What do you think of the self-sacrifice example we've been discussing? — J
I read the posts more as cost-benefit calculations (as in rational choice theory). It's not all that hard to account for altruism: even if there's no benefit to be had, there are still costs to minimise. It's just a matter of priorities. I though "joy" was just the word used in the context of Beethoven vs. Bach, while "good feelings" vs. "bad feelings" is the more general model. I'd like to append that in situations where there are no good feelings involved, it's likely "bad feelings" vs. "worse feelings". That said there might be some marginal good feelings in throwing yourself on a grenade: "I'll be remembered a hero!" As you say, it's the stuff we admire, and some people might enjoy the prospect of being admired. — Dawnstorm
I think we could acknowledge that losing one's temper, and other semi-involuntary acts, are not covered by the thesis "we always choose what we like," on the grounds that they aren't really choices.
But they cannot be total non-choices, right? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Such acts are "semi-involuntary." — Count Timothy von Icarus
If this was the case, then we would also say that a man not cheating on his wife was also "semi-involuntary" if his lust is in conflict with his desire to do the right thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus
it doesn't make sense to collapse the rational and lower appetites into one hodgepodge stew — Count Timothy von Icarus
lower appetites — Count Timothy von Icarus
Let's say that's a description of "genuine altruism." Would your view entail that such a person couldn't actually exist -- or at best would be in denial about what they were feeling? — J
I might derive no pleasure whatsoever from doing something altruistic that I believe it's my responsibility to do. — J
But in the wider, quality-of-my-life sense, trying to do this sort of thing is "what I like." — J
I like it because I believe it's morally right. It accords with my values. — J
Let's say that's a description of "genuine altruism." Would your view entail that such a person couldn't actually exist -- or at best would be in denial about what they were feeling? — J
I hope I haven't made things worse. — Dawnstorm
I can do something that helps you, but out of purely instrumental considerations. Is this altruism? — Dawnstorm
the emphasis on duty makes it seem like morals as rule-following. — Dawnstorm
it feels like you view "it's ultimately feelings" as feelings being the envisioned pay off. That's not the only role they have. Feelings are supposed to underly *any* value; therefore also any attachment to duty or responsibility you might have. — Dawnstorm
I can't read this line without seeing feelings front and center: "quality of my life"? "What I like"? Take feelings away and liking stuff is impossible, and quality of life becomes irrelevant to your praxis. — Dawnstorm
The label "genuine altruism" is an intrusion here: it doesn't order the field, but adds a semantic problem I can do without. — Dawnstorm
Does using my Nagel-derived concept, above, help any? I think the key point is that altruism takes the other person's situation, all by itself, without any appeal to how the altruist feels, as a reason for action. You may well believe that such a thing is impossible, of course, depending on what role you give reasons in ethical deliberation. If they wouldn't be reasons without some corresponding motivating feelings, then my and Nagel's account wouldn't fly for you. — J
Could you say more, though, about why you construe "like" to involve a feeling? Is this based on usage, or are you analyzing what "like" would have to mean, in order for it to say something meaningful? — J
I think the key point is that altruism takes the other person's situation, all by itself, without any appeal to how the altruist feels, as a reason for action. — J
to realise the other is a person is to realise that I am a person, the realisation of which is unpersonal and objective, and so the motivation towards altruism isn't direct (like say hunger) but derived from abstracted facts. — Dawnstorm
So, yeah, if emotivists say that every action is directly motived by an isolatable and easily categorisable desire, and Nagel says that isn't so, then I'm with Nagel. Beyond that, I haven't thought my intuitions through enough to say one way or another how feelings factor in. But take them away, away you're left with... what? Instructions? Elaborate if-then decision trees? — Dawnstorm
I wouldn't expect an appeal during the carrying out of the situation, not as a default. That comes in later, when others ask why you did something, and then the most likely reply is going to be "because he needed X" or some such. — Dawnstorm
But the comfort-flow itself is just there: it's not usually available for legitimisation or reflexion. — Dawnstorm
What we want to know is, what happens when an ethical choice arises that forces us to scrutinize our normal patterns of comfort and legitimization? Is the only tool at our disposal yet another look at the question of comfort? Or can I bypass how I may personally feel (again, taking "feel" in its broadest sense, to include like, prefer, etc.), ask for reasons, and let the comfort chips fall where they may? — J
If this were true one would discover what a good therapy for liver cancer is solely by investigating people's opinions instead of by studying livers. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The subjectivist (you, perhaps?) — J
Better to say, "It was wrong; I shouldn't have done it." — J
Perhaps there's a better pair of words to use that reflects the distinction — J
I'd be interested to know whether you think this sort of distinction can be preserved from an ethical-subjectivist point of view — J
I pointed out that a primary reason people call food "good" is because it is necessary for survival. — Leontiskos
Better to say, "It was wrong; I shouldn't have done it."
— J
Which expresses that person's personal, internal assessment of their behaviour. There is nothing close to objective about even the assessment mechanism here. — AmadeusD
Perhaps there's a better pair of words to use that reflects the distinction
— J
There must be, as I am not seeing a distinction in your elucidations. — AmadeusD
That is, if I say, "My statement was incorrect," that is equally personal and internal, with no pretense to objectivity? — J
The distinction — J
But I would have said that we all know the difference between doing something we really want to do -- have positive feelings about -- versus doing something quite repugnant, yet morally necessary as we see it. — J
Or must we always be talking past each other? — J
I have never had an objectivist say something I considered particularly rational about the basis for such a view. I assume the reverse is true. — AmadeusD
"Asking for reasons" quells existential anxiety (provided you find acceptable answers). You believe in God, you believe in rationality, you believe that people are basically good... anything to preserve the modicum of routine you need. — Dawnstorm
Again, I wish it were that simple. — J
it would have been dismissed centuries ago. — J
With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of emphasizing a small, terse fact, which is unwillingly recognized by these credulous minds—namely, that a thought comes when "it" wishes, and not when "I" wish; so that it is a PERVERSION of the facts of the case to say that the subject "I" is the condition of the predicate "think." ONE thinks; but that this "one" is precisely the famous old "ego," is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an "immediate certainty." After all, one has even gone too far with this "one thinks"—even the "one" contains an INTERPRETATION of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One infers here according to the usual grammatical formula—"To think is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active; consequently"... It was pretty much on the same lines that the older atomism sought, besides the operating "power," the material particle wherein it resides and out of which it operates—the atom. More rigorous minds, however, learnt at last to get along without this "earth-residuum," and perhaps some day we shall accustom ourselves, even from the logician's point of view, to get along without the little "one" (to which the worthy old "ego" has refined itself).
Beyond Good and Evil - 1.17
If Goodness cannot be known—if there is nothing to know—and if facts, truth, can never dictate action, then one cannot have an ethics where ends are ultimately informed by the intellect. The intellect becomes limited to a subservient role in orienting behavior towards positive sensation and sentiment (positive, but not known as good). — Count Timothy von Icarus
But isn’t this more or less how ethics already works in practice? Morality, as we experience and debate it, seems less like the discovery of timeless metaphysical truths and more like a code of conduct that is shaped by competing preferences, traditions, and values among different groups. — Tom Storm
Though, I add that the majority of people don't think this is what's happening. They think that morality is objective, and they've got the goods (or, they can get the goods). This is, in my view, the problem. — AmadeusD
But when your interlocutor's don't believe this is acceptable because other views are ipso facto reprehensible, it's not a discussion or anything — AmadeusD
I haven't read the the rest of this, because I want you to not make this same mistake over, and over, leading me to ignore: This is the not the same assessment as what one ought to do. This is a different consideration, based on the essentially arbitrary goal of 'curing liver cancer' or whatever you want to be done, in the abstract. Whether or not one should do X is not hte same as whether X would achieve such and such a goal. This is why it already seemed obvious to me we're not talking about hte same 'good' and I do not take yours as 'ethical'. I may well come back to the rest of that as I can see Leontiskos has replied also, so might feel the need to put somethign in. But it seems your basis is off from the way I see things (and this seems, to me, patent, not subtle). Its very hard to go through making the same criticism at each point.
But isn’t this more or less how ethics already works in practice?
Morality, as we experience and debate it, seems less like the discovery of timeless metaphysical truths and more like a code of conduct that is shaped by competing preferences, traditions, and values among different groups.
People argue, negotiate, and revise ethical standards using a mix of emotional intuitions, shared values, facts, and reasoning. Ethical reasoning isn’t absent just because there’s no fixed “Good” out there to be discovered. Instead, we appeal to consistency, consequences, fairness, or human flourishing -not because we know the good in some absolute sense, but because that’s how humans justify and improve their moral norms.
Do we need more than this?
As he says in the Treatise: "I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." — Count Timothy von Icarus
You and J both have denied goodness as a possible principle for ethics, — Count Timothy von Icarus
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