized (and hence the only one being 'possible-1'. But what it is that the Laplacean observer thereby sees to be necessary is not the intelligible action itself but rather the fine-grained physical realization of this action through bodily motions that are caused by antecedent physical/neurophysiological events. The explanation why those particular motions happen to be realizing a specific sort of intentional action (characterized in high-level purposive terms) isn't supplied by any sort of understanding of physical laws since physics can say nothing about the way practical reason and intentions relate to intelligible action types. It is the deliberation of the agent that makes this determination; which is another way to say that the agent is the cause of her own actions. This is what agent-causation amounts to. What makes it the case that only one among several 'possible-2' actions is executed is that the agent herself determines what sort of purposive action her own bodily motions (whatever their deterministic causes may be) will come to realize.

If you can't communicate like you're having a conversation rather than someone with some sort of logorrheic disorder there is something wrong with you. — Terrapin Station

You have the option of not participating in discussions not in your preferred style. It may be reasonable to ask participants to adopt a different style, but the site itself does not endorse one style or another, so other participants are under no obligation to conform to your expectations. Please attempt to respect the preferences of others who are also behaving within the site's guidelines.

so other participants are under no obligation to conform to your expectations. — Srap Tasmaner

That's obvious. That's not going to stop me from commenting on it. In my opinion it's a problem that people are so logorrheic and unfocused. Other people can have other opinions (and obviously do).

But what it is that the Laplacean observer thereby sees to be necessary is not the intelligible action itself but rather the fine-grained physical realization of this action through bodily motions that are caused by antecedent physical/neurophysiological events. The explanation why those particular motions happen to be realizing a specific sort of intentional action (characterized in high-level purposive terms) isn't supplied by any sort of understanding of physical laws since physics can say nothing about the way practical reason and intentions relate to intelligible action types. It is the deliberation of the agent that makes this determination; which is another way to say that the agent is the cause of her own actions. — Pierre-Normand

This is simply a conflation of epistemological and ontological issues.

What you're missing is the fact that different people have varied, disparate, and sometimes mutually exclusive notions of what constitutes "morality".

Imagine a person who believes that god created humans with free will and then rewards and punishes them based on the standards of their behavior. A determinist would deem this to be unfair because they are destined to behave in a certain way, and hold that the free will given to them by god is not the kind that actually enables them to choose to be a moral person...

The main implication of this issue is the destruction of "intrinsic moral guilt/blame" (such as an evil soul deserving of punishment). So what are we left with?

Something I call "pragmatic moral guilt/blame"...

Whether or not a person has true free will, we still need to behave as if they do (in some ways) because we're unable to perfectly predict their future actions. If someone commits the crime of rape, then we still need to take precautions to protect ourselves and prevent them from doing future harm (regardless of whether determinism is true or not). We might therefore incarcerate them, and while it's not a nice thing to do to people, since it's the less unfortunate of two unfortunate realities it makes pragmatic sense for us to do it. Torturing them while incarcerated per determinism is usually described as immoral because we don't hold them intrinsically responsible for their actions, and torture isn't in any way necessary for our protection or rehabilitative (which is a secondary moral strategy for dealing with a criminal population under a determinist moral framework).

Morality then becomes strategies and standards of behavior designed to maximize our socially shared values. People hate this description because it goes against their own versions of what "moral truth" is and where it comes from.

The problem is that so many people are concerned with the "truth" components of moral positions, and so they argue on endlessly, while the minimalist assertions of determinists that morality is just a cooperative strategy proves uninteresting to the lay-determinist ;) , (albeit uncontroversial given that this form of moral reasoning is slowly taking over our legal systems).

Essentially what I've described underlies a part of the reasoning behind the "compatibilist" definition of free will...

Imagine if we were total slaves to only one causal chain, we'd never go against a desire, never try new tastes and so on. — jkop

As opposed to being total slaves to many causal chains? A slave with many masters is no less a slave than a slave with one master, no?

This appears to be one of the many beliefs upon which determinism is founded. There is no reason to believe this actually is so, especially since everything is constantly changing. In any case, current understanding of quantum physics (probably the closest we can come to a fundamental understanding of nature and this time) pretty much undermines determinism. — Rich

Are you suggesting that we have no reason to believe that the laws of physics are consistent?

(There's ton's of strong evidence for this actually, namely the fact that science keeps working).

What about quantum mechanics actually undermines determinism or supports free will?

You can replace determined will with random will, but "random" does not equate to "free".

In the face of quantum randomness, we might just propose a non-local hidden variable theory and blame that for our actions anyway...

Judge: "Why did you do it?".
Defendant: "The uncertainty in the the "spin" of a quantum particle made me do it."...

The core idea is that when an agent performs an action in a deterministic world, that doesn't entail that this agent didn't have the ability to do something else but only that this ability was not actually exercised. — Pierre-Normand

This sounds like obfuscation. The point is not that the ability was not actually exercised, but that, in a deterministic world, if it was not exercised then it was never actually (as opposed to merely logically) possible that it could have been exercised.

If we want our dialogues to be meaningful, we must accept both free will and determinism. — Mariner

I think a better term is 'influence'. "Determinism" carries the baggage of the notion of absolute constraint. Otherwise, I agree with you, there must be some constraint given by external influences or the idea of freedom becomes meaningless. ('External' here meaning 'outside the ambit of the agent's control').

Are you suggesting that we have no reason to believe that the laws of physics are consistent?

(There's ton's of strong evidence for this actually, namely the fact that science keeps working).

What about quantum mechanics actually undermines determinism or supports free will?

You can replace determined will with random will, but "random" does not equate to "free".

In the face of quantum randomness, we might just propose a non-local hidden variable theory and blame that for our actions anyway...

Judge: "Why did you do it?".
Defendant: "The uncertainty in the the "spin" of a quantum particle made me do it."... — VagabondSpectre

I have no idea what a so-called Law of Physics is (a term that is bandied about with absolutely no definition) and since science is changing all the time and our understanding is changing all the time, there is zero evidence for such godlike claims of such a never changing, omnipresent, spiritual-like presence. But it doesn't stop people from using such concepts hoping no one will notice the lack of concreteness.

It might difficult for anyone to take a Newtonian position of determinism in the face of quantum probabilistic equations (probabilistic is very akin to potential choices) but again, those who wish to robotize humans will insist that somewhere, somehow humans should continue to deny their obvious everyday capacity to choose. If someone wishes to be a robot, be my guest, but there is zero evidence for such a notion.

I have no idea what a so-called Law of Physics is (a term that is bandied about with absolutely no definition) and since science is changing all the time and our understanding is changing all the time, there is zero evidence for such godlike claims of such a never changing, omnipresent, spiritual-like presence. But it doesn't stop people from using such concepts hoping no one will notice the lack of concreteness. — Rich

F=MA

The force required to accelerate an object (by a specific amount) is proportional to it's mass, as described by the above equation. (Newton's second law of motion).

We're as certain this will never change as we're certain about anything; It's basically 1+1=2. If you want to suggest that either of these things will stop being true you've got to literally tear up the most fundamental assumptions we've made about the nature of reality.

So that's an example of "a law of physics".

Regarding the "robot" like qualities of humans, the whole of neuroscience will happily disagree with your assertion that "there's no evidence".

If certain parts of your brain are removed or damaged, then you might exhibit somewhat predictable behavioral changes as a result.

We know that something in the going's on of the brain provides the decision making power of human consciousness, and there's mountains of evidence for this.

Determinists don't deny the illusion of choice or the pragmatism of actually making them, they're just not willing to call them "inherently and 100% free".

Free will is concerned with one's will being responsible for one's actions. — Michael

No, free will is concerned with one's free will being responsible for one's actions. If determinism is the case, then one's will is not free, and responsibility is reduced to causal responsibility. Moral responsibility, as it has traditionally and as it is coherently, understood in distinction to mere causal responsibility, is incoherent under the assumption of determinism, no matter how much wriggling those who do not wish to accept this are wont to do.

F=MA it's inapplicable at the quantum level and is at best a good approximation for practical purposes at larger levels. If this is example of a law of physics then it demonstrates my point very nicely.

Of course, if you change something things change. No one is suggesting it otherwise. However, exactly what will happen it's totally unpredictable, demonstrating once again that determinism is fluffy myth. I wonder why people hold on so tightly to such an idea with zero evidence supporting it. What we are all doing all the time is choosing yet determinists are so desperate they become Buddhists and start declaring the world as we experience it is all an illusion. And what is creating this illusion (there is no who in the world of robots)? Molecules??

The analysis is meant as a conspicuous definition that captures how we talk about dispositions of ordinary things. — Pierre-Normand

This kind of analysis cannot be anything but playing with words if it is not consistent with, and coherent in terms of, easily understandable common sense notions of free will and determinism.

F=MA it's inapplicable at the quantum level and is at best a good approximation for practical purposes at larger levels. If this is example of a law of physics then it demonstrates my point very nicely. — Rich

F=MA was never designed to describe the quantum scale though. Your objection to F=MA would be like an architect telling an astronomer that the standard candle principle doesn't apply to bridge design.

We have very good descriptions of quantum mechanics which we don't expect to suddenly change; even in the quantum world your supposition that there is no consistency is mistakenly founded.

We cannot be certain whether or not a given electron will emit a photon if we prepare it's "spin" in a particular state and then suddenly change it's orientation using a magnetic field. But what we do instead is describe a range of probabilities for given prepared states and given deviations from that prepared state. F=MA doesn't need to apply to the quantum world just as Hiesenberg didn't need his descriptions and calculations of quantum mechanics to apply to the Newtonian world... You're just comparing scientific apples to scientific oranges.

Of course, if you change something things change. No one is suggesting it otherwise. However, exactly what will happen it's totally unpredictable, demonstrating once again that determinism is fluffy myth. I wonder why people hold on so tightly to such an idea with zero evidence supporting it. What we are all doing all the time is choosing yet determinists are so desperate they become Buddhists and start declaring the world as we experience it is all an illusion. And what is creating this illusion (there is no who in the world of robots)? Molecules?? — Rich

Forgive me but it seems like you're very desperate to reject the idea of determinism by whatever means...

As a determinist I hold that the future is not predictable with absolute certainty (for various reasons), and nobody is arguing that we should act like the concept of "choice" is incoherent. What are you so afraid of?

This is simply a conflation of epistemological and ontological issues. — Terrapin Station

No, it's a metaphysical issue. It's a consequence of multiple realizability and of the falsity of nomological reducibility (of psychology to physics). That a given fine-grainedly characterized physical history of the set of material particle temporarily making up a human body happen to realize some specific form of intentional action of a person isn't determined by any level of physical details of this motion anymore than the value of a dollar bill is determined by the physical motion and structure of the atoms making it up. That you cannot know the value of the dollar bill on the basis of the knowledge of its material constitution isn't a matter of epistemic limitation regarding your precise knowledge of the latter, but rather a matter of the latter being insufficient to determining the former, in a metaphysical sense of "determination". This may be true even if the economic facts of the world supervene on the physical facts; and so might it be in the case of the psychological facts in relations to the physical facts that they supervene upon, or so even many non-reductive physicalists such as Jerry Fodor and Donald Davidson have convincingly argued.

I was also interested in first-person data, subjective experience... is there a compatibilist perspective that considers that kind of thing?

This sounds like obfuscation. The point is not that the ability was not actually exercised, but that, in a deterministic world, if it was not exercised then it was never actually (as opposed to merely logically) possible that it could have been exercised. — John

What you call "the point" is actually a substantive philosophical thesis that is in need of a rational defense however obvious its truth may seem from the standpoint of traditional compatibilist reasoning.

The traditional distinctions between logical, epistemic and nomological necessity/possibility are actually too crude to settle this question. That's because possibilities for action aren't equivalent to any of those three kinds of possibility. If an option still is open to you as a possibility for action, then it is both logically possible and epistemically possible that you will do it, but those possibilities for a range of different actions isn't simply a matter of your being ignorant of all the relavant facts regarding the (alleged) nomological possibility of only one of them. (It is 'nomologically possible' in the intended sense if its occurrence is consistent with already settled physical facts that you don't have any power over anymore at the time of practical deliberation in conjunction with the laws of physics).

If it were the case that the nomological necessity of just one determinate action implied a lack of alternative possibilities for other actions then, when faced with several choices for action and asked what it is that you will chose to do, it would make sense for you to reply: "I don't know yet, let's wait and see". (This would be a rationally justified answer if you were to accept the validity of van Inwagen's 'consequence argument'). But the sensible answer rather is: "I don't know, I haven't decided yet; what ought I to do?" And when you are deliberating what it is that you ought to do, you aren't inquiring about already settled facts that unbeknownst to you will cause you to act in a determinate manner, but rather about what it is that makes it reasonable for you to select one possible option in preference to the alternatives in your current situation.

All this seems to say, without acknowledging that it is saying it, is that free will is really an illusion caused by our lack of knowledge and understanding of all the ("fine-grained") forces determining our behavior. In other words free will and moral responsibility are inevitably "real for us" even if the world is really inexorably deterministic. Spinoza made that claim, and acknowledged it, some 350 years ago.

I was also interested in first-person data, subjective experience... is there a compatibilist perspective that considers that kind of thing? — Mongrel

I think the philosophical accounts regarding free will and determinism propounded by Michael Ayers, Michael Smith, Kadri Vihvelin and Erasmus Mayr are especially sensitive to the causal relevance of irreducible features of the first-person perspective of rational agents (and their characters, values and motivations). I am especially partial to the accounts of Ayers and Mayr, myself, but all four are illuminating. Consider Alfred Mele, also, though the specifics of his account are less congenial to me.