Which Hegelian text are you referring to? There are at least three your description could be pointing to.

How about quoting some text so that the context can be appreciated? — Paine

I have Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, Phenomenology of Spirit and some other books too. I need to get back to reading them. I did read a couple of introductory books on Hegel long time ago, so most of them are faded away from my memory. Need to refresh searching and looking for the books somewhere in the cupboards. This is not a Hegel thread, so maybe if someone starts one on Hegel, I would follow. I am only a learner, hence would be for studying mostly reading and asking if any questions arise.

What was Hegel's main response do you think to Kant's divided (by antimony?) world of phenomena and the beyond?

I, too, am only a learner.

In asking for clear references, I am not questioning your experience of a text but asking for a means to accurately share it. Otherwise, our swift ostensive gestures leave us talking to ourselves.

Ok, good idea. Will update soon.

You are asking two questions there. And you are assuming that they are necessarily just one.

So, I could pursue each one of them. But how is it my job to separate what you claim as a thesis to be what stands together? Why should I think that is true?

Kant's primary psychological observation is that we are separate from something about which we are very curious. Hegel tries to create thought spaces where we can satisfy our desires for complete systamization

Hegel tries to create thought spaces where we can satisfy our desires for complete systamization — Gregory

My general impression of Hegel, as a psychologist (him, not me), is that all this stuff we think about is directly related to our experiences while being people.

That is not to deny a desire for complete understating but Hegel's approach in Lordship and Bondage is a sharp departure from Kant preaching universal peace.

Lordship and Bondage — Paine

Hegel was pointing out that slavery is a part of the human condition; however, he believed in the progress of history. Things can get bad, but they lead to what is best. I would say Hegel believed in Leibniz's best of all possible worlds, but in a world that evolves into the best, the perfect. A current contemporary philosopher who has similar views is Tim Freke

But we were talking about Kant versus Hegel and their differences. Is that not worthy of clarification?

Of course. Hegel claimed Aristotle as his own, but his logo-becoming theology is the reverse of Aquinas's world view. Kant is opposed to it too. Kant kind of just rests on morality and says "let's 1) be moral, 2) do science to figure out the assumed (critique of judgment) to be designed world. Aquinas says "the perfect is in every way first". For Hegel it comes last (so history has importance. The potential that is actualized!). Kant can't prove that the perfect is real. Plato's "good" alludes him, except in that he contemplates his own conscience

Kant kind of just rests on morality and says "let's 1) be moral, 2) do science to figure out the assumed (critique of judgment) to be designed world. — Gregory

I sense that you do get the scope of conscience in the Protestant rejection of authority outside the voice of reason or faith. Kant advocates for a specific code of conduct as difficult as many others that have been proposed.

The laws of the heart are hard to decifer, so i can't declare i know Kant's inner reflections, but his system for me leaves something missing.

I am not arguing for his system. I left that long ago.

But I can argue what is an accurate account of it.

…..his system for me leaves something missing. — Gregory

Which system?

How does the suggested contradiction in his worldview relate to something missing in his system?

Just curious.

He has the 1) unknowable, 2) the knowable by science, 3) those things known by faith without a consulting reason (laws of the heart), 4) and ethical life. None of them relate by causality to another one. "Cause" is only in the scientific realm. Hope and faith are left to stand on their own along with a moral life goal. The unknowable stands as something enticing for the intellect and is described dualistically as noumena and the -thing-in-itself (i have yet to grasp the distinction). But we can never reach it. We are to pretend there is design in beauty even while not allowing the mind to really believe this. All that is just disconnected for me personally. Some people regard him as the greatest philosopher ever

My Hegel books.

Of course. Hegel claimed Aristotle as his own, — Gregory

Rosen says it is impossible to understand Hegel without understanding Plato and Aristotle. Do you agree? Why is it the case?

Ok Thanks.

Some people regard him as the greatest philosopher ever — Gregory

They shouldn’t; he was adamant that there is no such thing as a philosopher. (A839/B867)

Speaking of contradictions albeit regardless of worldview…..
He takes great pains to qualify several well-known individuals as philosophers, yet, given the above, questions the existence of philosophers as such, rather denominating them as “teachers”, and the rest learn, not philosophy, which cannot be taught, but, merely to philosophize.

Not as important as it is interesting, I guess.

Rosen says it is impossible to understand Hegel without understanding Plato and Aristotle. Do you agree? Why is it the case? — Corvus

Hegel uses terms from Aristotle and Platonism all the time. The "universal" he speaks of often. He turns things around though. In the Science of Logic you have there he says quality comes before quantity, which is the reverse of how Aristotle is usually interpreted. Aristotle seemed to think, in thought, there is first quantity or "matter" and that it is marked and structured by a form, which in turn is derived from a Form which is in the mind of the Prime Mover (or Movers). Simple, right? Hegel's take is influenced by Kant; quality is phenomena. Yes the world is matter. The Left Hegelians were correct! And so were the Right Hegelians after him. They both took part of the paradox and ran with it. Hegel tried to bring contradiction into a non-dual unity where there is no room left for contradiction. The latter becomes paradox, mystery, miracle, and we learn what is truly worth knowing.

I have read two of those and a portion of another.

The point I was making regards standards of citation. If, for instance, you want to cite from The Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by Miller, you could say that, and people would be able to find pages on that basis. If it is a less known book, one can find either a vendor or free text version to point to.

For example, here is the above-mentioned book at a vendor.

I see Science of Logic on your pile. That is quite a different book from Logic, Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences I have owned the latter book for decades and have had only brief glimpses of the other.

/rant on the value of good citations.

Understanding may construct a priori cognitions concerning possible experience, true enough, re: motion is necessarily change in time but not necessarily change in space (think: rotation). But principles and mathematical axioms, on the other hand, are the transcendental constructs of reason alone, hence, while they may certainly condition possible experience, insofar as their proofs reside in the domain of empirical knowledge, they are not conditioned by it, contra Hume. — Mww

It seems that such understandings are based on thinking about and generalizing from experience. Thus, we are said to know a priori what characteristics anything which qualifies as experience must have, in accordance with the most general characteristics all our past experiences are revealed by analysis, to have had.

When you say that principles and mathematical axioms are the transcendental constructs of reason alone, I am not sure what you mean. Those principles, it seems to me, at their most basic are abstracted from reflecting on an analyzing our experiences, and then once established may be elaborated in accordance with the entailments implicit in them, entailments which are discovered progressively by doing (experience) as seems to be the case with mathematics.

So, I don't see reason as a disembodied thing that can stand alone.

When you say that principles and mathematical axioms are the transcendental constructs of reason alone, I am not sure what you mean. Those principles, it seems to me, at their most basic are abstracted from reflecting on an analyzing our experiences, and then once established may be elaborated in accordance with the entailments implicit in them, entailments which are discovered progressively by doing (experience) as seems to be the case with mathematics.

So, I don't see reason as a disembodied thing that can stand alone — Janus

Kant seemed to do this 'removal of the mind from it's environment' thing. Reason can twist inward where it can no longer feel truth. This is why The Critique of Judgment is sentimental. He misses certainty that doesn't rely on a spurious infinity

Sorry mate, I don't know what you mean.

I don't see reason as a disembodied thing — Janus

:100:

The point I was making regards standards of citation. — Paine

Yes, I agree. Detailed and accurate source info for the quotations and citations are important and critical in the postings. Without them, some readers might accuse you for plagiarism.

Hegel tried to bring contradiction into a non-dual unity where there is no room left for contradiction. — Gregory

Why does Hegel try to avoid contradiction and dualism? Are contradiction and dualism unacceptable faults in philosophy?

Those principles, it seems to me, at their most basic are abstracted from reflecting on an analyzing our experiences — Janus

Well sure; that’s so easy to say, when there is already so much mathematically-inclined experience. We’ve all been exposed to number systems since a very early age. It doesn’t take long to learn that counting to 7, then continuing the count by another 5, gets you to a total of 12. From there, you easily see those two counts can never ever get you to any other number but 12.

I submit that it is from the most basic reflection and analysis of our counting experiences, that only the philosophically-inclined appreciate the apodeictic certainty, that it is impossible to arrive at 12 when all you have is a 7 and a 5. There is nothing at all contained in a 7, nor in a 5, which further authorizes you to do anything at all. From which it follows, even with experience of the existent numbers themselves being given, that whatever principle there may be regulating the use of that experience, is not contained in it. Hence the claim that while experience itself is conditioned by such principles, experience is not the condition from which they are given.

Might be easier this way: how many attempts, given only two straight lines, would it take to experience an enclosed space?

Now, before you laugh…..or maybe before you laugh any harder…..ever wonder how the very first ever farmer recognized, rather than have his sons stand guard all night, that to keep the indigenous fauna out of his wintertime food-stocks, it was necessarily required of him that he enclose such area, which he immediately and unquestionably realized to be impossible except under one and only one condition. In other words, he did NOT need the experience of destroyed crops, nor, insofar as he was the first ever, did he need the experience of other existent enclosed spaces, to know with apodeictic certainty, not so much how many lines do enclose a space, but how many do not.
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How ‘bout this: as soon as you imagine a triangle, that is, construct a three-sided figure in your head, so to speak, you’ve destroyed the very idea of a triangle in general.

There are things a human just knows, merely for being human. At this level, knowledge indicates that of which the negation is a contradiction.
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So, I don't see reason as a disembodied thing that can stand alone. — Janus

I rather think reason is certainly not a thing, and I think reason as certainly being disembodied, insofar as there is no place in any possible body in which reason as such is to be found. Nor any other abstract theoretically-constructed intellectual faculty.

Still, even granting to it greater import, does not mean reason stands alone. Reason is part of a system, after all, however speculative that may be. While it may do things of such greater import by itself because of what it is thought to be and thereby the powers thought as belonging to it, its importance is only manifest in relation to something else.
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Granting there are things a human just knows merely because he’s human, neglecting, or even in spite of, natural instinct…..how do we talk about it?

It doesn’t take long to learn that counting to 7, then continuing the count by another 5, gets you to a total of 12. From there, you easily see those two counts can never ever get you to any other number but 12. — Mww

That's right. Counting begins with objects. Fingers and toes, grazing animals being hunted, heads of corn or whatever. Calculating was practices with an abacus. It's all based on experience of actual things,

. In other words, he did NOT need the experience of destroyed crops, nor, insofar as he was the first ever, did he need the experience of other existent enclosed spaces, to know with apodeictic certainty, not so much how many lines do enclose a space, but how many do not. — Mww

Enclosure I would say is a very simple idea that we learn for example by experiencing our own bodies. Opening and closing our eyes, our mouths and our hands.

I rather think reason is certainly not a thing, and I think reason as certainly being disembodied, insofar as there is no place in any possible body in which reason as such is to be found. Nor any other abstract theoretically-constructed intellectual faculty. — Mww

by 'thing' I meant 'process' not 'perceptible object'. Reasoning goes on in the brain and is felt in the body in my view, and in that sense it is perceptible. We know when we are reasoning about something even if only inwardly. We visualize what we are reasoning about or hear an inner voice, or at least I do.

"Kant rated dialectic higher- and this is among his greatest merits- for he freed it from the seeming arbitrariness which it possesses from the standpoint of ordinary thought and exhibited it as a necessary function of reason. Because dialectic was held to be merely the art of practising deceptions and producing illusions, the assumpton was made forthwith that it is only a spurious game, the whole of its power resting solely on concealment of the deceit and that its results are obtained only surreptitiously and are a subjective illusion. True, Kant's expositions in the antimonies of pure reason, when closely examined as they will be at length in the course of this work, do not indeed deserve any great praise; but the general idea on which he based his expositions and which he vindicated, is the objectivity of the illusion and the necessity of the contradiction which belongs to the nature of thought determinations: primarily, it is true, with the significance that these determinations are applied by reason to things in themselves; but their nature is precisely what they are in reason and with reference to what is intrinsic or in itself. This result, grasped in its positive aspect, is nothing else but the inner negativity of the determinations as their self-moving soul, the principle of all natural and spiritual life." Science of Logic, Introduction

Anyway, I’ll stick with the affirmative regarding your “are (there) any "a priori cognitions in general" which do not have their genesis either in experience or in rules that are at their basis derived from experience”.