:grin:

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Why should there be only one thing that "drives" our actions or has the "primary role"?

Isn't it entirely possible for that some act be emotional disgusting or repugnant, and yet you ought do it? Ever changed a nappy? Isn't it a commonplace that you often ought do things in defiance of how you feel? What is courage? And see 's examples. The very same actions can be commendable or culpable.

Ethics as the study of interplay between intent and action, in a social context.

in a social context. — Banno

Allen murdered Shelley's son. Murder is wrong because of the way the community reacts to it, and that reaction is emotional.

One act of abuse is like a pebble in a pond, sending out waves of grief, and rage, and pain through the community. Those waves travel down through time, echoes upon echoes of the original sin.

Murder is wrong because of the way the community reacts to it, — frank

You sure about that 'because'?

First off, murder is unlawful killing. Some ways of killing are not unlawful. Is murder wrong becasue it is killing or becasue it is against the law?

Further, if the community reacts with glee, that makes it OK? Civilised countries have outlawed capital punishment, becasue they consider it immoral.

It's always a bit more complicated...

It's always a bit more complicated... — Banno

Yea. I said "first and foremost" to try to ward off the impression that there is no more to it than emotion. Emotion is the wind in that particular sail, though. Don't have any comment on weird interpretations of murder or nappies. :grin:

Allen murdered Shelley's son. Murder is wrong because of the way the community reacts to it, and that reaction is emotional. — frank

The emotivism wouldn’t say murder is wrong because of the community’s emotional reaction as if that were a causal explanation. Instead, they’d say calling murder "wrong" is an expression of the community’s emotional reaction.

As I understand it, the emotivist maintains that moral judgments aren’t factual statements about the world; they’re expressions of approval or disapproval. So when people say "murder is wrong," they’re not stating an objective fact but expressing their collective condemnation, foudned in emotions like grief, outrage, and fear. The status of murder on this view, is not an inherent property of the act but a reflection of how people feel about the act. And this is contingent upon culture language and experince. WHich is why peopel tend to share emotional reactions (for the most part).

Isn't it entirely possible for that some act be emotional disgusting or repugnant, and yet you ought do it? Ever changed a nappy? Isn't it a commonplace that you often ought do things in defiance of how you feel? What is courage? And see ↪javra's examples. The very same actions can be commendable or culpable. — Banno

Good point. I guess the response here might be that an emotivist might acknowledge that we may sometimes be compelled to act contrary to our immediate emotions, but would deny that there is an objective "ought" beyond how we feel about it.

Yes, changing a nappy might be disgusting, but if you care about the child, that feeling of care outweighs the disgust. The "ought" in that case is just another emotional response. One that wins out over revulsion.

Good point. I guess the response here might be that an emotivist might acknowledge that we may sometimes be compelled to act contrary to our immediate emotions, but would deny that there is an objective "ought" beyond how we feel about it. — Tom Storm

Hence non-cognitivism rather then emotivism, and the implication that one must think about the situation and not only about one's emotional response. One doesn't just feel, one thinks about consequences, and hence about what one wants to be the case. Setting this out as just (no more than...) an emotional response does not do it justice.

And what is the place of the word "objective" here? Would it be OK to assert that there is an "ought" in "one ought change the baby's nappy" but no ought in "objectively, one ought change the baby's nappy"?

Looking at these issues in terms of intent and action and consequences gives us a much more viable framework than "emotion". It moves from doing what you want to doing what you should, and hence away from mere egoism.

It's what you do, not what you feel or think, that counts, isn't it? — Banno

How we understand the doing -- the action -- is tied to the thoughts and feelings of the doer.

Nothing said implies it isn't. But not to the thoughts and feelings of the doer alone.

Who here thinks there is no difference between what they want and what is right?

Who here thinks there is no difference between what they want and what is right? — Banno

If you're alone on an island it's the same thing. The social aspect of morality is better explained by potent emotion rather than dead propositions.

I’ll give a short reason or two that summarizes the failure of emotivism. Emotivism can’t explain how moral language functions in arguments or conditionals (e.g., “If stealing is wrong, then murder is wrong.”), as emotional content lacks propositional coherence, which undermines it as an account of ethical reasoning.

In other words, as already mentioned, expressions of emotions aren’t truth-bearing. These statements fail where they must function as propositions to maintain meaning and inferential coherence. (This was pointed out in the Frege-Geach Problem.) These kinds of statements (“Stealing is wrong” akin to “Boo to stealing,”) cannot account for the logical role moral statements play in our ethical reasoning. Emotional statements lack what’s needed for validity. Emotional statements, again, lack a truth value.

There have been various attempts to address this issue, but in my opinion, they fail.

In fact, we don't – cannot – know that anything "comes after this life". — 180 Proof

Could be something, could be nothing.

thus, Hillel the Elder's response to the request to say the whole meaning of the Torah while standing on one foot:
What is hateful (harmful) to you, do not do to anyone.
Notice the Rabbi did not say "have faith"... — 180 Proof

An excellent answer to an obnoxious gentile; they only need to behave themselves and avoid idolatry. I'm sure after making this remark everyone cheered and then Hillel returned to Torah study or forming halakha.

Now explain Hegel to me standing on one foot.

:up:

There have been various attempts to address this issue, but in my opinion, they fail. — Sam26

We just have two different views of the nature of morality. I'm with Augustine, 'Love and do what you will.'. It's not about propositions, it's about love.

But these differences are what make the topic interesting, right?

Yes. I had in mind the possibility, for example, of someone believing that God is the final authority, but suitably cautious about thinking that they know the mind of God when it comes to what to do. — Ludwig V

That makes sense. It is not fundamentalism, The question it seems to leave me with though is: 'What use is an authority if you don't know what they want you to do?".

I'm interested in this business about total obedience and total trust. Both Abraham and Job raise it. — Ludwig V

So it's worth noting that while in the Isaac binding story Abraham exhibits this stringent faith, in the Sodom & Gomorrah story he does bargain with God. He bargains God down to 10 righteous men which are not able to be found in Sodom & Gomorrah so the cities burn.

Job is excellent in his book. He does question God. He laments the day of his birth. Yet he never curses or renounces God. He tows the line. So Job does question God yet his righteousness maintains. His reward at the end, I think, seems like it's almost tacked on and it's covered very briefly. I never read Job as expecting a reward. Personally, the notion of being adequately compensated/"rewarded" after one's family dies seems absurd to me so I always took it as perhaps some reward in the next life.

Job is timeless. Righteous men suffer for seemingly no reason all the time. Job provides a model, and that model -- that example -- makes room for questioning and lamenting.

It's a call to think about the way you see people. Do you judge by appearances? Do you assume that if someone is sick and poor, that they must have done something to deserve this? Or do you understand that it can happen to anyone of us?

Doing the right thing is an extension of love. All of it is meaningless without the reasoning behind it. My metaphysical view is that consciousness/mind is at the core of everything, and that core is love. However, moral language is an extension of that love.

I’ll give a short reason or two that summarizes the failure of emotivism. Emotivism can’t explain how moral language functions in arguments or conditionals (e.g., “If stealing is wrong, then murder is wrong.”), as emotional content lacks propositional coherence, which undermines it as an account of ethical reasoning.

In other words, as already mentioned, expressions of emotions aren’t truth-bearing. — Sam26

Indeed. As I understand it the emotivist doesn't believe in oughts or ought nots since they are just expressions of your preferences which are emotionally driven. When you say murder is wrong you are saying 'boo murder'.

In other words emotivism is not a normative ethical system that prescribes how one ought to act. It's is a theory about the nature of moral language and moral judgments. It seeks to explain where moral claims come from (namely, our emotions) instead of establish moral rules or duties.

Is it correct? I'm not sure. I'm mulling it over.

All of it is meaningless without the reasoning behind it. — Sam26

I don't think morality can be derived from any logical arguments. In fact, logic is as likely to be the ally of evil as much as good.

Good comes seeing ourselves in one another. That's probably the most mystical answer.

Is it correct? I'm not sure. I'm mulling it over. — Tom Storm

I don't see why it would be considered a good theory, but that's my view. I see much of philosophy as useless or poor epistemology, and emotivism is just one such theory.

I don't think morality can be derived from any logical arguments. In fact, logic is as likely to be the ally of evil as much as good. — frank

Logic plays an important role, but it's not the only way we justify our beliefs, it's just one of many ways. Again, as I commented to @Tom Storm an overarching view of epistemology is extremely important and Wittgenstein's ideas go a long way in answering such questions. There are many different ways we justify beliefs (many different language games), and understanding these language games helps us get the fly out of the fly-bottle. I don't agree with Wittgenstein's metaphysics, but his linguistic analysis is still the best along with Austin.

I agree that logic doesn't differentiate between good and evil, but that doesn't mean it's not useful in these discussions. Part of the problem is that we rely too much on logic, as if it's the only source of our justifications. It reminds me of people who continually rely on science as if it's the only good source of knowledge. It may in some cases be more precise, but it depends on what we're trying to answer.

If arguing from a purely secular point of view, morals are just another form of law, etiquite, custom, or tact. They may or may not be written down and there may or may not be specific consequences for violating them. They are all man made rules of social conduct, some of which are made through formal processes, some arbitrarily, and some just occur organically through interaction.

With morals, we learn them from those around us, the date of their creation lost to time. It's the reason people seem to know the morals of their culture. They just saw others doing the same thing.

If you want to make the argument that morals are not relative to time, place, and the peculiarities of different cultures, you can, but you're going to have argue either some mystical creator of morality or you're going to have argue something inherent within the constitution of the human DNA that demands them.

It simply makes no sense to speak of the world of forms, where the good exists outside the existence of humanity if you take a fully secular view of this. If a tree falls in the woods and there are no humans in existence anywhere, it does not matter. Mattering is a human concern. It is not a concern for whatever deer took a tree to the head.

On the other hand, if God says the tree falling in the woods matters (i.e. it is either good or bad), then it matters, even if there is no human anywhere to assess it.

If you want to make the argument that morals are not relative to time, place, and the peculiarities of different cultures, you can, but you're going to have argue either some mystical creator of morality or you're going to have argue something inherent within the constitution of the human DNA that demands them. — Hanover

I think there is a place for the mystical, but I disagree that moral arguments depend on some mystical God/creator/lawgiver. I think a very strong argument can be made that there is an objectivity to much of moral reasoning even if you remove the mystical. This isn't to say that culture, history, emotion, empathy, etc. don't play a part, they're just not the foundation that supports the argument. The problem is that people seem to want clarity and precision, and it isn't going to be found. There will always be grey areas needing more clarity because our knowledge is limited.

I think a very strong argument can be made that there is an objectivity to much of moral reasoning even if you remove the mystical. — Sam26

There obviously have been attempts at creating objective criteria or principles to determine what is moral (Utlilitarianism, Kantianism, etc.), but they do have feel of being post hoc, meaning we first list out what we know to be moral and immoral and then we try to arrive at what explains our list. That is, we know murder and stealing are wrong, and then we come up with reasons for why we must think that.

The second question, and the one I touched on above, what dictates the objective? Are you saying it's wrong to murder because human DNA demands that as a social rule? What are you ultimately referencing to prove something is good. With law, you point to the law. With morality, what to you point to?

The second question, and the one I touched on above, what dictates the objective? [...] What are you ultimately referencing to prove something is good. With law, you point to the law. With morality, what to you point to? — Hanover

It seems to me one can here only point to the Good, of a platonic / neoplatonic repute. It by entailment would be a) a completely fixed aspect of all being and b) completely impartial relative to the whims of individual egos or cohorts of these, this in all respects (be these egos deities or not), thereby being (non-physically) perfectly objective.

Oh wait, it's mysticalish of me to so say. Never mind, then.

Faith is a belief that can help someone achieve their goals, even in the face of reasonable/logical doubt. It is rooted in the uncertainty of accomplishing our intentions in the world successfully, and yet we must try given the nature of who and what we are and faith increases our chances of success. It is helpful to be confident accomplishments can occur despite uncertainty. I would be surprised if many of you haven’t heard of the placebo effect; simply believing, and having faith, in the helpful and good nature of a desired outcome that may manifest from one's actions, can affect and improve your health and healing, the outcome; and likewise, so does faith help all other conceivable preferences, goals, and desires. Acting with confidence improves your chances, in sum.

The status of murder on this view, is not an inherent property of the act but a reflection of how people feel about the act. — Tom Storm

Provided one accepts that morality is about how people feel, that's perfectly true. That means that the concept of murder has two components - a description of the act and the evaluation of it. It is wrongful intentional killing. "Boo-word" does not capture the description, though "boo-stealing" does.

I don't think morality can be derived from any logical arguments. In fact, logic is as likely to be the ally of evil as much as good. — frank

That shouldn't be surprising. Logic is about truth and falsity. Morality is about good and bad. Yet moral principles can be consistent or inconsistent with each other. But that doesn't mean they can't both be true at the same time; it means that one cannot conform to both at the same time. Compare "Bring me a red flower" and "Bring me a blue flower".

Personally, the notion of being adequately compensated/"rewarded" after one's family dies seems absurd to me so I always took it as perhaps some reward in the next life. — BitconnectCarlos

That's very generous of you. For me, the promise of a reward in the next life is not an incentive. But I rather think that Job, as a believer, might well have been incentivised by such a promise - or perhaps by the expectation of such a reward, even if it was not promised. I've noticed that the OT frequently mentions the rewards that one who keeps God's commandments can expect (and the punishments that are frequently dished out). It's old-fashined stick and carrot persuasion.

That makes sense. It is not fundamentalism, The question it seems to leave me with though is: 'What use is an authority if you don't know what they want you to do?" — Janus

The answer is, of course, that such an authority is not much use. Do you think that applies to God? I fear it does. The ancient Greeks understood that oracles were unreliable, in the sense that the interpretation of them was not always easy. Curiously, they don't seem to have regarded that as a problem - it was just how things were.

In other words, as already mentioned, expressions of emotions aren’t truth-bearing. These statements fail where they must function as propositions to maintain meaning and inferential coherence. (This was pointed out in the Frege-Geach Problem.) These kinds of statements (“Stealing is wrong” akin to “Boo to stealing,”) cannot account for the logical role moral statements play in our ethical reasoning. Emotional statements lack what’s needed for validity. Emotional statements, again, lack a truth value. — Sam26

Expressions of emotions aren't truth-bearing. But the terms for emotions are not just expressions. They contain a description as well. Anger at a late train is about the proposition that the train is late; if it turns out that the train is not late, the emotion does not necessarily disappear, but it become inappropriate and quite likely to disappear when the truth is revealed. And so on. On my view, moral statements normally include an expression of disapproval and an imperative to do or not do the action they are are about. Three distinct components, each which can be assessed in its own appropriate way. Expressions can be appropriate or inappropriate; commands can be obeyed or not; descriptions, of course, can be true or not.
Emotions are more complex than descriptions, and moral statement are more complex than emotions.

Hence non-cognitivism rather then emotivism, and the implication that one must think about the situation and not only about one's emotional response. One doesn't just feel, one thinks about consequences, and hence about what one wants to be the case. Setting this out as just (no more than...) an emotional response does not do it justice. — Banno

We could perhaps say that moral statements are logically more complex than emotions.

Yes, changing a nappy might be disgusting, but if you care about the child, that feeling of care outweighs the disgust. The "ought" in that case is just another emotional response. One that wins out over revulsion. — Tom Storm

You could describe it like that. But the reason that the feeling of care outweighs the disgust is that changing the nappy is more important than one's disgust. One doesn't just throw the disgust and the care into a set of scales and see which wins.

Looking at these issues in terms of intent and action and consequences gives us a much more viable framework than "emotion". It moves from doing what you want to doing what you should, and hence away from mere egoism. — Banno

Yes, there is a logic to morality. It's just not the logic of truth and falsity - though it does depend on it. The facts of the case make a different and those are to be established in the way that is appropriate to facts.

How we understand the doing -- the action -- is tied to the thoughts and feelings of the doer. — BitconnectCarlos

Yes. That's true. Thinking and feeling and doing are all part of what the action is. So is the on-looker's reaction.

What are you ultimately referencing to prove something is good. With law, you point to the law. With morality, what to you point to? — Hanover

You point out the harm done. Even in courts when accessing a lawsuit e.g., they focus on the harm, and if you show harm, then in many cases you win the case. It's not difficult in most cases to objectively demonstrate the harm done when lying (to relationships) murdering, stealing, and a host of other actions. To me, this seems rather obvious. How do we access the harm? We give the evidence or reasons to support the conclusion. The evidence usually comes in the form of testimony, reasoning, sensory experience, etc.

I would be surprised if many of you haven’t heard of the placebo effect; simply believing, and having faith, in the helpful and good nature of a desired outcome, that may manifest from one's actions, can affect and improve your health and healing, the outcome; and likewise, so does faith help all other conceivable preferences, goals, and desires. — loveofsophia

Yes, the placebo effect is real. Believe it or not, it works even if the doctor expresses some uncertainty about whether the placebo will work or not; which is good, because it means that you don't have to deceive patients in order to administer it. There's a theory that what really does the work is the sympathetic attention.

But over-confidence can wreck your attempts just as much as under-confidence. Telling the difference is hard.