3. I don't see what institutions are considered to be free here and what status the others might have. — Ludwig V

Coming back to this: The context here, for Rawls, is what he says about "reasonable pluralism" as the "inevitable outcome" of such institutions. What he has in mind, I think, are institutions such as a free press, freedom of speech, no state religion, and a "free market." Leaving the last one aside for the moment, we can see the degree of freedom he's picturing concerning speech and religion. Broadly, he's imagining institutions that exact no penalties for a pluralism of views, and place no barriers to the expression of such views, and prohibit the state from placing a hand on the scale when there is disagreement. I would say that this is, very broadly, the "free institutions" enshrined in Western democracy.

But . . . Rawls is on much shakier grounds if he also regards Western late capitalism as a free institution. I am not sure he does. He's aware that economic inequality is not only a matter of individual good or bad fortune, but is to some extent a feature of the system. But I don't know if he ever seriously considered socialistic reforms -- pretty sure there's no discussion of that in either Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism. I'd have to reread both him and Nussbaum to have an educated opinion one way or the other.

I would say that this is, very broadly, the "free institutions" enshrined in Western democracy. — J

That's all very well. But doesn't he recognize that all these freedoms are heavily qualified?

I found Prospect Magazine 2018 - Rawls' Justice as Fairness

We arrive at “the property question”: is it reasonable to allow private ownership of society’s major means of production? If we agree to conceive political society as a fair cooperative system for mutual benefit, the answer must be No: these assets are such that private ownership inevitably endows the owner with inordinate political power.
Rawls was hesitant to state this conclusion. He wanted to leave open an alternative to liberal democratic socialism that he called “property-owning democracy.” These two “ideal regime-types,” as he called them, differ essentially only in how they answer the property question.

I would say that this is, very broadly, the "free institutions" enshrined in Western democracy.
— J
That's all very well. But doesn't he recognize that all these freedoms are heavily qualified? — Ludwig V

I think he does. In Political Liberalism, for instance, in the section called "Free Political Speech," he points out that "the basic liberties not only limit one another but they are also self-limiting" (341), and goes on to give a very nuanced discussion of how this is so. This section ends:

The discussion illustrates how freedom of speech as a basic liberty is specified and adjusted at later stages so as to protect its central range, namely the free public use of our reason in all matters that concern the justice of the basic structure and its social policies. — Political Liberalism, 348

I would call this "heavily qualified," if you think about what he's actually saying. The possibly ideal liberty to speak as one pleases becomes confined to its "central range," which appears to be reasonable political discussion about matters of justice as they relate to structure and policies. The use of "reasonable," alone, would force a discussion of what this means in terms of limits.

We arrive at “the property question”: is it reasonable to allow private ownership of society’s major means of production? If we agree to conceive political society as a fair cooperative system for mutual benefit, the answer must be No: these assets are such that private ownership inevitably endows the owner with inordinate political power.
Rawls was hesitant to state this conclusion. He wanted to leave open an alternative to liberal democratic socialism that he called “property-owning democracy.” These two “ideal regime-types,” as he called them, differ essentially only in how they answer the property question.

Excellent. This is just how I read him too -- though as I said, I'd need to do some rereading on this question to be sure. But we find him saying typical Rawlsian things such as:

I have assumed throughout . . . that while citizens do not have equal capacities, they do have, at least to the essential minimum degree, the moral, intellectual, and physical capacities that enable them to be fully cooperating members of society over a complete life. — Political Liberalism, 163

I call this typical because his conception of a "capacity" is usually individual, such that "economic capacity" might not qualify -- though I think it should. And the "essential minimum degree" bit has generated a lot of debate, which would certainly have to be extended into the economic area as well.

I would call this "heavily qualified," if you think about what he's actually saying. — J

Yes, I agree. All very interesting.

I wonder who does the specifying and adjusting? In real life I think that there is a great deal of consensus developing and then being enforce in the same kind of ways that the rules of etiquette are enforced - spontaneous, non-organized individual reaction.

I call this typical because his conception of a "capacity" is usually individual, such that "economic capacity" might not qualify -- though I think it should. And the "essential minimum degree" bit has generated a lot of debate, which would certainly have to be extended into the economic area as well. — J

I think the talk of capacities comes from Nussbaum. As to economic capacity, I assume that means the capacity to earn money. But the limits of what might earn money are quite wide; so it's a different kind of capacity from, for example, the capacity to drive lorries or raise cattle. Perhaps, in this case at least, it may be more a question of finding some capacity that each person has that people will pay money for, as opposed to a capacity like the ability to play music, where it is more a question of selecting among the population.

The question of education raises its head again.

pretty sure there's no discussion of that in either Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism. I'd have to reread both him and Nussbaum to have an educated opinion one way or the other. — J

Rawls is modern liberalism par excellence, if we take Keynes as his economic counter-part. The idea of justice includes classes of various kinds such that all the people, in the veil of ignorance, would agree to those classes before rolling the dice to find out which class they are in.

The big difficulty there is... well, whatever. I know i'm not a liberal. I agree with you that there's no discussion upon "just how low can the lower class go?", because he was not a member of the lower class.

I wonder who does the specifying and adjusting? In real life I think that there is a great deal of consensus developing and then being enforce in the same kind of ways that the rules of etiquette are enforced - spontaneous, non-organized individual reaction. — Ludwig V

A good question, which can be asked of both Rawls and Habermas. Rawls has in mind a sort of ideal dialogue or dialectic, that seems clear, but there might be different answers about how it is realized by the state. Your analogy with etiquette is fine, but the problem is that we wouldn't tolerate etiquette police, whereas it seems we do need enforcement of these naturally occurring, non-organized forms of consensus.

I think the talk of capacities comes from Nussbaum. — Ludwig V

Yes, she's developed it in a particularly interesting way, but the quote does come from Rawls, who also used the term often.

As to economic capacity, I assume that means the capacity to earn money. — Ludwig V

At a minimum, but I also have in mind the various power-capacities that economic privilege endows one with. I don't need to spell this out, I'm sure; the fact that my parents were middle-class US citizens gave me some obvious unearned and unfair advantages over others. This is a problem for classical liberalism because, while there's arguably not much we can do about differences an individual is born with, the differences in economic status are systemic, not "natural," and could be ameliorated. Indeed, they might not exist at all, which is hard to imagine with differences of, say, gender or physical robustness or IQ-type intelligence.

in this case at least, it may be more a question of finding some capacity that each person has that people will pay money for — Ludwig V

An interesting alternative to guaranteeing a minimum standard of living. I suppose a more social-democratic view here would challenge the idea that economic viability needs to be deserved or earned at all. But I can easily see a capitalist society using your idea as a sort of bridge.

We can notice how this thought developed in a related area. It used to be held that the right to vote was no such thing, but rather had to be earned, if you will, by being a member of a certain sex and racial and economic class. Now liberal democracies believe that all adult citizens (with some troublesome exceptions) indeed have this right. But the parallel with "right to be economically stable" hasn't been made yet. We still believe, by and large, that people should earn their living. There's been, at least, some movement toward thinking that those who are unable to do so can be supported by the state, but this rarely translates into anything you or I would recognize as economic stability. (I'm speaking now about the US, which lags so far behind in this area -- 16.3 % of children below the poverty line??? :cry: .)

The idea of justice includes classes of various kinds such that all the people, in the veil of ignorance, would agree to those classes before rolling the dice to find out which class they are in.

The big difficulty there is... well, whatever. — Moliere

Not sure about that last part? :smile: But yes, this is a huge problem with the veil of ignorance, for Nussbaum and many others. Rawls assumed a lot when he imagined what we could know and not know, accept and not accept, conceptualize and not conceptualize, from behind that veil. The idea is resilient, though, because you can correct and stretch it without breaking it and making it useless.

there's no discussion upon "just how low can the lower class go?", because he was not a member of the lower class. — Moliere

Not entirely fair. Rawls has all kinds of things to say about this, most famously his "Difference Principle":

The basic structure should allow organizational and economic inequalities so long as these improve everyone's situation, including that of the least advantaged, provided these inequalities are consistent with equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity. — Political Liberalism, 282

As for the ad hominem part -- well, maybe being a member of the lower class would be a necessary condition for seeing it differently, but certainly not a sufficient one. See Broke and Patriotic, by Francesco Duina.

Not sure about that last part? :smile: But yes, this is a huge problem with the veil of ignorance, for Nussbaum and many others. Rawls assumed a lot when he imagined what we could know and not know, accept and not accept, conceptualize and not conceptualize, from behind that veil. The idea is resilient, though, because you can correct and stretch it without breaking it and making it useless. — J

I began to think that I was saying something not worth saying.

Not entirely fair. Rawls has all kinds of things to say about this, most famously his "Difference Principle": — J

Fair. I am not a Rawls reader, though I've done selections from A Theory of Justice.

From my perspective, though I haven't read what you recommended so this is off the cuff, is that it's very easy to accept economic differences when you're higher up, and not so easy when you're lower down. So even if we go with the veil of ignorance I suspect the people who roll snake-eyes will still feel bitter and want more out of life.

it's very easy to accept economic differences when you're higher up, and not so easy when you're lower down. So even if we go with the veil of ignorance I suspect the people who roll snake-eyes will still feel bitter and want more out of life. — Moliere

As an observation about people, I completely agree. And that bitterness would have a special sting since, as discussed, no one need be born poor.

Rawls has been described, personally, as a rather unworldly fellow who didn't care much for his own comforts. Thomas Nagel talked about "his purity and his freedom from the distortions of ego," but also said that "my dominant sense of Jack was that he was a natural aristocrat." Not sure that's the praise he would have wanted, if it is praise! But it speaks to your point, in that one's life experiences can't help influencing what you find acceptable, and maybe even noticeable.

This is a problem for classical liberalism because, while there's arguably not much we can do about differences an individual is born with, the differences in economic status are systemic, not "natural," and could be ameliorated. — J

It seems to me that the project of disentangling nature from nurture is extremely difficult, if possible at all. The two interact during the whole of life and the prospect of separating them is very dim.

The idea is resilient, though, because you can correct and stretch it without breaking it and making it useless. — J

I think we would do better to consider the ways in which we negotiate this issue in real life and, with luck, working out improvements to those. More likely to be meaningful than something dreamed up in an armchair.

Now liberal democracies believe that all adult citizens (with some troublesome exceptions) indeed have this right. — J

Yes, they do. And it is a problem. Insofar as compulsory education can address the issue, that's all we have.

It seems to me that the project of disentangling nature from nurture is extremely difficult, if possible at all. — Ludwig V

Sure, but isn't there a clear distinction to be made between "born with a speech impediment" and "born into poverty"? Most of the boundaries are fuzzier than that, agreed, but in principle I think it's a conception worth clarifying when we can.

I think we would do better to consider the ways in which we negotiate this issue in real life — Ludwig V

I vote for both/and rather than either/or. Theory + political realities.

Now liberal democracies believe that all adult citizens (with some troublesome exceptions) indeed have this right.
— J
Yes, they do. And it is a problem. — Ludwig V

Can you say more about what the problem is, as you understand it? (The exceptions I had in mind are the various state laws about convicted felons voting.)

Sure, but isn't there a clear distinction to be made between "born with a speech impediment" and "born into poverty"? Most of the boundaries are fuzzier than that, agreed, but in principle I think it's a conception worth clarifying when we can. — J

Yes, but the outcome of having a speech impediment as an adult might well rest on both causes interacting, not only after birth, but even before (polluted environment). But I'm happy to think of a specfrum, which results from the interaction of the two causes.

I vote for both/and rather than either/or. Theory + political realities. — J

Well, yes. Thought experiments and idealizations have their place. But so does hard, practical experience. Perfect impartiality may be beyond reach in practice, but practical arrangement can achieve something, and good practical arrangments can do better than bad ones.

Can you say more about what the problem is, as you understand it? (The exceptions I had in mind are the various state laws about convicted felons voting.) — J

I wasn't thinking about the details. There are various categories of people barred from voting in the UK.

Sitting Members of the House of Lords.
Those in prison.
People convicted of electoral malpractice are barred for five years.
Those compulsorily detained in psychiatric hospitals cannot vote.

The arguments are slightly different in each case. But the reasons seem obvious, except in the case of those in prison. I'm unclear whether the reason is that those in prison are regarded as unfit to vote or whether loss of the right to vote is part of the punishment.

Well, yes. Thought experiments and idealizations have their place. But so does hard, practical experience. — Ludwig V

Yes. Habermas has perhaps done better with this than Rawls, because much of what he's written about this has been in response to ongoing European issues about which there is real debate, and real concern about how to frame the debate. These are very much practical issues.

Sitting Members of the House of Lords.

I had no idea! Is this an outgrowth of the tradition (if I've got this right) that certain members of the royal family may not vote either?

I'm unclear whether the reason is that those in prison are regarded as unfit to vote or whether loss of the right to vote is part of the punishment. — Ludwig V

I realized I didn't know, and spent a bit of time consulting online sources. In the US, the answer appears to be "neither" -- felon disenfranchisement evidently began as part of the Jim Crow reaction to Black emancipation. The idea was that, because more Blacks spent time in prison (wonder why!), they could be further excluded from political influence once they got out. White felons were collateral damage, on this account.

As for current arguments, the answer appears to be "both": The idea of "civil death" as a punishment for certain crimes goes back many centuries, and is seen as both a just punishment for criminally harming the state, and a just precaution to make sure that such malefactors can't do further harm with their vote. The ethical connection between committing a felony and being unqualified to vote is, I guess, taken for granted.

I had no idea! Is this an outgrowth of the tradition (if I've got this right) that certain members of the royal family may not vote either? — J

The British Constitution is a wonderful thing. Strictly speaking, the royal family are entitled to vote; it's just that they think it would be tactless to do so. The same applies to the bishops of the Church of England, who are all classified as "lords spiritual" and are automatically working members. Nor (since 1999) does the ban apply to hereditary peers who have not been elected to be working members. But even those who are banned from voting in Parliamentary elections are allowed to vote in local elections.

The first law about this was passed in 1699. The official reason for the ban is that members of t[e House of Lords are there in their own right and so do not need a representative in Parliament. They can speak for themselves.

As for current arguments, the answer appears to be "both": — J

Yes. It all looks like a bit of a mess. It seems likely that the real reason the practice survives is that "votes for criminals" does not look like a vote winner.

Strictly speaking, the royal family are entitled to vote; it's just that they think it would be tactless to do so. — Ludwig V

:lol:

It seems likely that the real reason the practice survives is that "votes for criminals" does not look like a vote winner. — Ludwig V

Yes, and you really can't overestimate the degree to which the US is plagued by racist and classist assumptions. In depressingly large segments of the population, "votes for criminals" translates as "more so-called 'rights' for those people".

Yes, and you really can't overestimate the degree to which the US is plagued by racist and classist assumptions. — J

It seems patently obvious that you can, and that this is the standard driven by media/social media. The vast majority of the US is objectively not racist. Classist? A better argument can be made.

Rhetoric aside, and sorry for mine, this comes down to how you think of racism. If "objective racism" means "espouses/acts on consciously held racist views," then I might estimate this to be true of 50% of US people. But systemic racism is where the "racist assumptions" really play out, and here it would be difficult to find anyone, myself included, who is immune. The Implicit Association Test is one interesting indicator, and there are similar tests involving faces and racial traits.

But more generally, the US is constantly finding surrogates for explicitly racist policies, most recently the moves against immigrants. Our policing and justice system is of much longer duration. I have no hesitation in calling the belief that the US criminal system is fair and equitable a "racist assumption." It is impossible to believe this without ignoring the reasons why -- just to pick one feature -- people of color have less effective legal representation than white people. This is the systemic part. To say, "But that's not because of their race, it's because of ____ (usually some version of poverty or lack of education)" is to avoid the question, "But how did that come about? Why is this group poorer/less educated?" etc. The racist assumption here would be that, somehow or other, there is a racially neutral explanation of this.

All that said, there are many ways of using the word "racism" and I don't mean to dispute your right to use it differently. I'm just trying to explain what my comment meant.

If "objective racism" means "espouses/acts on consciously held racist views," then I might estimate this to be true of 50% of US people. — J

That is honestly, in my view, utterly bananas my guy. This makes me think perhaps you have never left your house. Obviously not, but having been around the States and understand how to look at sample sizing etc... this claim is one for which I would want to prevent you from holding office its so absurd. This purely to illustrate how flabbergastingly made-up this appears to someone looking in.

But systemic racism is where the "racist assumptions" really play out, and here it would be difficult to find anyone, myself included, who is immune. — J

Is this one of those "everyone's racist" arguments? Cause if so, this isn't even worthy of discussion. If everyone has it, why are we talking about it like its a bad thing? Its human nature if so.
If that's not the argument, I would suggest you're reading 'lines' and just eating them up. Its hard to even understand what's being brought forward in those sorts of tests. "implicit bias" means almost nothing. Humans discriminate. That's about 99% of our mental activity. There's also a bit of a bugaboo here: Racism against the majority is rife. I do actually care whether that ruffles feathers - it is. Karmelo Anthony is a PERFECT example of some rather extreme black privilege (until he was charged, I should add. It looks to have stopped).

But more generally, the US is constantly finding surrogates for explicitly racist policies, most recently the moves against immigrants. — J

That may be your view, and why you think 50% of the US is racist. I think its utterly preposterous. There is an argument here, though, that I think gets ignored: Non-racist policies carried out by racist people give a certain flavour. I'll say no more than to add that there are plenty of explicitly racist policies: they aren't aimed at black and brown people.

The racist assumption here would be that, somehow or other, there is a racially neutral explanation of this. — J

Your position is that a racially neutral explanation for any racial disparity would be, fundamentally, racist? Are you hearing yourself? Or am I not getting it?

Whichever answer, this doesn't apply to the actual commission of violent crime. What's the 'racist' explanation there? Particularly given its mainly intra-racial?

- Bananas indeed. :up:

That is honestly, in my view, utterly bananas my guy. — AmadeusD

this claim is one for which I would want to prevent you from holding office its so absurd. — AmadeusD

flabbergastingly made-up — AmadeusD

Gee, you really make me want to continue the conversation! :wink:

I can see I've pushed your buttons, so I'll let it drop, no hard feelings.

But I would want to lay a lot at the feet of democratic culture. I think most people like pluralism because they like democracy, and truth is always a threat to democracy insofar as we accept the modern notion of liberty as liberty to follow one's passions.

On the other hand is the idea that truth brings with it coercive imposition, which threatens the dignity of each human to choose for themselves. Either way, I tend to view the motive as moral more than speculative, especially for the non-academic masses

I'm replying to this comment in this thread because my thoughts are more on topic here.

I think the above is largely correct. However, the question then is: "why do people now think truth is incompatible with democracy?" A very robust appreciation for democracy existed in the United States in the early 20th century without an embrace of this sort of pluralism, without any apparent conflict.

Superman fights for "Truth, Justice, and the American Way," a phrase which could be delivered back then without any undercurrent of irony. In 1948, even "the world is essentially meaningless and purposeless" types like William Stace could espouse faith in logos and man's capacity to follow it. There is, up through the early Cold War, a "cult of the Founding Fathers" that tends to present them in terms not unlike how the ancient Greeks saw figures like Solon. And then there is stuff like the broad success of The Lord of the Rings and Chronicles of Narnia in the earlier context, versus the sorts of stories that are popular today, like A Game of Thrones and The Hunger Games. The latter two are considered "more realistic," in part, precisely because of uninspiring, more cynical endings.

I think post-modern skepticism re grand narratives, and a more general skepticism of logos's capacity for leading human life, has a larger impact on popular culture that is often acknowledged (through a variety of pathways, particularly its effect on the liberal arts). I'd argue that it is this skepticism that makes truth threating (rather than empowering) for democracy. That is, truth and reason should make democracy more secure, but in this climate the two come into conflict.

Also, the fact that logos is no longer fit to lead human life redoubles the modern liberal phobia of thymos (spiritedness, honor culture, etc.) sparked by the World Wars. So what you get is a society focused on epithumia (sensible pleasure and, in particular, safety) and "reasonableness" (which seems to often tie back procedurally to safety). This is, pointedly, not unlike how Juvenal and Tacitus saw their own society as its citizenry allowed the Roman Republic to die.

Now, I'll catch some flak for this, but for historians and theorists who use something like the epithumia, thymos, logos distinction, there are two types of "societies of epithumia:" the primitive, which must struggle to meet basic needs, and the decadent. Ibn Khaldun might be an example here. Or as William Durant puts it: "every civilization is born a Stoic, and dies an Epicurean."

To bring this back to Rawls:

A common critique of Rawls is that his "reasonableness" isn't enough to motivate citizens to attain arduous goods. It's procedural, and motivated by safety. Other liberals tend to draw on a similar sort of motivation (e.g. Stephen Pinker, Sam Harris, etc., i.e. "it's safest to prefer the progressive liberal social order; it's most likely to get you 'good enough' circumstances"). Hence, it doesn't really address Fukuyama's point about the inherent human drive towards megalothymia. More to the point, people are unlikely to want to storm beaches or resist sieges in the name of "reasonableness," i.e., to take the sorts of personal and collective risks that civilization requires.

I think those are fair critiques, but I would add that "reasonableness" also isn't a strong enough motivator to keep societies' leaders and elites honest. When faced with tensions between duty and personal pleasure or self-aggrandizement, reasonableness is not the sort of principle that gets people to do the hard thing, especially not when that means taking on significant risks. For that, you need a sense of thymos, arete, and pietas, all the old civic virtues. Hamilton for instance, wasn't willing to storm trenches because he thought his system would be a reasonable maximization of the self-directed pursuit of utility, but because he (like many Founders) self-reflectively thought of himself as a modern-day Cincinnatus or Cocles.

Certainly, thymos can lead to great evils, but it also leads to great goods. That's Plato's whole point. Logos needs to rule through thymos. Liberalism tends to cut out thymos because it will not allow any standard for human greatness or just desert to enter the public sphere (Rawls explicitly bans just desert from consideration). More to the point, in its contemporary form, it tends to preclude the "rule of reason" because reason, once deflated and deprived of proper authority as logos, only speaks to "how to get what we all want," and not "what should we want."

So, as Rawls might put it in his deontological contractarian terms:

Human beings have a desire to express their nature as free and equal moral persons, and this they do most adequately by acting from the principles that they would acknowledge in the original position. When all strive to comply with these principles and each succeeds, then individually and collectively their nature as moral persons is most fully realized, and with it their individual and collective good” (1971, 528; 1999, 462–3, emphasis added).

Yet we face the same sort of challenges one sees in criticisms of Hume:

Such a common end or desire, however, and the common flourishing in which this desire is fulfilled are simply not possible as such if we accept one key premise that Rawls himself has articulated and indeed started out from in the first part of his theory of justice: namely, that the good of each individual is essentially whatever he or she desires, that each individual determines (not discovers or discerns) his or her own life plan comprised of a “separate system of ends.” Recall Rawls’s famous example of the person who dedicates his life to counting blades of grass (1971, 432–3; 1999, 379–80). If this person does not affirm the principles of justice, or the social union of a well-ordered society, or the excellences of others enjoyed in that society as parts of his individual good, so be it; if after attempts at friendly persuasion he remains unconvinced, we have no theoretical or anthropological grounds to conclude that he has misunderstood who he really is and what makes for his truest personal and social happiness. He is simply different from us. On Rawls’s own terms, therefore, we cannot convincingly maintain that justice is congruent with the good for all persons; Rawls himself admits this towards the end of TJ (cf. 1971, 575–6; cf. 528–9; 1999, 504–5; cf.) Because “goodness as rationality” hinges on individuals’ separate systems of ends, a fully common good and ultimately the (ontological) “common or matching [moral] nature” (1971, 523; cf. 528; 1999, 459; cf. 463) on which it must be founded cannot be said to exist within Rawls’s liberal paradigm.

Mary Keys - Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good

Rawls has a "thick" theory in some respects, but this conception of the common good is thin. I don't think it's thick enough to support the demands of civilization in the long run, although it might work well enough for a while, especially for a civilization with economic and martial hegemony already in place and an existing culture it can draw on for values. But we're now seeing both of those factors evaporate.

Not to mention that Rawls himself is undermined by the advance of skepticism since the 1970s. Even his instrumental, Kantian reasonableness starts looks shaky in the face of today's logos skepticism.

Great post. I will have to come back to this when I have more time. Let me say just one thing:

I think the above is largely correct. However, the question then is: "why do people now think truth is incompatible with democracy?" A very robust appreciation for democracy existed in the United States in the early 20th century without an embrace of this sort of pluralism, without any apparent conflict.

...

There is, up through the early Cold War, a "cult of the Founding Fathers" that tends to present them in terms not unlike how the ancient Greeks saw figures like Solon. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Could part of it be that the United States was explicitly formed as a republic and not a mere democracy?

After all, what does Benjamin Franklin say when he emerges from the Constitutional Convention, which moved the U.S. from the Articles of Confederation to a Constitution?

• Powel: "Well, Doctor, what have we got, a republic or a monarchy?"
• Franklin: "A republic, if you can keep it."

The Articles of Confederation were a more thoroughly democratic form, and the natural question asks whether the move away from that can manage to be a republic without falling into a monarchy. Thus, arguably, the recent epoch you identify is more bound up with democracy than the former epoch. I think we have seen a resurgence of democratic thinking in the last few decades.

I think post-modern skepticism re grand narratives, and a more general skepticism of logos's capacity for leading human life, has a larger impact on popular culture that is often acknowledged (through a variety of pathways, particularly its effect on the liberal arts). I'd argue that it is this skepticism that makes truth threating (rather than empowering) for democracy…

Not to mention that Rawls himself is undermined by the advance of skepticism since the 1970s. Even his instrumental, Kantian reasonableness starts looks shaky in the face of today's logos skepticism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you’re going to use the word ‘postmodern’ it might be useful to distinguish political and sociological adoptions of the term from philosophical usages. For a range of thinkers, from Wittgenstein and Husserl to Deleuze and Heidegger, the critique of grand narratives involves anything but skepticism concerning truth. That is to say, for them it is the belief in foundational truth that courts skepticism, and the way beyond such skepticism requires the invocation of a groundless ground, a non-foundational yet determinate notion of truth.

Funny enough, that post originally included a paragraph about the old trope that: "no critic of post-modernism has ever understood it, and even if they have understood it, post-modernism has never actually effected anything" You know, the old "no true post-modernism," or "real post-modernism has never been tried." But I thought it was too long.

Well, it is a slippery term, not unlike "existentialist." But I do think it's a term we need because there is a real difference between early to mid-20th century liberalism, and the later "post-modern" "neoliberalism" (there might be "no true neoliberalism" either though). This difference accelerates with the decline of the USSR, and is exemplified by strong skepticism vis-á-vis grand narratives, an embrace of strongly relativistic theses, a heavy focus on debunking as opposed to positive argument (although this is already being identified in the 1950s), a heavy embrace of irony and desacralizarion , and I would say "logos-skepticism." By "logos-skepticism," I mean skepticism about the capacity of logos (reason, rationality) to be the organizing principle and asperation of society and individual life.

For instance, early Christian thought, particularly Origen and Clement of Alexandria, is extremely logo-centric in this way. Homer's Greeks are thymos-centric. They have an arete culture where "excellence" is the key pursuit of human life. Virgil would be a sort of mid-point, pivoting from arete to pietas, an alignment of honor to principles.

William Stace is a fine example because he thinks we face nihilism, but still has faith in logos, in principles. "To be genuinely civilized means to be able to walk straightly and live honorable" without "childish" props such as religion and teleology. There is a refreshing lack of irony in "Man Against Darkness."

Like I said, I think the biggest factor here is how the new outlook permeated the liberal arts, down to high school classrooms. Hanson and Heath's "Who Killed Homer?", now almost thirty years old, covers the effects on the discipline of classics for instance. There is the shift to focusing on "subverting," "decolonizing," "deconstructing," "constructing," "queering," etc. texts on the one hand, and then the tendency to begin cramming the latest scientific and mathematical jargon into humanities studies on the other, as well as a pivot to the abstruse (if not downright obscurantist).

There is a lot going on there, but one theory I like is that the reason the humanities latched on to this sort of style and thinking so readily is that the early-20th century focus on the primacy of science left the humanities as "a mere matter of opinion and taste." They weren't rigorous enough. They didn't produce "progress." They didn't fit in well with the now-dominant German conception of the "research university" as a place primarily concerned with publishing new technological findings. Aping the style of the sciences gives the humanities at least something of the atmosphere of the "legitimate fields," while being aligned towards "progress" gives them a claim to be doing something for society akin to what the natural sciences do through the development of new technologies.

Hence, the creation of analyses like:

This chapter is devoted to the narrative, situation of complex narrator-text or embedded focalization, NF1[F2Cx]. There is embedded (or secondary) focalization when the NF1 represents in the narrator-text the focalization of one of the characters. In other words, the NF1 temporarily hands over focalization (but not narration) to one of the characters, who functions as F2 and, thereby, takes a share in the presentation of the story. Recipient of the F2's focalization is a secondary focalizee (Fe2). (I. J. F. de Jong, Narrators and Focalizers. The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad [Amsterdam, 1987}, p. 101)

This is quite far from the "liberal arts" as the arts that "make men free" in terms of a capacity for individual self-governance and self-rule, although at least the less pessimistic, more Marxist thread in this shift still maintains something of this focus by still maintaining at least some idea about what exactly is being progressed towards.

For a range of thinkers, from Wittgenstein and Husserl to Deleuze and Heidegger, the critique of grand narratives involves anything but skepticism concerning truth. That is to say, for them it is the belief in foundational truth that courts skepticism, and the way beyond such skepticism requires the invocation of a groundless ground, a non-foundational yet determinate notion of truth.

I think this is debatable. Arguably there is an equivocation on what is meant by "truth" in play, but that's not what I meant by logos-skepticism at any rate.

By "logos-skepticism," I mean skepticism about the capacity of logos (reason, rationality) to be the organizing principle and asperation of society and individual life. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you are missing an important point. For many in the aftermath of the two world wars, it was clear that the Grand Narratives that they had inherited were a busted flush. They perceived that those narratives involved a great deal of irrational myth-making, which could not stand up to a rational critique. New departures were an absolute necessity in order to avoid any repetition of history. (OK, that's an emotional sketch. But I don't think it is wrong. It is an appalling failure and a great sadness that they project appears to be on the brink of falling apart. But perhaps it never really stood a chance.)

More to the point, people are unlikely to want to storm beaches or resist sieges in the name of "reasonableness," i.e., to take the sorts of personal and collective risks that civilization requires. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's true. But the embrace of reasonableness was intended to avoid the necessity of storming beaches and resisting sieges, which were regarded as grossly uncivilized activities. Risks, by all means, but avoidance of barbarity as a priority.

There is a lot going on there, but one theory I like is that the reason the humanities latched on to this sort of style and thinking so readily is that the early-20th century focus on the primacy of science left the humanities as "a mere matter of opinion and taste." — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is certainly true. Are you suggesting that it is not a problem? Things have moved on since the fifties, though the Arts and Humanities are still in a perilous position. But then, so are the (pure) sciences, which seem to survive as the hand-maidens of Applied Science and Engineering, which is where the money is - or, if you prefer, are essential to the modern economy.*
I should not be too scathing here. In the curriculum of medieval universities, the professions, (Theology, Medicine and Law) were the crowning subjects. Humanities (otherwise known as the trivium) were preparatory, grounding subjects. It was only in the 18th and 19th centuries that the status of the Humanities improved and became the mark of a civilized, cultivated person. This was a rational response to the improved market for an education for those who would never need to work.

* EDIT Please don't think that I mean to cast any aspersions on either Applied Science of Engineering. My censure is against the near ubiquitous use of money as the only or primary measure of value.

That's true. But the embrace of reasonableness was intended to avoid the necessity of storming beaches and resisting sieges, which were regarded as grossly uncivilized activities. Risks, by all means, but avoidance of barbarity as a priority.

Right, but the arc of the argument is that people who won't storm beaches or resist sieges (who lack thymos) also won't stand up to public corruption or resist the temptation to public corruption, and won't forgo current consumption for the sake of future goods (e.g. Europe's response to Russian aggression, the inability to moderately curtail consumption to address what appear to be unfolding environmental and fiscal disasters for future generations). So it isn't just about an ability to engage in war, but an ability to avoid war and crisis in the first place.

One reason for this is that the empiricist psychology undergirding liberalism tends to be fairly impoverished (in a number of ways). One way this manifests, in classical terms, is essentially the claim that man only has concupiscible appetites (i.e. an attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain), while ignoring the existence of irascible appetites (i.e. an attraction to the pursuit of arduous goods, where hope, not pleasure, is the key positive motivating force). Indeed, a lot of economics and political science is explicitly built on an anthropology that explicitly lumps all motivation into a concupiscible utility. And it is considered "reasonable" for man to be wholly concupiscible, a creature of epithumia, as is evident when people are chastised for voting "against their own economic interests," as if this, above all else, is what politics seeks to provide. Well, in liberal theory, that's perhaps true, the "common good" is just an aggregate of individual concupiscible goods, of consumption.

But Fukuyama's point, which seems to have been borne out quite well, is that human nature and the drive to meglothymos doesn't disappear just because one wants to banish it. Calling it "unreasonable" does little when the life of epithumia is itself not self-justifying, if it is ultimately "meaningless and purposeless," and the result of an irrational pleasure drive that reason can only do its best to satisfy. C.S. Lewis makes a similar but more nuanced point in the Abolition of Man, which is that, not only will thymos not disappear, but it will be destructive if it isn't oriented properly, and that orientation cannot be to epithumia, but must come from logos.

. They perceived that those narratives involved a great deal of irrational myth-making, which could not stand up to a rational critique

I think the voices that helped develop our current thymos-phobia and logos-skepticism were themselves plenty dogmatic and stuck living out their own myth, both the Russell-Stace-Camus types who declared the "obvious" meaninglessness and purposelessness of reality, and the later post-modern logos-skeptics, who themselves never challenge the empiricist presuppositions that led them towards skepticism.

That is certainly true. Are you suggesting that it is not a problem?

No, I think it's a huge problem. It ignores what the liberal arts are for. They are the ground, as you say, for making men capable of self-governance and self-rule (collectively and individually) as well as the ground for a common stock of ideas for political life, the pursuit of a common good. The move to make English all about "on the job communication," is atrocious in this regard.

I'd disagree about the value given to them in previous epochs. When Saint Augustine regularly cites Virgil, etc., he is drawing on a common culture and set of ideas as a vehicle for his thought. These played a quite large role in thought and politics, as the surviving texts themselves show. The liberal arts might be preparatory, but they are extremely important in this regard. You see this in John Milton being invited to essentially take on a role akin to Secretary of State in revolutionary England because of his learning for instance.

It was only in the 18th and 19th centuries that the status of the Humanities improved and became the mark of a civilized, cultivated person. This was a rational response to the improved market for an education for those who would never need to work.

They were considered essential for those entering public life from antiquity. This is why ancient political works and the works of the Church Fathers are full of literary references. I would also suppose it's why they tend to have good rhetorical style, that even comes out in old translations. You could give Origen or Augustine to a high schooler and expect them to come away with something fairly clear, without being bored to tears, which is certainly not true of a lot of philosophy or theology.

This is a very strange debate. You seem to be arguing that the world is going to hell in a handbasket because of the dominance of liberalism. But I believe that the world is going to hell in a handbasket because of the increasing dominance of illiberal forces, some of which call themselves neo-liberal. We agree about something! On the other hand, I'm not sure there has ever been a time when the world wasn't going to hell in a handbasket. Certainly, not in the last three hundred years.

I can't work out what the key points are here. Some possibly random comments:-

I think the voices that helped develop our current thymos-phobia and logos-skepticism were themselves plenty dogmatic and stuck living out their own myth, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. It is certainly true that the successes of liberalism in, let us say the 19th and 20th century were the result of deep commitment and dogged determination. So it is odd that you think that people of that kind are "thumos-phobic" (if I've understood what you mean by that correctly). Their positions were based on rational argument, so it is also odd that you think that they were "logos-sceptical" (If I've understood what you mean by that correctly).

people who won't storm beaches or resist sieges (who lack thymos) also won't stand up to public corruption or resist the temptation to public corruption, and won't forgo current consumption for the sake of future goods — Count Timothy von Icarus

My understanding of thumos is that everybody has it - the capacity to adopt and pursue values with commitment and effort. The problem with it, for Plato at least, is that it needs to be directed correctly. It may be true that reluctance to forego current consumption may be part of the reluctance of Europe to support Ukraine properly. But a big part of it is a reluctance to go to war. I don't think that's a bad thing, (so long as it is not overdone!)

One way this manifests, in classical terms, is essentially the claim that man only has concupiscible appetites (i.e. an attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain), while ignoring the existence of irascible appetites (i.e. an attraction to the pursuit of arduous goods, where hope, not pleasure, is the key positive motivating force). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think this distinction would stand up to analysis. But perhaps you are channeling the distinction between epithumia and thumos? In any case, it seems to me that the widespread condemnation of epithumia is wrong-headed. Our appetites include things that are not merely pleasurable but essential. The problem arises when they are pursued to excess or in the wrong way.

They (sc. the humanities) are the ground, as you say, for making men capable of self-governance and self-rule (collectively and individually) as well as the ground for a common stock of ideas for political life, the pursuit of a common good. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That, or something very like it, is indeed the traditional argument for them. But, for many, what happened in Germany in the first half of the 20th century has more or less destroyed that argument. At the very least, we have to note that love of the humanities is not sufficient to prevent people going down some very wrong paths.

That, or something very like it, is indeed the traditional argument for them. But, for many, what happened in Germany in the first half of the 20th century has more or less destroyed that argument. At the very least, we have to note that love of the humanities is not sufficient to prevent people going down some very wrong paths

Well, the irony here is that Germany is very often the primary example advocates of the classical education use to push their case (with at least some degree of plausibility IMHO). The modern research university is based on the German model that eschewed the liberal arts and the classical education structure and focused on technological progress and technical training instead. Germany was the poster child for a move towards rigidly technical education. Public debates in the US and UK specifically centered around the fear that this was giving them a leg up in economic and military competition as they rushed into their own reforms.

Nazism was also not particularly a project of the intelligentsia in the way communism was in Russia, so it seems harder to blame elite education.

This is a very strange debate. You seem to be arguing that the world is going to hell in a handbasket because of the dominance of liberalism. But I believe that the world is going to hell in a handbasket because of the increasing dominance of illiberal forces, some of which call themselves neo-liberal. We agree about something! On the other hand, I'm not sure there has ever been a time when the world wasn't going to hell in a handbasket. Certainly, not in the last three hundred years.

Well, my claim is that contradictions and problems in modern liberalism are causing the rise of those illiberal forces. If it weren't for these internal dynamics, the external threats would be quite manageable. That is, liberalism in its current form is self-undermining. That's not saying that there is nothing good about liberalism, capitalism, modernity, or republican government. Quite the opposite. I find these trends particularly disturbing precisely because I see the benefits of republican government. Right now though, I think liberalism is destroying the future of republics, or at least putting them in jeopardy. At a certain point, an Augustus does become better for most people than rule by recalcitrant oligarchs. That was the reality of the death of the Roman Republic; it led to the best governance in a very long time.

Yes. It is certainly true that the successes of liberalism in, let us say the 19th and 20th century were the result of deep commitment and dogged determination. So it is odd that you think that people of that kind are "thumos-phobic" (if I've understood what you mean by that correctly). Their positions were based on rational argument, so it is also odd that you think that they were "logos-sceptical" (If I've understood what you mean by that correctly)

Right, I think you're missing what I've said about the timing. I said skepticism about thymos (always present to some degree) increases after the World Wars, and increases again in the post-modern/neo-liberal period after 1970. Logos-skepticism doesn't really enter the picture until that later period. As I pointed out, you can see quite the opposite attitude in the 40s and 50s. Now, truth and reason are seen as in someway inimical to democracy if they do not allow for a "bourgeoisie metaphysics" that allows for multiple, conflicting truth claims (pluralism). Previously, truth and reason were seen as supporting democracy, because people could be led towards the best path by reason and commitment to principles.

The erosion of culture by capitalism no doubt plays a role, because culture directs logos and thymos, but in our fractured environment culture lacks the capacity to act as a unifying force.

The problem with it, for Plato at least, is that it needs to be directed correctly.

Exactly. My claim is that today, we don't direct it so much as we just try to suppress it. It conflicts with "reasonableness" and a focus on safety.

In any case, it seems to me that the widespread condemnation of epithumia is wrong-headed. Our appetites include things that are not merely pleasurable but essential. The problem arises when they are pursued to excess or in the wrong way.

I agree 100%. There is nothing wrong with epithumia. What is problematic is when a society is led by epithumia, when it becomes epithumia-(appetite and safety)-centric. In our current case, this happens because of thymos-phobia and logos-skepticism (or even logos-phobia; I can't tell you how many times I have seen people argue for robust pluralism/relativism, including the wholesale violation of the principle of non-contradiction, because to do otherwise would court autocracy).

On the other hand, I'm not sure there has ever been a time when the world wasn't going to hell in a handbasket. Certainly, not in the last three hundred years.

Yes, but just because problems are perennial doesn't mean they don't get better or worse. The state of the West, or of the US specifically, is arguably more dismal that it has been in a long time, and the forces leading to this seem unlikely to abate or be mastered any time soon without significant change. Again, this is because the challenge to liberalism comes from within liberalism itself. If China and Russia fell into revolt tomorrow, the prospects for the West would not look particularly brighter. Indeed, the lack of external threats might accelerate the decline, the way it did for Rome after victory in the Second Punic War.

I think post-modern skepticism re grand narratives, and a more general skepticism of logos's capacity for leading human life, has a larger impact on popular culture that is often acknowledged (through a variety of pathways, particularly its effect on the liberal arts). I'd argue that it is this skepticism that makes truth threating (rather than empowering) for democracy. That is, truth and reason should make democracy more secure, but in this climate the two come into conflict. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Can you say more about why post-modern skepticism makes truth threatening?

When faced with tensions between duty and personal pleasure or self-aggrandizement, reasonableness is not the sort of principle that gets people to do the hard thing, especially not when that means taking on significant risks. For that, you need a sense of thymos, arete, and pietas, all the old civic virtues. — Count Timothy von Icarus

A good point.

Certainly, thymos can lead to great evils, but it also leads to great goods. That's Plato's whole point. Logos needs to rule through thymos. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Where could I find this in Plato? This is the sort of thing that I tend to think Simpson neglects in his critique of liberalism.

Because “goodness as rationality” hinges on individuals’ separate systems of ends, a fully common good and ultimately the (ontological) “common or matching [moral] nature” (1971, 523; cf. 528; 1999, 459; cf. 463) on which it must be founded cannot be said to exist within Rawls’s liberal paradigm. — Mary Keys - Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good

Excellent. :up:

Rawls has a "thick" theory in some respects, but this conception of the common good is thin. I don't think it's thick enough to support the demands of civilization in the long run, although it might work well enough for a while, especially for a civilization with economic and martial hegemony already in place and an existing culture it can draw on for values. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Simpson would add that Rawls himself admits that he is incapable of adjudicating in favor of Western values over any other value system. His project is a working out of the axioms of Western values without being in any way able to justify those values. This is similar to Keys' point.

Can you say more about why post-modern skepticism makes truth threatening?

There are several dimensions to this, so it's a tough question. I think it is part of a far larger tendency in modern thought, the move to define freedom in terms of power/potency (as opposed to the capacity to actualize the Good). Milton's Satan is a great emblem of this, and it's no surprise that he gets read as a hero by future generations after this trend accelerates. There is a certain (although, IMO counterfeit) freedom in Hamlet's remark that "there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so." This means we ultimately decide everything, through, in Satan's words, the "unconquerable will." D.C. Schindler's book "Freedom From Reality: The Diabolical Nature of Modern Liberty" is pretty good on this.

You can also see this tend in the idea that ontology might be oppressive if it is not creative. On the classical view, this makes no sense. Ignorance is a limit on freedom, and being creative in error just binds you in ignorance.

Next, Marxism had been fairly popular in the West, particularly in academia, for a long time. But by the late Cold War, the many infamies of Marxist regimes had come to light and they seemed more like the norm rather than the exception for that ideology. People had already argued that capitalism was bankrupt and couldn't turn back now. Yet their great alternative was revealed to be more akin to Hitlerism than utopia, and no new alternative was forthcoming. So there is a sort of reflexive shell shock militating against strong belief.

So that's the broad context, but then this is paired with a number of influential skeptical arguments of "skeptical solutions" to questions of knowledge. Wittgenstein, who has been interpreted in extremely diverse ways, is especially influential here. The linguistic turn and a tendency towards deflationism (or just bracketing out questions of truth) in logic also helps. I mentioned this in the thread on pragmatism.

Now if you will all excuse me a moment of embracing polemic... the move to "pragmatism all the way down," seems to come from two different angles:

On the one hand, you have Analytics who, burnt by incompleteness and undefinablity, decided that, since truth couldn't be defined to their satisfaction, it simply could not exist. The rules of their "games" were thus the ultimate measure of truth, and since they had very many games there must be very many truths, with no game to help them choose between them.

Elsewhere in the Analytic camp were those who became so committed to the idea of science as the "one true paradigm of knowledge," that they began to imagine that, if science couldn't explain consciousness, then consciousness (and thus conscience) must simply be done away with (i.e. eliminative materialism, which gets rid of the Good and the agent who might know it).

From the other side came Continentals who came to define freedom as pure potency and power, and so saw any definiteness as a threat to unlimited human liberty. On such a view, anything that stands outside man must always be a constriction on his freedom. Everything must be generated by the individual. Perhaps we can allow the world to "co-constitute" with us, but only if a sort of freedom and agency, which in the end is really "ours" anyhow, is given to the world.

The result is a sort of pincer move on the notions of Truth and Goodness (and we might add Beauty here too.) We might envisage the two armies of Isengaurd and Mordor. The first is motivated by belief that it cannot win. The second, by pure considerations of power, and so it assumes that everyone else must have the same motivations.

If all debate is actually just about power relations, then it's best to tamp down on commitment.

This opens the door for narratives that frame all great historical evils as resulting from dogmatism and overwrought belief. There are other factors here too, e.g. the rise of the managerial class/culture documented by MacIntyre and Taylor, etc. As noted before, the problem is:

A. This misses how heroic and good historical events (e.g. ending slavery) also involve strong conviction; and

B. That plenty of disastrous events, e.g. the fall of the Roman Republic and the later collapse of the Western Empire, stem more from a lack of conviction, not a surfeit of it. As Yeats put it:

The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

Sounds familiar.

So IDK, I think it is partially historical accident, but I also think it fits into the broader pattern of connecting of liberty (and the Good) in terms of power. Truth is threatening because it gets associated with religion, Marxism, Nazism, etc.

Where could I find this in Plato? This is the sort of thing that I tend to think Simpson neglects in his critique of liberalism.

Republic, 442 b-c is one place (using the analogy of the city). I think Plato refers to the spirited part of the soul as the "natural ally" of the rational part when he first introduces the typology .. too, and maybe in a few other places. This comes out in the chariot image of the Phaedrus too.

On this point, C.S. Lewis (whose Abolition of Man focuses on just this question, particularly in the first chapter "Men Without Chests") also gives Alanus ab Insulis' De Planctu Naturae Prosa (iii) as an example, although I'm not familiar with that text.

I think you can find the same sentiment expressed at many points in the Philokalia though, for example by Saint Diadochos of Photiki, who, unlike many Pagans, does not see the irascible appetites, or anger in particular, as bad, but rather sees them as tools for rebuking the appetites, passions, and demons. He memorably advised that one fashion a whip from the name of Christ and drive out the demons from the soul as Christ drives out the merchants from the temple (the body itself being a temple to the Holy Spirit).

St. Thomas lays out a similar role for the irascible appetites in the first part of the second part of the Summa (roughly questions 20-30 IIRC), where he covers all the appetites (concupiscible then irascible) and discusses how none are evil of themselves, but are evil in their use (object, ordering to reason, or effect on habit).

So, while the idea is in Plato, it's often remarked that it is characteristically Christian to have a full-bodied redemption and endorsement of the lower (non-intellectual) appetites and the body in their "natural" (i.e. regenerated) state. Pagan thought tended to evolve to be more skeptical of the passions, appetites, and body. The Aeneid, for instance, seems to play with this tension quite a bit.

Simpson would add that Rawls himself admits that he is incapable of adjudicating in favor of Western values over any other value system. His project is a working out of the axioms of Western values without being in any way able to justify those values. This is similar to Keys' point

A deficiency that might be compounded if you did things like cut the cultural canon (Homer, Virgil, Milton, etc.) out of education due to concerns of "bias." Having removed all "bias," nothing supports one view over any other.

Fair enough - for full disclosure, I think this is a little underhanded but I appreciate the cordiality nonetheless :) Rare in these discussions.