1a. Neutral monism is a philosophical theory that proposes that reality is made of a neutral entity, rather than mind or matter. It's a way of explaining how the mind and matter relate to each other.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=neutral+monism.

*1b. Neutral monism is an umbrella term for a class of metaphysical theories in the philosophy of mind, concerning the relation of mind to matter. These theories take the fundamental nature of reality to be neither mental nor physical; in other words it is "neutral".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutral_monism — Gnomon

I would not want to get too tied up trying to summarize something like process philosophy with as simple a summary or term as "neutral monism".

Process is neither materialism nor idealism. It is an ontology and is monistic in the sense that there is one ultimate entity "actual occasions" of which reality is composed. These "actual occasions" have both material (or physical) and mental (or experiential) aspects. The physical cannot be separated from the experiential in the "actual occasions" of process. Events have varying duration but they all eventually perish and become part of the data (information) along with some possibility from the future (from the realm of eternal objects, a Platonic style notion) to become (through concrescence) a new event. The way the new event incorporates data from the past and possibility from the future is part of what Whitehead terms "prehension" (a non conscious form of mentality, relatedness or experience). This introduces non sensory experience into the world. This is pretty dense with language from Process and Reality. What is mere potential or possibility becomes actual. The many become one and are increased by one.

To make a more scientific connection try correlating the above type language and ideas or notions to quantum events, quantum collapse, quantum probability and quantum field theory. I am afraid this is just the roughest of outlines. Viewing everything as a process (a becoming, system and organism) and as intimately dependent upon and related to the rest of reality in which it is embedded (thrown) is at least for me more palatable than a world of independent objects, inherent properties and a universe which is purely mechanistic, deterministic and lacking in any overall direction and purpose.

I posted a link to a long article on Whitehead on the previous page, along with some excerpts. Here is another that I would like to understand.

Subjectivity as a Fundamental Feature of the Whole of Reality

Whitehead, on the basis of his interpretation of the modern conceptual framework, derives the task of sketching a metaphysics in which nature does not bifurcate and in which there is no division of nature and mind and their respective knowledge fields of the material and the mental. Such a metaphysics requires not only a radical reconstruction of the concept of nature, but necessarily includes an equally radical reframing of subjectivity. For Whitehead assumes that it is precisely the modernist conception of subjectivity (and thereby objectivity) that has contributed decisively to the bifurcation of nature. His interpretation of modernity as a historical–discursive formation characterized by the bifurcation is therefore crucial to his radical reconstruction of the concept of nature.

Such a reformulation of the concept of nature includes for Whitehead not least the dissolution of the opposition nature/subjectivity or else nature/experience: instead of excluding the subject and experience from nature and thus opening the door to bifurcation, for Whitehead subjectivity is a fundamental feature of the whole of reality. According to the Philosophy of Organism, everything that exists feels; every atom and every flower feels. A statement, as Melanie Sehgal notes, “that sounds strange only against the background of a concept of experience implicitly oriented towards conscious, human perception, as it characterizes modern philosophy” (Sehgal 2016, 209f., my translation). Reality must be described as a hierarchy of consistently given, though varying, degrees of subjectivity. This is also the reason why Whitehead can state “that apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness” (Whitehead [1929] 1978, p. 167). If such a relocation of subjectivity into nature is linked to the goal of correcting the materialist–mechanistic conception of the ‘natural’ world as it derived from the bifurcation, subjectivity can also no longer be a “privilege of higher developed entities, let alone an ontological distinction of man” (Wiehl 2007, p. 30, my translation). On that note, Whitehead vehemently rejects modern anthropocentrism, which locates subjectivity outside of nature: “Pansubjectivism,” Reiner Wiehl elaborates, “thus means in Whitehead not only the implementation of the subject in nature and the natural sciences, but equally also a naturalization of subjectivity” — Source

I too have come to accept that 'the subjective' is irreducible, and that reality is subjective, in this radical sense. But I'm a little uneasy about the apparent pan-psychism of this excerpt. I still can't see how non-organic nature possesses a 'degree of subjectivity'. Any guidance appreciated.

“…. There is unrest in the forest
Trouble with the trees
For the maples want more sunlight
And the oaks ignore their pleas
The trouble with the maples
(And they're quite convinced they're right)
They say the oaks are just too lofty
And they grab up all the light
But the oaks can't help their feelings
If they like the way they're made
And they wonder why the maples
Can't be happy in their shade.

There is trouble in the forest
And the creatures all have fled
As the maples scream, "Oppression"
And the oaks just shake their heads
So the maples formed a union
And demanded equal rights
They say, "The oaks are just too greedy
We will make them give us light".

Now there's no more oak oppression
For they passed a noble law
And the trees are all kept equal
By hatchet, axe, and saw…”
————-

Not much for guidance I know. But still….for that intelligence internally sufficient to enable itself with such a notion as “subjectivity”, is just as enabled to either deny it elsewise on the one hand, or make an absolute mess of it altogether on the other.

I would not want to get too tied up trying to summarize something like process philosophy with as simple a summary or term as "neutral monism". . . . .
Process is neither materialism nor idealism. — prothero

I can understand your wish to avoid trivializing all-encompassing Process Philosophy with a single ambiguous concept. But my interest in the novel notion of "Neutral Monism" is that it seems to fit into my own personal (idiosyncratic & unorthodox) philosophical worldview : Enformationism. In which the single Substance of our world --- (both physical and metaphysical) --- is EnFormAction (the power to enform or transform). Remember, tangible Matter is, according to Einstein, merely a temporary form of the processing power of Energy.

I won't try to fully explain that ambiguous dual-monism concept in a brief forum post. But it's a combination of both Idealism and Materialism under a single name : EnFormAction*1. Admittedly, it sounds like an oxymoron, if the reasoning underlying the term is misunderstood. If you merge Idealism (mind stuff) and Materialism (body stuff) into a monistic worldview, what you get is a Neutral Monism : neither Real nor Ideal, but both Matter and Mind. When you add the current scientific understanding that Generic Information*2 is both mental content and energy/matter, the mash-up term may begin to make sense.

The concept of EnFormAction was derived from a combination of Quantum Physics and Information Theory. In the so-called "New Physics", the subatomic foundation of reality is both material object (particle) and dynamic process (wave propagation). The objective particle fits into the worldview of Materialism, and the subjective process seems to be closer to Idealism. So, the associated philosophical worldview is a BothAnd*3 perspective of our reality, as revealed by both materialistic Science, and idealistic Philosophy.

If this introduction sounds like gobbledygook to you, just ignore it, and I'll end it here. But if you can see some similarity to the Whiteheadian worldview, I can get into further detail, and get more feedback from you. But it will take the thread further off-topic, and might work better as a new thread. :smile:



*1. EnFormAction : A reformulation of the word "Information" (mind stuff).
Physical Energy + Mental Form + Causal Processing Action = Evolving Reality (matter & mind)

*2. Information is Energy :
An objective, dynamic and physically justified concept of information is elaborated starting from Shannon's concept of entropy and applied to information technology, artificial intelligence (consciousness) and thermodynamics.
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-658-40862-6

*3. Both/And Principle :
Conceptually, the BothAnd principle is similar to Einstein's theory of Relativity, in that what you see ─ what’s true for you ─ depends on your perspective, and your frame of reference; for example, subjective or objective, religious or scientific, reductive or holistic, pragmatic or romantic, conservative or liberal, earthbound or cosmic. Ultimate or absolute reality (ideality) doesn't change, but your conception of reality does. Opposing views are not right or wrong, but more or less accurate for a particular purpose.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.html

Nominal? I'll take that! Without accepting th premise LOL

]

I too have come to accept that 'the subjective' is irreducible, and that reality is subjective, in this radical sense. But I'm a little uneasy about the apparent pan-psychism of this excerpt. I still can't see how non-organic nature possesses a 'degree of subjectivity'. Any guidance appreciated. — Wayfarer

I am going to give you some excerpts from Whiteheads “ The Concept of Nature Chapter 2: Theories of the bifurcation of Nature” which is eminently readable compared to a lot of “Process and Reality”

“ For natural philosophy everything perceived is in nature. We may not pick and choose. For us the red glow of the sunset should be as much part of nature as are the molecules and electric waves by which men of science would explain the phenomenon. It is for natural philosophy to analyse how these various elements of nature are connected.

The theory of psychic additions would treat the greenness as a psychic addition furnished by the perceiving mind, and would leave to nature merely the molecules and the radiant energy which influence the mind towards that perception. My argument is that this dragging in of the mind as making additions of its own to the thing posited for knowledge by sense-awareness is merely a way of shirking the problem of natural philosophy. That problem is to discuss the relations inter se of things known, abstracted from the bare fact that they are known. Natural philosophy should never ask, what is in the mind and what is in nature. To do so is a confession that it has failed to express relations between things perceptively known, namely to express those natural relations whose expression is natural philosophy” ANW

“ The nature which is the fact apprehended in awareness holds within it the greenness of the trees, the song of the birds, the warmth of the sun, the hardness of the chairs, and the feel of the velvet. Nature which is the cause of awareness is the conjectured system of molecules and electrons which so affects the mind as to produce the awareness of apparent nature.” ANW

“The reason why the bifurcation of nature is always creeping back into scientific philosophy is the extreme difficulty of exhibiting the perceived redness and warmth of the fire in one system of relations with the agitated molecules of carbon and oxygen, with the radiant energy from them, and with the various functionings of the material body. Unless we produce the all-embracing relations, we are faced with a bifurcated nature; namely, warmth and redness on one side, and molecules, electrons and ether on the other side. Then the two factors are explained as being respectively the cause and the mind's reaction to the cause.” ANW

Just to throw time and space into the equation
“In succeeding lectures I shall explain my own view of time and space. I shall endeavour to show that they are abstractions from more concrete elements of nature, namely, from events. The discussion of the details of the process of abstraction will exhibit time and space as interconnected, and will finally lead us to the sort of connexions between their measurements which occur in the modern theory of electromagnetic relativity” ANW

Also Helpful from Steven Shaviro “Whitehead and Feeling”
“On Whitehead’s account, a tree has feelings – but they are probably quite different from the feelings that human beings have. A tree may well feel assaulted, for instance; we know that trees (and other plants) release pheromones when insects start eating their leaves. These emissions both act as a chemical attack on the predator, and warn other trees (or, indeed, other parts of the same tree) to take defensive measures as well. It is not ridiculous, therefore, to claim that a tree has feelings. However, it is unlikely that a tree would ever feel insulted or humiliated – these are human feelings that have no place in the life of trees.

This, of course, is the point at which many people will accuse Whitehead of anthropomorphism and projection. We can respond to this objection with Jane Bennett’s maxim that anthropomorphism helps us to avoid the far worse problems of anthropocentrism. After all, she notes, "too often the philosophical rejection of anthropomorphism is bound up with a hubristic demand that only humans and God can bear any traces of creative agency." In other words, attributing feeling to trees helps to shake us from our all-too-human, self-congratulatory belief that we are totally unlike all other entities: such as Robert Brandom’s view that we are sapient, whereas other living things are merely sentient. But actually, I don’t think that Whitehead is being anthropomorphic at all: rather, he is inverting the direction of anthropomorphic projections. For Whitehead, human feelings are in fact the exemplification, within our own experience, of a broader kind of process that is far more widely distributed among entities in the world.

The important point here is that subjective experience need not involve, and can be detached from, consciousness. On the one hand, Whitehead catergorically insists that "apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness." But he also continually reminds us that most of this "experience of subjects" is nonconscious. We feel more than we can know. And many organisms feel events in the world, without necessarily being conscious of what they feel. Trees for instance, have feelings, as many recent studies have shown (see, for instance, What a Plant Knows, by Daniel Chamovitz). Trees sense and feel the sunlight; they sense and feel water in the ground; they sense and feel when insects eat their leaves. But none of this necessarily means that trees are overtly conscious; most likely, they are not.

There is no ground for claiming that physicality somehow excludes mentality. I am inclined to agree with Strawson here; but the larger, Whiteheadian point is that the issue gets entirely confused when we simply equate mentality with consciousness. Neurobiologists have shown that many and perhaps most mental processes occur non-consciously, and may well be absolutely inaccessible to consciousness. But we need not assume, as neurobiologists and philosophers of mind generally do, that all this nonconscious mental activity can rightly be described as computation. Whitehead’s discussion of feeling gives us a broader picture of mental functioning than cognitive psychology does. I cannot develop this here, but my hunch is that feeling in this sense is a necessary precondition for cognition, but is not in itself cognitive.” SS

At the most fundamental level for one event to become data for a succeeding event (to perish) and for a new event to introduce any novelty or creativity into the world. The forming event (undergoing concrescence) must “prehend” (think primitive feeling, relatedness or external relations) both the data of the perishing event and the possibilities (eternal objects or lures) of the future. This form of prehending is a primitive form of “feeling or subjectivity”. A form of mind or experience (not consciousness) which extends to the most primitive of natural processes. The world is not a static being but a constant state of flux.

Think perhaps also of the phenomena of “quantum entanglement” where an event or measurement on one side of the universe instantaneously affects an event or measurement regardless of distance or locality, a “spooky action at a distance” which implies some connectedness throughout nature that our usual notion locality and direct contact to have effects fails to account for

In the end, purely physical explanations of nature tend to leave out elements of nature which are not directly measurable or observable. The written description of an experience or the purely physical explanation of an experience (think the color red, or a roller coaster ride) is never adequate to having the experience itself. It is very convenient to bifurcate nature and say one part is “real and objective” and the other is “merely subjective” but it shirks the real task of natural philosophy and speculative philosophy.

Thanks, very helpful.

It is very convenient to bifurcate nature and say one part is “real and objective” and the other is “merely subjective” but it shirks the real task of natural philosophy and speculative philosophy. — prothero

That pretty well sums it up!

The important point here is that subjective experience need not involve, and can be detached from, consciousness. On the one hand, Whitehead catergorically insists that "apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness." But he also continually reminds us that most of this "experience of subjects" is nonconscious. — prothero

Very subtle and important point. I think the common misconception is to believe that consciousness refers only to what one is consciously aware of, the contents of discursive thought. It goes far deeper than that, as Whitehead is intuiting.

The latter quote is from Steven Shaviro but it reflects my point of view. I personally try to avoid the term "consciousness" except for the self aware inner discursive part of human experience. The terms "mind in nature" for surely there are a variety of types of mind in nature and "unconscious experience" cause a little less confusion. Yes Whitehead does lead to a form of panpsychism, but a variety which David Ray Griffin refers to as "panexperientialism" which I often adopt. All higher forms of mind are derived from this more primitive form of experience which is essential to the flux, creativity and novelty of nature. This gives rise to the so called "combination problem" but seems less serious to me that the new introduction of mind into a view of nature in which it is completely absent in most of the natural world.

I appreciate that.

I'll try and articulate a point about my view of panpsychism or panexperientialism. I have a great deal of admiration for Whitehead —especially his critique of the Cartesian division, and how he brings process and experience into the heart of metaphysics. It makes panexperientialism a compelling alternative to materialism.

That said, there’s a subtle but crucial issue that I think still needs to be addressed. Panexperientialism still treats experience as an object of theory, rather than recognizing that experience is necessarily first-person. Experience is never something we ‘know about’ in the same way we know about objects or processes. It is always undergone, always first-personal.

So - my understanding of the 'primacy of the subjective' is that it is not something that can be treated objectively, which is why I'm critical of Philip Goff's sense of panpsychism. From an earlier thread:

I think his mistake is to believe that 'experience' is something that can be known in the third person. In other words, experience is not an object of cognition, in the way that an electron or particle or other object can be. We don't know experiences, we have experiences; so any experience has an inescapably first-person element, that is, it is undergone by a subject. So we can't objectify 'the nature of experience' in the way we can the objects and forces that are analysed by the natural sciences.

Now, in one sense we can be very clear about our own experiences - we certainly know what an unpleasant or pleasant experience is, and we know that some experiences have specific attributes, across a vast range of experiences. But in all cases, we know those things experientially - we know about those attributes, because they are the constituents of our experience, in a way very different from how we know and predict the behaviour of objects according to physical laws. — Wayfarer

Pan-experientialism is subject to the same kind of criticism. Experience as an object of third-person knowledge overlooks the fact that experience is always undergone rather than observed. This suggests that instead of categorizing experience as an explanatory variable in a metaphysical system, we should see the inquiry itself as leading to a fundamental shift in perspective—one that recognizes the impossibility of objectifying the subject at all. That is where the 'way of unknowing' becomes not just a mystical doctrine, but a necessary epistemic move. It also ties in with the philosophical theme of epistemic humility, 'he that knows it, knows it not'.

I think that short-circuits many of these questions about what kinds of things are conscious, without, however, falling back into any kind of reductionism.

Wonderful that after your whimsical poem about elms and oaks, Prothero directly addresses the question of whether trees feel.

The important point here is that subjective experience need not involve, and can be detached from, consciousness. — prothero

Could you elaborate? This seems prima facie ridiculous to me, so wanting to assuage my worries.

Pan-experientialism is subject to the same kind of criticism. Experience as an object of third-person knowledge overlooks the fact that experience is always undergone rather than observed. This suggests that instead of categorizing experience as an explanatory variable in a metaphysical system, we should see the inquiry itself as leading to a fundamental shift in perspective—one that recognizes the impossibility of objectifying the subject at all. That is where the 'way of unknowing' becomes not just a mystical doctrine, but a necessary epistemic move.

I think that short-circuits many of these questions about what kinds of things are conscious, without, however, falling back into any kind of reductionism. — Wayfarer

I am skeptical that there will ever be a satisfactory materialistic explanation of any form of experience. I think this may permanently be the realm of speculative metaphysics, ontology and natural philosophy..The attraction of process philosophy for me is the monistic unified picture of nature which it entails along with a bit of teleology .I also find it to be conceptually compatible with modern quantum physics.

Some of this depends on what one means by “matter” in modern physics. Our investigation into the building blocks of nature has brought us quantum mechanics which is different conceptually and mathematically from classical or even Einstein's Relativity physics.

I tend to roughly equate the “actual occasion or event” of process metaphysics with the “quantum event” of modern physics and quantum field theory.. I also tend to equate the probabilistic (potentiali) nature of quantum physics with the introduction of a degree of freedom, creativity and novelty in nature. The sequencing of events both assures continuity and novelty into nature. The preservation of the past and the introduction of the novelty of the future into the present moment requires some type of external relation (prehension, experience) awareness of outer reality rather be entirely an isolated internal relation. This provides the basis for higher forms of experience in more complex systems.

This is the role of speculative philosophy to provide us with a set of concepts and language with which to unify, comprehend and discuss all of our experience of the world both our objective observations and measurements and out inner subjective experience as a unified monistic whole.

I will try but not tonight. Did you read all the previous posts because it is fairly extensively discussed. Do you not think other creatures than humans have experience, have forms of mind? Do you think all experience is limited to consciouness? Modern neurobiology would indicate there is a lot of "unconscious" experience and mental activity?

I tend to roughly equate the “actual occasion or event” of process metaphysics with the “quantum event” of modern physics and quantum field theory.. I also tend to equate the probabilistic (potentiali) nature of quantum physics with the introduction of a degree of freedom, creativity and novelty in nature. — prothero

You might be interested in someone I've discovered, Federico Faggin. I ran across his book Silicon a couple of years ago. He's a legendary Silicon Valley figure, having engineered the first successful microprocessor. But he had an overwhelming mystical experience and turned all his attention to philosophy of consciousness. Anyway, his latest book is Irreducible, and it's very much about those kinds of ideas. I haven't made any headway with it - too many books! - but I am intending to study that particular aspect of what he's saying. More info here.

Modern neurobiology would indicate there is a lot of "unconscious" experience and mental activity? — prothero

I would certainly appreciate that!

As for the quip there, I think this is contradictory. The previous discussion didn't seem to touch that issue - if it's unconscious, its not being experienced. That's somewhat baked in, as best I can tell/as far as I know. With that out there..

Do you think all experience is limited to consciouness? — prothero

Yes. I don't think there is any other option. Subconscious (or even pre-conscious) activity doesn't seem to be experienced ny anything but hte mechanisms undergoing the changes required to actually constitute those activities. But again for me, that's somewhat baked-in to the words and concepts being used.

If something is not made conscious, whence comes subjective experience?

If something is not made conscious, whence comes subjective experience? — AmadeusD

I think this will lead us into a disagreement about language, about the definition of consciousness?
Do the terms mind, experience and consciousness all convey the same meaning for you?
What entities or creatures in nature do you consider to be conscious, to have experience?

I think this will lead us into a disagreement about language, about the definition of consciousness? — prothero

I don't see that it will - but that could be another interesting discussion!

mind, experience and consciousness — prothero

A mind can be conscious. A conscious mind can experience.

They can also not. So, i hold these to be sufficiently different to say "no" to your question.

What entities or creatures in nature do you consider to be conscious, to have experience? — prothero

Conscious minds, when they also have experience. I believe a conscious mind is necessary, but not sufficient. Whence commeth Chalmers.

Whitehead catergorically insists that "apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness. — prothero

This is such because he is in a Block Universe of only events/occasions…yet it all did actually happen once, but in an instant, all at once.

@Wayfarer

A mind can be conscious. A conscious mind can experience. — AmadeusD

Conscious minds, when they also have experience. I believe a conscious mind is necessary, but not sufficient. Whence commeth Chalmers. — AmadeusD

I am still not getting a sense of how you are using these words. I am not looking for an argument, just a clarification of your thinking, to see if there is any common ground for discussion.

Let's take some specific examples
Cows
Cows clearly have a brain. Do cows have a mind? Are cows conscious? Do they have experiences?
How about sentience, awareness, perception, etc.
How about bees? Same questions both with the caveat individual bees or hive minds?

Wonderful that after your whimsical poem….. — Wayfarer

I was merely highlighting a personally-opined absurdity, re: casting a very specific intellect into the virtually unfathomable waters of Mother Nature.

I mean….how in the HELL would we humans ever know whether a honeypot ant underground in the Sonoran desert, after having turned into a nectar larder for his hive-mates to survive on during the dry season, can be considered conscious of having done so, to have instilled feelings for an otherwise impossible-to-neglect evolutionary obligation.

So we got these cool little mini-cameras down there about ten feet of so, witness the transformation of these little guys, gawk in wide-eyed wonder, then exalt our own silliness by asking if maybe they’re embarrassed from being spied on. We would be, so why wouldn’t an ant, huh?

But why stop there. Why not offer….probably best received in some peer-reviewed anthropomorphism journal….that they’re actually proud of their evolutionary majesty, which we can justify to ourselves because they haven’t ganged up and destroyed the cameras, which OBVIOUSLY means either they’re quite comfortable exhibitionists, or, they’re perfectly aware that if they do, whoever put them there will stomp the shit out of their snug home it took three years to build.

(Sigh)

Neutral monism — Gnomon

I would rather say, Natural monism. It is only because uniquely humans have minds which construct and project code which in turn affects the body (feelings, activity) that we reify the code. Cows don't vacillate between mind and body. And nature already is neutral, as in One. It is only we, that require neutrality between our reality and make-believe. And that is because we cannot/refuse to see the fictional nature of our make-believe.

I would rather say, Natural monism. It is only because uniquely humans have minds which construct and project code which in turn affects the body (feelings, activity) that we reify the code. Cows don't vacillate between mind and body. And nature already is neutral, as in One. It is only we, that require neutrality between our reality and make-believe. And that is because we cannot/refuse to see the fictional nature of our make-believe. — ENOAH

I suppose you are making a distinction between Nature and Culture. Nature simply is what it is, but in artificial Culture, philosophers classify & categorize & evaluate. If Nature is all there is, then it is singular & monistic. But "uniquely human" minds tend to analyze Nature into subordinate parts, that may be further distinguished as positive or negative.

Be that as it may, I like "Neutral Monism" because it emphasizes the "neutral" (harmonious) whole consisting of sometimes antagonistic parts. That's the point of my personally coined term BothAnd. The natural world is both one (cosmos) and many (things & processes). :smile:


Both/And Principle :
My coinage for the holistic principle of Complementarity, as illustrated in the Yin/Yang symbol. Opposing or contrasting concepts are always part of a greater whole. Conflicts between parts can be reconciled or harmonized {or neutralized} by putting them into the context of a whole system.

The Enformationism worldview entails the principles of Complementarity, Reciprocity & Holism, which are necessary to offset the negative effects of Fragmentation, Isolation & Reductionism. Analysis into parts is necessary for knowledge of the mechanics of the world, but synthesis of those parts into a whole system is required for the wisdom to integrate the self into the larger system. In a philosophical sense, all opposites in this world (e.g. space/time, good/evil) are ultimately reconciled in monistic Enfernity (eternity & infinity).

Conceptually, the BothAnd principle is similar to Einstein's theory of Relativity, in that what you see ─ what’s true for you ─ depends on your perspective, and your frame of reference; for example, subjective or objective, religious or scientific, reductive or holistic, pragmatic or romantic, conservative or liberal, earthbound or cosmic. Ultimate or absolute reality (ideality) doesn't change, but your conception of reality does. Opposing views are not right or wrong, but more or less accurate for a particular purpose.

This principle is also similar to the concept of Superposition in sub-atomic physics. In this ambiguous state a particle has no fixed identity until “observed” by an outside system. For example, in a Quantum Computer, a Qubit has a value of all possible fractions between 1 & 0. Therefore, you could say that it is both 1 and 0.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.html

But "uniquely human" minds tend to analyze Nature into subordinate parts, that may be further distinguished as positive or negative. — Gnomon

Opposing or contrasting concepts are always part of a greater whole. Conflicts between parts can be reconciled or harmonized {or neutralized} by putting them into the context of a whole system. — Gnomon

I see and admire your perspective. But consider whether the particulars, processes and conflicts are not things only observed by humans whose minds are the cause of disintegration of an otherwise singular whole. I.e., processes are not real, not how so-called God or nature or cosmos "sees" it; but how we inescapably see it via the lens of disintegration (not the best term, but then no term can ultimately be the best)

NOT:

Conflicts between parts can be reconciled or harmonized {or neutralized} by putting them into the context of a whole system. — Gnomon

BUT RATHER: Conflicts/parts only appear to that single species who can no longer be the whole because it has emerged/evolved a mind which displaces It with the multifarious forms of this/that.

Opposites don't really exist, they necessarily exist to the species which uses its imagination uncontrollably in the construction and projections of opposites.

BUT RATHER: Conflicts/parts only appear to that single species who can no longer be the whole because it has emerged/evolved a mind which displaces It with the multifarious forms of this/that.
Opposites don't really exist, they necessarily exist to the species which uses its imagination uncontrollably in the construction and projections of opposites. — ENOAH

I agree that most animals don't conceptualize opposites in Nature. But they do experience the physical effects of those positive & negative and hot/cold oppositions. For example, the weather in the Southeastern US today is characterized by March winds, but caused by invisible interacting hot & cold air masses.

All sentient creatures in the affected area will experience scary stuff like lightening & tornadoes without knowing why. Humans will also experience prolonged power outages, but they have weather reporters to explain when, where, and why. The latter question also may not apply to non-humans. The physical actions may appear arbitrary to a deer, but can be conceived as the wrath of god or devil to a human. :wink: :joke:

PS___ The negative effects (tornadoes & hurricanes) of hot & cold air can be neutralized by mixing them into merely warm air . . . . in the larger context.

Cows have brains. I take it they have a mind, but cannot be sure. I also take it they have experiences, as they appear to deliberate and show awareness to a relatively high degree for a lower animal, as it were.

Bees have brains. They might have minds. I do not think they have experiences. They do not seem aware of much. They seem to react, not respond, to stimuli.

How about sentience, awareness, perception, etc. — prothero

Awareness is the best corollary of consciousness in my view. The P Zombie notwithstanding. If you are not aware that you are undergoing X, you are not experiencing it. Your body might be, in some super-strict sense, but what we mean here is subjective experience. So, if you're not aware, that's not on the table.

Perception is the weirdest of all these to me, because it seems to have a dual meaning even in this specific context: It can mean that your apparatus can receive information - but it can also mean that you are aware of said information. I leave this one to the side lol.

These were a variety of terms about mental abilities, which are bandied about in the forum and even by professional philosophers of mind without much agreement about their meaning or definition, much less about where in nature (which creatures or systems) might possess them to what degree.

For instance some promoters of panpsychism will tell you that fundamental particles are conscious. What they mean is that they postulate or speculate that the events of quantum physics have some primitive property non physical aspect which might be the precursor to all higher forms of perception, mind and consciousness in nature. . I think, use of the word consciousness in that context causes the idea to be immediately rejected and ridiculed. This is because most of us use consciousness to refer to the self aware, self reflective, inner discursive mental activity which we experience in our own lives, when not sleeping, drugged or under anesthesia.

I feel pretty strongly that human consciousness has evolved from more primitive forms of mind in nature. I also largely reject the notion that “mind” emerged de novo from nature without more primitive precursors being present. Human “consciousness” may in fact be a special form of mind. The role of conscious mental activity may be overrated even in humans. I take this position on the basis of some knowledge of neuroanatomy, neurology and neuroscience.
I am a panpsychist of sorts. Even several philosophers of mind have begun to consider various forms of panpsychism in their exploration of consciousness, so it is not a ridiculous notion.
The form of panpsychism I adopt is derived from Whitehead's process philosophy. This entails the notion of non conscious and even non sense perception forms of experience. Because of the way you wish to use the term experience this will make no sense to you. So instead the term “prehension” which Whitehead used can be substituted. Whitehead quite casually and purposefully interchanges the term “prehension” with feeling or lure, I think to maintain the connection between the primitive events of process with the higher forms of intellect in more complex and higher organisms and systems.

Cows have brains. I take it they have a mind, but cannot be sure. I also take it they have experiences, as they appear to deliberate and show awareness to a relatively high degree for a lower animal, as it were. — AmadeusD

Have you worked with cows? You seem to have some respect for their mental abilities. I have worked with them and would share these sentiments.

Bees have brains. They might have minds. I do not think they have experiences. They do not seem aware of much. They seem to react, not respond, to stimuli. — AmadeusD

Might want to do some research on bees, they seem much more complex and responsive to environmental changes and threats than you wish to give them credit for.s I think you will find they are not stimulus fixed response creatures in the way you propose.

Awareness is the best corollary of consciousness in my view. The P Zombie notwithstanding. If you are not aware that you are undergoing X, you are not experiencing it. Your body might be, in some super-strict sense, but what we mean here is subjective experience. So, if you're not aware, that's not on the table — AmadeusD

If you wish to follow my train of thought, it should be the experience in the super strict sense.

The jelly fish advances “attraction” and withdraws “repulsion” according to environmental clues or situations. For me this means they perceive, are aware and respond. They also exhibit memory. To me this enough to assert experience but again you assign a different meaning to the word.

Perception is the weirdest of all these to me, because it seems to have a dual meaning even in this specific context: It can mean that your apparatus can receive information - but it can also mean that you are aware of said information. I leave this one to the side lol. — AmadeusD

In ways it is among the most important of the concepts. Certainly perception in the sense of being “aware” of the wider or external world and responding to it is pretty widespread (if not universal) in the natural world.

Have you watched Corvids solve puzzles or octopi opening jars? How about honey badgers exploring various ways to escape from an enclosure? It seems the height of anthropocentric thought to deny the abilities of our follow creatures in terms on their performance. It also seems quite illogical and against evolution to postulate that human thought and consciousness arrived in the world without a long evolutionary path and many precursor forms of mind in nature.

I feel pretty strongly that human consciousness has evolved from more primitive forms of mind in nature. I also largely reject the notion that “mind” emerged de novo from nature without more primitive precursors being present. — prothero

No issues with this. I find the preamble a bit out of hte place though. I am being quite specific about what hte terms mean, for me, in those sentences. So if that's just context for your questions, fair enough, but I want to be clear - they are simply terms for me. They are not ambiguous and I don't use htem interchangeably. The only one that can be multi-faceted in my mind, is 'experience'. Something without any awareness can 'go through' something (as in the body example) but I cannot find anything subjective in that, so I reject the term 'experience' in the context we're speaking. Experience means subjective awareness of one's own life/circumstances.

I am a panpsychist of sorts. — prothero

Same, but it's vague and ill-defined, so it's an intuition and nothing I could support properly, I think.

Have you worked with cows? — prothero

Yessir.

responsive to environmental changes and threats than you wish to give them credit for.s I think you will find they are not stimulus fixed response creatures in the way you propose. — prothero

I do not see reason for this in the research I've seen/known about. Bees are certainly very complex systemically. AN individual bee? Not really, no. Happy to be shown something though!

For me this means they perceive, are aware and respond. — prothero

These are reactions you're describing, not responses. I think that's a key difference here, in how we're seeing the word experience. Jellyfish do not have brains. They sense and react (though, this is erroneously described as 'response' in places but that is patently not the case). I see your view of it, but don't think it makes much sense, personally. The claim that one can experience without a mind seems absurd on it's face, and on further analysis.

Certainly perception in the sense of being “aware” of the wider or external world and responding to it is pretty widespread (if not universal) in the natural world. — prothero

False. The ability to receive and react to stimuli is, as I take it, literally universal in the animal kingdom (as it is a property of animals). Awareness and deliberative response is common, but far, far, far from Universal. Can you elaborate on why you would make that claim?

Have you watched Corvids solve puzzles or octopi opening jars? — prothero

Yes, and to the following question too.

It seems the height of anthropocentric thought to deny the abilities of our follow creatures in terms on their performance. — prothero

I don't know what you mean, but it's highly likely I haven't done whatever you're complaining about.

It also seems quite illogical and against evolution to postulate that human thought and consciousness arrived in the world without a long evolutionary path and many precursor forms of mind in nature. — prothero

Probably. But I have no reason to reject that at a certain point, consciousness arises at a level far, far beyond the previous. We have no evidence of this run-up, and we're pretty damn good at finding gradual processes in the records.

No issues with this. I find the preamble a bit out of hte place though. I am being quite specific about what hte terms mean, for me, in those sentences. So if that's just context for your questions, fair enough, but I want to be clear - they are simply terms for me. They are not ambiguous and I don't use htem interchangeably — AmadeusD

Yes, you may in fact, in your mind, have very precise meanings that you attach to these terms. However, not everyone will accept or agree with your meanings, definitions and usage. I find many discussions in the forum come down not so much a discussion of ideas or concepts but disagreements about language. If I disagree with you, it is not a personal attack and if I use language a bit differently it does not mean I am deficient in the meaning of words.

Language is inherently a little imprecise and a little ambiguous. Especially when one starts talking about things like religion or other realms of speculative philosophy. I think thoughts and concepts occur before the attempt to put them into words and thus putting things into language sometimes is difficult and what you intend to mean and what the other party interprets can be quite different.

Experience means subjective awareness of one's own life/circumstances. — AmadeusD

. I suppose that is why I (and others) go out of our way to specify "non conscious forms of experience". You may reject such a notion but only because of your definition of experience as requiring consciousness or at least self awareness.

This is speculative philosophy so there is a lot of room for different points of view about mind in nature which is fine. I cannot prove my point of view with empirical data or experiments. Subjective experience by its very nature is beyond the realm of measurement, quantification or direct observation. The only criteria I like to see applied is that such speculations do not deny or ignore whatever scientific information or data are available.

Having said this and taking note of your claim to some form of panpsychism.

Where in the chain of nature do you speculate mind begins or ends?
The same for consciousness?
Let's work with just those few terms at the moment, since the other terms may result in language
disputes.

I don't know what you mean, but it's highly likely I haven't done whatever you're complaining about. — AmadeusD

I am not complaining and I am trying not to argue, just trying to explore each others ideas and concepts.

These are reactions you're describing, not responses.[/quote}
— AmadeusD

We have no evidence of this run-up, and we're pretty damn good at finding gradual processes in the records. — AmadeusD

False. — AmadeusD

Experience means subjective awareness of one's own life/circumstances. — AmadeusD

These are all opinions stated as facts which I am sure i do as well.

One point I would stress is that 'consciousness' far exceeds 'what I am consciously aware of'. After all, you're not consciously aware of cell mitosis and digestion and all the other parasympathetic and autonomic processes maintaining your organism, but should they be disrupted or cease, then you'll become aware of it very quickly indeed (or not, in the case of death). As in Indian consciousness researcher put it:

Consciousness in the Indian tradition is more than an experience of awareness. It is a fundamental principle which underlies all knowing and being … the cognitive structure does not generate consciousness; it simply reflects it; and in the process limits and embellishes it. In a fundamental sense, consciousness is the source of our awareness. In other words, consciousness is not merely awareness as manifest in different forms but it is also what makes awareness possible … It is the light which illuminates the things on which it shines. — K. Ramakrishna Rao

Which brings up the language problem of how one defines "consciousness" as opposed to terms like sub conscience and unconscious.
Some would say that there is a universal consciousness of which all individual consciousness partakes. You may fall into that camp. I personally do not, at least not in that form. I think once again most people use "consciousness" to mean our self-n-reflective, inner discussive subjective experience and so without further discussion or explanation they find the assertion or speculation unreasonable. Likewise, you use the terms "awareness" and "cognition" both of which bring various interpretations to mind.

Yes, an interpretive framework is definitely needed. Whitehead's seems to be close to a form of panpsychism ('consciousness everywhere'), which, while I can sympathise, I've already questioned in a previous post.

I fully endorse that phrase of his, 'outside subjectivity nothing whatever', but I interpret its meaning differently. I don't mean that there is some invisible meta-mind - like Berkeley's God - holding everything in existence. What that means to me, is that outside the constructive activities of mind, there can be no conception of anything whatever. So that even though, in the empirical sense, we can picture and analyse the world prior to the arrival of h.sapiens, even that activity is in an obvious sense, still mind-dependent, in that it relies on perspective and measurement. What the world is outside of or apart from that is an empty question. (More in keeping with Buddhist philosophy, which is a kind of moderated realism.)

That's what I mean by saying that the idea of consciousness as 'conscious awareness' is fallacious. Consciousness in the broader sense comprises the entire framework within which knowledge is obtained in the first place. The mistake of naturalism is to then try to understand that process in consciousness from the outside, so to speak, as something objective or external, when it is implicit in the very act of knowing.