Present your argument proving our universe and its conservation laws have nothing to do with objective reality. — ucarr

That burden is yours, to prove that the conservation laws of just this one particular universe have any objective relevance at all. It's your assertion, not mine. All I see it an attempt to slap an E1 label on an E4 definition, with some E2 thrown in since perception always seems to creep in there as well. — noAxioms

I've already presented a math theorem justifying the conservation laws of just this one particular universe.

You say E1 needs a rational justification, not an empirical one. I can point to a rational justification of E1 in the form of Noether's Theorem. It makes the prediction that WRT mass, “If a system has a continuous symmetry property, then there are corresponding quantities of mass whose values are conserved in time. – Wikipedia”
— ucarr

Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noether’s Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem. — ucarr

Can you counter-narrate the following:

Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes, no statistically significant evidence has been found. Critics argue that the multiverse concept lacks testability and falsifiability, which are essential for scientific inquiry, and that it raises unresolved metaphysical issues.
-- Wikipedia

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. — ucarr

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms

Although we're debating whether you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence, you seem to be arguing numbers exist. — ucarr

Read the bold part. I said the opposite. You asked for an example of a relation between an existent thing and a nonexistent thing. That was one example.

Unicorns (and dragons) valuing human female virgins is another example.
If you feel that numbers exist (or you think that I assert that), then we can relative Pegasus to its count of wings, making that an example of such a relation. — noAxioms

Since I read you as thinking numbers exist and you say your words express the opposite thought, I now know you think numbers don't exist.

Consider: You're teaching numbers to your child. In your backyard you've laid two stones set apart. You walk your child to the first stone and place his hand upon it. You say aloud, "one." You coax your child to say aloud, "one." You repeat this action at the next stone. You then put the two stones close together and place your child's hand on each stone, one after the other. At each stone the little person says aloud, "one." You then say aloud, "two." While speaking, you put your hand onto one stone and then onto the other. Finally you coax the child to say aloud, "two." The child picks up a stone in each hand and runs around the yard excited, yelling, "two!"

Does the child, completely ignorant about numbers, see the difference between one stone and two stones?

Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. — ucarr

OK, how is the count of Pegasuses (Pegasi?) determined? Maybe there are 5. Subjectively Pegasus counts himself as 1, as does anybody that sees him. Not zero. It seems that you already must presume the nonexistence of Pegasus to conclude a count of zero of them, rather than determining in some way a count of zero and from that concluding nonexistence. — noAxioms

In your assessment of what I wrote, by having Pegasus count himself, you err. If he counts himself, he exists. I made the math statement Peagasus exists zero times, meaning he doesn't exist.

This is pretty easy if existence means 'in some domain'. Pegasus does not exist in Moscow, so Pegasus can count himself or his wings all he wants, but that doesn't put him in the specified domain. Predication works fine despite the nonexistence. — noAxioms

You assume Pegasus exists when you have him perform the action of counting himself. Your assumption doesn't specify which domain he occupies, and thus his absence from Moscow has no bearing upon the fact of his existence. Can you demonstrate predication sans existence without paradoxically assuming the existence of the non-existent thing?

Reversing our direction and beginning by saying two wings are a predication about a non-existent Pegasus, we cannot prove this connection between Pegasus and two wings — ucarr

Proof is not the point. We presume Pegasus has two wings. Proving a premise negates the point of it being a premise. — noAxioms

Proof is the point. You're trying to refute EPP by demonstrating predication sans existence. There's no logical refutation of EPP via demonstration of predication sans existence if it's assumed (or presumed).

We never leave mind-dependent perception. No brain, no mind, no perception. — ucarr

I don't dispute that perception is mind dependent, but the topic is about predication of mind-independent things, not perception or mind dependent concepts of predication. — noAxioms

You're examining the grammar governing the ontics of material things. There are no discussions that aren't about mind-dependent perception somewhere down the line. Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications?

I don't dispute that perception is mind dependent, — noAxioms

This is about mind-independence. Perception plays zero role in that by definition. — noAxioms

Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception, I don't see how we can apply our minds to both modes.

modify | ˈmädəˌfī

|verb (modifies, modifying, modified) [with object]
make partial or minor changes to (something), typically so as to improve it or to make it less extreme: she may be prepared to modify her views | the theory has been modified to fit subsequent experimental evidence | (as adjective modified) : a modified version of the aircraft. — ucarr

We see in the definition that "modify" is an action that changes of the state of being of the object of its action. — ucarr

Different definition. I reject this usage as how predication applies to the predicate. Predication does not imply an action of change of state over time, as does the definition quoted. Surely your dictionary had more appropriate definitions than that one. — noAxioms

predicate

noun | ˈpredəkət | Grammar
the part of a sentence or clause containing a verb and stating something about the subject (e.g., went home in John went home): [as modifier] : predicate adjective.
• Logic something that is affirmed or denied concerning an argument of a proposition.

verb | ˈpredəˌkāt | [with object]
1 Grammar & Logic state, affirm, or assert (something) about the subject of a sentence or an argument of a proposition: a word that predicates something about its subject | aggression is predicated of those who act aggressively.
2 (predicate something on/upon) found or base something on: the theory of structure on which later chemistry was predicated.

I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject.

Since you're not exploring nonexistence of concepts, I pointed out your example deals with an abstraction and thus it's irrelevant to non-existence of material things. — ucarr

None of my examples are about abstractions. If I meant the abstraction of X, I would have said something like 'the concept of X'. I didn't use those words, so I'm not talking about the existence of concepts, but rather the mind-independent X. The OP is very clear about this distinction. — noAxioms

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states.
So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

I read your two above quotes as evidence of you talking about abstractions towards examining whether EPP can be eliminated without causing a problem. I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract composite of all the possible states of an abstraction.

By your own understanding of mind independent reality, you cannot know it directly, but only by inference. — ucarr

You are very bad at knowing anything by inference due to your contradictory insistence of mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. As I said, you apparently can't do it. I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms

I am sorry that you cannot distinguish the two. I'm trying to help out out of that hole but I don't think I can, in which case you have no hope of justifying EPP except perhaps under E2, the only definition that you seem to be able to grasp. — noAxioms

Let's establish that here we're examining: a) a material red stop sign that's mind-independent; b) a concept of a material red stop sign that's mind-dependent.

You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed. The fundamental flaw, you say, is my insistence on mental perception in any consideration of mind independence.

Yes, I insist on considering mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. My justification for this insistence is simple and obvious. Our access to mind independence only occurs through mind. You acknowledge this limitation when you say, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one."

You address the core issue of this conversation when you say, "I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way."

Can we go beyond the bounds of mind in our observations of nature? We've already agreed we get beyond our own solitary mind through social reality. By observing the behavior of others, when we compare it to our own behavior in similar situations entailing similar stimuli, and when we see similar reactions, we infer other minds are perceiving what our mind perceives.

Perhaps we disagree on the interpretation of objective reality inferred from social interaction. I think the subject/object couplet is a fluid dynamic associated with entanglement of subject-object. With your talk of mind independence, and your frustration with my adherence to mind dependence and perception in application to observation of nature, you suggest to me a striving for clearly articulated separation of subject and object, as if somehow observation can be done without subjectivity.

14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time. — noAxioms

The neuronal circuits that support your articulation of your above quote do possess: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum. — ucarr

That they do, but if I was talking about those, I would have said 'concept of 14. I was not talking about the conception of it. — noAxioms

You were talking about it because whenever you talk of mind independence, that's just more neuronal circuits in your brain allowing you to entertain another concept. You've acknowledged this by saying, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one."

A key difference between our thinking has you believing we can set aside our subjectivity whereas I don't believe we can.

The universe doesn't exist within time. Neither does 14. Both these have predicates. — noAxioms

Are their predicates outside time? — ucarr

Predicates don't have coordinates. They're not objects. One can apply predicates to objects within time, such as a person having a tatoo only after a certain age, but only because a person very much does have temporal coordinates. — noAxioms

If predicates don't have temporal coordinates, then they only exist as emergent properties of their subjects. This is true of them, as it is true of all abstractions, a set that predicates belong to. Abstractions, being mind dependent, don't inhabit the realm of mind independence. Given this limitation, predicates are contingent things. Their position within the causal cone of material things establishes them as contemporaries of material things but logically subsequent to them. This argument establishes EPPL, viz., Existence Precedes Predication Logically.

EPPL establishes (E ∧ P) as a two-part complex. It precludes predication without existence because ¬(E ∧ P) = (¬E ∧ ¬P) = { }.

If predicates do have temporal coordinates, then they exist as abstractions derived from multi-part sampling of observations of individual material things linked thematically and collected into a set expressed by the abstract concept. They are materially encoded within the brain as neuronal circuits.

The number 14 does possess mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum because it is only conceivable through its attachment to its material referents (14 stones). This attachment gives 14 existential meaning and presence as a position on the number line. Detached from its material referents, 14 becomes graphic markings without ontics or physics.

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow, nor are they present anywhere else apart from the location of Baker St within the mind-scape of abstract-only things. Conclusion: Baker St exists only in the mind-scape, but exist there it does indeed, and thus its positive existence cannot be an example of its predicates sans existence. — ucarr

Again, predicates don't have coordinates. They not predicates located at/near Baker St, but instead are predicates of Baker St itself, independent of the street's nonexistence in Moscow. — noAxioms

You're using the temporal coordinates of your neuronal circuits to make claims about predicates that don't have them. You're never independent of time, so your cognitive claims about things timeless are always based upon your temporal neural activity. You cannot set aside your material subjectivity. No material existence, no claims about immaterial things. Cognitive Baker St. is never independent of your material subjectivity.

Concerning E5 definition: — noAxioms

There is no future-to-past relationship at the time of measurement. Neither role of "cause" or "effect" exists before the connection linking the two roles. — ucarr

There is such a relationship at the time of measurement since the measurement defines the existence of the cause event relative to the measurement event.

X = 1. Where is the elapsing time in this measurement?
— noAxioms

The two events are ordered, cause first, measurement later. — noAxioms

P → Q. P is a correlation of Q. Consider P alone. Can you detect from P alone whether or not P is a correlation of Q? Consider Q alone. Can you detect from Q alone whether or not Q is a correlation of P? We only know correlative relationships through pairing. Given P → Q, where is the elapsing time in this measurement?

Correlations are not causations, but causation always implies correlation, and no laws require a uni-directional arrow of time.

...There is no coming into existence of anything. An event is an event and as such, has a time coordinate. — noAxioms

As you say, events have no time coordinates WRT existence.

E5 is not relevant to non-events, so asking of 14 exists under D5 is a category error. Oddly enough, the definition is relevant to something like the set of all possible chess states.

If non-events equal non-existence in your context here, then all events - including predications - expressed in terms of non-events, are category errors.

...this topic is not concerned with knowledge of mind-independent things, but rather the existence of them. — noAxioms

This topic, and all others, must necessarily be concerned with knowledge as facts. There is no mind independence paired with subjectivity.

The entanglement of ontology and epistemology is a big message to us from QM.

QM does not posit or conclude any role to knowledge or perception. If you think otherwise, you read too many pop articles. — noAxioms

Inference from calculations applied to experimental data detected phenomena now labeled QM. Math analysis of QM phenomena translates to the technology enabling our online dialog. QM is the basis of the information age.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them.

OK. But neither mental activity creates the object in question. Empirical perception does not create a white horse where there wasn't one without it. Hence it being mind independent. Similarly, Pegasus does pop into existence because of your imagination. It is also independent of your mind, but lacks the causal relationship that you have with the white horse. Per D5, the white horse exists relative to say your belt buckle and Pegasus does not. — noAxioms

The white horse exists relative to the mind and also to other material things. Pegasus only exists relative to the mind.

The presumed mind independence of the white horse is founded upon social interaction and its characteristic responses to public stimuli across vast numbers of individual observers. There's a presumption of mind independence within the context of mind-inter-dependence, something that reduces to individualized mind dependence.

I'm saying existence reduces to the Standard Model. — ucarr

I have no clue what you mean to say when you say existence (metaphysics) reduces to a physical model of the universe. The model isn't an ontological one. At best, one might say that things that are part of this universe (rocks and such) exist, but that's existence relative to a domain, and is essentially E4. I've shown how EPP is incompatible with any definition of the form 'exists in some restricted domain'. So maybe you're not trying to define E4 existence, but mean something else by those words.

Does 14 exist under this unclear definition? If not, is 14 an even number?

I think it incorrect to say it has no properties.

Good because nobody ever claimed such a paradoxical statement, regardless of what 'it' is.

If Ohio disappears totally, Columbus disappears totally — ucarr

Columbus is not a predicate of Ohio. 'Contains Columbus' is, but Ohio would still contain Columbus even if both no longer 'appear' to whatever is apparently defining their existence. I walk out of a room and the ball on table disappears from my view, but the ball is still round despite not appearing to me.

When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist. — ucarr

Does this statement beg EPP? — ucarr

How can you not see that? It is a mild reword of EPP, both forbidding predication of a things that don't exist, despite all my examples of predication of things that don't exist.

You want an abstract and fundamental definition of existence as it pertains to material things, and not as it pertains to abstractions, right? — ucarr

I don't restrict my scope to material things. 14 has been one of my frequent examples and it isn't a material thing, nor is it an abstraction, although abstracting is necessary to think about it.

I came up with a nonexhaustive list of 6 definiitions, one or two of which are mind dependent. None are fundamental, and being definitions, I think all 6 are abstract. Mostly I was trying to see if EPP makes any sense (has any meaning) relative to definition 1. The other five I've already analyzed.

... do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works. — noAxioms
The second part of your claim marks you as a realist_materialist.

Nope, which is why I carefully put 'whatever that means' in there.

Yes, bolstered by QM, I give credence to entanglement of epistemics and ontics.

QM does not give any ontic state that is dependent on epistemics, pop articles notwithstanding.

The infinite series of negations, an asymptotic approach from existence to non-existence, the limit of existence, can't arrive at non-existence and talk about it because such talking sustains existence. True non-existence is unspeakable. Its negation is so total, it even negates itself, a type of existence. — ucarr

I could not parse much of what you said, but this bit makes it pretty clear that a mind-dependent definition of existence is being used, and 'nonexistence' is some sort of location somewhere, unreachable. I could not figure out how the size of the universe had an relevance whatsoever to a thing being talked about.

The whole comment seems irrelevant if a different definition of 'exists' is used, especially a mind-independent one that this topic is supposed to be about.

We can only talk about mind independence via use of our minds. — ucarr

I didn't say otherwise, but the mind-independent existing things don't require being talked about to exist.

My statement specifically addresses mind independence lying beyond our direct access.

So don't access it directly.

I have no trouble defining 'existence sans perception', but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way.. — noAxioms
Your bold clause above examples a contradiction: It has you practicing the perception of defining a word in the absence of perception.

I wasn't talking about my act of defining a phrase.

I think your final sentence above expresses your primary motivation for seeking to refute EPP.

I don't think EPP can be refuted, but perhaps my motivation for seeking its justification and not finding it.

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. — ucarr

I don't think my mind exists by all 6 definitions, so I cannot accept this statement without explicit meaning. Being self-aware is a predicate, and without presuming EPP, that awareness may very much be predication without certain kinds of existence. I've already given several examples where this must be the case, none being refuted.

Can you counter-narrate the following:

Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes — ucarr

I think if there was direct evidence of them, they by definition wouldn't be other universes. Most of the basic multiverse types fall necessarily out of theories that explain observation that no single classical universe theory can. For instance, Greene's inflationary multiverse (Tegmark's type II) explains the fine tuning issue, a very serious problem in a mono-universe interpretation.
The simplest (by far) quantum interpretation necessitates Greene's quantum multiverse. Sure, you can't prove or falsify any of these interpretations, but explaining their predictions without a multiverse gets either very complicated or insanely improbable, both violating Occam's razor.

The only relevant quote in the wiki multiverse page was references to existence.

"Together, these universes are presumed to comprise everything that exists: the entirety of space, time, matter, energy, information, and the physical laws and constants that describe them."
This one seems to presume a sort of E4 existence, substituting the multiverse for just our universe. Same relation, but far less anthropocentric.
Most of the references seem to use something like the E4 definition, but I think the intent is meant objectively despite the authors not thinking that out though. It isn't the point of the web page.

I now know you think numbers don't exist. — ucarr

I didn't say that either, especially since the type of existence wasn't specified. I would not make a claim that vague. You seem to be under the impression that I have beliefs instead of having an open mind to such matters. Part of learning is not presuming the answers before looking for evidence only in support of your opinions.

In your assessment of what I wrote, by having Pegasus count himself, you err. If he counts himself, he exists.

By which definition? I might agree to it with some definitions and not with others. You statement without that specification is vacuously ambiguous.

You assume Pegasus exists when you have him perform the action of counting himself. — ucarr

No, I just don't presume EPP when having him perform that. But as I said, you cannot conceive of no EPP, leaving you in no position to justify it. Trust me, there are lots of people on Earth that don't exist by your definition, and yet have no problem counting their own fingers and such. Pegasus is kind of like that, quite capable of counting wings without the bother of your sort of existence.

Proof is the point. You're trying to refute EPP by demonstrating predication sans existence.

Sure. One counterexample is plenty, and I provided several, so EPP does not hold for existence defined as any form of 'part of some limited domain', which covers E2,4,5,6. That proof is simple.
Where proof isn't the point is where it cannot be shown. EPP cannot be proven true or false under E1 or E3, so barring such proof, and it being demonstrated false with other definitions, EPP is accepted on faith, never on rational reasoning.

Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications?

I don't know what you think 'direct knowledge' is.as distinct from knowledge that isn't direct.

Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception

It does not. It is about existence independent of perception.

I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject. — ucarr

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication.

I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract composite of all the possible states of an abstraction. — ucarr

Spacetime is 4D and that means that all 'objects' have temporal extension. It is not just an abstraction, it is the nature of the thing in itself. To assert otherwise as you are doing here is to deny the standard model and pretty much all of consensus physics.

You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed.

It's not your practice of inference that I'm pointing out, it is the continuous practice of defining existence in a way that requires perception by you, counting by you, utterances by you, or in short in any way that requires you. Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them.

A key difference between our thinking has you believing we can set aside our subjectivity whereas I don't believe we can.

I also don't think I can set it aside, but the existence of some rock doesn't depend on my subjectivity.

The fundamental flaw, you say, is my insistence on mental perception in any consideration of mind independence.

It's not fundamental (outside of idealism). Yes, consideration is mind dependent, but I'm not talking about the consideration, I'm talking about the existence of the subject of predication. This exactly illustrates my point. I'm trying to talk about the subject, and you concentrate instead on the necessity of it being considered. There is no such necessity.

So yes, use your mind to consider this or that, but don't talk about the considering or the perceiving. Four consecutive examples below where you talk only of the concepts and not about the mind independent thing.


1

If predicates don't have temporal coordinates, then they only exist as emergent properties of their subjects. This is true of them, as it is true of all abstraction — ucarr

I am not talking about abstractions of predicates.

2

The number 14 does possess mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum because it is only conceivable through ...

Not talking about the concept of 14.

3

You're using the temporal coordinates of your neuronal circuits to make claims about predicates that don't have them.

I am not talking about conceptualizing or neurons.

4

Cognitive Baker St. is never independent of your material subjectivity.

And again. Not talking about cognitive Baker St. I'm talking about Baker St.

Concerning E5 definition: — noAxioms

P → Q. P is a correlation of Q. Consider P alone. Can you detect from P alone whether or not P is a correlation of Q? — ucarr

What are P & Q? Events? I am presuming so. They are effectively each a set of four coordinates

I don't know what you think it means for one event to be a correlation of another. Measurement of entangled pairs are said to be correlated, but not that one is a correlation of the other. It's a mutual thing, not an arrow going one way, I'm presuming this sort of mutual thing in my answers.

I am guessing that "is a correlation of" means that a measurement at P and Q are found at some later event R to be correlated. That means that P & Q both exist relative to R, but that neither P nor Q necessarily exists relative to the other.

Consider Q alone. Can you detect from Q alone whether or not Q is a correlation of P?

There is no P in 'Q alone'. There is just Q. P does not exist relative to Q. It is a counterfactual, and E5 does not posit counterfactuals.

Given P → Q, where is the elapsing time in this measurement?

Frame dependent, and said 'measurement' is done by R, not P or Q.

Correlations are not causations, but causation always implies correlation, and no laws require a uni-directional arrow of time.

Locality is not violated since neither P nor Q exists relative to the other, so no correlation exists relative to either of them either. The correlation only exists relative to R.

As you say, events have no time coordinates WRT existence.

Existence has no location, so it cannot be used as an origin for a coordinate system. The assignment of an origin event is arbitrary. Coordinate systems are frame dependent, origin dependent, and are very much abstractions. Events on the other hand, as well as intervals, are frame independent and physical.

then all events - including predications

Predications are not events. They don't have coordinates.

The presumed mind independence of the white horse is founded upon social interaction and its characteristic responses to public stimuli across vast numbers of individual observers.

Yes, such is the basis for E4, but it is still anthropocentric existence, still dependent on perception. Such is presumed by the wiki article on the multiverse, which still suggests a restriction that what exists is defined as what we see and infer from it.
E1,3,5,6 go beyond that to actual mind independence.

I'm saying existence reduces to the Standard Model. — ucarr

I have no clue what you mean to say when you say existence (metaphysics) reduces to a physical model of the universe. — noAxioms

Do you equate existence with metaphysics to the exclusion of identifying metaphysics with material things?

I equate metaphysics with cognition of the mind-scape. Specifically, I equate metaphysics with the grammar, viz., the foundational rules governing the complex (as in multi-part entity) of material reality and its emergent forms (cognitions of the mind-scape).

I think metaphysics an emergent property of material things. As such, it's part of the sub-domain of material things labeled cognition. Within cognition, metaphysics is the grammar governing both material things and cognitive things.

The model isn't an ontological one. At best, one might say that things that are part of this universe (rocks and such) exist, but that's existence relative to a domain, and is essentially E4. — noAxioms

I think the Standard Model is the source of cognition and therefore of metaphysics.

I've shown how EPP is incompatible with any definition of the form 'exists in some restricted domain'. So maybe you're not trying to define E4 existence, but mean something else by those words.[/quote]

I agree that existence, being the largest of all possible contexts (environments), does not reside within a larger, encompassing context. The Standard Model, with its symmetries and conservation laws, grounds existence, the largest of all contexts.

I think it likely your E1-E6 do not cover all facets of my definition of existence. For example, E2, your only statement about subjectivity, nevertheless says nothing about QM entanglement and its
subject-object complex.

Does 14 exist under this unclear definition? If not, is 14 an even number? — noAxioms

You seem to be asking whether math is encompassed within The Standard Model. Yes, it's contained within cognition.

I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. — ucarr

Good because nobody ever claimed such a paradoxical statement, regardless of what 'it' is. — noAxioms

For proper understanding of my intended communication, my quote needs to be presented and evaluated in its entirety.

I want to modify your characterization of general existence. I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. Like white light within the visible light spectrum, which contains RGB, viz., all of the colors, general existence contains The Quintet (mass_energy_force-motion_space_time), viz., all of the properties. Temporal forms of material things are emergent forms whose properties are funded by The Quintet. I don't expect any modern physicist to deny any property is connected to the Standard Model. In effect, assertion of predication sans existence is a claim that properties exist apart from the Standard Model. As an example, this is tantamount to saying the color red of an apple has nothing to do with the electromagnetism of the elementary charged particles inhabiting the visible light spectrum. — ucarr

The main point of my argument points to the generality of existence in terms of its grasp of all of the forms taken by emergent material things. Saying existence has no properties is like saying variable x doesn't signify a specific number because its range encompasses all numbers (when you add (a+bi) to the mix).

If Ohio disappears totally, Columbus disappears totally — ucarr

Columbus is not a predicate of Ohio. 'Contains Columbus' is, but Ohio would still contain Columbus even if both no longer 'appear' to whatever is apparently defining their existence. I walk out of a room and the ball on table disappears from my view, but the ball is still round despite not appearing to me. — noAxioms

We have options for predicating the Venn diagram relationship linking Columbus and Ohio. For example, "Columbus implies Ohio." By this statement we see Columbus is always a predicate of Ohio.

When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist. — ucarr

Does this statement beg EPP? — noAxioms

How can you not see that? It is a mild reword of EPP, both forbidding predication of a things that don't exist, despite all my examples of predication of things that don't exist. — noAxioms

I argue my statement doesn't assume EPP in route to proving it because of the statement, "Modifiers attach to their objects." This isn't a re-wording of EPP. It's a stipulation by definition pertaining to the application of "modify" WRT EPP. For example, an adjective changes the perceivable state of its object-noun by giving the reader more information about the attributes of the object-noun. I'm saying the modification of an adjective cannot be carried out in the absence of its object-noun. Since this is an argument for proper procedure in the application of EPP, specifically WRT predication, I don't see how it's an example of begging EPP.

Perhaps you think because I say, "there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist." that means I'm assuming existence instead of proving it. I'm not trying to prove existence. I'm trying to prove existence precedes predication. Given this fact, the assumption of the existence of existence is allowed.

You want an abstract and fundamental definition of existence as it pertains to material things, and not as it pertains to abstractions, right? — ucarr

I don't restrict my scope to material things. 14 has been one of my frequent examples and it isn't a material thing, nor is it an abstraction, although abstracting is necessary to think about it. — noAxioms

Can you explain how abstracting to 14 isn't an example of rendering 14 as an abstraction?

I was trying to see if EPP makes any sense (has any meaning) relative to definition 1. — noAxioms

I see we both place our main focus on E1 WRT to EPP. I seek to defend EPP and, as you say, you're examining its status. An important difference separating us is my thinking subject-object entangled and your thinking them isolated.

If language cannot prove anything, then language cannot demand proof. — ucarr

Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works. You're crossing that line. — noAxioms

The second part of your claim marks you as a realist_materialist. — ucarr

Nope, which is why I carefully put 'whatever that means' in there. — noAxioms

My main point is that language - in the form of logic - seeks to evaluate to valid conclusions as proof of truth content in statements.

realism | ˈrēəˌliz(ə)m |
noun
Philosophy the doctrine that universals or abstract concepts have an objective or absolute existence. The theory that universals have their own reality is sometimes called Platonic realism because it was first outlined by Plato's doctrine of “forms” or ideas. Often contrasted with nominalism.
• the doctrine that matter as the object of perception has real existence and is neither reducible to
universal mind or spirit nor dependent on a perceiving agent. Often contrasted with idealism (sense
2). - The Apple Dictionary

Can you explain how it is that, "but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works" doesn't make a definitive statement about the independence of the ontological from the epistemological towards aligning you with realism? I see that you attempt to keep the meaning of reality vague, however, if the word has meaning in your statement, then it means what the dictionary says it means:

reality | rēˈalədē |
noun
2 the state or quality of having existence or substance.
•Philosophy existence that is absolute, self-sufficient, or objective, and not subject to human decisions or conventions. - The Apple Dictionary