But your perception is limited so your arguments could not be rational or logical if you depend on them. — MoK

Perception is the origin of knowledge. Without perception, you are a blind and deaf.

Perception is the origin of knowledge. But without perception, you are a blind and deaf. — Corvus

Correct. But I talk about your perception rather than perception in general. Do you think that you can figure out everything alone?

Correct. But I talk about your perception rather than perception in general. Do you think that you can figure out everything alone? — MoK

One can only access one's own perception. But the rational and logical analysis on the contents of perception is the basis of object knowledge.

If one misuses rational analysis on the contents of the perception, then he misunderstands the world. I was just pointing out the misuse and misconception of your analysis and claims.

One can only access one's own perception. But the rational and logical analysis on the contents of perception is the basis of object knowledge. — Corvus

So, according to you, that is the Sun that moves around Earth? That is the only thing that you perceive! So please explain how you could conclude otherwise!

If one misuses rational analysis on the contents of the perception, then he misunderstands the world. I was just pointing out the misuse and misconception of your analysis and claims. — Corvus

Do you have faith in what other people, experts in other fields of study, say?

So, according to you, that is the Sun that moves around Earth? That is the only thing that you perceive! So please explain how you could conclude otherwise! — MoK

I never said that. You are saying it. :D

Do you have faith in what other people, experts in other fields of study, say? — MoK

I have faith in the folks with rational minds and claims.

So Earth is subject to rotation all the time? Yes or no?

So Earth is subject to rotation all the time? Yes or no? — MoK

Earth is off-topic for this thread. The topic is "Physical cannot be the cause of its own change".

You need to demonstrate if physical objects change on their own. Or at least explain, what you mean by that statement.

Earth is off-topic for this thread. The topic is "Physical cannot be the cause of its own change". — Corvus

It is not off-topic if we accept that Earth is subject to change. That is an example of a physical that is subject to change and does not a need a mind to observe it. So again, Earth is subject to rotation all the time whether one observe it or not? Yes or no?

You need to demonstrate if physical objects change on their own. Or at least explain, what you mean by that statement. — Corvus

We have a long way to get there. First, let's see if we agree on motion of a physical in time.

I can show you have an understanding is wrong if you accept that you and baseball are on Earth and Earth is a moving object. — MoK

Relative to what!?

Motion is relative to other bodies says most every physicist and on a practical level a great many philosophers on the topic matter. So the assertion, 'this thing moves.' Makes no sense unless you assert what it is moving relative to. Movement is not a property it's a relation. The Earth does not move relative to the Baseball. Relative to an inertial frame at the center of mass of the solar system the Earth would then be moving in a roughly circular trajectory.

This is why people in the past have distinguished, as Descartes did, between the gross everyday motion of objects that depends on reference frames compared to say the proper motion of objects collectively away from or towards each other. This is distinguished further from dynamical influences.

Forces cause accelerations. . . but accelerations are not forces nor do they imply their presence. Einstein's GR thought experiment for example along with Newton's sixth corollary attest to this.

Otherwise, you would be able to say a car has a force on it as a result of inference from the acceleration but because nothing inside the car is moving relative to the driver they would say there is no force or external influence perturbing them! Which is nonsense.

There can be perturbing influences which effect the states of things yet not have their be any relational changes take place such as a change of place. The things that would change would then have to be other sorts of non-relational properties. Which could be fairly abstract such as whether certain abstract conservation principles are locally conserved, the charge of particles, their spin possibilities, etc.

I am a condensed matter physicist by training. I studied particle physics and cosmology in depth before pursuing my Ph.D. in condensed matter physics. That was however 30 years ago and I changed my subject of study from condensed matter physics to epidemiology and now I have settled down on philosophy. — MoK

Which doesn't excuse you from not being able to understand the difference between reality and the metaphors you use to talk about it.

Nature is composed of no more billiard balls and water waves than economics is really a bunch of tubes filled with water because you can easily model it as such.

Ergo, you need to make it expressly clear how you understand where your concepts end and reality is meant to begin.

Yes, it is a false assumption in contemporary physics. I didn't want to get involved in more detail here since that requires a knowledge of quantum field theory. But here you go as you asked for it: The motion of an electron for example is produced with two field operators, namely the annihilation field operator and the creation field operator. So how does it work? The annihilation field operator first acts on the ground state that contains one electron and destroys the electron so we are left with the vacuum state. The creation field operator then acts on the vacuum state and creates a new electron in another place later. So, a simple electron that is subject to motion in space is not the same one in different stances of time. — MoK

Such a literal reading of the highly abstract creation/annihilation operators in quantum mechanics is not the only interpretation or language one could potentially use to talk about them.

It is not off-topic if we accept that Earth is subject to change. That is an example of a physical that is subject to change and does not a need a mind to observe it. So again, Earth is subject to rotation all the time whether one observe it or not? Yes or no? — MoK

Earth or electron are not good example for physical here. Because as you have seen, they are not directly perceptible objects, which easily confuse you onto mixing up the arguments.

The baseball was a good example. You can see it, hold it, place it on the desk, you can drop it, or throw it, and observe if it moves or changes. But whatever you do, don't confuse it with Earth or electron.

If you are not happy with baseball example, then MoK could be a good example, if you prefer. You can observe MoK, because you are MoK. You cannot be mistaken MoK for the Earth or electron.

Let us know whatever example you prefer to discuss on the change of physical issue.

Relative to what!? — substantivalism

I wanted to discuss the relative motion with him later. We know by fact that Earth is a moving object though since it rotates around its axis, it moves around the Sun, and the Sun moves as well in the Milky Galaxy. etc.

Which doesn't excuse you from not being able to understand the difference between reality and the metaphors you use to talk about it. — substantivalism

What metaphors are you talking about?

Nature is composed of no more billiard balls and water waves than economics is really a bunch of tubes filled with water because you can easily model it as such. — substantivalism

I don't understand how the cited book is relevant to our discussion. Do you mind elaborating?

Ergo, you need to make it expressly clear how you understand where your concepts end and reality is meant to begin. — substantivalism

Reality is what the mind indirectly experiences through our senses. However, it exists independently of the mind. Concepts are experienced directly by the mind and constructed by neurobiological processes in the brain.

Such a literal reading of the highly abstract creation/annihilation operators in quantum mechanics is not the only interpretation or language one could potentially use to talk about them. — substantivalism

Could you give me an example of another interpretation you have in mind? I am aware of Bohmian's interpretation and others if that is what you have in mind.

Ok, let's consider a moving baseball for the sake of discussion.

I wanted to discuss the relative motion with him later. We know by fact that Earth is a moving object though since it rotates around its axis, it moves around the Sun, and the Sun moves as well in the Milky Galaxy. etc. — MoK

Those are relative changes not monadic ones. You can undo them or even make them disappear as if they never happened by just being in the same reference frame as the ball.

Motion is a poor thing to appeal to when talking about physical changes as it is dependent on the observer.

What metaphors are you talking about? — MoK

When physicist talk about reality they use analogies to everyday experiences and things they are more familiar with. This is why early pre-Socratic philosophers despite their lack of access to modern scientific advancements held similar atomist views as we currently do because, aside from dogmatic tradition, there was no other way they could explain how they think the unseen works.

Modern day science does the same through the usages of analogue models. Such as the Rutherford atom that makes analogies to the solar system to talk about atomic structure. Probabilistic interpretations of Schrodinger's equation fall into this although a mechanistic interpretation based on seeing a formal analogy to hydrodynamical phenomena is also possible.

General relativity also has these by virtue of its non-literal 'curvature' metaphors used to talk about it which are sometimes actually bolstered by actual reformulations of GR as an elastic medium or a fluid of sinks/sources.

Whatever is responsible for setting off a particle detector aren't water waves, probability wave functions, elastic vibrations in a medium, billiards, or tiny solar systems. These are all explicit fantasies but useful ones and the language we use to talk about how things are or what properties they really have are MIXED IN OR PERVADED by such things. So saying how much you've learned in your career in terms of applied theory tells me nothing about if you actually are able to tell the difference here. When you say electron and list its properties are you talking about those properties that a fictional analogue model ascribe to it or those which are mind-independent?

For example, classical physicists ascribed to nature solidity or the inability to interpenetrate by mere intuitive dictate as a result of the analogue models they used. There is no experiment that can showcase whether interpenetration such as sometimes proposed in the case of bosons is really possible. Modern day contrarians would still contend that any example of boson overlapping could be redefined in terms of mere greater field intensity rather than individualized entities occupying the same space.

Could you give me an example of another interpretation you have in mind? I am aware of Bohmian's interpretation and others if that is what you have in mind. — MoK

I'm using interpretation in a different light. By interpretation I'd mean through the usage of analogue models how you understand those operators.

Those are relative changes — substantivalism

Ok, I got your point and I agree.

When you say electron and list its properties are you talking about those properties that a fictional analogue model ascribe to it or those which are mind-independent? — substantivalism

I am talking about the mind-independent entity that exists and has a set of properties. Whether an electron is fundamental or not is another question.

Ok, I got your point and I agree. — MoK

Use a different example of a possible monadic property that you can ascribe time to. A quick example would be color. Maybe the spin of a particle because under certain interpretations or understanding of that its not literally a spinning magnetic top it just has an inherent magnetic moment intrinsic to it.

Appeals to non-relational properties as paradigmatic examples to bolster changes over time. That would help.

I am talking about the mind-independent entity that exists and has a set of properties. Whether an electron is fundamental or not is another question. — MoK

The more vague or uncertain you keep those declared properties the better in altogether confidence. You can still use any assortment of analogies in your arguments and the opposition would have to only disagree with the consequences of this analogizing.

Use a different example of a possible monadic property that you can ascribe time to. A quick example would be color. — substantivalism

Are you talking about the color of an object? An object does not have a color. The color is the manifestation of neural processes in the brain.

Maybe the spin of a particle because under certain interpretations or understanding of that its not literally a spinning magnetic top it just has an inherent magnetic moment intrinsic to it. — substantivalism

I don't think that spin is a good example since I have difficulty convincing people that an electron is an example of a physical!

Appeals to non-relational properties as paradigmatic examples to bolster changes over time. That would help. — substantivalism

Non-relational/intrinsic properties are preserved during the time so I need relational properties to explain a change.

Are you talking about the color of an object? An object does not have a color. The color is the manifestation of neural processes in the brain. — MoK

Which is irrelevant. Is it grammatically the case in ordinary language that we use the word color to ascribe a relation or property?

I don't think that spin is a good example since I have difficulty convincing people that an electron is an example of a physical! — MoK

Technically, your job is actually tremendously even more difficult as you have to define what it means to be physical. Numerous approaches to doing so have they own deficits:

Via negativa - Is to define the physical in terms of what it is not which is a fruitful enough approach but some would say it doesn't tell you much. . . and it doesn't because it avoids direct positive clarification.

Ordinary objects - This is the intuitive direction many go initially seeing the physical as a cluster concept of sorts but then its still plagued by some peculiar web of decisions as to what you include in the definition of the physical. Causation, spatial location, solidity, interpenetration, etc. Which has notoriously changed over time.

Theory based conceptions - These are the popular attempts at defining the physical in terms of the entities postulated from future ideal theories or our best current ones. Course, this is met with easy objections from the purview of something like Hempel's dilemma.

You need to weaken your position as its too strong as it appears to others. If by the physical you mean to say what kinds of things ACTUALLY exist then this forces them to ask you, ". . . but how do you know that?!" You could weaken it by taking a conceptual possibility approach as is commonly practiced in metaphysics saying something along the lines of, "I don't know if things in nature have these properties but lets assume they do then. . . this follows. . ."

Approach it from the angle of pure math. Make some axiomatic assumptions and then argue their consequences. This doesn't excuse you from needing to make them as specific as possible or making explicit what axioms you do need to get to where you need to go.

Non-relational/intrinsic properties are preserved during the time so I need relational properties to explain a change. — MoK

. . . but those relational properties are dependent on the frame of reference and its sort of peculiar to assign them casual powers or any mind independent existence at all.

Despite that a problem remains. If you have an entire universe composed of nothing but a ball that never changes with regards to relational properties as no other things exist to compare it to then how can we say that each 'frame' of this universal movie of ours is any different to previous ones if the universe is always the same in each? What do we appeal to here?

Which is irrelevant. Is it grammatically the case in ordinary language that we use the word color to ascribe a relation or property? — substantivalism

An object just seems to have a property such as color. An object is made of elementary particles each has a set of intrinsic properties, such as mass, and extrinsic properties, such as location. The color therefore is neither an intrinsic property nor an extrinsic property of the elementary particles. An object, therefore, does not have any color. The color is just the result of the neurobiological process in the brain. These processes are due to the existence of the sense vision. The vision is the result of the interaction of light with the retina. The light is however emitted from an object. So it is the light that is emitted from an object that determines what color we are going to perceive.

Technically, your job is actually tremendously even more difficult as you have to define what it means to be physical. Numerous approaches to doing so have they own deficits: — substantivalism

I gave several examples of instruments that detect electrons, such as the screen in the double-slit experiment or cloud chamber, but they wanted an example of something that they could only directly see!

Via negativa - Is to define the physical in terms of what it is not which is a fruitful enough approach but some would say it doesn't tell you much. . . and it doesn't because it avoids direct positive clarification. — substantivalism

I don't think that tells much either.

Ordinary objects - This is the intuitive direction many go initially seeing the physical as a cluster concept of sorts but then its still plagued by some peculiar web of decisions as to what you include in the definition of the physical. Causation, spatial location, solidity, interpenetration, etc. Which has notoriously changed over time. — substantivalism

The ordinary object could be useful but it has its own problem since the motion of the object is perceived in psychological time which is not the time that I am considering that an object exists in the different instants of it.

Theory based conceptions - These are the popular attempts at defining the physical in terms of the entities postulated from future ideal theories or our best current ones. Course, this is met with easy objections from the purview of something like Hempel's dilemma. — substantivalism

I have enough training for this approach but this approach is heavily based on the experiments that they constantly deny. They just want an example of something they can see! I feel very frustrated sometimes thinking that it is hopeless to discuss things with these individuals!

Approach it from the angle of pure math. Make some axiomatic assumptions and then argue their consequences. This doesn't excuse you from needing to make them as specific as possible or making explicit what axioms you do need to get to where you need to go. — substantivalism

I may do that.

. . . but those relational properties are dependent on the frame of reference and its sort of peculiar to assign them casual powers or any mind independent existence at all. — substantivalism

Correct. But I have to deal with what I have.

An object just seems to have a property such as color. . . The color therefore is neither an intrinsic property nor an extrinsic property of the elementary particles. An object, therefore, does not have any color. The color is just the result of the neurobiological process in the brain. These processes are due to the existence of the sense vision. The vision is the result of the interaction of light with the retina. The light is however emitted from an object. So it is the light that is emitted from an object that determines what color we are going to perceive. — MoK

I didn't say its mind independent, I said it was an example of a monadic property. So your arguing against nothing here.

If you want to be pedantic then, however, technically, those properties you ascribe an electron such as mass or location could also therefore be just as neurologically created.

If you've canvassed the philosophy of spacetime not everyone will agree on the reality of location being a real mind independent extrinsic property. Quantum theories of spacetime withstanding. The same with mass which is characteristic of an interaction and there is literally a whole philosophy that asks whether these sorts of features in fact exist independently of or not of other things. That is, whether mass is even an intrinsic property at all or merely a mass relation. Although that skepticism could extend to all known quantities that one ascribes things including charge, length, temporal durations, etc.

These are all dependent on external interactions which doesn't tell you if it makes sense to ask if they 'exist' independent of interaction. An object has mass because of the way its accelerated but to say it still has this liquid 'mass property' even when nothing is accelerating it seems rather peculiar.

I gave several examples of instruments that detect electrons, such as the screen in the double-slit experiment or cloud chamber, but they wanted an example of something that they could only directly see! — MoK

You call what they detect an electron but beyond that you can't truly, confidently, ascribe properties to the electron unless you make your language clear as to where you analogue models or metaphors end to when you are talking directly about an electron.

Yes, the screen gives detections. What specific properties this implies you ascribe to electrons INDLCUDING INDIVIDUATION is a WHOLE different matter which is epistemological in nature and skepticism can always creep in. This is why scientific instrumentalism and operationalism are popular perspectives. An electron is just defined as what a particular device detects or a certain kind of reading.

What properties does it have? That is a nonsense question to the instrumentalist or operationalist as experiments don't tell you what fundamental intrinsic properties things have.

The ordinary object could be useful but it has its own problem since the motion of the object is perceived in psychological time which is not the time that I am considering that an object exists in the different instants of it. — MoK

Then your time may be an abstraction, as a good number of other philosophers have claimed, from psychological time and not as 'real' you think it is.

I have enough training for this approach but this approach is heavily based on the experiments that they constantly deny. They just want an example of something they can see! I feel very frustrated sometimes thinking that it is hopeless to discuss things with these individuals! — MoK

Physicist and philosophers alike would be even more frustrating as those with the same training in your fields can be just as skeptical. Instrumentalists, operationalists, and various neo-positivists can admit EVERYTHING from the experiments you talk of to the math you use yet still feel its not enough to justify the claims one makes about what things are out there. What properties they absolutely have, etc.

That is why I say you should weaken your position otherwise your arguing something which has been argued to death for some thousand years. The scientific realism vs. anti-realism discussion and you should make you argument independent of that.

If you want to be pedantic then, however, technically, those properties you ascribe an electron such as mass or location could also therefore be just as neurologically created. — substantivalism

The trace of motion of an electron in a cloud chamber is real but we cannot observe it until we look at it.

If you've canvassed the philosophy of spacetime not everyone will agree on the reality of location being a real mind independent extrinsic property. — substantivalism

Ok, I read about that a long time ago I have a faint memory of that right now.

The same with mass which is characteristic of an interaction and there is literally a whole philosophy that asks whether these sorts of features in fact exist independently of or not of other things. That is, whether mass is even an intrinsic property at all or merely a mass relation. Although that skepticism could extend to all known quantities that one ascribes things including charge, length, temporal durations, etc. — substantivalism

Ok, thanks for the reference. I will look at it later.

You call what they detect an electron but beyond that you can't truly, confidently, ascribe properties to the electron unless you make your language clear as to where you analogue models or metaphors end to when you are talking directly about an electron. — substantivalism

We have an electron gun, two slits, and a screen in the double-slit experiment—the electron gun works based on the photoelectric effect producing electrons with a specific speed. Electrons affect the screen producing different spots each spot is related to the contact of an electron with the screen. These are basic stuff. I don't know what to say if someone wants to deny these.

Yes, the screen gives detections. What specific properties this implies you ascribe to electrons INDLCUDING INDIVIDUATION is a WHOLE different matter which is epistemological in nature and skepticism can always creep in. — substantivalism

I am not interested in discussing other properties of an electron here, but its location. There was a point where an electron was emitted from the gun, it then traveled and hit the screen. So there are two points in time where the electron was in locations L1 and L2. I don't see how one can deny that.

Then your time may be an abstraction, as a good number of other philosophers have claimed, from psychological time and not as 'real' you think it is. — substantivalism

My time is different from psychological time and it is necessary for any change. I have an argument for it as follows: Consider a change in the state of something, X to Y, where X and Y are two states that define the change. X and Y cannot lay on the same point since otherwise these states occur simultaneously and there cannot be any change. Therefore, X and Y must lay on different points of a variable, let's call these points tx and ty. ty, however, comes after tx to allow Y to come after X. This variable is called time.

That is why I say you should weaken your position otherwise your arguing something which has been argued to death for some thousand years. The scientific realism vs. anti-realism discussion and you should make you argument independent of that. — substantivalism

All I need is an example of a physical that everybody agrees with.

The trace of motion of an electron in a cloud chamber is real but we cannot observe it until we look at it. — MoK

Exactly! It's interactions with its environment are clear but its locality or other such properties which are not merely tagged on by virtue of our measurement devices or senses is but a different matter.

We have an electron gun, two slits, and a screen in the double-slit experiment—the electron gun works based on the photoelectric effect producing electrons with a specific speed. Electrons affect the screen producing different spots each spot is related to the contact of an electron with the screen. These are basic stuff. I don't know what to say if someone wants to deny these. — MoK

You agree with them because the collapse of a wave function is an open problem and whether an electron is all there at the screen or not depends on the analogue model you use (or interpretation if you like that word better).

Whether it's the Cheshire cat collapse of Copenhagen or something more extended as in Bohm wave theory or even more peculiar and non-precise as in a full fledged quantum field theory.

I am not interested in discussing other properties of an electron here, but its location. There was a point where an electron was emitted from the gun, it then traveled and hit the screen. So there are two points in time where the electron was in locations L1 and L2. I don't see how one can deny that. — MoK

Many interpretations actually deny just that. Some say an electron travels all the possible feynmenn paths and others ascribe an indisputable extension out to infinity for an electron seeing its wave function as a fundamental part of it.

The only thing we are confident in is that the interaction is fully localized, the measurement, not the thing that did the perturbing.

A buoy can be perturbed in an open ocean in a consistent up and down fashion but it doesn't really make sense to say the wave doing it is all at the buoy as its extension is far larger.

All I need is an example of a physical that everybody agrees with. — MoK

Well you are not going to find those in the atomic or sub-atomic as those are where the least amount of agreement is localized.

My time is different from psychological time and it is necessary for any change. I have an argument for it as follows: Consider a change in the state of something, X to Y, where X and Y are two states that define the change. X and Y cannot lay on the same point since otherwise these states occur simultaneously and there cannot be any change. Therefore, X and Y must lay on different points of a variable, let's call these points tx and ty. ty, however, comes after tx to allow Y to come after X. This variable is called time. — MoK

When you say these states X and Y are they in the past/present/future respectively?

As a naive presentist would say, if any of these states are in the future/past then they are made up fictions which correspond to nothing. Past things or future things don't exist but we can play the game of pretending they are real but imagination is not coincident with the real. If they are present then they exist in an intuitive fashion but there isn't a different 'real' state to compare its change to as no other state exists to compare it to. What now?

Exactly! It's interactions with its environment are clear but its locality or other such properties which are not merely tagged on by virtue of our measurement devices or senses is but a different matter. — substantivalism

The particle's location is well defined, as one can see its slow motion in a cloud chamber. I am not interested in the other properties of particles here.

You agree with them because the collapse of a wave function is an open problem and whether an electron is all there at the screen or not depends on the analogue model you use (or interpretation if you like that word better).

Whether it's the Cheshire cat collapse of Copenhagen or something more extended as in Bohm wave theory or even more peculiar and non-precise as in a full fledged quantum field theory. — substantivalism

I think De Broglie–Bohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics is the right one since it is paradox-free.

Many interpretations actually deny just that. Some say an electron travels all the possible feynmenn paths and others ascribe an indisputable extension out to infinity for an electron seeing its wave function as a fundamental part of it. — substantivalism

The Feynman path integral formulation although is a very strong formulation for calculation is incoherent. If we accept an electron as an entity then it cannot travel in different paths with different weights. The same for particle-wave duality in the Copenhagen interpretation. All problems are resolved if we accept the De Broglie–Bohm interpretation as a correct interpretation of quantum mechanics. The particle in this interpretation has a definite position in space in terms of time.

Well you are not going to find those in the atomic or sub-atomic as those are where the least amount of agreement is localized. — substantivalism

They are localized according to observation, cloud chamber slow-motion for example. Physicists think that elementary particles have no definitive position because they cannot explain diffraction patterns in the double-slit experiment by considering an electron as a particle only. I don't understand why they resist De Broglie–Bohm's interpretation. I know that Feynman's path integral formulation is an easy and elegant way of calculating physical properties and functions but that does not mean that it is a correct interpretation.

When you say these states X and Y are they in the past/present/future respectively? — substantivalism

X exists at now and Y exists at the immediate future.

As a naive presentist would say, if any of these states are in the future/past then they are made up fictions which correspond to nothing. Past things or future things don't exist but we can play the game of pretending they are real but imagination is not coincident with the real. If they are present then they exist in an intuitive fashion but there isn't a different 'real' state to compare its change to as no other state exists to compare it to. What now? — substantivalism

Presentism is false since it cannot explain change and cause and effect. Accepting presentism means that cause and effect exist at now. Cause and effect however cannot lay at the same point in time since the cause and effect become simultaneous and there cannot be any change therefore if we accept that the cause exists at now then the effect must exist at the immediate future.