But my senses only feel in my visiom of sense. It takes abstract thought coupled withe imagination to think of something or someone not before you in their presence. We know each oher as humans, so then should we treat the body as phenomena or the thing in itself — Gregory

It's important to understand the link between Kant and cognitive science. Scholars recognise that Kant understood, in a way that nobody before him did, the role of the mind in the construction of what we take to be independently real. This is Kant's 'Copernican Revolution in Philosophy' which means that thought doesn't conform with things, but that things conform with thought. 'Kant drew a parallel to the Copernican Revolution in his proposal to think of the objects of experience as conforming to our spatial and temporal forms of intuition and the categories of our understanding, so that we have a priori cognition of those objects.'

So why is that? It's because our knowledge of the world, even though that is outside us, is constituted by the brain as 'idea' (per Schopenhauer). It's really important to understand what that means. The division between self and world is itself part of what the brain constructs. Easy to say, but hard to discern.

Dialetheism is associated usually with Hegel, — Gregory

For Hegel contradiction is the essential element in the changes and progress of the world.

Kant, who was very interested in formal logic, — Gregory

Kant's logic was not formal logic. It was transcendental logic i.e. he thought transcendental idealism works under the principle of the logic.

has his mental "antimonies" in his system. So my question is: was contradiction a necessary part of logic and/or reality in the worldview of Kant? If we can only see two sides of an idea, how do we know they unite at a highet level? — Gregory

Antinomies were what our reasons face when dealing with God, world, freedom and souls. Reason was supposed to know truth on everything. But when it comes to these objects, reason doesn't know what they are. For Kant, that was antinomy of reason, which is also the limitation of reason.

:up: :up:

The division between self and world is itself part of what the brain constructs. — Wayfarer

That's merely empirical, not transcendental – in Kant's system (CPR); your statement doesn't make sense, Wayf.

Could it be said that Kant was not Hegelian, but was he an absurdist? — Gregory

Kant lived in the earlier times than Hegel. How could Kant have had been a Hegelian? Could Plato have had been Heideggerian? :D

Kant, who was very interested in formal logic,
— Gregory

Kant's logic was not formal logic. It was transcendental logic i.e. he thought transcendental idealism works under the principle of the logic. — Corvus

Logic employed by the understanding is commonly, albeit loosely, called formal, but by Kant’s theory-specific terminology, called general or applied. Reason, on the other hand, employs transcendental logic, which has congruent subject/predicate form, but different origin of conceptions contained therein.

Understanding is the faculty of cognition in accordance with general/applied logic of rules, hence may or may not be empirical; reason is the faculty of determination of rules in accordance with transcendental logic, hence is never empirical. Logic is still logic, the source of its conceptions indicates the kind of logic it is, the functional domain to which it belongs.

Kantian speculative philosophy treats human intelligence as a tripartite syllogistic logical system, in which understanding provides the major either with or without conjunction with sensibility, judgement provides the minor(s) either with or without empirical representations, reason provides the conclusion, which is always and only transcendental, in accordance with pure a priori principles, the arbiter being contradiction either with itself or with experience. In this format, there is given the contingency of empirical knowledge on the one hand, and the certainty of pure a priori inference on the other.

The purity of this type of speculative analysis was taken to be sufficient ground for refuting Hume, which was the primary raison d’etre for the construction of transcendental philosophy in the first place….to falsify the standard empiricist’s claim that a priori cognitions in general, all that which cannot follow from the “constant conjunction of empirical cause and effect”, should be “consigned to the flames…”, insofar as if such were to be the case, the universality and necessity of mathematical truths cannot be explained.

….or so it seems.

Great summary :up: however a few points ...

Logic employed by the understanding is commonly, albeit loosely, called formal, — Mww

Formal logic means the type of logic which uses symbols and formal languages for analysing the statements and propositions for validity i.e. propositional logic, predicate logic and modal logic.
In mathematical logic it also means the logic which can be computable via the intelligent machines.

Reason, on the other hand, employs transcendental logic, which has congruent subject/predicate form, but different origin of conceptions contained therein. — Mww

Reason itself is a faculty which analyses and finds truths, but if it is to employ transcendental logic for its operation, then does it not duplicate itself with another faculty of truth telling system? Does it imply that reason says true on X, but the logic says false on X at the same time? If both of them says true, then why does reason need the logic, and why logic needs reason?

Are they not rather actually the same faculty expressed in different terms?

Formal logic means the type of logic which uses symbols and formal languages…. — Corvus

Which is why I said “commonly, but loosely, called”, insofar as the human intellectual faculties do not use symbols or language; it is only when talking about such use, in the attempts at describing it, is various symbology necessary in order to communicate. We represent to ourselves logic in a metaphysical sense, merely that by which the system functions, with various conceptions some of which the system itself doesn’t even use. Reification writ large, and the bane of proper metaphysics.

….reason says true on X, but the logic says false on X at the same time….. — Corvus

Sorry, that makes no sense to me.

If we can only see two sides of an idea, how do we know they unite at a highet level? — Gregory

We don't "know," we settle (or, knowledge is settlement); and, they don't unite at a "highest" level, they unite at the [temporary] ["most"] functional level (or highest is functional)

Which is why I said “commonly, but loosely, called”, insofar as the human intellectual faculties do not use symbols or language; — Mww

When there are the official definition of formal logic, describing logic in commonly and loosely was a bit odd. We do use symbols extensively in all sciences, mathematics, arts, and communications too. Ignoring the symbols would be ignoring intelligence.

….reason says true on X, but the logic says false on X at the same time…..
— Corvus

Sorry, that makes no sense to me. — Mww

How could a case of contradiction which is possible in the reality and also in logical thinking not make sense to you?

How could a case of contradiction which is possible in the reality and also logical thinking not make sense to you? — Corvus

First of all, nowhere in the statement that made no sense to me was the concept of reality to be found, and nowhere in the logic of my own understanding of the statement, was the deduction of the conception of reality possible.

The second statement, in response, in the form of a secondary conditional query, the conception of reality is found, so that statement makes sense to me. Now I can say, reality does not hold contradiction, that being the purview of pure a priori logic manifest in critical thought, so even though the statement makes sense, it is theoretically invalid.

The world seems to be objects we perceive by our senses as extended. But there is so much more to experience than that. Phenomena is embedded in the pure extension stripped of color, smell, and taste (subjective?). There are all the ideas of philosophy living in the very being of things. Hegel presents the world as negative, moving, and as positive, objective, and Platonic on the flip side. Where does purpose come from? We don't know but it's there. Where does the extended come from for that matter

And yes, Hedeigger was a finitist Hegelian lol, imo

First of all, nowhere in the statement that made no sense to me was the concept of reality to be found, — Mww

The second statement, in response, in the form of a secondary conditional query, the conception of reality is found, so that statement makes sense to me. — Mww

Now I can say, reality does not hold contradiction, that being the purview of pure a priori logic manifest in critical thought, so even though the statement makes sense, it is theoretically invalid. — Mww

Your writings are ambiguous in what it is trying to say. My point was clear. If reason is based on logic, then they are likely to conflict on their judgements. Moreover it sounds a redundant statement to say that reason is based on logic.

Where does purpose come from? We don't know but it's there. — Gregory

Purpose for what? Isn't purpose from your psychology?

And yes, Hedeigger was a finitist Hegelian lol, imo — Gregory

Under what evidence is it the case? Gadamer was into Hegel stuff for mainly on hermeneutics, but not sure if Heidegger was.

For Hegel contradiction is the essential element in the changes and progress of the world. — Corvus

Yeahrp.

:up:

Reason itself is a faculty which analyses and finds truths, but if it is to employ transcendental logic for its operation, then does it not duplicate itself with another faculty of truth telling system? Does it imply that reason says true on X, but the logic says false on X at the same time? If both of them says true, then why does reason need the logic, and why logic needs reason?

Are they not rather actually the same faculty expressed in different terms? — Corvus

No.

There's a lot of lingo there that can be interpreted in various ways. But "No", I think, is the true answer to all of your questions above.

"Faculty" is a fun word from the early modern period. It doesn't specify much other than thought-furniture/functions in the imaginations of the early moderns.

Reason, in Kant, is a generalizations of the various powers of judgment which ultimately want truth.

I'd compare "Faculty" to "Category" in Kant, though -- not so much that reason itself is a faculty but faculties (categories) are a part of Reason.

That's merely empirical, not transcendental – in Kant's system (CPR); your statement doesn't make sense, Wayf. — 180 Proof

Exactly, ideas about the brain and whatever it is understood to do is part of an empirical understanding, not a transcendental.

Do you believe there are any "a priori cognitions in general" which do not have their genesis either in experience or in rules that are at their basis derived from experience and then elaborated to discover further entailments (as mathematics seems to be for example)?

Heidegger ends Being and Time on Hegel's analysis of time. He might have been referring to Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, the first pary of it about math, space, and time. Have you read one of Hegel's books? I've Phenomenology of the Mind about 7 times, and his "encyclopaedia' a few times. Sometimes there can be synchronisity in life

I'd compare "Faculty" to "Category" in Kant, though -- not so much that reason itself is a faculty but faculties (categories) are a part of Reason. — Moliere

I read Kant's insistence upon the intuitions as not a claim upon the limits of knowledge but acceptance of a structure we always use. The objection to Hume is about the range of options being entertained, a luxury not available to all.

You're making me want to become persnickity in the use of terms :D

"Intuition" has a special meaning in Kant, for instance -- it's the form in which the given is given. He doesn't insist upon intuition, though, but argues for it in the Transcendental Aesthetic.

I'd say that Kant's formulation of the categories of cause are the response to Hume.

But, I agree that these considerations are often...

a luxury not available to all. — Paine

Heidegger ends Being and Time on Hegel's analysis of time. — Gregory

I think it's important to see that Heidegger never ended Being and Time by his own design.

I think he got lost in his own hermeneutic, or perhaps just ended in aporia from his initial ambitions.

The important thing to note is that he never finished his thoughts -- so they are interesting, but he didn't do what Camus did, for instance, in posing a question and then answering it.

I believe the same was the fate of Kant and Leibniz. They never finished their systems to their own satisfaction.

I think Hegel was just philosophically spent by the end. Anything else he would have written would have been redundant in my opinion

As for Heidegger, his sense that time is alive and informs us of life reminds me of the turning wheels of the system of Hegel

Do you believe there are any "a priori cognitions in general"…. — Janus

Understanding may construct a priori cognitions concerning possible experience, true enough, re: motion is necessarily change in time but not necessarily change in space (think: rotation). But principles and mathematical axioms, on the other hand, are the transcendental constructs of reason alone, hence, while they may certainly condition possible experience, insofar as their proofs reside in the domain of empirical knowledge, they are not conditioned by it, contra Hume.

Good question, but tough to short-answer convincingly.

They never finished their systems to their own satisfaction. — Gregory

Kant said he did. Not only his own satisfaction, but to everyone else’s as well, assuming a commensurate ability to understand it. See Bxxiv.

No.

There's a lot of lingo there that can be interpreted in various ways. But "No", I think, is the true answer to all of your questions above. — Moliere

Ok, fair enough. I was wondering if reason and logic are the same or separate faculties in Kant. If they are the separate faculties, then they might create possible contradictory situations in their operations. That was my point to Mww. For the word "faculties", Kant uses the word often in his Lecture on "LOGIC" for meaning divisions.

"Faculty" is a fun word from the early modern period. It doesn't specify much other than thought-furniture/functions in the imaginations of the early moderns. — Moliere

We can see the word "faculty" often in the Logic Lecture book of Kant. For example "Reason is the faculty of the derivation of the particular from the universal or cognition a priori." - pp.442

Have you read one of Hegel's books? — Gregory

I did read some commentary books on Hegel. I did not read any of his original works.

I've Phenomenology of the Mind about 7 times, and his "encyclopaedia' a few times. Sometimes there can be synchronisity in life — Gregory

Cool. You must be very much familiar with Hegel's system. :up:

I support your effort to become persnickity in the use of terms.

Kant is pretty darn specific in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic regarding what he supports and objects to in Hume.

My observation applies more to comparisons made afterwards.

See Bxxiv — Mww

Thanks. I've read several places that Kant wanted to complete Descartes "universal algebra" agenda. That is, a system that can explain everything that humans can know. Leibniz tried this as well

Cool. You must be very much familiar with Hegel's system — Corvus

After getting better at reading his works, it felt as if i could predict what each next paragraph would be about. Or maybe it was a psychological trick, idk, but his arguing is dizzying, so it's best to keep it abstract and keep in mind the various uses of the words form, universal, particular, negative, positive, abstract, concrete, ratio, measure, essence, ect.

Reason, in Kant, is a generalizations of the various powers of judgment which ultimately want truth. — Moliere

In Logic Lecture book, it says logic is derived from reason. and is is a doctrine, it provides rules / it is a demonstrated theory. It contains the ground for passing judgements as to whether something is true or false. -pp.432

Which Hegelian text are you referring to? There are at least three your description could be pointing to.

How about quoting some text so that the context can be appreciated?

After getting better at reading his works, it felt as if i could predict what each next paragraph would be about. — Gregory

I feel Hegel is an important and significant philosopher, and was planning to read his original texts sometime. His metaphysics, and philosophy of religion were interesting. But Science of Logic sounds interesting too. Look forward to discussing on Hegel sometime in the near future with you and others who are interested in Hegel too.