OK. What do you think of the self-sacrifice example we've been discussing?

What do you think of the self-sacrifice example we've been discussing? — J

I agree with Dawnstorm's comment:

I read the posts more as cost-benefit calculations (as in rational choice theory). It's not all that hard to account for altruism: even if there's no benefit to be had, there are still costs to minimise. It's just a matter of priorities. I though "joy" was just the word used in the context of Beethoven vs. Bach, while "good feelings" vs. "bad feelings" is the more general model. I'd like to append that in situations where there are no good feelings involved, it's likely "bad feelings" vs. "worse feelings". That said there might be some marginal good feelings in throwing yourself on a grenade: "I'll be remembered a hero!" As you say, it's the stuff we admire, and some people might enjoy the prospect of being admired. — Dawnstorm

So you'd agree that our motives for action come down to feelings, Humean "passions." Is that a psychological fact about human beings, such that someone who claimed not to have feelings motivating their actions would be self-deceived?

I think we could acknowledge that losing one's temper, and other semi-involuntary acts, are not covered by the thesis "we always choose what we like," on the grounds that they aren't really choices.

But they cannot be total non-choices, right? Otherwise it wouldn't make sense to punish people for most assault cases where they lost their temper or to blame people for adultery if they were compelled by strong urges, etc. We'd be powerless against our vices and baser impulses if they could deprive us of choice.

Now, when a man acts on impulse and throws a punch in rage, or commits adultery when in the throes of lust, we normally say something like what you said. Such acts are "semi-involuntary." And we say this not because one appetite or passion is pitted against another. If this was the case, then we would also say that a man not cheating on his wife was also "semi-involuntary" if his lust is in conflict with his desire to do the right thing. Likewise, we don't say "my not punching my boss in the face for insulting me was semi-involuntary because my anger conflicted with what I thought was best."

Instead, we tend to speak of a suppression of choice when some passion or appetite overwhelms our self-reflective grasp of what is best. And this is precisely why it doesn't make sense to collapse the rational and lower appetites into one hodgepodge stew, Nietzsche's "congress of souls. And that is precisely how I'd answer your question re rational action.

Of course, our desire for "goodness as such" is always being subverted by competing impulses and desires, lack of cognitive resources, and ignorance, and that's why the development of rational freedom and self-governance is aspirational and something that must be cultivated.

But they cannot be total non-choices, right? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Such acts are "semi-involuntary." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, that's how it looks to me.

If this was the case, then we would also say that a man not cheating on his wife was also "semi-involuntary" if his lust is in conflict with his desire to do the right thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is interesting. True, we wouldn't call it "semi-involuntary," but we might very well offer an explanation that deprived the individual of considerable freedom of choice. Depends how much stock you put in deep-psychological explanations that bypass conscious reasons. To my thinking, they're often accurate, but not necessarily, and shouldn't be the default mode of explaining. Yet it's always important to ask, Exactly how much free choice did X have, in a given situation?

it doesn't make sense to collapse the rational and lower appetites into one hodgepodge stew — Count Timothy von Icarus

Indeed not. Your talent for a striking phrase can get the better of you sometimes, though! Is this really the best and fairest way to characterize what Humeans and other anti-rationalists are doing? The question is very difficult, and no good philosopher is willing to settle for a hodgepodge, certainly not Hume himself.

If you use the word "self-deception" you presuppose the possibility of a fight "X against X". Self versus self.

I don't think that's possible.

In my view, a human consists of multiple active instances. Nobody ever found any "I"-core in the skull, spine or in the mind. I guess there's no central X. Particularly, there's no X that could fight against X. There are many instances: A, B, C ... zillions of them. When there is a fight, it's a fight D vs Z, or X vs G etc.

In my mind there may be an instance "L" that aims at having sex with a strange lady. And there's another instance "E" that aims at the loyality with my wife. (These examples are not autobiographical; I'm not married, hehe.) So when there is a fight, it isn't X vs X. It's L vs E -- in this example.

I think rationality must refer to the respective instance which is calculating the ratio of the current options.

When there is an occassion to have sex with a strange lady, and all ratios with other options are evaluated -- including time, duration, place, intensity, long-term consequences etc. -- then it's a rational decision of instance "L" to do it.

What's the rational decision of "E"? That instance comes to the rational conclusion it's better to stay loyal due to the wonderful long-term effects of being loyal.

Now there's another instance "T" that evaluates the ratio of L's choice to E's choice.

And so on.

The cascade of ratios gets bigger and bigger, so we often get confused and make decisions that will be, in summary, not optimal. -- Luckily, we are brain owners; we are able to learn from our mistakes. We keep improving our rational network.

lower appetites — Count Timothy von Icarus

What do you mean by "lower"?

Is appetite not an essential phenomenon in life?

What is love in your view? Is it something lower or something higher?

What is happiness? Is it in category "high" or category "low"?

What's a computer? High or low?

Is a bird lower than an elephant?

I've never understood this high/low idea. Is it a religious idea?

In my view, instinct, desire, love, hate etc. are so essential important phenomena; they make the difference between a living creature and a robot.

Is your religion a machine?

Let's say that's a description of "genuine altruism." Would your view entail that such a person couldn't actually exist -- or at best would be in denial about what they were feeling? — J

I have trouble answering this question for two reasons: (a) I'm not quite sure I understand your model (more later), and (b) I'm not exactly sure what my view amounts in philosophical terms (here I've been role-playing myself as rational choice theorist, while earlier in this thread I've been roleplaying myself as emotivist).

So let me try:

I might derive no pleasure whatsoever from doing something altruistic that I believe it's my responsibility to do. — J

This seems to seperate the motivation from the deed in some way. I think you'd need to elaborate on the how more here: for example, I can do something that helps you, but out of purely instrumental considerations. Is this altruism? My instinct would be to say "no", but under a social contract model, all altruism could be described like that, so it's not quite off the table. Do you see my confusion here?

The second thing is that the emphasis on duty makes it seem like morals as rule-following. This does sort of clash with my view: people who accept a duty do so either because they're forced to, or because they internalised their "position" in society. If you "believe its your responsibility" it's likely the latter.

And third, it feels like you view "it's ultimately feelings" as feelings being the envisioned pay off. That's not the only role they have. Feelings are supposed to underly *any* value; therefore also any attachment to duty or responsibility you might have.

But in the wider, quality-of-my-life sense, trying to do this sort of thing is "what I like." — J

I can't read this line without seeing feelings front and center: "quality of my life"? "What I like"? Take feelings away and liking stuff is impossible, and quality of life becomes irrelevant to your praxis.

Do you maybe instinctively translate feelings to something like the Freudian id? I envision something more like a structuring personality principle that underlies it all. More like a constant flow that only makes itself known when there's turbulence.

I like it because I believe it's morally right. It accords with my values. — J

This to me has no meaning outside specific theories. "Morally right" is a variable that has different content in different theories; different theories craft different formulae for it; and some theories have little use for it at all (maybe as a macro further out). Since I'm not quite sure where you're coming from, this is something I suspend my interpretation on when reading, until I have a better grasp and can make educated guesses.

Let's say that's a description of "genuine altruism." Would your view entail that such a person couldn't actually exist -- or at best would be in denial about what they were feeling? — J

So now: do you have a better grasp why I don't quite understand your description? If I'm unsure what "genuine altruism" is, I can't judge whether it "actually exists". For better or worse:

I believe there are people who feel good when making others feel good. I believe there are people who feel good about doing their duty, which includes making other people feel good. I believe this can but needn't occur in the same person. The label "genuine altruism" is an intrusion here: it doesn't order the field, but adds a semantic problem I can do without. I'm open to the possibility that I'm missing something, but if I'm missing something here it's likely because it's not usually within my relevance horizon, and thus to see it would require painstaking bottom-up construction with many false starts. Or alternatively an epiphany.

I hope I haven't made things worse.

I hope I haven't made things worse. — Dawnstorm

Not at all. This is a very thoughtful and responsive post. I'll try to reply in stages.

I can do something that helps you, but out of purely instrumental considerations. Is this altruism? — Dawnstorm

No, not on my understanding (which I should say is very influenced by Thomas Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism). Something is altruistic when it is motivated by the belief that the plight of others, all by itself, gives me a reason to act.

the emphasis on duty makes it seem like morals as rule-following. — Dawnstorm

I know. The only word I can think of which is as disreputable as "duty" in the ethical lexicon would be "sin." You'll notice that I didn't in fact use the word "duty," because I hate it too. I prefer "responsibility." But to your point . . . I don't know whether ethics has to involve rule-following, but it probably does have to involve acting on reasons or principles. And these are often in direct conflict with our feelings.

it feels like you view "it's ultimately feelings" as feelings being the envisioned pay off. That's not the only role they have. Feelings are supposed to underly *any* value; therefore also any attachment to duty or responsibility you might have. — Dawnstorm

Yes. It would be unfair to the advocate of "it's ultimately feelings" to construe them as meaning "I expect to feel a certain way after I've helped you." Feelings should be seen as the motivator, not the pay-off, in order to make this view robust. The idea is that, at bottom, I feel a certain way about my responsibility (as I conceive it), and this provides the motivation for my action.

I can't read this line without seeing feelings front and center: "quality of my life"? "What I like"? Take feelings away and liking stuff is impossible, and quality of life becomes irrelevant to your praxis. — Dawnstorm

I agree that "quality of life" is hazy. I'll think more about a better way to talk about the attachment a person feels to a certain self-presentation of their values.

And "like" can also be questioned. Could you say more, though, about why you construe "like" to involve a feeling? Is this based on usage, or are you analyzing what "like" would have to mean, in order for it to say something meaningful?

The label "genuine altruism" is an intrusion here: it doesn't order the field, but adds a semantic problem I can do without. — Dawnstorm

Does using my Nagel-derived concept, above, help any? I think the key point is that altruism takes the other person's situation, all by itself, without any appeal to how the altruist feels, as a reason for action. You may well believe that such a thing is impossible, of course, depending on what role you give reasons in ethical deliberation. If they wouldn't be reasons without some corresponding motivating feelings, then my and Nagel's account wouldn't fly for you.

Does using my Nagel-derived concept, above, help any? I think the key point is that altruism takes the other person's situation, all by itself, without any appeal to how the altruist feels, as a reason for action. You may well believe that such a thing is impossible, of course, depending on what role you give reasons in ethical deliberation. If they wouldn't be reasons without some corresponding motivating feelings, then my and Nagel's account wouldn't fly for you. — J

I'm unfamiliar with Nagel's position on altruism, so I just read some summeries and skimmed others. First, I note that every commenter seems to have different takeaway (which makes it harder for me to grasp), and to top it off the most detailed, text-adjecent summary I read was in German, so I don't what the appropriate words in English are (and anyway, it was fairly long, so I just skimmed it, but it's definitely interesting at the very least).

What I got out of it is quite akin to us being social animals: to realise the other is a person is to realise that I am a person, the realisation of which is unpersonal and objective, and so the motivation towards altruism isn't direct (like say hunger) but derived from abstracted facts. Not sure how close this is to Nagel's postion; as I said I just skimmed it, and the specifics were very convoluted and in some parts hard to understand (especially on a skim).

To this I say, this feels to be... off topic? Let me backtrack to another question you asked, at that point, because I think it's relevant:

Could you say more, though, about why you construe "like" to involve a feeling? Is this based on usage, or are you analyzing what "like" would have to mean, in order for it to say something meaningful? — J

"Like" to me expresses an emotional attachment. It doesn't just involve feeling, it is feeling something. I think the problem comes with isolating as "feelings" spurts of our emotional flow we recognise, but that's almost certainly describing feelings by reference to exceptional states. Instead of, say, "happiness" we should look at "comfort". This is a sort of baseline that renders you able to act. You notice comfort only in transitional stages, if it's an ongoing state it becomes part of the background until disrupted. But it's important to the upkeep of routine.

This is, for example, a huge problem for social justice movements: to even be understood you need to make people realise what it is like to live in constant discomfort. And then, to be actionable, a majority needs to give up part of their comfort to accommodate a minorty. How do you motivate something like this on a huge scale, when it's easy to maintain comfort by simple dismissal (say of "being trans" as confused).

So, for example, I don't much like vanilla ice cream; I don't dislike it, but there are almost always alternatives I prefer. As I talk about this on here, I'm not in a position where I have access to icecream, so it's not situationally relevant. It's still true, as a general matter of fact, about me. It's also a trivial fact, so if you were to tell me that, no, I do actually like vanilla ice cream, I'm mistaken, I'd be puzzled, but I wouldn't experience any huge change in my emotional state. There's no disruption in the general comfort level - that'd be even true if I were currently uncomfortable somehow. However, if you were then to insist on this fact, and make a bigger deal out of it than I ever could, I'd likely get uncomfortable with this conversation. So while me liking or not liking vanilla ice cream would be involved here, it'd be very marginally - I'd be uncomfortable with this situation. However, the presence of "vanilla ice cream" as topic could create an association such that I'd further on experience a modicum of discomfort when faced with vanilla ice cream, that would re-inforce and worsen my reaction to vanilla ice cream, and to the extent that I'm unaware of this, you may now be right, and I'm actually mistaken in some small part, at least under one consideration: an underappreciate amount of dislike towards vanilla ice cream has little to do with its properties.

So, yeah, if emotivists say that every action is directly motived by an isolatable and easily categorisable desire, and Nagel says that isn't so, then I'm with Nagel. Beyond that, I haven't thought my intuitions through enough to say one way or another how feelings factor in. But take them away, away you're left with... what? Instructions? Elaborate if-then decision trees?

So:

I think the key point is that altruism takes the other person's situation, all by itself, without any appeal to how the altruist feels, as a reason for action. — J

I wouldn't expect an appeal during the carrying out of the situation, not as a default. That comes in later, when others ask why you did something, and then the most likely reply is going to be "because he needed X" or some such. It's inefficient to observe yourself too much; but neverless any action necessarily integrates into your daily comfort flow - only exceptional or challenged decision get the appeal treatment, and the appeal is usually going to be targeted towards what flies. This is not to say that people are insincere; they need to be comfortable either with their justifications or their duplicity (or whatever I'm not thinking of right now). Acts, justifications, social sanctioning... all feedback and modify your comfort flow such that they may make future actions more or less likely. But the comfort-flow itself is just there: it's not usually available for legitimisation or reflexion. Especially in routine situation your comfort level will usually remain an unacknowledged necessary condition of making value judgements. It might come up during a crisis (too strong a word; I'm thinking of any break of routine here, no matter how big or small) or when challenged - but often a set of social macros (any ethical position you might name) will obscure it even then.

Again, and this is important, I'm trying to explain my intuition. I haven't thought this through to my satisfaction (and probably never will, since I'm hard to satisfy).

to realise the other is a person is to realise that I am a person, the realisation of which is unpersonal and objective, and so the motivation towards altruism isn't direct (like say hunger) but derived from abstracted facts. — Dawnstorm

That's fair enough to Nagel. The important thing is that this motivation is 1) also impersonal, in the sense that it provides reasons for anyone to act, not just me; and 2) it can be stated without reference to my (or anyone's) personal feelings or preferences.

So, yeah, if emotivists say that every action is directly motived by an isolatable and easily categorisable desire, and Nagel says that isn't so, then I'm with Nagel. Beyond that, I haven't thought my intuitions through enough to say one way or another how feelings factor in. But take them away, away you're left with... what? Instructions? Elaborate if-then decision trees? — Dawnstorm

That's in part, I believe, why Nagel called his book The Possibility of Altruism. If we do eliminate feelings, even understood very broadly as you do, what could be left? What in the world could motivate me to take an unpleasant, difficult action, at no benefit whatsoever to myself, if not a strong "passion" which tells me I "should"? That is Hume's position, more or less. In contrast, Nagel argues for reasons as motivators -- beliefs, truths, entailments, arguments, the whole deal.

That is what I think myself. Given certain values (which are not generated in this way at all), we then want to know how to apply them. And the answer will be: as your reason dictates. On this view, reasons can create feelings, strong feelings, which can then help us do the right thing. But the reverse is not true. Reasons are either valid or invalid or somewhere in between, without reference to what my personal feelings or inclinations might be. This is of course why it is often so hard to "let reason be your guide."

(And if it worked out so neatly in practice, we'd have no ethical quandaries! Believe me, I know this is not like working a decision-tree.)

I wouldn't expect an appeal during the carrying out of the situation, not as a default. That comes in later, when others ask why you did something, and then the most likely reply is going to be "because he needed X" or some such. — Dawnstorm

Yes, that's all I meant by "appeal" -- theoretical, not in medias res.

But the comfort-flow itself is just there: it's not usually available for legitimisation or reflexion. — Dawnstorm

No doubt true. What we want to know is, what happens when an ethical choice arises that forces us to scrutinize our normal patterns of comfort and legitimization? Is the only tool at our disposal yet another look at the question of comfort? Or can I bypass how I may personally feel (again, taking "feel" in its broadest sense, to include like, prefer, etc.), ask for reasons, and let the comfort chips fall where they may?

What we want to know is, what happens when an ethical choice arises that forces us to scrutinize our normal patterns of comfort and legitimization? Is the only tool at our disposal yet another look at the question of comfort? Or can I bypass how I may personally feel (again, taking "feel" in its broadest sense, to include like, prefer, etc.), ask for reasons, and let the comfort chips fall where they may? — J

This is extremely difficult to think through without an example; and I'm not even sure what would count as an example.

My hunch is that scrutinising your normal patterns of comfort is one of most uncomfortable things you can do in a moral context. You threaten your self image; you threaten your sense of the-way-things-are. Different people may have different tolarance level over all, and intra-personally the tolerance levels may vary by topic. "Asking for reasons" works because of this: you'd rather sacrifice some comfort-at-issue than the comfort-of-knowing-what-you-do-is-right. "Asking for reasons" quells existential anxiety (provided you find acceptable answers). You believe in God, you believe in rationality, you believe that people are basically good... anything to preserve the modicum of routine you need.

If this were true one would discover what a good therapy for liver cancer is solely by investigating people's opinions instead of by studying livers. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't read the the rest of this, because I want you to not make this same mistake over, and over, leading me to ignore: This is the not the same assessment as what one ought to do. This is a different consideration, based on the essentially arbitrary goal of 'curing liver cancer' or whatever you want to be done, in the abstract. Whether or not one should do X is not hte same as whether X would achieve such and such a goal. This is why it already seemed obvious to me we're not talking about hte same 'good' and I do not take yours as 'ethical'. I may well come back to the rest of that as I can see Leontiskos has replied also, so might feel the need to put somethign in. But it seems your basis is off from the way I see things (and this seems, to me, patent, not subtle). Its very hard to go through making the same criticism at each point.

The subjectivist (you, perhaps?) — J

Fairly committed emotivist, so yes.

Fwiw, I am aware of that line between O and S ethics. I am discussing it.

Better to say, "It was wrong; I shouldn't have done it." — J

Which expresses that person's personal, internal assessment of their behaviour. There is nothing close to objective about even the assessment mechanism here. This is why these uses of value words are misleading imo, not just inapt.

Perhaps there's a better pair of words to use that reflects the distinction — J

There must be, as I am not seeing a distinction in your elucidations. I see different uses of two words to mean the same thing in disparate circumstances. No worries with that, but it, to me, reflects an emotivist bent. That's fine, I suppose.

I'd be interested to know whether you think this sort of distinction can be preserved from an ethical-subjectivist point of view — J

That would seem somewhat contradictory. Choices and preferences are distinct. They don't need compartmentalizing.

I pointed out that a primary reason people call food "good" is because it is necessary for survival. — Leontiskos

Which tells us nothing ethical. I have tried to be extremely clear, but for some reason both you and Timothy seem to think "This is good, because X" is the same as "This is good". You're either subtly rejecting objectivist ethics, or you're wildly confused from where I'm standing...

Better to say, "It was wrong; I shouldn't have done it."
— J

Which expresses that person's personal, internal assessment of their behaviour. There is nothing close to objective about even the assessment mechanism here. — AmadeusD

Well, that might be so. Are you meaning to say that this is characteristic of all 1st-personal judgments? That is, if I say, "My statement was incorrect," that is equally personal and internal, with no pretense to objectivity? I suspect that's not what you mean. Rather, in this case you believe that there cannot be an objective assessment mechanism here, unlike a judgment about, say, accuracy. But that's assuming the conclusion, no?

Perhaps there's a better pair of words to use that reflects the distinction
— J

There must be, as I am not seeing a distinction in your elucidations. — AmadeusD

The pair in question is "prefer" and "choose". The distinction -- which I agree is hard to put in clear terms -- is between an action I actually like, or enjoy, or grok, or whatever other word we use to express a Humean passion, and an action that has none of these characteristics but that I do because I believe I should -- that it's the right thing to do. As above, we have to be careful not to start by assuming that the latter type of action is impossible, on theoretical grounds. I guess, if nothing comes to mind when you ask yourself for a personal example, it might be hard to characterize further. But I would have said that we all know the difference between doing something we really want to do -- have positive feelings about -- versus doing something quite repugnant, yet morally necessary as we see it.

Concerning what "ought to do" means: I wish I could agree with those who believe that we can derive an "ought" from an "is", ethically. This would involve going from a foundational, definitional understanding of what a human being is, to rational deductions about values which carry with them obligations (as opposed to reasons) for action. It would make things much simpler. But I agree with you that the ethical "ought" resists this deductive understanding. For me, one of the most interesting questions in meta-ethics is: Given this basic difference of opinion, is there any way that the two versions of ethics can really talk to each other? Or must we always be talking past each other? I think a real conversation would have to involve a very active curiosity about how to live into the opposite position, a kind of understanding from within.

That is, if I say, "My statement was incorrect," that is equally personal and internal, with no pretense to objectivity? — J

Not quite, but I think this comes into something about when we can even apply the note 'correct'. If it's a question of reportage, then there's a rubric in place. I think the problem of perception means we can never be objective even in this case, but I note a serious difference between that statement when referring to, for instance, the fact of a Cat being in the room at the time (and wrongly saying it wasn't) or making a claim about, for instance, the worth of a policy which you perhaps misunderstood initially. In the latter, its just your position (now). In the former, you can be wrong. That you think your interpretation was off, is what's motivated the latter. That you can now see a Cat in the room motivates the former. They seem different to me. "I was wrong' doesn't actually seem to properly capture either issue, though, so we mayyy be talking past each other.

The distinction — J

Right, so you're delineating desire and practicality. Fair enough. I still cannot understand the choice being 'not preferable' and still the correct choice, all things considered. Plenty of choices fit "undesired" though, which again, boils back to an emotional output in my view. Though, I seems you're trying to say in the one case, it's emotional and in the other not. Hmm. I don't know that I see the distinction.

But I would have said that we all know the difference between doing something we really want to do -- have positive feelings about -- versus doing something quite repugnant, yet morally necessary as we see it. — J

Sure. Based on our emotional statements about the things in question. That seems baked in here.

Or must we always be talking past each other? — J

This seems true. I have never had an objectivist say something I considered particularly rational about the basis for such a view. I assume the reverse is true.

I have never had an objectivist say something I considered particularly rational about the basis for such a view. I assume the reverse is true. — AmadeusD

Not for me. If subjectivism or emotivism about ethics were obviously irrational, it would have been dismissed centuries ago. Again, I wish it were that simple.

"Asking for reasons" quells existential anxiety (provided you find acceptable answers). You believe in God, you believe in rationality, you believe that people are basically good... anything to preserve the modicum of routine you need. — Dawnstorm

Interestingly, I think this is right -- finding a basis for ethical values does indeed do these things -- but at the same time it can't settle the question. Because . . . if we accept all this and find that our anxiety is indeed quelled, and our routine preserved, we may still find ourselves asking, "But is this enough? Is this what 'doing good' really means?" That the question can be meaningfully asked at all seems to put it in a different category from, say, "OK, I've demonstrated the Pythagorean theorem, but is that enough? Do I really understand what a right triangle is?" I'd say that question was meaningless, but the ethical question doesn't seem to be like that.

Again, I wish it were that simple. — J

I'm the opposite. Intuitively, I assume there must be something more. But I cannot find even a coherent articulation of what that 'something more' could even be. I wish I could find it (maybe this amounts to the same thing lol - but I want my intuition to work, instead of be a clear instance of evolutionary illusion.

it would have been dismissed centuries ago. — J

Plenty of examples of why this is patently not the case! Divine Command theory being one.

Really? I think "hodgepodge stew" might be guilty of not going far enough. A stew is, after all, a whole, and fairly inseparable. For Hume, we're a "bundle." As he says in the Treatise: "I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."

Or take Nietzsche:

With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of emphasizing a small, terse fact, which is unwillingly recognized by these credulous minds—namely, that a thought comes when "it" wishes, and not when "I" wish; so that it is a PERVERSION of the facts of the case to say that the subject "I" is the condition of the predicate "think." ONE thinks; but that this "one" is precisely the famous old "ego," is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an "immediate certainty." After all, one has even gone too far with this "one thinks"—even the "one" contains an INTERPRETATION of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One infers here according to the usual grammatical formula—"To think is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active; consequently"... It was pretty much on the same lines that the older atomism sought, besides the operating "power," the material particle wherein it resides and out of which it operates—the atom. More rigorous minds, however, learnt at last to get along without this "earth-residuum," and perhaps some day we shall accustom ourselves, even from the logician's point of view, to get along without the little "one" (to which the worthy old "ego" has refined itself).

Beyond Good and Evil - 1.17

IDK, anti-realists and voluntarist have their view. I think it's wrong, but I also don't think they're really just realists and intellectualists in disguise.

If Goodness cannot be known—if there is nothing to know—and if facts, truth, can never dictate action, then one cannot have an ethics where ends are ultimately informed by the intellect. The intellect becomes limited to a subservient role in orienting behavior towards positive sensation and sentiment (positive, but not known as good). I do think Hume is quite right about this. I think Hume is rarely wrong about tracking down where his assumption lead (I just don't know why we'd accept many of his assumptions).

Plato is also in agreement with Hume here. This is precisely what the soul is like when "reason is a slave of the passions," right down to the epistemic concerns. The disagreement lies in Plato's belief that this does not represent the totality of human experience or the limits of the rational soul.

If Goodness cannot be known—if there is nothing to know—and if facts, truth, can never dictate action, then one cannot have an ethics where ends are ultimately informed by the intellect. The intellect becomes limited to a subservient role in orienting behavior towards positive sensation and sentiment (positive, but not known as good). — Count Timothy von Icarus

But isn’t this more or less how ethics already works in practice? Morality, as we experience and debate it, seems less like the discovery of timeless metaphysical truths and more like a code of conduct that is shaped by competing preferences, traditions, and values among different groups.

People argue, negotiate, and revise ethical standards using a mix of emotional intuitions, shared values, facts, and reasoning. Ethical reasoning isn’t absent just because there’s no fixed “Good” out there to be discovered. Instead, we appeal to consistency, consequences, fairness, or human flourishing -not because we know the good in some absolute sense, but because that’s how humans justify and improve their moral norms.

Do we need more than this?

But isn’t this more or less how ethics already works in practice? Morality, as we experience and debate it, seems less like the discovery of timeless metaphysical truths and more like a code of conduct that is shaped by competing preferences, traditions, and values among different groups. — Tom Storm

I agree that this is what is happening. Though, I add that the majority of people don't think this is what's happening. They think that morality is objective, and they've got the goods (or, they can get the goods). This is, in my view, the problem. There's no issue with differing views, cajoling, adjusting, compromising etc. etc.. But when your interlocutor's don't believe this is acceptable because other views are ipso facto reprehensible, it's not a discussion or anything. Luckily, overall, the Law does this well and so people can cry into their cereal about it, i guess.

Though, I add that the majority of people don't think this is what's happening. They think that morality is objective, and they've got the goods (or, they can get the goods). This is, in my view, the problem. — AmadeusD

You may be right about this.

But when your interlocutor's don't believe this is acceptable because other views are ipso facto reprehensible, it's not a discussion or anything — AmadeusD

Yes, that is a problem.

I guess on a philosophy forum, there's bound to be people who, generally theists of a stripe, believe in foundational guarantors of all things—whether it be The One or some other ground of being.

Of course you and I could be wrong too. :wink:

I haven't read the the rest of this, because I want you to not make this same mistake over, and over, leading me to ignore: This is the not the same assessment as what one ought to do. This is a different consideration, based on the essentially arbitrary goal of 'curing liver cancer' or whatever you want to be done, in the abstract. Whether or not one should do X is not hte same as whether X would achieve such and such a goal. This is why it already seemed obvious to me we're not talking about hte same 'good' and I do not take yours as 'ethical'. I may well come back to the rest of that as I can see Leontiskos has replied also, so might feel the need to put somethign in. But it seems your basis is off from the way I see things (and this seems, to me, patent, not subtle). Its very hard to go through making the same criticism at each point.

"I'm not going to read your posts past the first sentence or actually engage with any arguments at all. But my position is very strong. No, I can't positively articulate it either. I will write posts consisting of just the word 'wrong' though."

I address the ordering of ends to other ends, and the question of ultimate ends/ends sought for their own sake in the next paragraph. So the "mistake," was perhaps trying to take the time to work up from the simple to the more difficult.

Then again, why should am I expecting that someone who declares that there is no good or bad, so no good or bad argument, or good or bad faith discussion, to act otherwise? I suppose you're "living your truth" in emotivism, because it does seem to be "true for you." Afterall, what possible arguments or explanation could I offer that could constitute "good" arguments? On the upside, I also cannot possibly have "bad" arguments either.

And thus, when you make your moral pronouncements (which seems to be in most posts) about all the flaws of "Wokeness," I take it that this is just meant to articulate something like "boo-hoo for Wokeness." It cannot mean that it is truly bad to accept such beliefs at least.

But isn’t this more or less how ethics already works in practice?

IDK, current law in the developed world and international law is based on the natural law tradition. The ethics of the academy does not trickle down much into society any more. That elites from these societies increasingly no longer understand this tradition doesn't change where it came from (and this decay in understanding is arguably partly why it appears to be collapsing, although many explanations could be offered of course.)

Morality, as we experience and debate it, seems less like the discovery of timeless metaphysical truths and more like a code of conduct that is shaped by competing preferences, traditions, and values among different groups.

People argue, negotiate, and revise ethical standards using a mix of emotional intuitions, shared values, facts, and reasoning. Ethical reasoning isn’t absent just because there’s no fixed “Good” out there to be discovered. Instead, we appeal to consistency, consequences, fairness, or human flourishing -not because we know the good in some absolute sense, but because that’s how humans justify and improve their moral norms.

Do we need more than this?

I am not really sure what you think a "fixed" or "transcendent" good is here. However, an ethics based on facts about human flourishing is not anti-realism. Sam Harris, for instance, is not an anti-realist. He has an ethics based on knowledge about Goodness (which he has a fairly reductionist account of, claiming it to be "certain sets of possible brain states.") By contrast, the Good for the Aristotlian tradition (and much of the pre-modern tradition) is a principle like "fairness" or more specifically "lift" or "entropy," etc. It is an extremely general principle though, hence the large role for intuition and (properly oriented) emotion in ethics. You and @J both have denied goodness as a possible principle for ethics, but then turned to "fairness," "harmonious relationships," and "justice." I am not really sure what the difference here is supposed to be, such that the latter are more acceptable, since these are also very general principles.

An anti-realist says there are absolutely no facts about fairness, consistency, consequences, or human flourishing that have any bearing on which ends ought to be preferred. How exactly do you propose "facts and reasoning" to guide ethics if there are no facts that have a bearing on which ends are choice-worthy? Wouldn't the facts necessarily be nothing but window dressing on a contest of emotions, and ultimately, power? Facts select means, not ends in anti-realism.

On something like the emotivist view, where ethical discussion is just "noises people make to signal emotional states vis-á-vis certain actions," what exactly could constitute "good or bad argument" or "good or bad faith" in argument? It seems to me that ethical debate is nothing but ritualized power struggle at this point. There are no relevant "facts of the matter" to guide one's conclusions. No choices can ever be "more right" or "more wrong."

Your appeal to "fairness" and "human flourishing" to mediate arguments presupposes these are choice-worthy and knowable. I'd agree they are. But then we aren't talking about the situation I was describing. Presumably, "consequences" can guide ethical decision-making because some consequences are more choice-worthy than others. If they aren't, then I'm not sure about that either.

As he says in the Treatise: "I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Now hold on here! :smile: This is Hume on perception, not the moral ordering of the rational and lower appetites. Read the quote in context.

I was speaking to his denial of a strong self. However, it is directly relevant to his view of reason in context. Sense experience is where we discover "good" and "bad," which are known as correlated together by a wholly discursive reason.

He says “reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will.” (3.3.2.1) Reason might allow us to connect irrational sensations of pain and pleasure with different sense objects, but “it [could not] be by [reason’s] means that… objects are able to affect us.” (3.3.2.3)

What is the claim here, that Hume really does have a use for "rational appetites?" I think it's fairly obvious if you read those sections that he doesn't.

Yes, agreed, but we were discussing whether it's fair to say that Hume settled for a "hodgepodge stew" when it came to the passions and their relation to action. I don't think that's what you find at all in the Treatise (though I disagree with his conclusions, as do you). But I suppose that's another OP.

Plenty of examples of why this is patently not the case! Divine Command theory being one. — AmadeusD

I actually don't know what that is. Could you explain the context? Thanks.

You and J both have denied goodness as a possible principle for ethics, — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. Rather, I don't see a way to use "good for human beings" to generate "I ought to do X." That's because I see "good for human beings" as only one dimension of ethics, not the first principle from which all else may be deduced.

Right, the human good is a particular instance of the more general principle. Harris allows this too, expanding well-being to "all conscious creatures."