A problem here, I believe, is that you are assuming that there must be some kind of correspondence of our mental constructs of the world and the world in itself. The structure of the model must somehow reflect the structure of the world. But how can we verify this assumption? — boundless
No argument here since I did a whole topic on that (2 topics ago). But similarly, you, as 'a thing' is also just a mental imputation.Maybe individuating the JWST as 'a thing' is a mental imputation. — boundless
Again agree. While there are some objective constants, physical quantities and units don't seem to be among them.Note that my point is that physical quantities are defined in a relational way from the start.
Lock is unimportant. The hypothetical lab needs to be a box from which zero information can escape. We presume this, but in reality, such box would kill its occupants.Let's consider the Wigner's friend scenario, where the Friend makes an experiment in a lab which is locked from the outside. — boundless
You can always put another observer outside, perhaps outside a box containing Wigner and the inner box. What is demonstrated by doing this?Wigner is not 'entilted' to go outside of it and ask himself what the Friend, in the Friend's perspective is seeing.
As does the device measuring the (say) spin of some particle. The wave function collapses for both almost immediately upon this measurement. Wigner has to wait for his wave function (of the box) to collapse.Assuming that the Friend also has his 'perspective'
Wigner knows when the box is opened. The friend might know everything right away. The box cannot let information out, but letting information in is allowed.Still both of them do not actually know what the other truly observed.
I don't know what you mean by 'truly' here. This is a relational view. There is no objective truth going on anywhere. Nobody notices anything weird.Only that, in their own perspective, there are no logical inconsistencies. For Wigner it is as if the Friend sees the same as he sees. But it cannot say what is truly seen by the Friend.
The friend who notices spin up has a perspective, as does the friend noticing spin down. Those are two perspectives in superposition (relative to Wigner). Wigner knows this. What he doesn't know is which state things will collapse to relative to him when the box is opened. That part is a counterfactual.This also means that under RQM (and, really, QBism and similar) Wigner can't even say that there are 'perspectives' other than his own with certainty.
Where do you get this? Wigner subjectively sees up once box is opened. Friend sees up earlier than that, but it isn't intersubjective until they compare findings, so none of it is beyond anybody's perspectives. The agreement is grounded in empirical perspectives.Only positing something beyond the 'perspectives' can ground intersubjective agreement.
That I will agree with. It is an epistemological statement, not worded in an ontic manner. RQM is not about epistemology.This implies that one cannot know what is 'beyond' one's perspective.
Agree with the last statement, but not that the two perspectives (at different times, same place) are the same thing. Lots of changes can occur during those 20 minutes, lots of wave function collapses.As I see it, there is nothing in RQM (and, really, also in QBism and similar) that 'Mars in the perspective of Y' and 'Mars in the perspective of Z' are the same thing. Y will never find inconsistencies.
I'm not. The pen has no awareness of that which it measures. The interaction definition has nothing to do with consciousness or people at all.The problem with this IMO it is that we are 'anthropomorphizing' the pen.
The world does not 'appear' at all to the pen. It just exists in some state relative to the pen. That's what I mean by a perspective. It's just a system state at a moment in time, a system capable of being affected by past events, so a vacuum state won't do.... But how the world appears to a pen
Those are straight out of wiki. The former has arguably been solved. The latter as well, but arguably less so. Copenhagen doesn't derive it: It is just postulated up front. MWI could have done that.Regarding MWI, ... I am not sure if the 'preferred basis problem' (i.e. how to explain in MWI that the wavefunction can be decomposed in a way to explain the appearance of the 'classical world') has been solved and, also, it's not clear to me how the Born Rule is explained in this interpretation. — boundless
That's a valid reason to prefer some other interpretation, but not a valid critique of it. The critique I quoted just above are valid critiques, and are or are not solved, depending who you ask.But, yes, in a way the first 'objection' is not perhaps 'scientific' but simply philosophical.
Funny, but that's the part that makes me prefer another interpretation, not the stuff you listed above. See my response to Apu below.Oddly enough, it is actually the closest physical theory to a 'ontological monism' that has been proposed (the universal wavefunction being only 'real thing' ...
We always build internal models, and while my model in some ways has correspondence to states in my world, I don't call my model 'knowledge' like it is some kind of accurate representation.If the division into physical objects is conceptual and doesn't reflect faithfully the structure of mind-independent world, how can we claim that we do have knowledge of the 'world beyond' our perspective? — boundless
Indeed. Even science makes such designations, again, finding it useful to do so.But this still is based on some assumptions you make about the 'world in itself'. Assumptions that do not seem to be justified in light of scientific knowledge only.
There's no exact match, and there's no check if by insane chance you got one actually right. The purpose of the model is not to be accurate. The purpose is to be useful, and to be useful, it merely needs to be accurate enough to predict what will actually be observed.How can you check that the description of the 'mind-independent world' actually matches its structure?
The intersubjective agreement seems compelling enough.It seems a reasonable inference, yes, but can we have compelling reasons to assert that there is this correspondence?
And lack of a rational answer to that question makes me ask a different question instead.from my subjectove perspective the issue is borderline close to "why is there anything at all?". — Apustimelogist
And lack of a rational answer to that question makes me ask a different question instead. — noAxioms
Well, my reply would be that if this were not the case, then it would suggest a picture of the world and metaphysics which is much more inflated than I currently believe, where there is some kind of conspiratorial aspect of nature that deceives our senses. Even though this could be the case, I don't see any positive evidence to believe this over a simpler story of how the world works and how we relate to it like the one that has been built up through physics, biochemistry, neuroscience, etc. — Apustimelogist
I think Wittgenstein’s Tractatus may offer a solution here. That is in order for us to make sense of the world, that is to avoid speaking non sense, our language, mental construct, and the world must be isomorphic. This is not an outcome of empirical verification but of logic analysis. — Richard B
One might still assume that our cognitive functions are useful, i.e. have a pragmatic goal. — boundless
No argument here since I did a whole topic on that (2 topics ago). But similarly, you, as 'a thing' is also just a mental imputation. — noAxioms
Again agree. While there are some objective constants, physical quantities and units don't seem to be among them. — noAxioms
Lock is unimportant. The hypothetical lab needs to be a box from which zero information can escape. We presume this, but in reality, and such box would kill its occupants. — noAxioms
The friend, as described here, seems to serve no purpose since he simply reports what the device does, and the device alone would have sufficed. The friend perhaps only serves a significant role in the 'consciousness causes collapse' interpretations. — noAxioms
You can always put another observer outside, perhaps outside a box containing Wigner and the inner box. What is demonstrated by doing this? — noAxioms
I don't know what you mean by 'truly' here. This is a relational view. There is no objective truth going on anywhere. Nobody notices anything weird. — noAxioms
The friend who notices spin up has a perspective, as does the friend noticing spin down. Those are two perspectives in superposition (relative to Wigner). Wigner knows this. What he doesn't know is which state things will collapse to relative to him when the box is opened. That part is a counterfactual. — noAxioms
That I will agree with. It is an epistemological statement, not worded in an ontic manner. RQM is not about epistemology. — noAxioms
I'm not. The pen has no awareness of that which it measures. The interaction definition has nothing to do with consciousness or people at all. — noAxioms
Those are straight out of wiki. The former has arguably been solved. The latter as well, but arguably less so. Copenhagen doesn't derive it: It is just postulated up front. MWI could have done that.
Objective collapse interpretations also seem to do this. I can't think of one that derives it.
Apparently any counterfactual definition like Bohmian just postulates an initial state compatible with the Born rule, and from there it has foundational principles that preserve this distribution property. — noAxioms
That's a valid reason to prefer some other interpretation, but not a valid critique of it. The critique I quoted just above are valid critiques, and are or are not solved, depending who you ask. — noAxioms
We always build internal models, and while my model in some ways has correspondence to states in my world, I don't call my model 'knowledge' like it is some kind of accurate representation.
There is matter near me in my world and I cordon off a subset of that matter and designate it 'chair' despite the fact nothing in the physical world is a function of that subset.
Look at a person, which changes its component parts every second. Nevertheless, I designate a boundary to what I consider to be that person — noAxioms
Everything (not just humans) does this. It has pragmatic utility. — noAxioms
There's no exact match, and there's no check if by insane chance you got one actually right. The purpose of the model is not to be accurate. The purpose is to be useful, and to be useful, it merely needs to be accurate enough to predict what will actually be observed. — noAxioms
The intersubjective agreement seems compelling enough. — noAxioms
You think it can be useful without having any correspondence to reality at all? Note that correspondence isn't like direct realism. You can say "my experience corresponds to things in reality" without saying "I'm experiencing reality raw, as it truly is, without any intermediary processing". — flannel jesus
What I am questioning is how we can make claims of knowledge about it. — boundless
If we want to emerge from the subjective at all, from the realm of ideas, we must conceive of knowledge as an activity that does not create what is known but grasps what is already there.
— Basic Laws of Arithmetic, 23 — J
Actually the conspirational nature is not to be invoked here. One might still assume that our cognitive functions are useful, i.e. have a pragmatic goal. Practical usefulness does not lead to accuracy.
The problem I see here is that one can't claim knowledge about the 'mind-independent world' if one doesn't make some assumptions that can't be proven empirically.
I don't think that anyone believes that newtonian mechanics gives us a literal picture of the world nowadays. Still, it is still immensely useful and in a sense a source of valid knowledge, if knowledge is interpreted in a pragmatic way. — boundless
So we have to juggle both the subjective ontology of idea formation, and the objective metaphysics of what is thereby formed. — Fire Ologist
as they both agree the idea of addition also must exist in each other's minds; it's the same addition each sees separately, in each other's minds, in 2+2 and in 3+17. This is both mind-independent (shared between two different subjects), and only there because of the minds that know addition. — Fire Ologist
As an entanglement relation, I would suggest it exists. Almost all our pragmatic models involve such a relation, even if the relation isn't recognized as such.... when I hear sounds they correspond to real frequencies and amplitudes in differential air pressure. You're suggesting that not even that kind of correspondence exists? — flannel jesus
Agree that your discussion about Wigner's friend was framed in epistemic term. So the friend sort of fills a role in that respect, even if a simple printer would have also served.Consciousness causes collapse' is to be interpreted as a phrase though. If collapse is merely an epistemic oupdate of a conscious agent, I don't see anything controversial. Of course, if consciousness causes a physical change, then things are different. So, let's not confuse these two distinct interpretations. — boundless
OK, I think I worked it out. You're talking about Wigner's opinion of what the friend has measured while the friend is still in the box. That's a clear counterfactual, and unless an interpretation is used that posits counterfactuals, there is no 'truly' about it. RQM does not posit counterfactuals.Only that, in their own perspective, there are no logical inconsistencies. For Wigner it is as if the Friend sees the same as he sees. But it cannot say what is truly seen by the Friend.
I don't know what you mean by 'truly' here.. — noAxioms
No, not at all. Existence of anything is relative to that which has measured the thing, and so far, our 'perspective bearers' have not been measured. They will momentarily, but then they're not the perspective bearers anymore, they're the observed.For instance, the relational view expressed here still has to make the assumption that the 'perspective-bearers' have their existence independent from the perspectives. — boundless
Quite the opposite. Where are you getting all this?Also, it makes the assumption that its truth is perspective-independent.
That seems tautological. Perhaps I'm missing the question.If my knowledge is restricted to what I can know from my own perspective, how can I know that?
According to RQM, their ontology relative to Wigner is a superposition of states. According to other interpretations, the ontology is different. Ontology seems to be a mental construct, a function of say one's choice of interpretation, but it also might be a physical mind-independent status, depending on which (if any) interpretation is actually the case.The friend who notices spin up has a perspective, as does the friend noticing spin down. Those are two perspectives in superposition (relative to Wigner). Wigner knows this. What he doesn't know is which state things will collapse to relative to him when the box is opened. That part is a counterfactual. — noAxioms
Ok. But what about the ontological status of the two Friends?
Are you suggesting that Wigner isn't sure that the friend is like himself? That Wigner cannot discard solipsism? I suppose that's correct, but it's not considered a valid quantum interpretation since it leads to zero knowledge of anything. Ditto with superdeterminism, a loophole in Bell's proof, but you still don't see it included in the interpretations list.Also, he can't go outside his perspective, so what he can know is that he will never find inconsistencies. He can't in any way know that the Friend has his own perspective.
Yes. I am not using any of those words as something requiring a human or other 'observer' to be involved.But you are still treating the pen as a 'perspective-bearer', i.e. something differentiated and something relative to which one can define a state of 'everything else'. — boundless
Logical analysis is enough to know they're valid. You can't know that they're sound of course.Futhermore, if one adopts a relational standpoint, one can't never know that they are valid.
I don't understand that problem enough to have an opinion about how problematic it is or to critique any solution proposed or counter-critique.But I am not sure that the 'preferred basis' is truly solved in a non 'for all practical purposes' way. — boundless
A person is differentiated in a way that a chair isn't. I, as a conscious human being, have a private conscious experience that strongly suggests to me that I am differentiated enough to be a distinct entity. I would say that other humans are like me in this respect. This is also probably true for animals, assuming that they are conscious beings.
It suggests to you, yes. Physics seems mute about it, which is my take.
Again, read the topic linked, which gets into exactly where a human boundary is.
Any biological cell is more clearly bounded than is a person, but even it gets fuzzy in some ways.
A living thing can be discontinuous, as can information processing.
I don't think the point is particularly important to this topic.
— boundless
Calling it 'the world' is already an observer bias.Bernard D'Espagnat distinguished two senses of objective. 'Strongly objective' is something that is independent from any cognitive perspective (a property of the 'world in itself').
Terminology granted, but both seem to contrast 'objective' with 'subjective', as opposed to objective vs relational.'Weakly objective' is something that every cognitive agent can agree upon. Nothing weakly objective can be assumed to be strongly objective.
Often, yes, but sometimes and idea is of something not already there. Any fiction for instance.But what is an idea, but an idea of something. Like a word, an idea, sitting in the mind, is about something "already there" before the idea of it was formed. — Fire Ologist
As I said above, the title is poorly worded. My focus is on those that posit a mind-independent reality (which is almost everybody except idealists), they tend to restrict their idea of what exists to 'this universe', calling 'the universe' instead of just one of many. Why is this one special? Because it is observed (by us) of course, which makes it pretty mind-dependent in my book.I do not support "mind-independent reality?" But I must say I do not understand anything you said. — Athena
Reality is defined as 'what is' (or not), so not sure how reality is a reaction to itself.All of reality is a reaction to what is.
The number 17 doesn't seem to be a matter of cause & effect. It's just a member of the set of integers. You might say it is but an abstraction, but I think it is far more fundamental than that.All things are a matter of cause and effect.
I never realty understand these conversations. Before anything on the planet, possibly in the universe, existed that had even the vaguest hint of understanding of mathematics, there would have been any number of instances when groups of objects joined together. Rocks rolled down a mountain, and came to rest among other rocks. Leaves fell from plants, and landed interspersed with each other. Whatever scenario. My guess would be that, despite there being nothing in existence that could count or add, in none of those instances was the number after the groups combined anything other than the combination of the numbers of the separate groups.as they both agree the idea of addition also must exist in each other's minds; it's the same addition each sees separately, in each other's minds, in 2+2 and in 3+17. This is both mind-independent (shared between two different subjects), and only there because of the minds that know addition.
— Fire Ologist
OK, but mind-independent only in the sense of "not confined to my mind." It doesn't tell us whether these intersubjective sharings are mind-independent in the sense of "about something that exists regardless of whether either of us has the idea of it." — J
Ironically, Wittgenstein's Tractatus can also be invoked to support the view that one can't go outside one's perspective (see TLP 5.6-5.641...here a link). And in fact, one can cite the later Wittgenstein's view that sense can be pragmatic in nature. Even if my picture is wrong, then, if it still has pragmatic use, I don't see why it would be 'nonsense'. — boundless
I think the disagreement is that what you are attacking is some kind of unique objective description of the universe (e.g. Newtonian mechanics, falsely speaking). However, from the beginning of the conversation, I have just been talking about information about the world we gain from perception or observation. And we may put boundaries around objects in perception in different ways if we really want to; but, nonetheless, what appears on our retinas and other sensory boundaries are patterns that map to events or structures out in the world, mostly in a consistent manner. And this kind of consistent mapping (at least in some restricted relevant context) I think is actually the minimal requirement for pragmatism and use. — Apustimelogist
OK, I think I worked it out. You're talking about Wigner's opinion of what the friend has measured while the friend is still in the box. That's a clear counterfactual, and unless an interpretation is used that posits counterfactuals, there is no 'truly' about it. RQM does not posit counterfactuals. — noAxioms
No, not at all. Existence of anything is relative to that which has measured the thing, and so far, our 'perspective bearers' have not been measured. They will momentarily, but then they're not the perspective bearers anymore, they're the observed. — noAxioms
Quite the opposite. Where are you getting all this? — noAxioms
According to RQM, their ontology relative to Wigner is a superposition of states. According to other interpretations, the ontology is different. Ontology seems to be a mental construct, a function of say one's choice of interpretation, but it also might be a physical mind-independent status, depending on which (if any) interpretation is actually the case. — noAxioms
Are you suggesting that Wigner isn't sure that the friend is like himself? That Wigner cannot discard solipsism? I suppose that's correct, but it's not considered a valid quantum interpretation since it leads to zero knowledge of anything. Ditto with superdeterminism, a loophole in Bell's proof, but you still don't see it included in the interpretations list. — noAxioms
Yes. I am not using any of those words as something requiring a human or other 'observer' to be involved. — noAxioms
I don't understand that problem enough to have an opinion about how problematic it is or to critique any solution proposed or counter-critique.
I said I don't buy it for different reasons than it offending my delicate sensibilities (the argument put forth in the Bell paper linked by the most recent post by Wayfarer. — noAxioms
Calling it 'the world' is already an observer bias. — noAxioms
Terminology granted, but both seem to contrast 'objective' with 'subjective', as opposed to objective vs relational.
The first means it relates despite not being seen (like say the far side of the moon, at least until the 60's). The latter is more of a property: It's there period vs it's there relative to something else. 37 exists, vs 37 is a member of the set of integers. That's different than 'we both can count to 37'.
I kind of irks me that 'objective' has two distinct meanings here, both quite relevant. — noAxioms
I believe that one has to take seriously his discussion in the whole section. — boundless
. . . according to a specific mathematical model that if it isn't actually showcased within the confines of our accepted empirical assumptions/guidelines to be ever potentially even falsifiable for centuries to come then it will only become more under-determined.Part of what has been learned is the incredible unlikelihood of our universe's fundamental constants being what they are — noAxioms
It's like how a skeptic will always find holes in the arguments I give to not drink bleach. . . alas. . . I still decide not to.My prior topic attempted to illustrate the lack of justification of mind-independent reality. Campbell here seems to imply that it is a strong human need to find one, but in the end, as my other topic poorly found out, it cannot be justified. It is what it is, and what it is is apparently what we say it is. — noAxioms
Ergo, we should all be deflationist about philosophy as much as we can until we can't and diagnose the translation issue. It's no longer the era of idealism vs realism but rather a debate about what terms in each respective philosophy are incommensurable and which are not.For communication to occur (the primary function of language-use) it would do the speaker or writer good to understand the language understood by their listeners and readers, as well as the level of understanding of the language. What would you hope to accomplish in talking about quantum physics to a 4 year old, or publishing a book written in Spanish in Russia? The relativized nature of language disappears when it is actually used to successfully communicate. You could say that the relativized nature of language only appears when miscommunication occurs. — Harry Hindu
. . . BUT despite that skepticism. . . despite that under-determination. . . despite that lack of truthful absolute justification. . . you and I will probably retain many of these biases of the manifest image out of mental inertia, bias, dogmatism, apriorism, and moorean intuitionism.I don't think that scientific knowledge alone can give us a definite answer about this question. This would imply that we have to 'suspend judgment' about how our models can 'reflect' the structure of the world and admit that, in fact, we have no way to make sure claims about our own cognitive perspective. — boundless
Yes. . . but that is easier said than done.I think Wittgenstein’s Tractatus may offer a solution here. That is in order for us to make sense of the world, that is to avoid speaking non sense, our language, mental construct, and the world must be isomorphic. This is not an outcome of empirical verification but of logic analysis. — Richard B
Not contesting that. What I am contesting is that it wasn't 'the universe' until those 'understanding' things designated it as such. Without said observation, it is merely 'a universe', not the preferred one.I never realty understand these conversations. Before anything on the planet, possibly in the universe, existed that had even the vaguest hint of understanding of mathematics, there would have been any number of instances when groups of objects joined together. — Patterner
That actually speaks to me, even though I think I'm interpreting these words in a different light than was intended.In H.O Mounce’s Wittgenstein’s Tractatus An Introduction, puts it nicely when he says, “For the solipsist in wishing to deny the independent reality of the world, in maintaining that only he and his ideas are real, has the idea of his self as an object standing, as it were, over and against an unreal world. But when he realizes the confusion in this, when he sees that there can be no such object as he takes his self to be, the world reappears as the only reality in which his self can manifest itself.” — Richard B
I reference something like that all the time, separating pragmatic truths from the rational ones.Some time ago, I mentioned the distinction of the 'two truths' ... — boundless
In the right reference frame, it is what happens, but it's still a provisional truth in that frame. I don't think what you call 'ultimate truths' are frame or perspective dependent.For instance, "The Sun rises in the east and sets in the west" is true in a provisional sense. But it also isn't true, right? We know that it is not a correct description of what 'really happens'.
The bolded bit is such a perspective reference, and illustrates the point of this topic.On the other hand, 'ultimate truths' would be correct statements that in some ways describe how the world is 'in itself'.
The friend is almost immediately entangled with the spin-measurement device, so he's going to match that every time, whether or not Wigner has measured the friend yet or not.No, I was thinking also about what the Friend measured after he exited the box. — boundless
Interesting that Rovelli phrased it that way, but if it were not true, the view would be falsified. The statement is true of quantum mechanics and not just any subset of interpretations.Rovelli actually brilliantly paraphrased his views like this: "More precisely: everybody hears everybody else stating that they see the same elephant they see. This, after all, is a sound definition of objectivity." ... Wigner hears his Friend stating he saw the same thing Wigner observed. But this is not a way, for Wigner, to go outside Wigner's perspective.
No, it just means that the friend event that Wigner measures is a different perspective than the Wigner event doing the measuring. That friend perspetive event cannot measure the Wigner event in question since said Wigner event doesn't exist relative to the friend event in question.When Wigner and the Friend meet, their interaction is (also) a measurement. So, the state of the Friend is 'measured' by Wigner. Does this mean that the Friend loses his status as a 'perspective bearer'?
Also, it makes the assumption that its truth is perspective-independent. — boundless
Knowledge is not the same as truth. Sure, knowledge seems perspective dependent, which is why we don't know where the nearest alien intelligence is.Quite the opposite. Where are you getting all this? — noAxioms
If I say that my knowledge is restricted to my own perspective, how can I claim there are other perspectives and there are no perspective-independent things? — boundless
More or less, yes. Note that my point isn't about only RQM. But all models who claim that knowledge is perspectival.[/quote]RQM (like almost all ontic interpretations) doesn't treat any person different than another. It doesn't even treat pens differently than people.Are you suggesting that Wigner isn't sure that the friend is like himself?
This is philosophy of mind, which of course has no resolution. Sure, but we're presuming sufficient mind-independence to suspect one person's experience is functionally similar to any other.But also note that our knowledge seems to be perspectival. Wigner can't 'see' the world from the Friend's perspective in order to confirm his belief that, indeed, the Friend is, as you put it, like him. This is so precisely becuase Wigner's knowledge is limited by his perspective.
The syntax suggests that this world exists to the exclusion of any other, all because it's the one we see. A far less mind-dependent wording would be 'a world' which doesn't carry any implication of being the preferred world.Calling it 'the world' is already an observer bias. — noAxioms
Why? — boundless
Different, not necessarily better. Best to define how the word is being used up front when wielding it.Are you saying that a better distinction [of 'objective'] would be between "what is independent from any relation" vs "what is relation-dependent"? — boundless
Almost all events are preceded by prior events. Not sure what that has to do with uncaused occurrences like beta decay. A few interpretations have it being a caused (determined) thing.I'm going to arrogantly say very little and assume I've solved all the thread's problems.
1 ) Physical != preceded by an event, the timing of beta decay events is random, they only have a cause in an abstract sense rather than a preceding event sense. — fdrake
OK, This seems to say that 'laws' don't count as causes.2) Preceded by an event != caused, even in how we use cause in explanations. People want to say things like "the tendency of a system towards its ground state causes...", even when that's not talking about a precedent event, it's talking about a "law" {an abstract generality} causing an event {a concrete particular}
Agree. The Dome thing is a wonderful example of an uncaused occurrence in Newtonian mechanics (which demonstrates that it isn't deterministic as claimed).3 ) Mathematised != determined, compare Norton's Dome in Newtonian mechanics {arbitrary rolling point} and any quantity associated with a distribution {anything that can be represented with a wavefunction has a wavefunction squared...}
Title is poorly worded, mostly due to lack of being able to express a correct one in a short line.5 ) Measurement != thought, OP grants this, so already undermines the premise in the title.
Sorry Zeno :(6 ) Physical != part of a mathematical model, like bouncing balls' amplitudes following a geometric decline only stopping in the limit.
But the quarks possibly supervene on maths objects. That doesn't make said maths physical in the same way, I agree.7 ) Physical != part of a physical theory - maths objects are parts of physical theories, but not physical in the same way as quarks and chairs.
An electron trajectory though space is a counterfactual.8 ) Relational != causal - come on you lot, an electron's trajectory through space is related to is charge
Sure. Some models have good odds, and others have really low odds.Which makes the 'unlikelihood' of our universe arising from random chance depend on the current models one may adopt or might come about within a hundred years or so of empirical stagnation. — substantivalism
But the bleach thing at least has an argument, even if the argument isn't perfect.It's like how a skeptic will always find holes in the arguments I give to not drink bleach. . . alas. . . I still decide not to. — substantivalism
I never realty understand these conversations. Before anything on the planet, possibly in the universe, existed that had even the vaguest hint of understanding of mathematics, there would have been any number of instances when groups of objects joined together.
— Patterner
Not contesting that. What I am contesting is that it wasn't 'the universe' until those 'understanding' things designated it as such. Without said observation, it is merely 'a universe', not the preferred one. — noAxioms
I don't know what to make of this. I can talk about the fork I used at dinner without meaning it's the only, or the preferred, fork. If it was my turn at bat, I wouldn't ask the ball boy for a bat, because he needs to knows which one. There are many, but I need to specify. And I'll be in all kinds of troubles if someone asks what I'm doing this weekend, and I say, "I'll have to ask a wife."The syntax suggests that this world exists to the exclusion of any other, all because it's the one we see. A far less mind-dependent wording would be 'a world' which doesn't carry any implication of being the preferred world. — noAxioms
In the right reference frame, it is what happens, but it's still a provisional truth in that frame. I don't think what you call 'ultimate truths' are frame or perspective dependent. — noAxioms
The bolded bit is such a perspective reference, and illustrates the point of this topic. — noAxioms
The friend is almost immediately entangled with the spin-measurement device, so he's going to match that every time, whether or not Wigner has measured the friend yet or not. — noAxioms
Interesting that Rovelli phrased it that way, but if it were not true, the view would be falsified. The statement is true of quantum mechanics and not just any subset of interpretations. — noAxioms
RQM (like almost all ontic interpretations) doesn't treat any person different than another. It doesn't even treat pens differently than people. — noAxioms
The syntax suggests that this world exists to the exclusion of any other, all because it's the one we see. A far less mind-dependent wording would be 'a world' which doesn't carry any implication of being the preferred world.
My whole topic contrasts 'the world' with 'this world, among others', with the former implying mind-dependence. — noAxioms
The number 17 doesn't seem to be a matter of cause & effect. It's just a member of the set of integers. You might say it is but an abstraction, but I think it is far more fundamental than that. — noAxioms
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