I will read those articles when I have time. Thanks for the references.

This seems to be saying time entails an order, but it doesn't answer my question. — Relativist

I am not saying that time is needed for order. I am saying that time is required for any change. That is the Mind that keeps things in order.

Is time an existent? — Relativist

Subjective time exists and it is the object of experience and causation by the Mind. Please read my second argument.

Is it a relation? — Relativist

No.

Is it a property? — Relativist

No.

Why do you call it "subjective? — Relativist

Because the Mind and only the Mind experiences it.

Is it not objectively real? — Relativist

It exists, so in this sense, it is real.

Is this just reference to special relativity? — Relativist

This is something that I am currently thinking about. So I cannot give a clear answer to you. I have to refresh my memory of special and general relativity which I read in good depth 30 years ago. I don't remember the details right now. I believe that subjective time is the time in Einstein's special and general relativity though since I don't have any other candidate for it.

My view is that time is fundamentally a relation between states of affairs. An event is a state of affairs (a point of time). — Relativist

To me, subjective time accommodates different states of affairs.

Do you believe in ghosts? :wink:

metaphorically speaking, yeah. But also, I don't have a problem with what you're trying to prove. I have considered similar notions, especially in the case of Eternal Recurrence... I personally am unconvinced by your argument, but I will admit I had equivocated your meaning here:

I did it. Please read the OP. — MoK

Thought you were saying you made an argument for God. Because I thought you made it as a parallel to say this this thus that (about God).

So you are asking the big Why! — MoK

It wasn't a big why. It was admittance of the intrinsic unintelligibly of the world. And what was considered problematic by Descartes, Newton, Huygens, Locke, etc., was motion. That's way simpler that consciousness.

But it is unintelligible to us. We simply proceed to do science through theories, and we have dropped the expectation that the world will ever make (intuitive) sense to us. And as with motion, so with consciousness, as John Locke (certainly no pushover) astutely observed:

"Whether Matter may not be made by God to think is more than man can know. For I see no contradiction in it, that the first Eternal thinking Being...should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought... For, since we must allow He has annexed effects to motion which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that He could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon?"

Substitute "God" for "Nature."

We don't understand why gravity works as it does, but we know that it does work without material contact, through Newton's theory of gravitation.

We don't understand why matter could think, but we know that thinking depends on matter, as shown by the fact that no person lacking a brain can think.

Bohmian interpretation is paradox-free so it is the correct interpretation. — MoK

I suspect some physicists might disagree. But we can put that aside.

Then, the important problem is how we could have mental experiences where therein options are real while the the physical processes are deterministic. I think the solution to this problem is that we are dealing with neural processes. So I think the result of neural processes in the brain can lead to the existence of options as mental phenomena. Think of a situation in which you are in a maze. Although the neural processes are deterministic in your brain they can give rise to a mental representation in which options are real when you reach a fork. — MoK

But how can you say physical processes are deterministic? Some show regularity, others show randomness, and we see exceptions to rules quite frequently.

Free will is the ability to do or not to do something. That so called "physical processes" happen before we are aware of them only shows that most of our mental activity happens at an unconscious level, what we decide to do with that, is up to us. We can act on an urge or not.

No, I think we already agree that experience which is a mental phenomenon can not be considered to be physical. We also agree that the mental has causal power as well. That is all I need to make my argument. — MoK

You have asserted that the mental cannot be physical. There is no argument given as to why this has to be so. It's a semantic argument that "the mental cannot be physical, because mental phenomena are not physical phenomena".

But that does not solve a simple question: why can't mental stuff be physical stuff?

Seeing and hearing are extremely different from each other, but we don't assume these are metaphysically distinct things. We treat them as different sensations, even though, again, they are very different. So why should we assume that the mental is more radically different from the physical than seeing is from hearing?

If we can't give a reason why, then we are likely carving out a mistaken distinction.

metaphorically speaking, yeah. — DifferentiatingEgg

Ok.

But also, I don't have a problem with what you're trying to prove. I have considered similar notions, especially in the case of Eternal Recurrence... — DifferentiatingEgg

I am discussing the Mind here. What does it have to do with Eternal Recurrence?

Thought you were saying you made an argument for God. Because I thought you made it as a parallel to say this this thus that (about God). — DifferentiatingEgg

I am not making an argument for the existence of God here.

It wasn't a big why. It was admittance of the intrinsic unintelligibly of the world. And what was considered problematic by Descartes, Newton, Huygens, Locke, etc., was motion. That's way simpler that consciousness. — Manuel

Or maybe the world including the Mind is intelligible.

But how can you say physical processes are deterministic? Some show regularity, others show randomness, and we see exceptions to rules quite frequently. — Manuel

Physical processes are deterministic once we agree that Bohmian's interpretation is the correct interpretation.

Free will is the ability to do or not to do something. That so called "physical processes" happen before we are aware of them only shows that most of our mental activity happens at an unconscious level, what we decide to do with that, is up to us. We can act on an urge or not. — Manuel

Free will is the ability to choose between options. The conscious mind becomes aware of options and this is due to physical processes that happen in the brain.

You have asserted that the mental cannot be physical. There is no argument given as to why this has to be so. It's a semantic argument that "the mental cannot be physical, because mental phenomena are not physical phenomena". — Manuel

No, I said accepting the definition of physical and experience they cannot be the same thing since the object and the subject cannot be the same thing.

But that does not solve a simple question: why can't mental stuff be physical stuff? — Manuel

The object and the subject cannot be the same thing.

I discussed my view (perdurance) earlier. Here's an article in the Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy. — Relativist

Ok, let's focus on your definition. Accepting that the the brain is made of parts then we say that brain A is identical to brain B IFF their parts have the same intrinsical and relational properties. In this sense, the brain at t0 is not identical to the brain at t1 since the relational properties of the parts of the brain are subject to change all the time.

Because they instantiate universals. Laws are relations among universals. — Relativist

The laws of physics to the best of our understanding are not universal. The standard model contains three forces from four forces in nature. It is a quantum theory of three forces. The string theory is a theory of the last force so-called gravity as well as other forces. We still don't know, the proper theory that explains our world and physical laws since there are many many theories in string theory. The number of theories is estimated to be $10^{500}$. That means that the laws of physics are not universal but it is only one instance from many many possible instances.

I discussed my view (perdurance) earlier. Here's an article in the Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy.
— Relativist
Accepting that the the brain is made of parts then we say that brain A is identical to brain B IFF their parts have the same intrinsical and relational properties. In this sense, the brain at t0 is not identical to the brain at t1 since the relational properties of the parts of the brain are subject to change all the time. — MoK

Correct, it's not identical, but there is a causal relation between consecutive temporal parts. No other object in spacetime has this unique series of temporal parts.

You agree that object identity does not endure in time, so you need to somehow account for the intuition that are the same person you were yesterday. Perdurance seems the best option, but you lack a causal relation between temporal parts, since you attribute causation to a universal "Mind".

The laws of physics to the best of our understanding are not universal. — MoK

Laws of physics do not necessarily correspond to the actual laws of nature. They can be localized instances of actual law - compare Newton's law of gravity to general relativity.
They may also be approximations (compare standard chemistry to the more fundamental quantum chemistry).

We still don't know, the proper theory that explains our world — MoK

Not knowing what the actual laws of nature ARE, does not imply there aren't actual, immutable laws of nature underlying everything. The sought-after "theory of everything" depends on it.

Correct, it's not identical, but there is a causal relation between consecutive temporal parts. No other object in spacetime has this unique series of temporal parts. — Relativist

Correct.

You agree that object identity does not endure in time, so you need to somehow account for the intuition that are the same person you were yesterday. — Relativist

I think you are talking about personality here. Our personalities are partly due to our genes and partly due to what we have experienced. I studied psychology a little but I can tell that different parts of the brain play different roles when it comes to personality. To my understanding, some parts of the brain are hard-wired because of our genes and some are not and change depending on our experiences. Therefore, I think that we are not the same person to some extent as yesterday since a part of us is subject to change.

Not knowing what the actual laws of nature ARE, does not imply there aren't actual, immutable laws of nature underlying everything. The sought-after "theory of everything" depends on it. — Relativist

The theory of everything is a unified theory of four forces, namely electromagnetic force, strong nuclear force, weak nuclear force, and gravity. The theory of everything is not universal though since we know from string theory that the laws of physics are one instance among many many other instances. Our universe could be a different universe in the sense that there could be different forces and particles.

he theory of everything is not universal though since we know from string theory that the laws of physics are one instance among many many other instances. Our universe could be a different universe in the sense that there could be different forces and particles. — MoK

Under a theory of everything (TOE), the hypothetical different forces and particles would be local manifestations of that TOE. The TOE would be the fundamental law.

I think you are talking about personality here. — MoK

No, I'm talking about personal identity over time. It appears you deny that you are the same person you were yesterday.

Your claims about different parts of the brain relating to personality, and the role of genetics are inconsistent with your claim that the brain at t1 was created ex nihilo.

Under a theory of everything (TOE), the hypothetical different forces and particles would be local manifestations of that TOE. — Relativist

What do you mean by this?

The TOE would be the fundamental law. — Relativist

No, as I explained there is no such thing as universal/fundamental laws. The theory of everything applies to particles and forces in our universe. We still don't know why we have such a physical that moves according to such the laws of physics. As I demonstrated our universe could be different by this I mean it could have other sorts of particles and forces.

No, I'm talking about personal identity over time. It appears you deny that you are the same person you were yesterday. — Relativist

I said, "Therefore, I think that we are not the same person to some extent as yesterday since a part of us is subject to change." I know for sure that my mood changes from day to day so in this sense I change over time. I am generally a very patient person though and I think that is part of my genetics so in this sense, I don't change over time.

Your claims about different parts of the brain relating to personality, and the role of genetics are inconsistent with your claim that the brain at t1 was created ex nihilo. — Relativist

Let's consider an electron, for example. An electron has some intrinsic properties, such as mass, spin, and charge, and some extrinsic properties, such as location. The intrinsic properties are preserved by time whereas the extrinsic properties are subject to change. These properties can be explained in terms of the vibration of the string. So the intrinsic properties of an electron are not subject to change since they are related to the specific mode of vibration of the string which is not subject to change over time whereas the location of an electron is subject to change and that is related to another mode of vibration of the string which is subject to change over time. I think that the Mind experiences these modes of vibration of the string as a result creates another string at different points in time. The content of the experience of the Mind determines whether something, different modes of vibration of the string, is going to change or not. Once we understand an electron and its motion, we can understand a brain since the brain is made of electrons and quarks.

, I think that we are not the same person to some extent as yesterday since a part of us is subject to change — MoK

You're sidestepping the issue. You need to explain to what extent you are the same person, and how you account for this, given that MoK begins to exist ex nihilo at every instant of time.

The TOE would be the fundamental law.
— Relativist
No, as I explained there is no such thing as universal/fundamental laws. — MoK

You believe in ontological emergence, which I deny. Ontological emergence is contrary to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The PSR entails reductive physicalism. Reductive physicalism entails a fundamental basis for the laws of physics, and all possible alternative laws of physics.

Let's consider an electron, for example. An electron has some intrinsic properties, such as mass, spin, and charge, and some extrinsic properties, such as location. The intrinsic properties are preserved by time — MoK

You're contradicting yourself again: perpetual creation of everything ex nihilo entails no preservation of properties.

You're sidestepping the issue. You need to explain to what extent you are the same person, and how you account for this, given that MoK begins to exist ex nihilo at every instant of time. — Relativist

Each morning that I wake up, I, my conscious mind, am feeded by several types of information from my subconscious mind. This information includes different sorts of perceptions of my surroundings and my body. I also become self-aware and that is due to the activity of the conscious mind. It is through self-awareness that I can know that I am a person. When it comes to the question of whether I am the same person as yesterday, then I need to be informed by the subconscious mind since all memories of my past experiences are stored in the subconscious mind.

Regarding the causation of my brain and how it is preserved please see below.

You believe in ontological emergence, which I deny. Ontological emergence is contrary to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The PSR entails reductive physicalism. — Relativist

Not at all. I don't think that ontological emergence is possible at all and I am not talking about it here.

The PSR entails reductive physicalism. Reductive physicalism entails a fundamental basis for the laws of physics, and all possible alternative laws of physics. — Relativist

If you accept there are possible alternative laws of physics then it follows that our universe could be different therefore the laws of physics are not universal.

You're contradicting yourself again: perpetual creation of everything ex nihilo entails no preservation of properties. — Relativist

It does since the act of causation is supported by experience. If there was no experience then we would have a problem with how the intrinsic properties of parts of the brain are preserved. I already commented on how the intrinsic properties of an electron are preserved. The intrinsic properties of an electron are nothing but the specific mode of vibration of a string. The Mind experiences the string and its vibration without it, it would not be possible to create another string later that has the same mode of vibration.

If you accept there are possible alternative laws of physics then it follows that our universe could be different therefore the laws of physics are not universal. — MoK

I distinguished between the laws of nature (which are ontological) and laws of physics (epistemological; best guesses based on available data). Newton's law of gravity (which implied instantaneous action at a distance) is (or was) a law of physics - and was never a law of nature.

So there may be different laws of physics (what we would have guessed at) but they would be due to the same, fundamental laws of nature - assuming reductionism (as I do).

On this semantical account, you would apparently deny there are laws of nature, because all causation is "vertical"- a consequence of the universal mind. You could accept "laws" of physics as instrumentalist descriptions of observed behavior, but you have to be open to the universal mind choosing to operate differently

You're contradicting yourself again: perpetual creation of everything ex nihilo entails no preservation of properties.
— Relativist
It does since the act of causation is supported by experience. — MoK

That universal mind is remembering the properties and creating them afresh. That is not an ontological preservation; it is a duplication.

Each morning that I wake up, I, my conscious mind, am feeded by several types of information from my subconscious mind. — MoK

This is inconsistent with your claim that the universal mind recreates your brain ex nihilo at every instant.

You still haven't explained what YOU are. You just began to exist, ex nihilo.

I distinguished between the laws of nature (which are ontological) and laws of physics (epistemological; best guesses based on available data). Newton's law of gravity (which implied instantaneous action at a distance) is (or was) a law of physics - and was never a law of nature. — Relativist

I don't understand your distinction between the laws of nature and the laws of physics here. To me, the laws of physics refer to regularities in physical processes only whereas the laws of nature encompass all regularities including biological, chemical, etc. processes as well. I think that physical processes are fundamental and can explain biological, chemical, etc. processes though. What I am trying to say here is that the laws of physics are not universal because there are an infinite number of different candidates available.

So there may be different laws of physics (what we would have guessed at) but they would be due to the same, fundamental laws of nature - assuming reductionism (as I do). — Relativist

You have to explain what you mean by the laws of nature then. Could you give an example of it?

On this semantical account, you would apparently deny there are laws of nature, because all causation is "vertical"- a consequence of the universal mind. — Relativist

I cannot deny the laws of nature as I don't understand what it is yet.

You could accept "laws" of physics as instrumentalist descriptions of observed behavior, but you have to be open to the universal mind choosing to operate differently. — Relativist

That is possible if we accept that the Mind has the capacity to decide. One however can only decide when there are options available for the decision. The options are the realization of two states in which both states are accessible. If you have no option then you have to deal with your only option and act accordingly.

That universal mind is remembering the properties and creating them afresh. That is not an ontological preservation; it is a duplication. — Relativist

Yes, it is a duplication. That is what I mean by causation/creation.

This is inconsistent with your claim that the universal mind recreates your brain ex nihilo at every instant.

You still haven't explained what YOU are. You just began to exist, ex nihilo. — Relativist

What am I? I am a person with a body and at least two minds (with a small "m" rather than a capital "M"). A mind is a substance that exists in space, opposite to the Mind that is Omnipresent in space. There are at least two minds in MOK, one I call the subconscious mind and another one the conscious mind. I cannot tell what the subconscious mind experiences since I don't have access to its mental contents. I can only talk about the conscious mind and its experiences. The conscious mind perceives many ideas, such as memorized thoughts, psychological time, perception of a simulation of reality, etc. from the subconscious mind. It has very little memory so-called working memory which is registered in a part of the brain temporarily. The main duty of the conscious mind is to construct new thoughts with the help of the part of the brain that it has access to. The conscious mind does not directly produce thoughts though. The thoughts are the byproduct of neurobiological activity in a part of the brain. The conscious mind just perceives thoughts. It however can decide when there is a conflict of interests. For example, you might have two different thoughts and you are not sure how to proceed because of the conflict of thoughts. That is when the conscious mind comes into play and decides which thought to be considered and which thought to be discarded. Both thoughts are however registered in the subconscious mind for further analysis in the future. It is through the constant exchange of information between the subconscious mind and conscious mind that we can develop coherent thoughts, write a sentence, learn new activities, etc.

I distinguished between the laws of nature (which are ontological) and laws of physics (epistemological; best guesses based on available data). Newton's law of gravity (which implied instantaneous action at a distance) is (or was) a law of physics - and was never a law of nature.
— Relativist
I don't understand your distinction between the laws of nature and the laws of physics here. — MoK

"Law of nature" = an aspect of physical reality; an aspect of the way the world actually is (whether we know it or not)
"Law of physics" = a theory (developed by physicists). It corresponds to a law of nature if it is true.

F=G*(m1*m2)/r^2 is a law of physics. It was assumed to be true for many years. Strictly speaking, it is not exactly true, so it is not a law of nature.

General relativity is a law of physics that seems to be true; if so then it is a law of nature.

That universal mind is remembering the properties and creating them afresh. That is not an ontological preservation; it is a duplication.
— Relativist
Yes, it is a duplication. That is what I mean by causation/creation. — MoK

Therefore, as I said, properties are not "preserved", as you had said. Instead, they are duplicated. So you were wrong when you said: "The intrinsic properties are preserved by time"

What am I? I am a person with a body and at least two minds — MoK

You just now came into existence, having been vertically caused by the Mind. There's a "you" that came into existence 1 minute ago, 5 days ago, and even one nanosecond ago. Nothing is preserved from one moment to the next

Nothing connects all these "you's". Nothing accounts for a preserved identity, since there just a continuous series of MoKs who come into existence ex nihilo with no causal relation between them.

The current you is analogous to the projected image of a single frame of a film. One frame doesn't cause the next; there's just an illusion of motion.

What I am trying to say here is that the laws of physics are not universal because there are an infinite number of different candidates available. — MoK

You assume a mind is choosing among the "choices".

A reductive physicalist believes the observed laws of physics are manifestations of more fundamental law. Consider string theory: it can account for 10^500 3-dimensional "brane universes", each with a different "physics", but all are accounted for by the string theory.

"Law of nature" = an aspect of physical reality; an aspect of the way the world actually is (whether we know it or not)
"Law of physics" = a theory (developed by physicists). It corresponds to a law of nature if it is true.

F=G*(m1*m2)/r^2 is a law of physics. It was assumed to be true for many years. Strictly speaking, it is not exactly true, so it is not a law of nature.

General relativity is a law of physics that seems to be true; if so then it is a law of nature. — Relativist

Ok, I got what you mean with the laws of nature. If so, then there are an infinite number of the laws of nature.

Therefore, as I said, properties are not "preserved", as you had said. Instead, they are duplicated. So you were wrong when you said: "The intrinsic properties are preserved by time" — Relativist

I have already explained this twice. The string's specific vibration mode defines the related particle's intrinsic properties. The Mind experiences this mode of vibration and, as a result, creates another copy of the string with the same mode of vibration at another point in space. Therefore, the intrinsic properties of the particle are preserved.

You just now came into existence, having been vertically caused by the Mind. There's a "you" that came into existence 1 minute ago, 5 days ago, and even one nanosecond ago. Nothing is preserved from one moment to the next.

Nothing connects all these "you's". Nothing accounts for a preserved identity, since there just a continuous series of MoKs who come into existence ex nihilo with no causal relation between them.

The current you is analogous to the projected image of a single frame of a film. One frame doesn't cause the next; there's just an illusion of motion. — Relativist

The intrinsic properties of my parts are preserved as I discuss above. The relational properties of my parts are subject to change all the time and that is necessary since otherwise I could not have biological properties which parts are changing and other parts unchanging.

You assume a mind is choosing among the "choices". — Relativist

I just said that the Mind experiences and causes. How did we end up with such a universe with these specific laws of physics? I don't know and I don't think anybody knows that.

A reductive physicalist believes the observed laws of physics are manifestations of more fundamental law. Consider string theory: it can account for 10^500 3-dimensional "brane universes", each with a different "physics", but all are accounted for by the string theory. — Relativist

Correct. But string theory is only one theory among many other possible theories since in string theory one assumes that the fundamental entity is a string but that fundamental entity could have any geometrical form.

there are an infinite number of the laws of nature. — MoK

What accounts for this being possible? IMO, something must exist to account for non-actual possibilities. The alternative is to assume everything that is logically possible, is actually (metaphysically) possible.

I have already explained this twice. The string's specific vibration mode defines the related particle's intrinsic properties. The Mind experiences this mode of vibration and, as a result, creates another copy of the string with the same mode of vibration at another point in space. Therefore, the intrinsic properties of the particle are preserved. — MoK

And I've explained multiple times that this entails an absence of continuity. Duplication is not the same thing as preservation.

You have still not accounted for identity over time. Even if we pretend duplication = preservation, you haven't identified what makes brain at t1 the same as the brain at t0. Per your account, they are not identical. The same is true for MoK's body as a whole: it's constantly changing, so it's properties are changing - so it's not strictly identical from one instant to the next.

You assume a mind is choosing among the "choices".
— Relativist
I just said that the Mind experiences and causes. How did we end up with such a universe with these specific laws of physics? — MoK

Either the Mind is making a choice, or it is random. Why call this object a "mind" if it isn't making choices?

string theory is only one theory among many other possible theories since in string theory one assumes that the fundamental entity is a string but that fundamental entity could have any geometrical form. — MoK

Not if reductive physicalism is true. You deny this, but you still need to account for the contingency: what makes those other possibilities possible?

What accounts for this being possible? — Relativist

Within string theory, a string has infinite modes of vibration available. Each mode is related to specific particles and forces, in other words, to specific laws of nature.

IMO, something must exist to account for non-actual possibilities. — Relativist

That is beyond the scope of string theory. You cannot find an answer to that in string theory. In string theory, any specific vibration of the string is related to a specific particle and force, hence specific laws of physics.

The alternative is to assume everything that is logically possible, is actually (metaphysically) possible. — Relativist

Our universe is vast and infinite in space. The laws of physics may be different in different regions of it. The multiverse although it is hypothetical could also be true so we could have different universes with different laws of physics.

And I've explained multiple times that this entails an absence of continuity. — Relativist

The act of causation is such that the new particle is created at time t1 in the vicinity of the former particle that exists at time t0 so continuity is preserved.

Duplication is not the same thing as preservation. — Relativist

The duplication is such that the intrinsic properties of a particle are held.

You have still not accounted for identity over time. Even if we pretend duplication = preservation, you haven't identified what makes brain at t1 the same as the brain at t0. — Relativist

I discussed this in depth. You can find my explanation here and here. The brain is not identical in the different instant of time since the relational properties of its parts are changing all the time.

Per your account, they are not identical. The same is true for MoK's body as a whole: it's constantly changing, so it's properties are changing - so it's not strictly identical from one instant to the next. — Relativist

I don't understand how that could be a relevant objection to what I am arguing here, the OP. We know by fact that the relational properties of parts of a person change all the time even if we endorse physicalism. So, that is a valid question for physicalists as well. Do you have any answer to the question you posed yourself? Anyhow, I addressed your questions to the best I could.

Either the Mind is making a choice, or it is random. Why call this object a "mind" if it isn't making choices? — Relativist

I am trying to be minimalistic in my definition of the Mind. If I realize that there is a phenomenon that cannot be addressed with the current definition then I change the definition.

Not if reductive physicalism is true. — Relativist

What does reductive physicalism have to do with string theory?

You deny this, but you still need to account for the contingency: what makes those other possibilities possible? — Relativist

I am saying that each vibrational mode is related to a possible particle and force. Why we have such physical laws rather than another one is beyond the scope of string theory.

Within string theory, a string has infinite modes of vibration available. Each mode is related to specific particles and forces, in other words, to specific laws of nature. — MoK

This treats strings as fundamental, consistent with reductive physicalism.

In string theory, any specific vibration of the string is related to a specific particle and force, hence specific laws of physics. — MoK

But all these "laws of physics" are a consequence of the fundamental laws of strings.

The act of causation is such that the new particle is created at time t1 in the vicinity of the former particle that exists at time t0 so continuity is preserved. — MoK

There is no particle-particle continuity. Each particle is brand new, with no history and no future.

The duplication is such that the intrinsic properties of a particle are held. — MoK

Duplication is not the same thing as preservation.
— Relativist
The duplication is such that the intrinsic properties of a particle are held. — MoK

Makes no sense. The particle at t0 has properties; this particle (with its properties) is annihilated a t1. A new particle exists at t1 that has the same properties, but it's not the same particle.

Every electron in the universe has the same intrinsic properties. So when a specific electron at t0 is replaced by a "duplicate" at t1, what maked this particular electron the same identity? See my second picture and description, below.

I discussed this in depth. You can find my explanation here and here. The brain is not identical in the different instant of time since the relational properties of its parts are changing all the time. — MoK

Neither of those posts define what constitutes an identity over time. For example, you said:, "I think that we are not the same person to some extent as yesterday since a part of us is subject to change."

This does not define what IS the same- what aspects of yesterday's person make it the same person today? You referred to genetics, but your genes mutate over time. You are not geneticall identical to infant MoK.

All you claims are just vague allusions. The most common bases are: 1) essentialism - which associates an identity with an essence (a subset of properties that are necessary and sufficient for constituting an individual identity); 2) perdurance: an identity consisting of a connected series of temporal parts.

Because you embrace identity of the indiscernibles, you don't have the essentialist option. So you need some form of perdurantism, but you need to define what connects the temporal parts. The problem is that you have no direct causal connection between temporal parts. Here's a depiction of what you seem to be claiming with your "vertical causation":

The mind is creating electron/brain/body at each instant of time, with no direct connection between the "temporal parts". There's an indirect connection through mind, but the mind is simultaneously recreating every electron/brain/body. Let's focus on electrons: there's a universe full of electrons coming into existence at each instant of time. Here's a depiction of 3 electrons (electX,electY, electZ):


ElectX@t0->mind->ElectX@t1 is indistinquishable from
ElectX@t0->mind->ElectY@t1

What does reductive physicalism have to do with string theory? — MoK

As I discussed above, string theory is consistent with reductive physicalism

This treats strings as fundamental, consistent with reductive physicalism. — Relativist

Correct. But strings are not the only fundamental entity. The string is a one-dimensional Brane. In principle, you can have a d-dimensional Brane which moves in D-dimensional spacetime, where D>d.

But all these "laws of physics" are a consequence of the fundamental laws of strings. — Relativist

Correct.

There is no particle-particle continuity. Each particle is brand new, with no history and no future. — Relativist

There is. I already illustrated it. A stationary electron is a vibrating string, let's call this vibration V1. The string related to a moving electron has another vibration mode due to the motion of the electron, let's call this mode of vibration V2. The Mind experiences both vibrations of the string, V1 and V2, at time t0 and as a result, causes another string at time t1 at a position that is dictated by V2 while keeping V1 the same. The history of the string is held in the subjective time. Its future depends on V2 and the position of the string in the future. So the process of motion of the string is continuous.

Makes no sense. The particle at t0 has properties; this particle (with its properties) is annihilated a t1. A new particle exists at t1 that has the same properties, but it's not the same particle. — Relativist

It makes sense if you accept that the Mind experiences the string with V1 and causes another string later with the same mode of vibration namely V1. And the string is not annihilated in my theory but just created in the immediate future. So the history of the string is preserved in the subjective time.

Every electron in the universe has the same intrinsic properties. So when a specific electron at t0 is replaced by a "duplicate" at t1, what maked this particular electron the same identity? See my second picture and description, below. — Relativist

It is V1.

All you claims are just vague allusions. The most common bases are: 1) essentialism - which associates an identity with an essence (a subset of properties that are necessary and sufficient for constituting an individual identity) — Relativist

It could be essentialism. For example, look at this.

2) perdurance: an identity consisting of a connected series of temporal parts.

Because you embrace identity of the indiscernibles, you don't have the essentialist option. So you need some form of perdurantism, but you need to define what connects the temporal parts. The problem is that you have no direct causal connection between temporal parts. Here's a depiction of what you seem to be claiming with your "vertical causation": — Relativist

I already mentioned that a part of our brain is hardwired which means it does not change over time. The other part is subject to change always. It is due to this part of the brain that we can memorize new things over time, basically most of our past experiences. The memories however are held in synapses. You might find this article interesting, especially the section about memory.

The mind is creating electron/brain/body at each instant of time, with no direct connection between the "temporal parts". There's an indirect connection through mind, but the mind is simultaneously recreating every electron/brain/body. Let's focus on electrons: there's a universe full of electrons coming into existence at each instant of time. Here's a depiction of 3 electrons (electX,electY, electZ): — Relativist

The Mind as I discussed above keeps continuity in motion of each electron, quark, etc. Therefore, It keeps continuity in the motion of any object.

ElectX@t0->mind->ElectX@t1 is indistinquishable from
ElectX@t0->mind->ElectY@t1 — Relativist

Electrons are distinguishable to the Mind since each electron has a specific location in space.

But all these "laws of physics" are a consequence of the fundamental laws of strings. — Relativist

Correct. — MoK

Great! You at last agree that reductive physicalism is possible.

A stationary electron is a vibrating string, let's call this vibration V1. The string related to a moving electron has another vibration mode due to the motion of the electron, let's call this mode of vibration V2. The Mind experiences both vibrations of the string, V1 and V2, at time t0 and as a result, causes another string at time t1 at a position that is dictated by V2 while keeping V1 the same. The history of the string is held in the subjective time. Its future depends on V2 and the position of the string in the future. So the process of motion of the string is continuous. — MoK

Rewrite this while Incorporating the mind's "vertical causality.

Electrons are distinguishable to the Mind since each electron has a specific location in space. — MoK

OK, that gives a continuity for electrons consistent with a form of perdurantism. But that's a particle, a simple object. Now consider a complex organism, like MoK. There's not a fixed set of particles that comprise comprise you, so you can't base it on particle continuity. I suggest you accept perdurantism for this, instead of essentialism - it would be more consistent.

Great! You at last agree that reductive physicalism is possible. — Relativist

Sure I agree with this. :wink:

Rewrite this while Incorporating the mind's "vertical causality. — Relativist

I don't understand what you want me to do. I explicitly mentioned that the Mind experiences and causes a string. By this, I certainly mean vertical causation.

OK, that gives a continuity for electrons consistent with a form of perdurantism. But that's a particle, a simple object. Now consider a complex organism, like MoK. There's not a fixed set of particles that comprise comprise you, so you can't base it on particle continuity. I suggest you accept perdurantism for this, instead of essentialism - it would be more consistent. — Relativist

An object that is made of parts also can be explained and its motion is continuous as well. First, think of an object that is at rest for the sake of simplicity. Its parts are in constant motion and these motions are continuous as I discussed earlier. But parts of the object move in such a way that they persist to exist in the location of the object, let's call these motions M1={m1,m2,...}, where m1 is the motion of the first part, m2 is the motion of the second part, etc. Now we can discuss a moving object. The difference between a moving object and a static object is that parts of the static object have motion M1 only whereas the parts of a moving object have another motion M2. So, the motions of parts of a moving object are N=M1+M2 such that N={n1,n2,...} where n1=m1+M2 is the motion of the first part, n2=m2+M2 is the motion of the second part, etc. I have to say that the object in different instants of time is not the same even if it is at rest since its parts are in constant motion. The object just seems to be the same.