It's a statue of X, not X. There's a difference, kind of the same difference between the concept of 14 and 14. — noAxioms

But if X was originally a statue of X, then a statue of X is X. No?
The concept of 14 is 14.

Adjective yes, and for argument sake, noun, yes. Does that thing playing that role need to 'exist' to have that adjective apply to it? Depends on definition of 'exist' (nobody ever specifies it no matter how many times I ask), and it depends on if EPP applies to the kind of existence being used. — noAxioms

Does the noun need to exist for the sake of the adjective function? Since an adjective is defined as a modifier (of a noun), how can it modify if there's nothing for it to modify? Consider a parallel question, "How can red exist if there's no thing that's red?" Even redness, as a noun, is a thing red. Clearly, if redness doesn't exist (the state of being red), then red doesn't exist.

As for the general definition of the infinitive: to exist, I say it's the ability to be measured, and thus the ability to exhibit its presence as a measurable thing. Therefore, all existing things have a measurable presence. Let's consider something believed to exist, but not measurable. The math concept of infinity is an example. An infinite series can be parsed into segments unlimited. Now we see that the abstract concept of infinity can be measured indefinitely, so it's not completely measurable rather than unmeasurable.

The color read exists

Only as a concept/experience, hardly as a 'thing' in itself... — noAxioms

The color red and the taste of sweetness exist as effects of a) a segment of EM wavelengths of the visible light spectrum; b) an organic chemical compound including oxygen, hydrogen and carbon.

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes?

I think he referenced Sherlock Holmes and his attribute of having an address. This of course presumes he is using some definition of 'exists' that precludes Sherlock Holmes but does not preclude say Isaac Newton. — noAxioms

Sherlock Holmes exists as a proper noun with adjectival attributes in the same manner that other proper nouns exist with adjectival attributes as, for example, Isaac Newton. They both exist in language. Neither exists in flesh and blood.

I differ from Meinong in that I affirm EPP and therefore think existence is what attributes emerge from.

Does a unicorn being horny make it exist then? If so, what definition of 'exists'? If not, how is that consistent with EPP?
17 is prime, so 17 exists? Same questions. — noAxioms

My answer here is the same as directly above: unicorns and prime numbers exist within language, and language is a real thing, so they are real linguistically. As we say in common speech, a real person differs from a fictional person in that the former exists in both flesh and blood and language whereas the latter exists only in language.

A machine can perceive stuff without what most would call a 'mind', but I suppose it would not qualify as a sentient thing. — noAxioms

You know about machines that base their behavior upon their own judgment rather than mechanically and non-self-consciously responding to human-created programming?

If it's impossible to measure something not present

Dark matter is not perceived, but we measure it nonetheless by its effects on other more directly perceived things. — noAxioms

In your example with dark matter, presence precedes indirect measurement.

I'm proceeding with the belief existence is the most inclusive context than can be named.

...there's not much utility to a definition that doesn't exclude anything. — noAxioms

This explains our conversation; it's hard to define and rationalize totality.

if two things exist outside of (A≡A) but rather as (A) = (A) then that reduces to (A), and thus they're not in separate universes; they're in one universe. Also, if (A) = (A) can't be reduced to (A), then they're not identical; they're similar as (A) ≈ (A'). — ucarr

Think of a fraction in math. If the numerator and the denominator are the same, then, as you know, the value of the fraction evaluates to one. In the first statement in parentheses, it's merely saying noAxioms is noAxioms, a circularity we don't waste our time on. The second statement, an equation, translates to A/A. Then we can treat A as a variable that let's us add a coefficient, such as 2. So 2A/2A = 1A = A. The third statement is a logical deduction from knowing that if a fraction has a value other than 1, then the numerator and the denominator are not equal.

Do material things relate to each other immaterially? If distance is a relation between material things, say, Location A and Location B, then the relation of distance between the two locations is the journey across the distance separating them. — ucarr

Distance is not a journey. That word implies that a separation isn't meaningful unless something travels (which drags in time and all sorts of irrelevancies). — noAxioms

I think the implication you describe is a true implication. If D(istance) = A, and A > 0, then any length beyond a dimensionless point is meaningful in terms of the definition of distance. We know this because the dimensionless point (0 distance) is the negation of length which, in our context here, equals distance. Our conclusion, then, says both thinking about and experiencing distance becomes meaningful as a journey either of the mind or of the body.

Given your description of an inter-relationship between material things and immaterial container, I expect you to be able to say how material and immaterial interact. — ucarr

The time for a rock to hit the ground depends on a relation with the immaterial gravitational constant. That seems to be an example of material things interacting with something not material.
Greed (not a material thing) drives much of the actions of people (material things).
A shadow (not a material thing) has a length, and often relates to a material object. — noAxioms

Math → emergent from brain; Greed → emergent from brain; Shadow → emergent from massive object. The bi-conditional IFF connects them necessarily to physics.

1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.. — noAxioms

Also, can you explain how an immaterial universe is expanding? — ucarr

Space expands over time... — noAxioms

If your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space?

Does the noun need to exist for the sake of the adjective function? — ucarr

Depends on definitions.

how can it modify if there's nothing for it to modify?

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence.
If we posit EPP, then a contradiction is reached when asserting that Pegasus has wings, as you seem to be doing.

Even redness, as a noun, is a thing red.

OK, you're qualifying a perception as a 'thing', which is probably consistent with an assertion that red exists, at least by most definitions of 'exists'.

I don't think it makes sense to say a thing is in a state of being red, except under idealism where 'things' are just ideals and a red ideal is logically consistent. I don't think a stop sign is red, it just appears that way to some of us.

As for the general definition of the infinitive: to exist, I say it's the ability to be measured, and thus the ability to exhibit its presence as a measurable thing. Therefore, all existing things have a measurable presence. Let's consider something believed to exist, but not measurable. The math concept of infinity is an example. An infinite series can be parsed into segments unlimited. Now we see that the abstract concept of infinity can be measured indefinitely, so it's not completely measurable rather than unmeasurable.

The color read exists

I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence.
If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.

Your example of 'red' makes me suspect the former (E2) since I don't know how a perception can be measured. I cannot for instance in any way measure somebody else's conscious perception, hence a mind-dependent definition typically leading to solipsism.

So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2.

The color red and the taste of sweetness exist as effects of a) a segment of EM wavelengths of the visible light spectrum

Now that's a physical thing: a wavelength. But that description says nothing about how it appears to various observers.

b) an organic chemical compound including oxygen, hydrogen and carbon.

I will protest this one. A hydrocarbon is simply not sweetness. It is a molecule, and sweetness is only a perception when the molecule is contacted in just the right places by something evolved to be sensitive to it.
Ditto for redness, a perception of a specific wavelength range by some observers, but not most of them.

To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different.

Sherlock Holmes exists as a proper noun

No. 'Sherlock Holmes' exists as that. Sherlock Holmes is not that. The former is a proper noun with 14 letters and only the latter lives on Baker St. Had I wanted to refer to the proper noun, just like had I wished to refer to the mental concept, I would have explicitly said so.

Whether or not Sherlock Holmes exists or not depends on definitions, and by your definition above, I would say that yes, he exists since you can measure him the same way you claimed to measure the mathematical concept of infinity. To that, instead of giving examples of things that exist, give some examples of something nonexistent. Pretty tough to do since the mere act of thinking about the example is a measurement, and thus it must exist.

You know about machines that base their behavior upon their own judgment rather than mechanically and non-self-consciously responding to human-created programming?

You make it sound like the machine choices are being made by humans, sort of like a car being driven. Sure, the machine didn't write its own code, but neither did you. Sure, the machine was created in part by human activity, but so were you.
None of that detracts from the fact that it is doing its own measurement of whatever it needs to, and reacting accordingly by its choice, not being remote controlled (like so many humans claim to be). I called the measurement 'perception' since I lack a better word. I hessitated to use the word 'sentient' since the word has heavy human connotations. Nothing else is sentient since nothing non-human has human feelings. If there was a word the robot might use to describe what it feels, you would in turn not have that. But I rarely see robots use human language to communicate with each other. It's just not natural for them.

In your example with dark matter, presence precedes indirect measurement.

Under E2, yes. Oddly enough, under E5 it doesn't. Rovelli discussed that interesting bit. Under a relational view like that, measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement.

If your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space?

Space isn't material either, at least not by any typical definition of 'material'. Space expansion over time means that (given a simplified linear expansion), a meter expands to two meters after twice the time. The universe doesn't exist in time, so it doesn't change. It is all events, all of spacetime and contents of said spacetime.

Of course there are other definitions of 'universe', some of which are contained by time. Some use the word to refer to the visible universe, which expands over time since after a longer time, light from more distant things has had enough time to reach us. The visible universe has a time-dependent size, and thus the visible universe expands, currently at a rate of about 6-7c proper distance along lines of constant cosmological time. But that would be true even without expansion of space.

But if X was originally a statue of X, then a statue of X is X. No? — Corvus

No. The Trojan Horse was arguably a mythological statue. Pegasus was never a mythological statue.

The concept of 14 is 14.

Per a very explicit statement in the OP, if I wanted to refer to the concept of 14, I would have explicitly said something like 'the concept of 14' or 'the perception of X'. Your inability to distinguish the two prevents any productive participation in a discussion about realism.

But if X was originally a statue of X, then a statue of X is X. No?
— Corvus
No. The Trojan Horse was arguably a mythological statue. Pegasus was never a mythological statue. — noAxioms

X is a free variable. It can take any value in it. X could have been a statue of Pegasus for its original value. Your inability to understand even what a variable has been the cause of muddle and confusion

, if I wanted to refer to the concept of 14, I would have explicitly said something like 'the concept of 14' or 'the perception of X' — noAxioms

It is not matter of if you wanted. We have had this discussion many times before, and it had been concluded that number is concept. Your ignorance on the fact has been contributing to beating around the bush in circles instead of seeing any progress in the discussion.

Does the noun need to exist for the sake of the adjective function? — ucarr

Depends on definitions. — noAxioms

How can it modify if there's nothing for it to modify? — ucarr

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

I think there's a logical issue embedded in your language: A = ¬EPP; B = Pegasus; C = Existence;
D = Object; E = Winged (modifier) → Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. This logic sequence says you're having it both ways when you say, "An object modified lacks existence." In so saying, you say that E{B} = 0{B}. If E, a modifier, can modify E[B} so that it evaluates to 0{B}, then you show how E changes the initial state of B to a final state of B = to 0{B}. This statement says that B = Object, when modified by E, becomes 0{B}. The translation for this says, "B = Object, when modified by E becomes { }. This means that E modifies B = Object such that it becomes B equals an expression of the null set, the set of nothing. So modifier E changes Object B into non-existence. Only non-existence can practice infinite negation so that there is never any existence that can get started. Non-existence admits no presence of existence. They cannot intersect. This tells us that E{B} ≠ { } because something existing, such as E, cannot modify non-existence because E itself cannot exist within the presence of non-existence. Only zero can evaluate to zero, a non-modification. This tells us that modification only applies to existing things acting upon other existing things, and thus there are no attributes modifying things that don't exist.

If we posit EPP, then a contradiction is reached when asserting that Pegasus has wings, as you seem to be doing. — noAxioms

What is the chain of reasoning from EPP to "Pegasus has wings," being a contradiction?

I think there's a logical issue embedded in your language: A = ¬EPP; B = Pegasus; C = Existence; D = Object; E = Winged (modifier) → Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. This logic sequence says you're having it both ways when you say, "An object modified lacks existence." — ucarr

Don't follow, but that may be me. You reference only C and D, so let's say B is my mailbox and C is <stuff in my kitchen>. I don't know what " Let C = {D | D ∉ C} " means. It seems to say existence is some object where the object is not in my kitchen which seems to be a self contradictory definition of what existence meant. Existence is anything that doesn't exist. I didn't say that.
Maybe I read it wrong. E would be 'has a flag'. We can go to Pegasus after we work out the mailbox example, and also if we have a far better definition of 'existence'.

In so saying, you say that E{B} = 0{B}.

Don't know what any of that means. Sorry if I'm not up on the notation. I don't know what the zero means. Existence of Pegasus is the zero of Pegasus?

What is the chain of reasoning from EPP to "Pegasus has wings," being a contradiction?

It is assigning predication to something that doesn't exist, where EPP says existence is necessarily prior to predication.
Actually, it says that existence is conceptually prior to predication, which makes it possibly not about realism at all. Pegasus can be conceived to have wings only if one first conceives of Pegasus. It has nothing to do with if Pegasus actually is real or not. Maybe that is all the principle is about, and not about realism.
But in that case, Meinong is spouting nonsense with his examples. Sherlock Holmes has a pipe, which requires Sherlock to be conceived before we conceive of him with the pipe. Need a better example. A jabberwockey lives on Baker street. That's a predicate even if I have no concept of what a Jabberwockey is.

But if X was originally a statue of X, then a statue of X is X. No?
— Corvus
No. The Trojan Horse was arguably a mythological statue. Pegasus was never a mythological statue. — noAxioms
X is a free variable. It can take any value in it. X could have been a statue of Pegasus for its original value. — Corvus

Fine, then X is a statue of Pegasus, but that doesn't make your statement valid since a statue of X would be a statue of a statue, not a statue of Pegasus. And yes, they do make statues of statues. They sell them in gift shops.

We have had this discussion many times before, and it had been concluded that number is concept.

Only by a non-realist, and this discussion is about realism. Per my OP, if I say '14', I am discussing 14 and not the concept of 14. If you can't do that (if only to demonstrate the inconsistency of it), then as I say, you've nothing to contribute to a discussion about a stance that distinguishes the two.

Your ignorance on the fact

14 being no more than a concept is not a fact, it's an idealistic opinion.

I think there's a logical issue embedded in your language: A = ¬EPP; B = Pegasus; C = Existence; D = Object; E = Winged (modifier) → Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. This logic sequence says you're having it both ways when you say, "An object modified lacks existence." — ucarr

I don't know what " Let C = {D | D ∉ C} " means. — noAxioms

Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. C = Existence; D = Object (that gets modified). Existence (C) is expressed as Let C = {D | D ∉ C}. The two brackets enclose the set of Existence. First there's D = Object. This is followed by the vertical line |. This is a partition indicating the set of Existence has two sections. In the first section containing only D we have a representation saying D is a part of existence. On the other side of the partition, in the second section, we have D ∉ C, which means D is not a part of existence. This is a sentence logic (SL) statement representing your sentence verbal statement:

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

By definition, an adjective attaches to a noun in its role as modifier of the noun. If, as you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." then the adjective also doesn't exist since its defined as a modifier of the object and is not defined as anything else.

Since you take the position that, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." you imply that the adjective exists as a modifier and it modifies an object that doesn't exist. Since the adjective, defined as a modifier of an object, exists, then its object exists. If the adjective also modifies an object that doesn't exist, you imply that the object simultaneously does and doesn't exist. The contradiction of something simultaneously existing and not existing is expressed in sentence logic as: Let C (existence) = {D | D ∉ C}.

You think a modifier can modify an object that exists, and you also think a modifier can modify an object that doesn't exist. I think a modifier can only modify an object that exists. If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist. But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state, and thus its state can't be changed, and thus it can't have a modifier that changes its state.

In so saying, you say that E{B} = 0{B}. — ucarr

E{B} says E (Winged) changes B (Horse) into Winged Horse. 0{B} says 0 (non-existence) changes B (Horse) into { }, the null set, which is the empty set, or non-existence. This is the crux of my argument supporting EPP. Non-existence, like zero, negates infinitely all that would seek to be in its presence.

What is the chain of reasoning from EPP to "Pegasus has wings," being a contradiction? — ucarr

It is assigning predication to something that doesn't exist, where EPP says existence is necessarily prior to predication.
Actually, it says that existence is conceptually prior to predication, which makes it possibly not about realism at all. Pegasus can be conceived to have wings only if one first conceives of Pegasus. It has nothing to do with if Pegasus actually is real or not. Maybe that is all the principle is about, and not about realism.
But in that case, Meinong is spouting nonsense with his examples. Sherlock Holmes has a pipe, which requires Sherlock to be conceived before we conceive of him with the pipe. Need a better example. A jabberwockey lives on Baker street. That's a predicate even if I have no concept of what a Jabberwockey is. — noAxioms

All of this, speaking in terms of logical consistency, revolves around definition, grammar and syntax. Object by definition ≠ non-existence. Adjective, by grammar ≠ modify a word for an existing thing if no such word is in the sentence. If an adjective adjacent to a noun, attaches to the noun as its modifier, then their juxtaposition tells us that if and only if adjective modifies noun does noun objectify adjective.

Even redness, as a noun, is a thing red. — ucarr

OK, you're qualifying a perception as a 'thing', which is probably consistent with an assertion that red exists, at least by most definitions of 'exists'. — noAxioms

I don't think it makes sense to say a thing is in a state of being red, except under idealism where 'things' are just ideals and a red ideal is logically consistent. I don't think a stop sign is red, it just appears that way to some of us. — noAxioms

I think it makes sense to say a thing is red such that there's an intersection between the thing and redness such that the two overlap. Within the region of the overlap, it's as if the two are one, as the language indicates.

The color read exists — noAxioms

I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence.
If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.[/quote]

I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement.

Your example of 'red' makes me suspect the former (E2) since I don't know how a perception can be measured. I cannot for instance in any way measure somebody else's conscious perception, hence a mind-dependent definition typically leading to solipsism. — noAxioms

You can measure another person's perceptions by inference. If two people independently look at a red square printed on paper, and then are asked to point to what color they saw while looking at a printed spectrum of colors that includes red, both pointing to red lets each know indirectly what the other perceives.

So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2. — noAxioms

Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees looking at a drawing of Pegasus by the inference to red described above. If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent.

The color red and the taste of sweetness exist as effects of a) a segment of EM wavelengths of the visible light spectrum; b) an organic chemical compound including oxygen, hydrogen and carbon. — ucarr

Now that's a physical thing: a wavelength. But that description says nothing about how it appears to various observers. — noAxioms

Ditto for redness, a perception of a specific wavelength range by some observers, but not most of them. — noAxioms

Again, by the same argument above. How do you suppose societies persist if each individual is locked inside of a private reality not able to be communicated to others?

To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different. — noAxioms

With respect to the question of mind-independence, your example contradicts the point you're intending to have it make. You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives. How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge?

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes? — ucarr

I think he referenced Sherlock Holmes and his attribute of having an address. This of course presumes he is using some definition of 'exists' that precludes Sherlock Holmes but does not preclude say Isaac Newton. — noAxioms

Sherlock Holmes exists as a proper noun with adjectival attributes in the same manner that other proper nouns exist with adjectival attributes as, for example, Isaac Newton. They both exist in language. Neither exists in flesh and blood. — ucarr

No. 'Sherlock Holmes' exists as that. Sherlock Holmes is not that. The former is a proper noun with 14 letters and only the latter lives on Baker St. Had I wanted to refer to the proper noun, just like had I wished to refer to the mental concept, I would have explicitly said so. — noAxioms

I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent that has only other language referents whereas Issac Newton is a language referent that has other language referents and physical referents as well. I don't understand from your words here why you're refuting my distinction.

You know about machines that base their behavior upon their own judgment rather than mechanically and non-self-consciously responding to human-created programming? — ucarr

You make it sound like the machine choices are being made by humans, sort of like a car being driven. Sure, the machine didn't write its own code, but neither did you. Sure, the machine was created in part by human activity, but so were you.

None of that detracts from the fact that it is doing its own measurement of whatever it needs to, and reacting accordingly by its choice, not being remote controlled (like so many humans claim to be). I called the measurement 'perception' since I lack a better word. I hessitated to use the word 'sentient' since the word has heavy human connotations. Nothing else is sentient since nothing non-human has human feelings. If there was a word the robot might use to describe what it feels, you would in turn not have that. But I rarely see robots use human language to communicate with each other. It's just not natural for them. — noAxioms

I didn't create my own dna, but I know it created me. Are you ascribing the same self-knowledge to AI?
Are you saying that when AI performs rational functions, it knows its doing so? Since you think AI has feelings, apparently you do think AI is self-aware. Is that correct? Don't confuse the impressive accomplishments of AI's iterative machine learning with self-awareness.

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it? If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball? Presumably, the soccer ball existed even before I had a notion to seek after it.

f your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space? — ucarr

Space isn't material either, at least not by any typical definition of 'material'. — noAxioms

If space isn't material, then how is it I can walk into a room? When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space. Isn't that how we talk about space? On the other hand, non-existence, infinite negation, can't even do the infinite negation I describe it doing. Non-existence, then, is the limit of negation. The accommodation of the presence of existing things by space is one of the most fundamental actions within physics.

The universe doesn't exist in time, so it doesn't change. It is all events, all of spacetime and contents of said spacetime. — noAxioms

How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static? I wonder if you hold with background independence?

Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. C = Existence; D = Object (that gets modified). Existence (C) is expressed as Let C = {D | D ∉ C}. The two brackets enclose the set of Existence. First there's D = Object. This is followed by the vertical line |. This is a partition indicating the set of Existence has two sections. In the first section containing only D we have a representation saying D is a part of existence. On the other side of the partition, in the second section, we have D ∉ C, which means D is not a part of existence. — ucarr

That actually seems to say that existence is things that don't exist. Your verbal description says it means that existence is things that either exist or don't exist. Neither makes sense to me.

Is this meant to be your definition of 'exists'? Because from that I have no idea what does and doesn't exist. It seems to presume that we already know, yet no definition is given.
Most of my definitions E1,2,3,4,6 seem to define existence as membership in some domain, with the domain being different with each of them.

By definition, an adjective attaches to a noun in its role as modifier of the noun. If, as you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." then the adjective also doesn't exist since its defined as a modifier of the object and is not defined as anything else.

Going by that, a winged horse exists because there's a noun to attach 'winged' to. Existence by language usage, which I suppose falls under E2.

Since you take the position that, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." you imply that the adjective exists as a modifier

If by 'exists' here, you mean 'is a predicate of' relation, sure. If not, then you need to define how you're using 'exists' here before I can agree to taking such a position. Remember, no EPP if we're predicating nonexistent things.

you also think a modifier can modify an object that doesn't exist.

I do? Depends on definitions.
I am taking an open mind and not telling anybody how things are. Such is the nature of exploration.

I think a modifier can only modify an object that exists.

Actually, your logic in your earlier post was perhaps predicating nonexistent things when talking about winged horses. But yes, you did say that you hold to EPP.

If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist.

I don't think a modifier changes any state. It already is the state. Maybe I don't understand you here. Give an example of a state that changes due to it having a predicate.

But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states. So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't).

Adjective, by grammar ≠ modify a word for an existing thing if no such word is in the sentence.. — ucarr

Two things wrong with this. I can talk about the homeless. The noun is not in the sentence. It's implied, but your wording doesn't allow that.
Secondly, 'existing thing' is simply not a grammatical requirement, allowing reference to a winged horse.
Be careful about using language rules as a substitute for logic.

I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement.

You can measure another person's perceptions by inference. If two people independently look at a red square printed on paper, and then are asked to point to what color they saw while looking at a printed spectrum of colors that includes red, both pointing to red lets each know indirectly what the other perceives. — ucarr

OK, so we're talking E2 despite the topic not being about mind dependent reality.

Yes, there is a tiny bit of overlap between perception and quantum entanglement, but they're a world apart in my opinion.

Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees

But I don't care what somebody else's mind sees. I care about what exists. Of course, if by 'exists' you mean that you have in some way perceived it, then it exists in that way by definition.

If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent.

But nobody was questioning the existence of the drawing or of a statue (OK, I am questioning it). We're questioning the existence of Pegasus, and by E2, yes. Pegasus (and not just the drawing) exists, but that's a mind-dependent existence.

Yes, the fact that two people see and agree on a common referent (the drawing in your example) is solid evidence that it is mind independent. It is more than just a concept. Any view that isn't idealism is based on that, but it isn't in any way proof. I have better proof of mind independence.
So OK, the drawing is perhaps more than an ideal. The ideal corresponds to something mind independent. Next question: Does it exist? Depends on definition. OK, specifically, does it exist under definitions E1,3,4,5,6? Most of those are similar but with different domains. Under which domains does the drawing exist? Under which domains is EPP valid? E4 still seems anthropocentric, a form of mind dependency. Thus E4 makes for a poor definition for mind independent existence.

You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives.

My example showed the color of the stop sign to be a predicate of perception, not a predicate of the sign. I also did not mention a third part. The example was how you would see it.
What is evidence for the sign's mind independence is that we both see it, as we did with your example of a drawing above.

How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge?

By concluding its mind independence independently of concluding its existence, which remains an defined assertion anyway.

I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent

No it isn't. You need to understand this. Had I wanted to reference the language referent, I would have said 'Sherlock Holmes' and not Sherlock Holmes. With the latter usage, I am not in any way talking about the language referent.
I was asked of what Meinong probably denies the existence, and he doesn't deny the existence of the language referent 'Sherlock Holmes'. It appears in countless places, including this post.

I didn't create my own dna, but I know it created me. Are you ascribing the same self-knowledge to AI?

Kind of off topic, no? I have neither claimed this nor denied this.



Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it?[/quote]The measurement defined the wave function, not the other way around. So it seems that the effect (the measurement) causes the existence of the cause, at least under the E5 definition.

If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball?

Your seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical wave function collapse. Try an example that isn't so classical

Presumably, the soccer ball existed even before I had a notion to seek after it.

Yes, it did (E5), because it was measured even before you had a notion to seek after it. Your current state was a function of the ball, as it is a function of a great deal of anything inside your past light cone.

f your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space? — ucarr

If space isn't material, then how is it I can walk into a room?

Most people use 'material' to mean matter. If space was matter, you could not walk into a room since it was already full. So rather than argue about this, let's clearly define 'material' before we decide if space qualifies as it or not.
Yes, current theory gives space properties. It's just that velocity isn't one of those properties despite so many trying to give it that property.

When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space.

I would say that there is the same space in a full room. I don't consider the space to be only the empty portion. So no, i would not say the space in the room does anything by my presence since there's no more or less of it than before I entered. The room has the same dimensions and thus occupies the same space, full or empty. It is that coordinate space that is expanding, not 'volume of emptiness'.

How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static?

It has a temporal dimension. What you call 'change' is a difference in cross sections at different times, just like an MRI image has different pictures of cross sections of a body at different values of some spatial axis.

I wonder if you hold with background independence?

I suppose I hold to it. I only know the relevance to general relativity.

Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. C = Existence; D = Object (that gets modified). Existence (C) is expressed as Let C = {D | D ∉ C}. The two brackets enclose the set of Existence. First there's D = Object. This is followed by the vertical line |. This is a partition indicating the set of Existence has two sections. In the first section containing only D we have a representation saying D is a part of existence. On the other side of the partition, in the second section, we have D ∉ C, which means D is not a part of existence. — ucarr

That actually seems to say that existence is things that don't exist. Your verbal description says it means that existence is things that either exist or don't exist. Neither makes sense to me. — noAxioms

Things that either exist or don't exist simultaneously. This is a description of paradox. The idea is simple, "Talking about attributes implies the existence of a thing that possesses the attributes describing its nature." If this is reality, then saying,

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

is an example of winged _______________. You say, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." That means there's something to modify, something that exists. Next you say, The object simply lacks the property of existence." Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox.

Most of my definitions E1,2,3,4,6 seem to define existence as membership in some domain, with the domain being different with each of them. — noAxioms

I think existence is fundamental to the entirety of all types of reality (subjective/objective). For this reason, I've been focusing on the definition closest to what I believe: E1.

By definition, an adjective attaches to a noun in its role as modifier of the noun. If, as you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." then the adjective also doesn't exist since its defined as a modifier of the object and is not defined as anything else. — noAxioms

Going by that, a winged horse exists because there's a noun to attach 'winged' to. Existence by language usage, which I suppose falls under E2. — noAxioms

Within the scope of predication, I don't object to what you say here. I think the scope of existence is greater than language since I think earth, for example, existed before there was a language naming it.

Since you take the position that, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." you imply that the adjective exists as a modifier

If by 'exists' here, you mean 'is a predicate of' relation, sure. — noAxioms

I acknowledge this truth within the scope of language. I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. Non-existence precludes relations. Humans can talk meaningfully about relations between existing things and non-existence, as Meinong does.

This type of talk, however, depends upon the indirection of complexity. I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence, and the different parts have relations connecting them. Because the sentence has the indirection of complexity, humans cannot observe the imaginary object directly. They can observe the local part, the language part, directly. They cannot observe the non-local part, the imaginary part, directly. In this example there is the real-imaginary thing, the language establishing the predication of a circular triangle. This we can observe directly as language. The non-local part, the imaginary-imaginary thing, the actual circular triangle that is the referent for the language signing for it, we cannot observe directly.

you also think a modifier can modify an object that doesn't exist.

I do? Depends on definitions.
I am taking an open mind and not telling anybody how things are. Such is the nature of exploration. — noAxioms

I think here you have a good policy.

If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist. — ucarr

I don't think a modifier changes any state. It already is the state. Maybe I don't understand you here. Give an example of a state that changes due to it having a predicate. — noAxioms

Here you say something interesting because, by my reading of you, you involve modification with state change. Let's imagine that a soccer ball inhabiting objective reality without being observed has a proto-color undefined. The soccer ball is in motion. At some point, it enters a field of visible red light. In this zone, observers see that the soccer ball is red. It moves on to a field of visible green light and observers see that now the soccer ball is green. In both instances of the soccer ball being observed first red and then green, we perceive that modification plays the role of a function that creates a bi-furcation of before/after for the soccer ball. In our example it's clear the two visible light fields are existing things that embody their colors as real things, but WRT the soccer ball, they can't act as modifiers until a pre-existing thing enters the field of their presence and undergoes the modification of their functions.

Things that either exist or don't exist simultaneously. This is a description of paradox. — ucarr

Two things here.
1) I was trying to unpack your symbolic notation, which is indeed paradoxical, but it doesn't reflect anything I said.
2) You mention 'simultaneiously', which seriously narrows down the sort of existence you're talking about. Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction. So we're once again talking about E2 existence, and we all agreed that Pegasus has exists as a human concept.

The idea is simple, "Talking about attributes implies the existence of a thing that possesses the attributes describing its nature." — ucarr

Wrong, because I explicitly stated that EPP was not one of my premises, and the implication you mention directly requires EPP, else it is a non-sequitur.
Your job is to demonstrate that "Pegausus has wings" leads to a contradiction, but without begging EPP. Yes, I realize that it is a contradiction if that principle is presumed, but I don't presume principles unless there's a logical reason to do so. Believing an unjustified principle is essentially rationalizing your beliefs, as opposed to holding rational beliefs. People are very good at the former and just terrible at the latter, perhaps for the best. We're evolved to do that, so to do otherwise is against our nature.

Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox.

I never said it exists. Read the quote.

I think existence is fundamental to the entirety of all types of reality (subjective/objective). For this reason, I've been focusing on the definition closest to what I believe: E1. — ucarr

OK, E1. Yet all your descriptions are of E2. Pegasus doesn't exist because you do not see it. A T-Rex doesn't exist because you see it, but it isn't simultaneous with you. That's not objective existence. That's existence relative to you, or E2.
Just saying that your posts in no way reflect using 'exists' in an E1 way, so it was a surprise to see that statement. E1,5 & maybe 6 are mind independent, but your posts imply that they exist due to your perception of them.
There is no empirical test for E1 existence since it isn't defined in an empirical manner, so it is really hard to justify the existence of something if E1 is what you mean by 'existence'. It needs a rational justification, not an empirical one.

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence.

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets.


As for my counter to EPP, I point out that 8 is an even number, which is a predicate of 8. The concept of 8 is not even, but the concept of 8 bears the concept of something even. Either way it is not a predicate of the concept. How is EPP consistent with that?

I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence

No, presumably only the concepts have existence, especially per Meinong.

Let's imagine that a soccer ball inhabiting objective reality without being observed has a proto-color undefined. — ucarr

You know I don't consider color to be a predicate of a soccer ball, but I will allow it to have physical properties that would result in perception by some as what you call these proto-colors, yet unspecified.

The soccer ball is in motion. At some point, it enters a field of visible red light. In this zone, observers see that the soccer ball is red.

More like black and white. All colors look pretty much like grayscale under monochrome light. If the ball had two different materials (as most do), the one would be lighter than the other. Anyway, were it observed by a simple human-made digital camera, yes, you'd get a picture with only reds in it. I'm just being picky here, not disagreeing with anything. More picky: Is there such a thing as invisible red light?

Your soccer ball seems to reflect at least these two wavelengths of light, else your story would not work.

In our example it's clear the two visible light fields are existing things

Not clear under E1. Yes, clear under E2 and E4, the two anthropocentric definitions.

But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state — ucarr

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states. So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

You make analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field and then argue for such axiomatically determined existence therein. If “existence” and “predicate” are only words, then, of course, you can axiomatically determine their existence.

If an adjective adjacent to a noun, attaches to the noun as its modifier, then their juxtaposition tells us that if and only if adjective modifies noun does noun objectify adjective. — ucarr

Adjective, by grammar ≠ modify a word for an existing thing if no such word is in the sentence.. — ucarr

Two things wrong with this. I can talk about the homeless. The noun is not in the sentence. It's implied, but your wording doesn't allow that.

Regarding your example sentence, in your prepositional phrase, "about the homeless." the modifying adjective "the" attaches to the noun "homeless." If you remove "homeless" from the sentence, the sentence disappears and becomes an incomplete thought with the article dangling.

Secondly, 'existing thing' is simply not a grammatical requirement, allowing reference to a winged horse. Be careful about using language rules as a substitute for logic. — noAxioms

When an adjective attaches to a noun as its modifier, the state of the noun changes in your perception because the adjective gives you additional information about that state of existence.

The color read exists — noAxioms

I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence. If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.[/quote]

I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement. — ucarr

OK, so we're talking E2 despite the topic not being about mind dependent reality. — noAxioms

I don't think my example is limited to mind-dependent reality. The inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence.

So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2. — noAxioms

Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees looking at a drawing of Pegasus by the inference to red described above. If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent. — ucarr

But I don't care what somebody else's mind sees. I care about what exists. Of course, if by 'exists' you mean that you have in some way perceived it, then it exists in that way by definition. — noAxioms

Knowing what someone else's mind sees by evidence supporting inference to my mind seeing the same thing is how we know what exists beyond mind-dependent perception. If I see a car run a red light and enter an intersection, and then one car in the oncoming traffic swerves one way to avoid the intruding car, and another car in the oncoming traffic swerves another way, then I know both swerving drivers saw the same intruding car. I know my perception of the intruding car is not confined to my mind.

If there's no way to transcend one's own mind, and yet all members of society are confined to their own minds likewise, and therefore I can infer what's confined to the mind of another is the same as what's confined to my mind by what my mind sees as the behavior of others, then that's a functional simulation of objective reality, and the conjectured real, unreachable objective reality is trivial. Given this, the epistemological reach for the conjectured real, objective reality is just academic fuss.

Pegasus (and not just the drawing) exists, but that's a mind-dependent existence. — noAxioms

Since you expect me to understand what the word "Pegasus" signs for, you must believe my mind-dependent perception of Pegasus is the same as yours. Our two perceptions together make Pegasus a social reality.

Yes, the fact that two people see and agree on a common referent (the drawing in your example) is solid evidence that it is mind independent. It is more than just a concept. Any view that isn't idealism is based on that, but it isn't in any way proof. — noAxioms

I now suspect your apparent quest for epistemic certainty is the idealism lurking within this conversation.

Again, by the same argument above. How do you suppose societies persist if each individual is locked inside of a private reality not able to be communicated to others? — ucarr

To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different. — noAxioms

With respect to the question of mind-independence, your example contradicts the point you're intending to have it make. You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives. How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge? — ucarr

My example showed the color of the stop sign to be a predicate of perception, not a predicate of the sign. — noAxioms

You separate predicate of perception from predicate of the sign. Since you're claiming our confinement to our mind's perceptions, aren't you unable to know the predicate of the sign? Isn't it generally understood what's perceived in our minds is a functional substitute for whatever is out there causing it?

How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge? — ucarr

By concluding its mind independence independently of concluding its existence, which remains an defined assertion anyway. — noAxioms

So, the ontic status of mind independence independent of existence is what you're examining?

I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent that has only other language referents whereas Issac Newton is a language referent that has other language referents and physical referents as well. I don't understand from your words here why you're refuting my distinction. — ucarr

No it isn't. You need to understand this. Had I wanted to reference the language referent, I would have said 'Sherlock Holmes' and not Sherlock Holmes. With the latter usage, I am not in any way talking about the language referent.
I was asked of what Meinong probably denies the existence, and he doesn't deny the existence of the language referent 'Sherlock Holmes'. It appears in countless places, including this post. — noAxioms

You think Sherlock Holmes non-existent but receptive to predication?

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it? — noAxioms

The measurement defined the wave function, not the other way around. So it seems that the effect (the measurement) causes the existence of the cause, at least under the E5 definition. — noAxioms

E5 "state X exists to state Y iff X is part of the causal history of Y"

Since IFF denotes a bi-conditional relationship between the wave function and its measurement, then the two are different expressions of the same thing. Notice the possessive pronoun attaching measurement to wave function. There is no precedence in the case of equality.

If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball? — ucarr

Your seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical wave function collapse. Try an example that isn't so classical — noAxioms

That my seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical change, is my point. The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me.

Yes, current theory gives space properties. It's just that velocity isn't one of those properties despite so many trying to give it that property. — noAxioms

Loop quantum gravity posits space as a construction from elementary units (of space) assembled. By this definition, space is a divisible thing. Space as a four-manifold of Relativity warps around celestial bodies including the earth. Things fall to earth due to its curved space.

When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space. — ucarr

I would say that there is the same space in a full room. I don't consider the space to be only the empty portion. So no, i would not say the space in the room does anything by my presence since there's no more or less of it than before I entered. The room has the same dimensions and thus occupies the same space, full or empty. It is that coordinate space that is expanding, not 'volume of emptiness'. — noAxioms

So-called emptiness ≠ emptiness.

When you throw a football, or anything else with a horizontal trajectory velocity, its trajectory traces a parabola. This is a predication about how space physically accommodates material objects.

How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static? — ucarr

It has a temporal dimension. — noAxioms

Spacetime means space and time are connected. Gravity and acceleration cause elapsing time to slow down relativistically. The universe has an age. It is changing its age and its degree of expansion.

You make analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field — ucarr

I made no mention of any existence within a language field. Your comment used words that implied usage of 'existing' within the domain of time, as opposed to your usual domain of perception, and I was noting that. I need to do this since you've been very inconsistent and unclear with your usage of the word. There are no axioms being leveraged.

When an adjective attaches to a noun as its modifier, the state of the noun changes in your perception because the adjective gives you additional information about that state of existence.

Yes, language alters E2 existence, but not the other kinds, and this topic is about the other kinds.

I don't think my example is limited to mind-dependent reality. The inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence.

You say that your example is not limited to mind-dependent reality, yet your example is one of perception. Pick an example that is not based on mind or perception.

A moon meteor strike event exists relative to an Earth state a couple seconds later because Earth measures the moon. Now consider a supernova explosion in a galaxy 3 GLY distant. That supernova event exists relative to today's Earth event because Earth measured it 100 years ago say. (Notice that at all times I am referencing events, not objects)
Our moon does not exist (at all) relative to that supernova event since that distant event has not measured any event of our moon. So same moon existing relative to one thing but not relative to the other. That's how a relational definition of existence works. It works backwards, with ontology being caused not by past events but by future ones as the future measurements get entangled with that which gets measured. There is no mind dependence whatsoever in that, but it requires causal relations between what would otherwise not be meaningful events.

I know my perception of the intruding car is not confined to my mind. — ucarr

Yes, that is the primary evidence for E4 sort of existence. Unlike E2, the car would still be there if you were not, but it's existence is still epistemologically based. You posit the mind-independent existence of the car from your mind dependent perception of it. Our tiny corner of the universe exists, but probably not other universes because we don't see those. There's incredible resistance to theories that only explain things by requiring the 'existence' of far more than what was presumed before. It started when Earth was all that existed, coupled with the domes of light show that circled overhead. The discovery of other galaxies was met with significant resistance, and you can see those. Imagine the pushback when the boundary got pushed back to nonexistence. So yes, your car example is evidence for E4, but E4 is still very anthropocentric.

Since you expect me to understand what the word "Pegasus" signs for, you must believe my mind-dependent perception of Pegasus is the same as yours.

Not sure. You seem to perceive a drawing instead of a flying horse. I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse, and not the existence or predicates of either a drawing (which has E4 existence) or the concept of Pegasus (E2 existence). Neither of the latter has wings, but the former does. EPP says that last statement is meaningless.

You separate predicate of perception from predicate of the sign. Since you're claiming our confinement to our mind's perceptions, aren't you unable to know the predicate of the sign? — ucarr

I am absolutely separating the two, and no, it does not mean that I cannot infer the predicates of the sign, such as its mass or location. I was just noting that being red wasn't one of those predicates. That is a deception of language. We say that 'the sign is red', and we hear that so many times that you believe it, instead of realizing that it would be far more correct to say 'the sign appears red'. Knowing the difference is a good step towards knowing the mind independent thing itself, but it's got a long way to go from there.

So, the ontic status of mind independence independent of existence is what you're examining?

'Ontic' means existence, so it seems contradictory to refer to ontic status independent of existence. But while 'ontic' refers to what is, it isn't confined to just one definition of what is, E1-E6+.

You think Sherlock Holmes non-existent but receptive to predication? — ucarr

I am trying to avoid personal opinions. If EPP is not embraced, then yes, Sherlock Holmes being non-existent but receptive to predication seems not to be contradictory. I have invited you to demonstrate otherwise, but without begging EPP. Much probably depends on which definition of existence is chosen. I've already admitted that denial of EPP is inconsistent with E2,E3 existence since it seems impossible to conceive of something not conceived.
How about existence relative to a domain? Baker St does not exist in Moscow, yet it has predicates. There's an example of a perfectly consistent predication sans existence. This covers E4 and E6 and probably E5.
So E1 is the problem. Sherlock Holmes presumably doesn't objectively exist and yet he wears a trench coat. I cannot say he just exists in some other domain, since that would violate E1. So trick is to drive that premise to contradiction without leveraging EPP.

E5 "state X exists to state Y iff X is part of the causal history of Y"

Since IFF denotes a bi-conditional relationship between the wave function and its measurement, then the two are different expressions of the same thing. Notice the possessive pronoun attaching measurement to wave function. There is no precedence in the case of equality. — ucarr

For the most part, I am willing to accept this. The measurement event and the wave function of its entire causal past (a subset of its past light cone given a presumption of locality) can be thought of as expressions of the same thing, neither being prior to the other. But all past events (the causes) are temporally prior. I was caused in part by my parents long ago, thus my parents then exist in relation to me now and not v-v.

The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me.

Under E5 it's existence relative to you is by definition caused by you. Without you, there'd be no ball relative to you.
Its existence relative to you just has nothing to do with the event of your learning about it. It has been part of your causal past long before that.

Spacetime means space and time are connected. — ucarr

Yes. Spacetime is part of the universe, not something in which the universe is contained.

Gravity and acceleration cause elapsing time to slow down relativistically.

Both wrong. Time isn't something that elapses under the spacetime model. It is a dimension. Due to deformation of otherwise flat spacetime, timelike worldlines between two events are shorter along paths near mass. Coordinate time dilation (an abstract coordinate effect, not a physical one like gravitational effects) is not a function of acceleration.

The universe has an age.

This statement presumes the universe is is something contained by time. If so, you discard the spacetime model, but adopt an nonstandard model where it is meaningful to say the universe-object-with-age exists (E4, existing in some larger container universe)