we do not access reality directly,
— T Clark — Fire Ologist

I agree with that. Except maybe the reality associated with our own existence. But that’s a small, lonely piece of being.
— Fire Ologist

I guess we're on the same page except I don't see "the reality associated with our own existence" as small or lonely. I think it's half of everything. The world is half out there and half in here. — T Clark

So I don’t think we are saying much differently here about reality. I agree that the world as presented in my mind is constructed by my mind using the “world out there” and my mind “in here” as its raw materials to make the construction presented in me. Since Kant we see this clearly, but Plato’s cavemen make a similar point.

I was talking about what we might know absolutely and certainly. The only bit I claim to know directly, meaning where the “out there” meets the “in here”, is my own existence, my own thinking.

So to be more precise, the vast, vast majority of reality can only be known indirectly (half out there and half in here), but I can know that I exist directly and absolutely (out there IS in here at once). I am a part of reality (like the out there), and I can know this (in here is now out there). Descartes actually said something. “I am” is absolute knowledge, to me. Further, I now directly can conclude “certain absolute knowledge also is real, because I know ‘I exist’ certainly and absolutely.” So ‘I am’ and ‘certain knowledge is’ are two absolute truths about reality, known by my own direct access to the objects now known, namely, my existence, and my knowledge of this as knowledge.

So there is some absolute knowledge for the knowing, but, as a good scientist, I find that it ends up only being knowledge about me that I can know directly. The fact that I can only know the world indirectly is a third absolute truth, but it is again, a truth about me and my limitation up against a world out there, and provides no color to the world, other than whatever color ‘I am’ might have (hard to pin down the color of my mind - also changes a lot!).

Yes, agreed, we have knowledge. Is some of it absolute? To me "absolute" means without uncertainly at least in this context. I don't know anything without uncertainty and I suspect you don't either. — T Clark

Just because what I say can be critiqued to the point of meaninglessness, the critique then would reclaim the real existence of meaning in the universe. So if we are to claim any knowledge at all, regardless of the degree of certainty we believe it may have, we must have set something absolute before us to distinguish this knowledge from the thing it certainly or uncertainly knows. We can’t make a move without fixing something absolutely. You can’t say you know nothing with certainty and mean what you say. Then the only thing you know absolutely is that you know nothing. That may be the extent of knowledge, making something known out of “nothing”, but then there you have something certainly; “I know nothing” becomes absolute knowledge. But besides this, thanks to Descartes, Socrates was wrong; he should have said he knew something after all - he certainly existed while he wondered if there was anything he could know.

But knowing thyself is a small lonely science, (maybe until you admit this “self”, which is real in the world, is a mixture, requiring interaction with the “out there” as it forms “in here” during its self-reflection/thinking/perception. This would all grow as absolutely certain knowledge then. Now we are following Hegel.)

There is no wall between different aspects of reality, but there is a wall between different aspects of how we think about that reality. Physics and my family are both parts of reality, but I don't generally use the same words to describe them. — T Clark

This all describes one reality (as far as I can tell). You agreed with Tom who said there are multiple realities, based on multiple perspectives and frameworks.
But here you say “There is no wall between different aspects of reality.” That points to only one reality.
Above you said “The world is half out there and half in here.” That is one whole reality as well.
Here you say “ Physics and my family are both parts of reality…”

That’s parts of one reality.

One world.

Being always means the same being.

(I think a clarification between “reality” and “being” and “world” and may “the subjective experience” may be helpful here, but that would require we start this conversation over, and I think we are making points without such clarifications. And I would rather not write a book here on TPF. But maybe we have to…)

I tend to think what matters most is that the enterprise is self-correcting — Srap Tasmaner

So is that what you see as the core of science?

you seem to be saying that the natural sciences check more of our "science" boxes than the social sciences — Leontiskos

I was trying not to say that, in fact, — Srap Tasmaner

But do you think it is true? It seems a basic fact that cannot be brushed aside in favor of a theory that would prefer it otherwise, hence my question to you:

Why do you suppose the modern holds that the natural sciences are more scientific than the social sciences? — Leontiskos

I think we have to actually grapple with the now-common belief that that the natural sciences are more scientific than the social sciences. Indeed, I don't see how it is possible to construe what you said about box-checking without admitting the interpretation I gave. Our colloquial understanding of "science" does seem to prefer the natural sciences to the social sciences.

Roughly, I'm trying to say that I think it's a mistake to identify science with the methods that worked for the low-hanging fruit. — Srap Tasmaner

And I'm wondering if there is an argument for that sort of claim. What makes it a mistake? Because the contrary position is pretty easy to represent: <Science pertains to knowledge of the natural world, and where our knowledge of the natural world is more certain and reliable, there science is more present>. That actually strikes me as the default position, and it accounts for the current consensus that the natural sciences are more scientific than the social sciences.

Consider the fact that a very common objection to science-pluralism is that it would be unable to distinguish true science from pseudoscience (and the proponents of science-pluralism really do struggle with this objection). A pseudoscience is basically just a "science" which produces uncertain and unreliable "knowledge."

That's quite interesting. Mathematics is particularly troublesome, but I want to defend the view that there are approaches to the study of atoms and mountains and lungs and whale pods and nation states that are all recognizably scientific and scientific because of some genuine commonality, despite the differences which are unavoidable given the differences among these phenomena. That commonality might be more "family resemblance" than "necessary and sufficient conditions," but I lean strongly toward the mechanism of communal self-correction being required. I guess we could talk a lot more about all this. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay. Yes, I think this would be worth talking more about, namely the essence of science.

Note that I am not saying that the things we call "sciences" have nothing in common. That would be a strange thesis. I am basically saying that science is a genus; the various sciences are species within that genus; and that there are differences between the various species which bear on their "scientificity." The claim that some sciences are paradigmatic is more conservative, whereas the claim that some sciences are more scientific than others is more daring. But if I wanted to defend the second thesis I would begin by noting that sciences are more scientific than pseudosciences, despite the fact that we never quite know where to draw the line. The deeper point here is that if the science-pluralist cannot consider the idea that there might be a hierarchy of sciences (or multiple hierarchies depending on our criteria), then it's not clear to me that their thesis has risen to the level of philosophy.

I'm going to hold off talking about pedagogy, but I'm glad you brought it up, because I think "learning" (as a concept at least) should be far more central to philosophy. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay good, and I agree. I think that if we considered pedagogy, development, and parenting more often we would have more serious discussions.

This is my 30,000-foot view of science, and why I mentioned the importance of specifiable plans for further investigation above: science is a strategy for learning. That's the core of it, in my view, and everything else serves that, and anything that contributes to or refines or improves the process is welcome. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, wonderful. I like that better than your notion of self-correction. For Aquinas science is, "an organized body of knowledge following in a demonstrative manner from certain premises which are either immediately known to be true or which are proved in another science" (paraphrase).

Do you think there are non-scientific strategies for learning? For an Aristotelian science has to do with discursive/inferential knowledge, and so it would encompass any true strategy for learning, despite the fact that different sciences have different objects and methods. But obviously our colloquial understanding of science is much narrower than that.

Most everyone got it completely wrong about women. But yes, he should have known better, or talked to a woman. Today we are getting it wrong about women all over again, in many new and fanciful ways.

I also think Darwin would have perplexed Aristotle quite a bit. But not undone him, at all.

<Science pertains to knowledge of the natural world, and where our knowledge of the natural world is more certain and reliable, there science is more present>

Science is also generally thought of as universal knowledge. But in complex systems, it is often the case that what seems like a universal relationship is subject to change after passing various tipping points. We deal in "moving landscapes" in more complex fields. For instance, several "laws of economics," revealed themselves to be merely tendencies which existed within the economic, political, and technological environments that existed in the first half of the 20th century. We discovered that they were not truly universal towards the end of the century—that sort of thing.

For another example, with biology, we have to consider the possibility of extraterrestrial life, life based on a molecule other than DNA, perhaps even non-carbon-based life. This throws a wrench into claims to universality.

This is a problem, although I think information theoretic approaches shed light on a solution by way of returning to the conception of science primarily in terms of unifying principles that explain (and virtually contain) many particular causes.

But, my particular opinion is that these issues, and the motivation for scientific anti-realism, or pluralism, are driven by a self-reinforcing constellation of philosophical positions—representationalism, positivism, nominalism and key assumptions about philosophical anthropology—nominalism being the most relevant. Because of these presuppositions, the problems posed by fallibilism, the possibility of scientific revision, of one theory superceding another, or of paradigm shifts, seem to necessitate anti-realism or pluralism, even up to an abandonment of the principle of non-contradiction (e.g. Latin Averroism or "hermetically sealed magisterium"). Indeed, I don't think people are wrong to think that, given those presuppositions, this is where they will be led, to a choice between nihilism and pluralism (whether the two end up being all that different is another question).

What I find particularly interesting is how this sets up a new dialectical of the "reasonable" and the "unreasonable" as opposed to the old dialectic of the rational and irrational. Rawls conception of the "reasonable" individual might be a good example here. The rational is too bound up in its new straightjacket to be of much use, but the reasonable is allowed to rely on a certain je ne sais pas to delimit the vast expanses left open by nihilism or pluralism.

Science is also generally thought of as universal knowledge. But in complex systems, it is often the case that what seems like a universal relationship is subject to change after passing various tipping points. We deal in "moving landscapes" in more complex fields. For instance, several "laws of economics," revealed themselves to be merely tendencies which existed within the economic, political, and technological environments that existed in the first half of the 20th century. We discovered that they were not truly universal towards the end of the century—that sort of thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, very true. :up:

For another example, with biology, we have to consider the possibility of extraterrestrial life, life based on a molecule other than DNA, perhaps even non-carbon-based life. This throws a wrench into claims to universality.

This is a problem, although I think information theoretic approaches shed light on a solution by way of returning to the conception of science primarily in terms of unifying principles that explain (and virtually contain) many particular causes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, and therefore upon encountering non-carbon-based life we might recast our findings as relating to carbon-based life.

But, my particular opinion is that these issues... — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's interesting. I think you may be right in an academic sense. But I would want to lay a lot at the feet of democratic culture. I think most people like pluralism because they like democracy, and truth is always a threat to democracy insofar as we accept the modern notion of liberty as liberty to follow one's passions.

On the other hand is the idea that truth brings with it coercive imposition, which threatens the dignity of each human to choose for themselves. Either way, I tend to view the motive as moral more than speculative, especially for the non-academic masses. ...Of late the forum has been ringing with threads relating to liberalism.

I think we have to actually grapple with the now-common belief that that the natural sciences are more scientific than the social sciences. — Leontiskos

To the hoi polloi, "science" seems mostly to mean "medicine", which is no doubt an interesting story. For my purposes, medicine is a good example because the human body is complicated and difficult to study, and so progress in learning how it works has been noticeably dependent on developing new technologies. And here we're still talking about natural science.

When you turn to the social sciences, there are additional impediments to a scientific approach. The sciences of the past (history and archaeology) face unavoidable limitations on what can be observed. If instead you're studying the present, there can be difficulties with observation ― political science has to rely on polling, which presents enormous challenges, and other sources like voting data, which can be difficult to link with other sources of data, and still other sources like economic surveys. No one in the social sciences ever has nearly as much data as they would like, and what they would like is informed by theorizing that is perforce based on the limited data they can get. It's hard. You can design some pretty clever experiments in fields like psychology and linguistics, but economics and sociology are generally forced to make do with "natural experiments" (and in this they are more like astronomy and cosmology).

In short, I tend to think social scientists are doing the best they can, and if we are right to have less confidence in their results than in the results of physics or chemistry, it's not because their work is less scientific, but a basic issue, first, of statistical power (lack of data), and, second, of the enormous complexity of the phenomena they study.

Consider the fact that a very common objection to science-pluralism is that it would be unable to distinguish true science from pseudoscience (and the proponents of science-pluralism really do struggle with this objection). A pseudoscience is basically just a "science" which produces uncertain and unreliable "knowledge." — Leontiskos

I think honestly the similarities are only skin deep, and the processes of knowledge production in the two approaches differ dramatically.

The pluralism I'm inclined to defend is twofold: one is Goodman's point about the sciences that are not physics getting full faith and credit; the other is the communal self-correction idea. The latter rests upon the simple fact that others are sometimes better positioned to see the flaws in your work than you are. That presents an opportunity: you can systematize and institutionalize scrutiny of your work by others. Two heads are better than one; two hundred or two thousand heads are better than two. There are some practical issues with this, well-known shortcomings in the existing peer-review process, for instance, but the idea is deeply embedded in the practice of science as I understand it, and I think it has proven its worth.

Do you think there are non-scientific strategies for learning? — Leontiskos

Surely. Given the distinction between knowing that and knowing how, it stands to reason there's a difference between learning that and learning how. Acquiring a skill is a kind of learning that might here and there overlap with a scientific approach ― experimenting is what I'm thinking of ― but we would expect plenty of differences too, and the intended "result" is quite different.

I think I'm okay with restricting science to a strategy for learning what can be known, and I also want to say it is something like the distillation of everything we have learned about how to learn what can be known. Science itself is a how, not a what. And that also means that we can learn more about how to learn things, so there's no reason to think the methodology of science is fixed.

We're kind of going in every direction at this point, and I didn't even try to get to the "essence of science".

I'm wondering if the issues I'm discussing are still within the scope of this discussion. If they're not, I'll buzz off and bring it up somewhere else.

I'm also interested in such views' rise in popularity as a historical phenomena. When the positivists began attacking metaphysics, I hardly think post-modern pluralism was the goal they had in mind. — Count Timothy von Icarus

My understanding of metaphysics grows directly out of my reading and contemplation of the works of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu and related works. My understanding of epistemology grows out of 30 years as an engineer where my primary job was to know things, know how I know things, and know how certain I am about the things I know. To call these "post-modern" is a stretch. Or is it? Is pragmatism related to post-modernism? "Do what works" could be seen as a pretty pluralistic position.

the dangers herein only began to become apparent to many when the political right also adopted the post-modern stance, leading to all sorts of concerns about a "post-truth" world. — Count Timothy von Icarus

My take on a pragmatic approach is that the fundamental issue is not truth, but rather what action should I take next. That doesn't mean truth isn't important, but I see it as one tool among others that help address the primary goal. Within that more limited scope, I think all the normal questions we ask and issues we address about truth are still relevant. In that context, I think rigorous standards for truth are important. Again, I think this discussion probably belongs in a different thread.

I'm not sure what this example is supposed to demonstrate. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's intended to demonstrate that methods are not true or false, they are effective or not.

How does this play out for the assertion of a distinct "Aryan physics" as set against a degenerate "Jewish physics?" Or a "socialist genetics" as set against "capitalist genetics?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'll restate my acknowledgement that my "all metaphysics is epistemology" remark was quick, off-the-cuff speculation. I wonder, but I don't know, whether it is worth following up on.

As for mixing politics with truth, i.e. you question about Aryan vs. Jewish physics, it's pragmatism again - what works. Even if conflicting political approaches to metaphysics and epistemology maintain high standards for establishment of truth, it is often decisions about what questions to ask that demonstrate where political differences lie. That's an issue I've been thinking about starting a thread about for a while.

I wonder if there are really no true ontological positions, only methodological ones. It's not what is real, it's where and how do we look. — T Clark

I meant to say earlier, I quite like this idea.

2. All human errors stem from impatience, a premature breaking off of a methodical approach, an ostensible pinning down of an ostensible object. — Kafka, the Zurau aphorisms

In short, I tend to think social scientists are doing the best they can, and if we are right to have less confidence in their results than in the results of physics or chemistry, it's not because their work is less scientific, but a basic issue, first, of statistical power (lack of data), and, second, of the enormous complexity of the phenomena they study. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, this looks like a great overview. It seems like you are building on what you said earlier, namely that the natural sciences are easier and the social sciences are harder. Specifically, we might say that they differ with respect to the difficulty required to achieve an equal level of certitude and reliability. You say that the difference is accounted for by the fact that social scientists lack data in comparison with natural scientists, and that they study more complex phenomena than natural scientists. You also imply that the social sciences which study the present are studying moving targets, which is harder. All of that makes good sense, even if it is not incontrovertible.

Would you say that the natural scientists are also doing the best they can? Because someone might say that if we expend an equal amount of effort in two different fields, and the first field yields much more knowledge than the second, then the first field must be more scientific than the second (thinking all the while in ceteris paribus terms, of course).

The pluralism I'm inclined to defend is twofold: one is Goodman's point about the sciences that are not physics getting full faith and credit; the other is the communal self-correction idea. The latter rests upon the simple fact that others are sometimes better positioned to see the flaws in your work than you are. That presents an opportunity: you can systematize and institutionalize scrutiny of your work by others. Two heads are better than one; two hundred or two thousand heads are better than two. There are some practical issues with this, well-known shortcomings in the existing peer-review process, for instance, but the idea is deeply embedded in the practice of science as I understand it, and I think it has proven its worth. — Srap Tasmaner

I would not object to the idea that two heads are better than one, but I could very well object to the idea that every "scientific" field should get "full faith and credit." Still, I would have to know more about what you mean by those two claims.

Why might we not have as much faith in "soft" or social sciences? Because the ROI is not as reliable. Why might we not give as much credit to "soft" or social sciences? Because where it is harder to demonstrate correctness, it is easier to fudge results. I really do think the social scientist requires more intellectual virtue than the natural scientist, given the fact that laziness and malpractice will be harder to detect in the social sciences. Peter Boghossian's remarkable experiment comes to mind.

Now someone might say, "If a science is less reliable and certain than mathematics or physics, then it is not reasonable to expect the same level of reliability and certitude from that science. Faith and credit therefore need to be adjusted for the social sciences." This is true, but I would make two points. First, this might in itself be enough to justify a claim that the social sciences are less scientific. Second, this does not invalidate the objections to faith and credit. Both considerations must apparently coexist.

By now it seems obvious that we must ask what we mean by "more scientific" and "less scientific." This is a particular problem in our age because "scientific" has become an honorific, and we tend to see discrimination in allocating honors as undemocratic. So what do we mean by "more scientific" and "less scientific," or just "scientific" in general? As a foil: the extreme pluralist might say that every discipline is equally scientific and we are not allowed to question anyone's scientificity. That looks like a dead end where "scientific" comes to mean nothing at all. And if we are to admit that "scientific" means something, then we run the risk of acknowledging that some things are more scientific than other things.

My instinct on this front is to link science with knowledge and to say that where there is more knowledge—quantitatively or qualitatively, potentially or actually—there will be more science. Or that where there is more potential for knowledge there is more potential for science (or else that where there is potential for knowledge there is a scientific domain simpliciter). This is also etymologically apt given that scientia was the highest or strongest form of knowledge. Of course this approach requires holding several different criteria in balance.

I think honestly the similarities are only skin deep, and the processes of knowledge production in the two approaches differ dramatically. — Srap Tasmaner

This would be one ready way of exploring what is meant by "more/less scientific," at least if we agree that pseudoscience is less scientific. I myself don't think it is that easy, and your earlier point that some disciplines will uncontroversially check all of the "science" boxes whereas other disciplines will not seems to jibe with the fact that what counts as a pseudoscience will vary a bit from person to person.

Surely. Given the distinction between knowing that and knowing how, it stands to reason there's a difference between learning that and learning how. Acquiring a skill is a kind of learning that might here and there overlap with a scientific approach ― experimenting is what I'm thinking of ― but we would expect plenty of differences too, and the intended "result" is quite different.

I think I'm okay with restricting science to a strategy for learning what can be known... — Srap Tasmaner

So to be clear, are you saying that science has to do with knowing-that, and non-scientific strategies for learning have to do with knowing-how? Even though there is some minor overlap?

I think I'm okay with restricting science to a strategy for learning what can be known, and I also want to say it is something like the distillation of everything we have learned about how to learn what can be known. Science itself is a how, not a what. And that also means that we can learn more about how to learn things, so there's no reason to think the methodology of science is fixed. — Srap Tasmaner

"Thus, a science is primarily the habit of soul, a speculative virtue of the intellect... Secondarily, a science is expressed in words and written down in text books" (Paraphrase of Aquinas).

So I don’t think we are saying much differently here about reality. I agree that the world as presented in my mind is constructed by my mind using the “world out there” and my mind “in here” as its raw materials to make the construction presented in me. — Fire Ologist

Yes, I think we are in agreement.

So to be more precise, the vast, vast majority of reality can only be known indirectly (half out there and half in here), but I can know that I exist directly and absolutely (out there IS in here at once). I am a part of reality (like the out there), and I can know this (in here is now out there). Descartes actually said something. “I am” is absolute knowledge, to me. Further, I now directly can conclude “certain absolute knowledge also is real, because I know ‘I exist’ certainly and absolutely.” So ‘I am’ and ‘certain knowledge is’ are two absolute truths about reality, known by my own direct access to the objects now known, namely, my existence, and my knowledge of this as knowledge. — Fire Ologist

Sure, although I've always thought Descartes' formulation is so limited as to be almost useless. It doesn't really tell me anything interesting. I understand you disagree with that.

So if we are to claim any knowledge at all, regardless of the degree of certainty we believe it may have, we must have set something absolute before us to distinguish this knowledge from the thing it certainly or uncertainly knows. — Fire Ologist

I don't understand this, but I'll probably disagree with it once I figure it out.

But knowing thyself is a small lonely science, (maybe until you admit this “self”, which is real in the world, is a mixture, requiring interaction with the “out there” as it forms “in here” during its self-reflection/thinking/perception. — Fire Ologist

I strongly disagree with this. I don't think you can know out there without knowing in here. I've been contemplating the idea that philosophy only deals with in here while science deals with out there. Let's not go into that here.

There is no wall between different aspects of reality, but there is a wall between different aspects of how we think about that reality. Physics and my family are both parts of reality, but I don't generally use the same words to describe them.
— T Clark

This all describes one reality (as far as I can tell). You agreed with Tom who said there are multiple realities, based on multiple perspectives and frameworks.
But here you say “There is no wall between different aspects of reality.” That points to only one reality.
Above you said “The world is half out there and half in here.” That is one whole reality as well.
Here you say “ Physics and my family are both parts of reality…” — Fire Ologist

You're right. I was careless with my language and I misunderstood you criticism of what I said. I took @Tom Storm's "What we encounter instead are multiple realities, each intelligible through particular conceptual frameworks or perspectives," as meaning the same thing as my "there is a wall between different aspects of how we think about that reality." Perhaps that's not what he meant. Tom?

Our colloquial understanding of "science" does seem to prefer the natural sciences to the social sciences. — Leontiskos

I think you're right about how many, perhaps most, people see this. I think it's because the epistemology of physics is different, has to be different, than psychology as it was historically practiced. Psychology has depended more on statistical truths, introspection, and observation rather than measurement. That's changed to a significant extent. The fact that people don't recognize cognitive science as part of psychology are falling for the fallacy your quote above expresses. This doesn't mean that old style psychology isn't still valuable, worth studying, and real science.

There are people, some here on the forum, who believe that geology is not a real science for some of the same reasons they don't think psychology is.

When you turn to the social sciences, there are additional impediments to a scientific approach. The sciences of the past (history and archaeology) face unavoidable limitations on what can be observed. If instead you're studying the present, there can be difficulties with observation ― political science has to rely on polling, which presents enormous challenges, and other sources like voting data, which can be difficult to link with other sources of data, and still other sources like economic surveys. No one in the social sciences ever has nearly as much data as they would like, and what they would like is informed by theorizing that is perforce based on the limited data they can get. It's hard. You can design some pretty clever experiments in fields like psychology and linguistics, but economics and sociology are generally forced to make do with "natural experiments" (and in this they are more like astronomy and cosmology). — Srap Tasmaner

This is well expressed, and I agree with what you've written. I think another reason for the problem is that the observational sciences always deal with complex, interactive, even chaotic systems. In physics you can pare away all the extraneous stuff and deal with very fundamental elements.

I meant to say earlier, I quite like this idea. — Srap Tasmaner

I like it too, it's catchy. I'll think about it more but I'm not confident it will be a fruitful path to follow.

I wonder if there are really no true ontological positions, only methodological ones. It's not what is real, it's where and how do we look. — T Clark

I would say that once we understand the meaning and also etymology of "method," we find that the idea doesn't make much sense in light of thousands of years of linguistic development. It would be a bit like saying, "There are really no fish; there's only fishing." If there's nothing to see then there's no need to look.

I would say that once we understand the meaning and also etymology of "method," we find that the idea doesn't make much sense — Leontiskos

When I was talking about method, I meant something consistent with this definition: Method - a systematic procedure, technique, or mode of inquiry employed by or proper to a particular discipline or art.

So to be clear, are you saying that science has to do with knowing-that, and non-scientific strategies for learning have to do with knowing-how? Even though there is some minor overlap? — Leontiskos

I'd say people quite often want to learn things that can be known, and when they reflect on how they're going about doing that, you have the beginnings of science. Recognizing that the first method that occurs to you, the natural or intuitive approach, might fail or produce unreliable results, and that taking some care up front, not just jumping in to slurp up facts as if they were just laying around, easily accessible to the laziest procedure, but planning an approach to learn what you want to know, that I would think of as the scientific impulse.

That can happen anywhere anytime.

For example, Ornette Coleman once said (I think this was in the liner notes to one of his early albums), it's when I found I could make mistakes that I knew I was onto something. We're talking here about how to play, and how to write, but it is also possible to have knowledge about what you play and what you write. Even if we, rightly, resist the philosopher's instinct to reduce knowing how to knowing that, we ought also resist excluding knowing that from knowing how.

Further example, John Coltrane was a student of music theory. There are stories of him and Eric Dolphy with books spread out all over the living-room floor around them, discussing and analysing modes and scales for hours. Intense interest in knowing that. There's also a story that a young music student came to visit Trane once to interview him, and brought along a transcription she had made of one his solos. She asked him to play it, and after trying a couple times, he handed it back to her and said, "It's too hard." Knowing how is still its own thing, howsoever informed by knowing that.

I guess all I'm saying is that "know" is a verb, so we're always talking about a how, whether it's knowing that or knowing how. Those are different things people do, but I think we know they are, and have to be, braided together continually. In science, the intent is to get the hows right so that you can produce thats reliably; in jazz, the intent is to take the thats you can get your hands on to improve your ability to how.

he handed it back to her and said, "It's too hard." — Srap Tasmaner

Just an aside: That's a great story, which I'd never heard before. I wish I could have been there; I would have asked him, "Do you mean too hard to play, or too hard to sight-read?" They're both forms of knowing-how.

Yeah I think there's a trick to that story, that it does mean it's too hard to sight-read.

But then I also think about the difficulty of notating jazz correctly. And I think about Jimi Hendrix, who seems to add some tiny bend or flutter to almost every damn note -- how do you notate all those micro-decisions? And so it is with any great musician, there are all those millisecond decisions that go into the performance, all those tiny variations that distinguish a good performance from a great one.

Now, should we say there is no hope of a scientific approach to great musicianship? I actually don't think so. I think the point is that vastly more data is needed than you might at first think, certainly more than you would think if you looked even at a complex score, which is great simplification of what a musician actually does.

Any of that make sense to you?

the difficulty of notating jazz correctly — Srap Tasmaner

Right, it's always a compromise. So is any notation, but jazz especially.

those tiny variations that distinguish a good performance from a great one. — Srap Tasmaner

I'd want to say that those tiny moments of musicality shouldn't be notated, even if they could be. This is the place where the musician can express something beyond the control of the composer.
Something has to be left un-notated for true musicality to emerge.

Now, should we say there is no hope of a scientific approach to great musicianship? I actually don't think so. I think the point is that vastly more data is needed than you might at first think, certainly more than you would think if you looked even at a complex score, which is great simplification of what a musician actually does.

Any of that make sense to you? — Srap Tasmaner

Boy does it ever. I do a lot of composing and recording, and this touches on a really tense issue right now, not just for me but for all musicians who avail themselves of digital technology. It would need a separate, not-very-philosophical thread to go into it in detail, but basically: What happens when software approaches the same abilities that humans have, in terms of performance and expressive nuance? With "vastly more data," can we get ProTools (industry-standard recording program) + various samples of instruments + intensive post-production editing tools = "great musicianship"? We are getting very close to this, not via better scores and notation -- that's 20th century, man! -- but via this whole new digital approach to coding and re-playing information.

As a 20th century guy, I find this worrisome and downright offensive. But I can't deny what my ears are telling me. Even more disturbing as a practical matter, if I've recorded a bass part that is "too hard" for me to play well, even with a lot of practice, do I give up and bring in a better player? Nope. I play it the best I can and then fix it, with post-editing. And by "fix it" I don't just mean correct wrong notes or timing -- that's the least of it. I can add "musicianly" nuances and phrasings, subtly adjust pitch and rhythm and groove, and generally massage the thing till it really sounds human-made, including little "mistakes". Human-made by a great musician? That goal is getting closer and closer. I'm deeply uncomfortable about what this is doing to my musicianship, and everyone else's who does this, but technology dictates artistic practice, and we're not going back from this, it's too valuable. (and fun)

PS -- The "vastly more data" as of right now would still include much better sound samples for many important instruments (this is data about timbre, one of the least well-notated aspects of traditional musical practice) -- and of course vocals are in another category altogether. But can that be far off?

To call these "post-modern" is a stretch. Or is it? Is pragmatism related to post-modernism? "Do what works" could be seen as a pretty pluralistic position.

People have always been pragmatic, engaged in bracketing, put more fundamental questions aside to focus on more pressing concerns, etc. I think the shift I am referring to is much more distinct, i.e. the claim that truth itself is "pragmatism all the way down." That "true = what gets me what I currently want."

This is quite distinct from recognizing the benefits of pragmatic approaches to problem-solving. Plato, for instance, has a tremendous respect for techne, as does Aristotle. However, they do not think techne (arts for achieving ends) exhausts the human capacity for knowledge. That might be one way to frame the question ontological truth: "does episteme, sophia, and gnosis exist?" And, if sophia (wisdom, theoria) doesn't exist, what exactly is the philosopher, the lover of wisdom?

A question that rears its head when we define truth in terms of usefulness is: "but is anything truly useful?" Obviously, we very often do things that we think are to our benefit, or are a path to some end we seek, but they actually aren't, or we discover that the ends we pursue aren't truly choiceworthy. There are obvious examples, like Newton drinking mercury for his health, and less obvious examples where it seems more crucial to have a clear distinction between what is believed to be useful and what is truly best.

A lot of what is said by advocates of the pragmatic theory of truth is a helpful medicine for people who have grown overly committed to a calcified, doctrinal view of metaphysics. Nonetheless, on versions where there is some truth about what is actually useful, the new theory seems to actually not be that different from earlier theories, whereas otherwise, the result will tend towards a thoroughgoing relativism. There is a pretty big gulf between C.S. Peirce and Rorty for instance.

My understanding of metaphysics grows directly out of my reading and contemplation of the works of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu and related works

Like other great thinkers of the Axial Age, these thinkers are skeptical of doctrines and the capacity of language to convey truth. But I do think this is quite a bit different from something along the lines of: "there is no Tao," and so "by Tao, we just mean what is in accordance with what we think works." I do not understand from these thinkers that there is truly no way to be more or less in line with nature—that wu wei can be consistent with whatever we currently think is beneficial.

It's intended to demonstrate that methods are not true or false, they are effective or not.

Ok, but are they truly effective or ineffective? I think the ontological question is going to worm its way back in with more complex cases.

Even if conflicting political approaches to metaphysics and epistemology maintain high standards for establishment of truth, it is often decisions about what questions to ask that demonstrate where political differences lie.

Indeed, but without a clear notion of truth, I don't get how one questions this sort of political influence. Yet I think it's obvious that it can be more or less pernicious. The point is, of course, not that we can step outside of political or historical influence, but that we can make judgements based on something that is not politics and history "all the way down." Otherwise, it becomes difficult to articulate what is wrong with an "Aryan physics."

If we claim it "isn't useful," we will just be faced with the question about the truth of usefulness. Surely, it was useful for the Nazis. Fiction presents us with a good extreme here. In 1984, it is useful, both for the Party, and for the citizens, to affirm "Big Brother is always right." It's so useful in fact, that the story closes on Winston having been tortured into loving Big Brother. Yet, just because society can be set up such that it is eminently useful to affirm:

WAR IS PEACE
FREEDOM IS SLAVERY
IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH

Or that "Oceania has always been allied with Eurasia and at war with Eastasia," even though the reverse was true just minutes earlier—does the fact that denying these will result in double-plus ungood consequences make them so?

it's when I found I could make mistakes that I knew I was onto something — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, good. That could sum up my thread, "Argument as Transparency."

but I think we know they are, and have to be, braided together continually — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, there is a very old Aristotelian tradition which holds that speculative and practical knowledge are intricately intertwined.

In science, the intent is to get the hows right so that you can produce thats reliably; — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, very good. Science is the reliable procedure for producing thats.

Yeah I think there's a trick to that story, that it does mean it's too hard to sight-read. — Srap Tasmaner

You could say that we know how to play Coltrane's solos simply in virtue of recording and replaying them. But of course humans can also reproduce them. Asian musicians seem to be very good at that sort of reproduction. Jazz musicians might be characteristically bad at that kind of reproduction.

in jazz, the intent is to take the thats you can get your hands on to improve your ability to how. — Srap Tasmaner

The difference of artifice does come into play, here. Think about a new musician who learns "blue notes" (such as a ♭5 or a ♭3 in a major key). Or else think about the cultural transition to blues when those forms of dissonance became popular. In such cases the "theory" that is being studied is in many ways a theory of cultural appreciation, and this applies to jazz a fortiori.

As a 20th century guy, I find this worrisome and downright offensive. But I can't deny what my ears are telling me. — J

I'd say the trick is played when we dissociate the music from the source. For example, before recordings you could only ever listen to music live, and at that time there was no possibility of dissociating the music from the source. The source and the music were inseparable, and the source was relatively well-understood. There is a qualitative philosophical difference between sound-patterns produced by humans and sound-patterns produced by machines, and we might just want to call the first music and the second sound-patterns. Of course at the end of the day the machine is produced by a human who wants it to produce music, and so the gulf will never be complete. And none of this means that you will always be able to tell the difference with your "eyes closed."

When I was talking about method, I meant something consistent with this definition: Method - a systematic procedure, technique, or mode of inquiry employed by or proper to a particular discipline or art. — T Clark

But disciplines and arts have ends; goals. There are no methods without ends and goals.

But disciplines and arts have ends; goals. There are no methods without ends and goals. — Leontiskos

Agreed. Given that, I guess I don’t see what you were trying to say in your previous post when you wrote “…once we understand the meaning and also etymology of "method," we find that the idea doesn't make much sense.”

Agreed. Given that, I guess I don’t see what you were trying to say in your previous post when you wrote “…once we understand the meaning and also etymology of "method," we find that the idea doesn't make much sense.” — T Clark

Well, a method without a goal would be like fishing without fish. Or , "no true ontological positions, only methodological ones," seems to posit methods without goals or ends. Unless we want to say that science has an end which has nothing to do with determining what is "ontologically" true?

I'd want to say that those tiny moments of musicality shouldn't be notated, even if they could be. — J

Agreed. I suppose I shouldn't have put it this way because I was thinking of the musicologist not the musician, someone who is analysing a performance rather than creating one.

I'm of two minds in this talk of "having enough data" I keep using, here in talking about music or above talking about the social sciences.

There's a great forgotten book called The Road to Xanadu by John Livingston Lowes (iirc) in which he traces every image, very nearly every phrase and every word, in two poems of Coleridge (Xanadu and Ancient Mariner) to sources in Coleridge's library. It's not an "explanation" of the poems; I believe the point Lowes made (and I may misremember) was that in a way knowing all this only deepens the mystery of Coleridge's creativity in taking all this material to create these things. It's not like you could train an LLM on Coleridge's library and then say, "Write me an astonishing poem," and out they would pop.

(Coleridge being a particularly ripe case, as Eliot described him, a man visited by the muse for a while, and when she left, he was a haunted man. Coleridge himself didn't understand what had happened.)

So, part of me does want to say that there can never be enough data to explain, much less predict, human action, and certainly not unlikely human action like creativity. The "human sciences" would then be marked either by arrogance or folly, as you like. I could be old school, I'm old enough.

But I'm not convinced. That attitude strikes me unavoidably as a rearguard action, defending human nobility against a godless and disenchanting science, that sort of thing.

Instead, I think it's simply a fact that the data needed, and the theory needed, are evidently beyond us, and so we must make do and aim a bit lower in our expectations, or at least be more circumspect in our claims. When it comes to scientifically informed debates over social policy, for instance, we sometimes know enough to do better, but still less than we think we do and so some caution is advisable.

We know a lot of what was swirling around in Coleridge's head, but not all of it, and we know something about how his brain worked, because it worked like ours, but the specific historical process that took those inputs and yielded those outputs is unrecoverable.

So it is with any musical performance. I'm inclined to say that one of the reasons the musician played this note this way is because of that time she wiped out on her bike when she was 8. That might be a big enough factor to make it into her biography ― if, say, she broke a finger that healed in a way relevant to her playing. It might be a kind of emotional turning point for her, if it nudged her attitude toward risk a certain way. It might be an infinitesimal factor, no more or less relevant than the peanut-butter sandwich she ate that day, but all of which went into making her the person who produced that performance.

We're talking really about what God knows about her. When God hears that performance, does he smile slightly and connect it to that skid on her bike? God has all the data, so how does he understand the world and the people in it?

It looks like that's the standard for science I have been indirectly endorsing, or if not "standard" then "ideal". Which is a little odd, certainly, but maybe that's fine. In practice, science is entirely a matter of making do, and being very clever about what you can learn and how despite not being gods. I guess.

Therefore Bayes.

"no true ontological positions, only methodological ones," seems to posit methods without goals or ends. — Leontiskos

I don't think that's true. You've inferred something I didn't imply.

So, part of me does want to say that there can never be enough data to explain, much less predict, human action, and certainly not unlikely human action like creativity. The "human sciences" would then be marked either by arrogance or folly, as you like — Srap Tasmaner

But does that consign the human sciences to arrogance or folly? Hermeneutics suggests that the job of the human sciences is not to explain but to interpret and understand.

I think you're right that we could never have enough data to explain human actions, even assuming those actions were deterministic enough to be explained. But more often than not, that isn't the right kind of explanation anyway. What we want to know isn't whether Lisa ate the peanut butter sandwich, but why Lisa chose to play what she played. And now we need an interpretation in order for the question to make sense -- in order for it not to be about collisions of atoms and neurons. "What she played" has to be given meaning, not just physical description.

God has all the data, so how does he understand the world and the people in it? — Srap Tasmaner

Right, and I'm positing that even God understands the world through interpretation, not (only) causality.

The data question I was raising about digital recording is a different one, of course. We can connect it to your question about knowing-that and knowing-how, though. My collection of digitized data that I use to produce a piece of music is a great big "knowing-that." It really is "all the data," at least arguably. Where does the knowing-how enter? From me -- but the thing I know how to do is to record the music, not perform it. There's still a techne, but it has shifted a great deal. Hence my worry that the old-fashioned performance techne gets atrophied.

People have always been pragmatic, engaged in bracketing, put more fundamental questions aside to focus on more pressing concerns, etc. I think the shift I am referring to is much more distinct, i.e. the claim that truth itself is "pragmatism all the way down." That "true = what gets me what I currently want." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I have three problems with this 1) As I see it, "what do I do next" is the fundamental question. 2) Again, pragmatism for me isn't about truth. 3) I said "the fundamental issue is not truth, but rather what action should I take next" not "true = what gets me what I currently want."

they do not think techne (arts for achieving ends) exhausts the human capacity for knowledge. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Something else I didn't say.

Like other great thinkers of the Axial Age, these thinkers are skeptical of doctrines and the capacity of language to convey truth. But I do think this is quite a bit different from something along the lines of: "there is no Tao," and so "by Tao, we just mean what is in accordance with what we think works." I do not understand from these thinkers that there is truly no way to be more or less in line with nature—that wu wei can be consistent with whatever we currently think is beneficial. — Count Timothy von Icarus

My pragmatism and my attraction to Taoism come from the same place. The writings of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu are absolutely pragmatic. They don't talk about truth much. It's not a fundamental aspect of their doctrine. "Wu wei" and "Te," are central concepts. This from Ziporyn's translation of the Chuang Tzu (Zhuangzi).

What I call good is not humankindness and responsible conduct, but just being good at what is done by your own intrinsic virtuosities [Te]. Goodness, as I understand it, certainly does not mean humankindness and responsible conduct! It is just fully allowing the uncontrived condition of the inborn nature and allotment of life to play itself out. What I call sharp hearing is not hearkening to others, but rather hearkening to oneself, nothing more. — Chuang Tzu

That's how wu wei works - you hearken to yourself then act without acting. There is no truth acting as a middleman.

Ok, but are they truly effective or ineffective? I think the ontological question is going to worm its way back in with more complex cases. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, saying something is effective requires we specify what it is effective in doing and what the standards of effectiveness are. Will acting in accordance with our intrinsic virtuosities automatically lead to acting effectively? Good question, by which I mean I don't have an answer. Yet.

A question that rears its head when we define truth in terms of usefulness is: "but is anything truly useful?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

I didn't say we should define truth in terms of usefulness. I don't remember bringing usefulness into this discussion at all. I said truth is a tool we use to help us decide how we should act.

without a clear notion of truth — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you and I can probably bash out a mutually satisfactory notion of truth. My thoughts in that regard are not all that unconventional. It's just that I don't think truth is a fundamental question.

without a clear notion of truth, I don't get how one questions this sort of political influence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the idea of truth can interfere with addressing the differences between ideologies. As I noted, what questions are asked is at least as important as the truth of the answers arrived at.

the job of the human sciences is not to explain but to interpret and understand. — J

Which is fine, I've just been avoiding committing to some major difference between the natural sciences and the human or social sciences, because I've been trying to clarify ― or insist upon or defend or something ― that there is some genuine continuity, that the political scientist is as much a scientist as the physicist. I'd like that point to come out similar to saying that a biologist is just as much a scientist as a physicist, which most people will agree to without a moment's thought, but I think it's obvious there are ways in which biology had a much harder time making progress than physics. We got the theory of evolution before genetics. We had the number of human chromosomes wrong ― even once we had a number ― until 1956.

To your point, part of my point earlier was not to assume that what makes physics science was everything about physics, some of that may only apply to physics, or may only apply to the natural sciences. So I'd be open to saying even the expected results differ, that we want explanations from the natural sciences but interpretations from the human sciences. That may be. Where I've been hoping to link them is in the process enacted to produce whatever kind of knowledge they produce, all that business about careful procedures and communal self-correction. It wouldn't bother me if there were sciences about different things that produced different sorts of results, so long as they were producing those results using a process that would be recognizably science to a scientist in any field. That's awfully idealized, I know, but I think about even what a sociologist could tell a chemist about the care with which he collected his data and the statistical analysis he performed on it, and the chemist would recognize a brother scientist at work, even allowing for the great differences in their fields.