I was thinking more of Aristotle. — Banno

What was his view?

:chin: Virtue ethics. Growth.

Virtue ethics. Growth. — Banno

But how do you know which direction to grow in? An external set of rules? Or things you were born knowing (as in Meno's Paradox).

But how do you know which direction to grow in? An external set of rules? Or things you were born knowing (as in Meno's Paradox). — frank

Bootstrapping.

Bootstrapping — Banno

A computer bootstraps from ROM. You're not a blank slate. Some things are innate, and brought out by experience.

A computer bootstraps from ROM. — frank

And you are not born into an abyss.

And you are not born into an abyss. — Banno

:up:

:up: :up:

I don't see how a moral statement can be considered truth-apt. I believe morality is rooted in emotion (though I don't necessarily subscribe to emotivism or expressivism) and also involves intersubjective agreements - cultural values. — Tom Storm

I'm not a fan of the "truth-apt" language. I look at truth, and other concepts like knowledge in terms of their use (language games), so my take is very broad. I'm very much a Wittgensteinian in this sense. I don't think I would agree that morality is rooted in emotion. Although there is obviously an emotional component. I think generally morality is rooted in the harm done, i.e., X is immoral because of the harm it causes. However, this is not always the case I'm sure there are exceptions. I agree that it does involve "intersubjective agreements" and "cultural values," but I also think there is an objective component to moral values.

I don't see how a moral statement can be considered truth-apt. — Tom Storm

And yet they are. It goes with the territory of "statement"
:down: :down:

I think generally morality is rooted in the harm done, i.e., X is immoral because of the harm it causes. — Sam26

When you say "morality is about harm done," it seems to me thsi is expressing an emotional reaction to harm. How does harm become objective? I can see hwo if you accept harm as a presupposition, you can then set objective steps towards its minimization.

I don't see how a moral statement can be considered truth-apt.
— Tom Storm

And yet they are. It goes with the territory of "statement" — Banno

Can you show me how stealing is wrong is truth apt?

Can you show me how stealing is wrong is truth apt? — Tom Storm

Odd.

It is true that stealing is wrong.

"Stealing is wrong" is false.

Two points: moral statements are statements, and statements are generally truth apt - the sort of thing that is either true or false.

And if they are not truth apt they cannot participate in rationalising our actions. They cannot, for example be used in syllogisms, such as "Stealing is wrong, one ought not do what is wrong, therefore one ought not steal".

Seems the thread has moved off topic to attempts to explain or even justify totalitarianism... I wonder why that is topical? Seems to be a common theme on the fora at present. — Banno

A lot of people are running around claiming that democracy is broken. There is a suggestion that we need a "strong man" leader. I could write a bitter speech about that, and about the strong men who have so far emerged. None of them seem to be strong enough to stand up to democractic scrutiny, so they are not strong enough to satisfy me.

There are moral truths, at least, in that some statements are both moral and true. I usually use "Don't kick puppies for fun" as a trite example. "Don't kick puppies for fun" is true. If someone disagrees, that's not so much about the truth of the sentence as about their moral character - that is, they are wrong. — Banno

It seems that there are indeed moral truths. On the other hand, while I agree that anyone who disagrees shows something about their moral character, I don't think the same applies to a statement like "Water consists of H2O". Someone who disagrees with that reveals their cognitive incompetence.
Moral truths, we could say, are in a different category from facts of the matter. The difference is that moral truths have an illocutionary (?) force. "One ought not to kick puppies" implies "Do not kick puppies". Hume was not wrong IMO. If you doubt him, see Aristotle "Reason, by itself, moves nothing" (NE VI, I think). Moral values, like other kinds of value, are what move human beings.
That might reconcile the argument between you and @frank.

By the same reasoning, the sentence is not something that needs justification. ↪Sam26 might count it as a given, a hinge, or a bedrock belief.
We might, heading back to the topic of this tread, ponder if it is an act of faith. I think it more an act of common decency. Thoughts? — Banno

I really don't follow the idea that "one ought not kick puppies" needs no justification. I would agree that a more general principle such as "one ought not to torment beings weaker than oneself" or "bullying is wrong" is not subject to justification.

The terms "given" and "bedrock" and "hinge" are all different. The latter, on my understanding are protected in a given debate, but might not be protected in a differently framed debate. The same applies fo "given", except that, like an axiom, it usually means a starting-point for a ratiocination. "Bedrock" seems more like an absolute to me - unquestionable in all contexts. So I'm broadly with you and @Sam26 on this.

I hesitate to say that accepting such statements is an act of faith, although they do seem to be related. Basic religious beliefs do seem to be functioning in this territory, but doubt and disbelief are not ruled out, which would make them different from "given" and "bedrock" and "hinge". But, since one can be true to (faithful to?) one's principles or not, I'm inclined to think that they fit in well with faith.

PS I have to sign out now.

The difference is that moral truths have an illocutionary (?) force. — Ludwig V

Yep. The force of some statements is "Things are thus". We change the words to match how the world is. The force of some other statements is "Things should be thus", and we change the world to fit the words. That's why you can't get an ought form an is - there's a change in direction, an about-face.

That "one ought not kick puppies" needs no justification does not mean it cannot be justified, as you suggest in terms of more general rules. It's just that if someone is told not to kick the pup, and they ask "Why not?", they are missing something important, which is not found in "Becasue bullying is wrong" but seen in what they think it OK to do.

I hesitate to say that accepting such statements is an act of faith — Ludwig V

Good.

Can you show me how stealing is wrong is truth apt?
— Tom Storm

Odd.

It is true that stealing is wrong.

"Stealing is wrong" is false. — Banno

But stealing may be permissible in certain circumstances or not harmful and even do good. How do you make the journey from such a statement (which seems to reflect context, preference and emotion) into truth?

Whether it is true is a very different question to whether it is truth-apt.

it usually means a starting-point for a ratiocination. "Bedrock" seems more like an absolute to me - unquestionable in all contexts. So I'm broadly with you and Sam26 on this. — Ludwig V

I don't hold to the view that Wittgensteinian hinges are necessarily absolute. In fact, most of them are not. For example, the rules of chess are hinges and they aren't absolute (absolute meaning they can't be other than they are). Most are contingent.

Yep. The bedrock metaphor is not as good as the riverbed metaphor. The bed remains relatively fixed.

Bedrock for me refers to hinges that are more fixed than other hinges. Hinges are layered, some more fixed than others, but the riverbed works well too. Nowhere does Wittgenstein use the word absolute so I stay away from that in most cases. Some hinges are absolute. For example, we are a body separate from other bodies.

“Necessary“ should probably be used in its quite specific modal fashion. “Absolute“ is pretty ill defined, and probably a nonsense word. It would be interesting to do a catalogue of hinge terms and bedrock terms and riverbed terms and so on.

…we need a "strong man" leader. — Ludwig V

Lord, preserve us from strong men.

There are two criteria that are used to distinguish between tyrants and sovereigns. One is that they are benevolent, at least in the sense that they try to do what is right. The other is that they are subject to the law. — Ludwig V

Maybe I was overly literal in the words' etymological meaning: with both tyrant and monarch being loose synonyms for despot, i.e. a single ruler with absolute power, in their etymological sense. With that acknowledged:

There of course are exceptions to most every generalization, and I’m by now confident that you will disagree with what I have to say. But with all of humankind’s history to look back on, I don’t find your two criteria indicative of what was and in many an area still is. The mythos of the noncorrupt and benevolent sovereign is much like the mythos that nobility is of noble character. I grant that my knowledge of history is not encyclopedic, but, given the span of human history I know of, most of the time things have not worked out this way.

So I more than greatly doubt your claim that these two criteria distinguish tyrants from sovereigns in practice - if that is indeed what you intended to say. Can you substantiate what you've here expressed beyond references to a) mythoi regarding what sovereignty is and ought to be and b) the potential historical exception that breaks the rule?

The statement "stealing is illegal" is true, verifiable by looking the law up to see see what it says.

But the writing of law is our societal idiosyncracy. Some cultures just have their elders speak their laws, and some may just know them from watching the behavior of others. Verification is achieved by just watching what people do.

In fact, societal laws are known by the vast number without ever having read a legal book. Even those who believe morality arises from its appearance in the Bible must admit they know morality despite never having read the Bible.

Substitute "law" for "morality" in all cases. It's no different in terms of how it's verifiable.

As @frank noted some time ago. The morality/legality distinction is not something universal. That's just our peculiar state/religion distinction we've created. The Torah, for example, provides the direction for everything. It all comes from God in that tradition.

How this links to the OP is the question. We can have morality, law, social norms, etiquette, manners and all such things without any belief in a higher power. Wolves and chickens have their complex social roles too.

The foundation of these norms is the metapysical question. Do we have them just to facilitate survival and therefore ingrained in our DNA? Or do they come from a higher source of wisdom directing us toward higher purpose? If you choose the latter, you have no way of asserting that than faith. The consequence of denying the higher power is to be a complex wolf or chicken though. That worldview is lesser i'd submit.

Whether it is true is a very different question to whether it is truth-apt. — Banno

Yes, but my point, perhaps badly worded, is that if the statement 'stealing is wrong' amounts to no more than the emotivist's "boo stealing!" This can't be truth-apt. I'm not convinced yet that the emotivist is wrong about this.

We can still argue that stealing often leads to social disharmony and suffering and if we find this discomforting the inference is obvious.

I bet you hate emotivism. :wink:

The Torah, for example, provides the direction for everything — Hanover

Including infectious disease control. It's like a blueprint for a civilization in a little package.

I never mentioned

humanism, secularism, rationalism, and existentialism — praxis

it's not that they are "tame" but that they are philosophical perspectives, not dogmatic ideologies.

On the contrary, such an ad hoc approach to social engineering is quite rational, as Popper argued in The Poverty of Historicism. By not adhering to a fixed constitution, the British system allows for more responsive, piecemeal reforms rather than trying to impose a grand, all-encompassing plan. — Banno

Good point. I should have thought of it.

So I more than greatly doubt your claim that these two criteria distinguish tyrants from sovereigns in practice - if that is indeed what you intended to say. — javra

I would agree with you. There's a tendency to use "tyrant" and "sovereign" as boo/hoorah words. I was reporting what people have said. I did not intend to endorse it.

It's just that if someone is told not to kick the pup, and they ask "Why not?", they are missing something important, which is not found in "Becasue bullying is wrong" but seen in what they think it OK to do. — Banno

I take your point. But I think it is a bit more complicated than you seem to think. I agree that it is probably true that most people do refrain from kicking puppies without being explicitly taught not to. On the whole, it seems that people do manage to understand what the rules are without explicit instruction, from observing what goes on around them.

However, there used to be a practice, I'm told, of some children, of picking the wings off flies and then watching their futile buzzing with amusement. Suppose we came across such a case. They are deficient in their understanding. Or, small children often treat their siblings or companion animals in ways that are cruel, not because they are wicked, but because they don't understand what they are doing. So we need to teach them. That might be authoritarian - "don't do that, or else" - or it might be persuasive - and that's where the arguments/justifications come in.

But stealing may be permissible in certain circumstances or not harmful and even do good. How do you make the journey from such a statement (which seems to reflect context, preference and emotion) into truth? — Tom Storm

I'm not sure about preference and emotion, but truth is certainly context-dependent.

Bedrock for me refers to hinges that are more fixed than other hinges. Hinges are layered, some more fixed than others, but the riverbed works well too. — Sam26

It's not unusual for Wittgenstein to express a point in several different ways. I'm never sure that's because he is drawing our attention to subtleties or because he wants to avoid getting trapped into a fixed form dogma. So I don't have a problem with what you say.

“Absolute“ is pretty ill defined, and probably a nonsense word. — Banno

I agree. I expressed my point badly.

The consequence of denying the higher power is to be a complex wolf or chicken though. That worldview is lesser i'd submit. — Hanover

By what criterion? What's wrong with being a complex wolf or chicken? Why do you have to create a hierarchy here?

The statement "stealing is illegal" is true, verifiable by looking the law up to see see what it says. — Hanover

Yes. That and the prospect of enforcement are the difference between law and morality. Yet I agree that they blur into each other - as in "you ought to obey the law" as a moral, not just a prudential, rule.

if the statement 'stealing is wrong' amounts to no more than the emotivist's "boo stealing!" This can't be truth-apt. — Tom Storm

Emotions are not simply "expressions" like "ouch!" or "boo". They include a cognitive element, which is identified when we say "I am angry because..." or "I am afraid of..." "boo stealing" includes the belief that the addressee has taken possession of something that does not belong to them. Yet if I were to characterize your anger as true, I would be understood as saying, not that your anger is justified, but that it is real, not pretended. When the belief driving an emotion is false, we talk of the emotion as irrational or inappropriate. So emotions are indeed not themselves true or false, but have are validated or not by a claim that is true or false.

I don't like emotions or descriptions as an understanding of moral rules. Yet they include - are related to both. So a compatibilist answer is required. Perhaps something ike this. Moral rules encode our expectations and requirements of people's behaviour. There are facts of the matter whether certain rules do encode our expectations and requirements. But we do not respond to people following or violating those rules in the same way as we respond to "plain" - morally neutral - facts of the matter.

Emotions are not simply "expressions" like "ouch!" or "boo". They include a cognitive element, which is identified when we say "I am angry because..." or "I am afraid of..." "boo stealing" includes the belief that the addressee has taken possession of something that does not belong to them. — Ludwig V

Maybe, but I’m not sure. For me, emotional reactions are likely to be preconcpetual, prelinguistic experiences to which we apply post-hoc rationalizations. "I am angry because..." what follows is the post-hoc part. I've often held that human preferences are primarily directed by affective states, with rational deliberation serving as a post-hoc justification rather than the initial determinant of choice.

I don't like emotions or descriptions as an understanding of moral rules. Yet they include - are related to both. So a compatibilist answer is required. Perhaps something ike this. Moral rules encode our expectations and requirements of people's behaviour. There are facts of the matter whether certain rules do encode our expectations and requirements. But we do not respond to people following or violating those rules in the same way as we respond to "plain" - morally neutral - facts of the matter. — Ludwig V

You can be an emotivist and a compatibilist. I'm not sure what your points mean in relation to emotivism. Can you clarify this?

it's not that they [humanism, secularism, rationalism, and existentialism] are "tame" but that they are philosophical perspectives, not dogmatic ideologies. — Janus

No specific "atheistic ideology" was mentioned in your initial claim that atheistic ideologies are equally as dangerous as religious ideologies so I mentioned a few. Granted some are less ideological than others so I'll focus on what I think may be considered the most ideological.

Humanism has a consistent framework with a core set of beliefs that can guide action, it's prescriptive, and it can certainly foster a group identity. It may be 'tame' because it's open to revision, doesn't require strict adherence to specific doctrines, and encourages critical thinking and individual autonomy.

On the other hand, Stalin promoted humanist rhetoric while carrying out violent purges, and it seemed to effectively motivate the population. Fuck, I hate it when I'm wrong.