Aha, I actually removed the reference to your post on purpose because what originally was going to be just a reply to your post ended up as just complicated train of thought that I couldn't be bothered to edit into something more comprehensible. Sometimes I like just posting those trains of thoughts about some complicated topic as they come to me but I don't expect them to be easily comprehensible for others so I decided to not ask for a reply, as it were, because I would need to excessively edit and re-think the post in order to do so. But I think one of the last quotes of that post gives a summary of my perspective:

I think my perspective is similarish too Otavio Bueno's structural empiricism masquerading as a very weak ontic structural realism... so weak that they are interchangeable. This comes from my anti-realist inclinations to deflate things but the desire to acknowledge a mind-independent reality in a way that is not totally divorced from what we do and think — Apustimelogist

Link to structural empiricism
e.g.
https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?cluster=14237184630099891718&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&as_vis=1

At the very least, when I create stories about the world - that may end up being erroneous - these stories are about real things, or supposed to be. That may be wrong.

I do uphold all of the anti-realist arguments against realism though regarding indeterminacy of our models - leading to the conclusion that models are nothing above how they are manifested or used within our own cognitive behaviors (e.g. a physics textbook is just squiggles on paper; it means nothing unless someone is engaging with it and comprehending it and then able to perform acts or calculations utilizing it - physical and cognitive events).

But then there is an interesting loophole in that this applies equally well to the use of words like "truth" or "real". They are indeterminate. They are manifest in use when I say things like "truth is what is the case; what is true is the case; that thing is true if and only if it is the case" and acts of identification of things "as the case", whether there is any deeper, profound, intrinsic, unique to that sense or reference - or not at all. And when the anti-realist says things are not real, that is equally indeterminate in the same sense which they use skeptical arguments to attack realism.

So then the question is: if truth and reality is in use, Why do I need to change my use of those words?

They work very well and coherently most of the time. I am sure almost every anti-realist maintains their use of those terms at least in some contexts within everyday life. I may want to change the use in some contexts, but not in any radical way - e.g. "the quantum wavefunction isn't real"; "I just discovered yesterday that ghosts are not real"; "Harry Potter isn't real".

Are scientific theories true?

Well, unlike some of the easier cases above I just gave, I think this is much more ambiguous and the answer appears different from different angles. Is Newtonian mechanics true as a unique metaphysical theory? No. Does Newtonian mechanics capture actual structure of the world in terms of empirical structure that satisfy predictions? I would say arguably yes. Is Newtonian physics as appears in those empirically verified events an idealization of fine-grained eventa? Arguably yes. Is that coarse-grained structure real though? Maybe, if you think of realism in terms of overlapping structure rather than unique objects. Are there many different formulations of classical physics with the same predictions? Yes. Are the differences non-trivial? Maybe, because some involve dynamical causality, some are about least action with fixed final boundary conditions, some describe classical mechanics as waves, some describe classical mechanics with complex numbers using a Hilbert space analogous to quantum theory.

We can say there are different ways of enacting the same empirical structures that we can distinguish non-uniquely through our sensory apparati but nonetheless map onto the world beyond those boundaries.

At least, that needs to be the story for my models about the universe to seem coherent.

I think there is a kind of Wittgensteinian aspect here in relation to his famous quote about "throwing away the ladder" or something like that. Once I have deflated all meaning to use, I can throw away the ladder and just use those words how I normally do, because my meaning of the words didn't depend on some kind of intrinsic magical ontology in the first place. There is nothing to be changed, just the acknowledgement of how meaning is nothing above use - and we cannot step outside of that as it were regardless of how much we try.

But in that use there is still some engagement with a real world, even if in a minimal sense. Something like active inference in the sense of Friston's free energy principle. To model the world entails a statistical coupling between the internal states of a system and some external states across its Markov Blanket from which there is a conditional independence. And from this perspective or story, any useful model implies some real meaningful interaction with the external world, even if in a limited, perspectival sense - even if I want to deflate representations, I could consider them in some sense real if there is a meaningful sense of a consistent statistical mapping (maybe only approximately, and idealized) in some context where information is being communicated between the external and internal states via the senses. This may not be unique, but then that would imply a very very thin kind of realism which is about empirical structure which anti-realists may not generally disagree with. Maybe they won't say what they see are real intrinsic objects of the world in a direct aquaintance; but maybe they would agree it is real information about the world that is consistent, albeit the plurality of ways we can extract consistent information is potentially huge.

Yes, I don't think a fundamental metaphysics of the universe is intelligible; but it doesn't mean the structures we perceive are not genuine information, even if there is always something a bit ineffable about that and we can artifically draw boundaries in various ways.

And there the tangent went, again!
But I think maybe that was describing how my position is kind of a structural empiricism masquerading as a weak ontic structural realism.... or rather maybe it is in fact a kind of very weak epistemic structural realism that I am espousing where I am embracing the kinds of trivialities you get from Newman's objection, whilst thinking about truth and realism and structure itself in this thin deflationary way related to use within a context, and perhaps ambiguous in a multi-scale reality within which our ability to engage with information is also intractable, convoluted (in the sense of a literal convolution), context-dependent and fuzzy (ambiguous even to ourselves often, think Quine jungle gavigai and Kripkenstein quus, but also very effective). Things can be the case in that their empirical consequences follow, counterfactually speaking. Things can also be the case even if "things" do not reflect rigid cookie-cutter boundaries. Even something like the self is like that - completely illusionary if we want to go down the road of deconstruction and deflation. Yet my holistic experiences must be an actual occuring structure of the universe (without implying anything deeper about what experience means - its just a thin word, a label).

I think I sit on the fence between preferring an epistemic or ontic structural view given that I would be more inclined to say that not just a notion of intrinsic fundamental reality is epistemically unintelligible but also that in some sense there is nothing more to know about reality than structure - an intrinsic aspect completely distinct and separate from structure seems kind of redundant, even nonsensical to me. The closest we could get to that is conscious experience. But the thing is that from my perspective, I am inclined to say that the only intelligible description of conscious experience is as informational structure. Like, without defining information in any kind of profound metaphysical or ontological way, it seems completely coherent to me to say that my visual experiences can be equated to some informational structure originating from my retina due to light hitting it. At the same time, the fact that all world structure we can engage with is contingent on a perspective is more in line with the epistemic view, even though I would say that this perspectival structure may have a consistent mapping to whatever is outside our sensory boundaries and so is veridical in some sense, albeit a weaker sense of veridical than someone who believes that perceptions have to capture some unique way the world purportedly is. Similar to as Banno sometimes says, I like conceptualizing our engagement with a real world in terms of kinds of "views from anywhere" as opposed to a kind of "view from nowhere" (god).

I would like to gracefully withdraw from this thread. I do not understand what anyone is saying. — Athena

I'm with you. :rofl:

Still, I'll respond to this:

Number 17 is not matter. Therefore, number 17 or the word "blue" can not be caused nor effect anything. — Athena

I don't think they spring from nothing, for no reason.

Can we talk about a 'realism' without 'ultimate truths' or the possibility to know them? — boundless

Realism can be relational. You can talk about it either way. 2+2=4 seems like an 'ultimate truth', but who can say for sure?

I'm not sure about what you are getting at. I would say that usually realism involves that the world can be known, at least in priciple, as it is independently of any perspective of any subject.

What I am getting at is the contradiction in your statement there. Yes, realism usually involves the world relative to which we interact. But that relation is precisely what makes its preferred existence mind dependent. Yes, an identical world except without any observers would arguably be more mind independent, but there would be nothing, even in another world, to label it 'the world' instead of just 'a world'. It's the preferredness of this world that makes it mind dependent. Take away that preference and it becomes mind independent, but it also drops the barrier to all those other worlds from equally existing, leaving open the question if there is still a barrier at all distinguishing what exists from what doesn't.

To exist means to stand out. This world stands out to us, making it a mind-dependent standing out. From what do these other worlds stand out?

But oddly enough I would say that if there are 'as may worlds as perspectives' then the presence 'mind-independent reality' is more difficult to defend.

Only if a perspective requires a mind, which I often emphasize to the contrary.

Some interpertations however claim that they are 'ontologically interpretable' (to use a phrase by d'Espagnat), in the sense that they can be read as providing a correct description about the world as it is in itself. — boundless

Tall claim, but I suppose most interpretations (maybe not copenhagen) can be read this way.

Rovelli is saying that each 'observer' can't go outside 'his' own perspective.

I'm not sure what it would mean to go outside one's own perspective. I have a lot of perspectives (any moment along my worldline), but those are all mine. Nothing prevents anybody from imagining what another observes, which is exactly what's being done here with Wigner's friend. Almost all thought experiments leverage imagined perspectives.

'He' will never find any inconsistencies because all data 'he' will be able to find will be consistent 'for him'. But if 'his' knowledge is limited by 'his' own perspective, then, he can't actually know what 'others' observe.

As you quoted Rovelli saying, he knows the other observes the same elephant.

If the friend is in superposition in the box, then the friend is in superposition of having observed up and down. There's no funny experience to that. It's perfectly normal to the friend and we are in such superposition at all times relative to anything that hasn't currently measured us. All this is very different than the friend observing his own superposition, which nobody does.

I can talk about the fork I used at dinner without meaning it's the only, or the preferred, fork. — Patterner

But you've measured many forks, but measured only one world. This leads some (not all) to conclude there is but 'the' one world, and if 'what there is' is defined as what is observed, then there is indeed but the one world, but that definition isn't a mind-independent one.

And I'll be in all kinds of troubles if someone asks what I'm doing this weekend, and I say, "I'll have to ask a wife."

So says the Mormon.

The universe I'm in may or may not be the only universe. But it's the only one I have any experience of. If I start talking about "a" universe, people will be confused. They'll probably stop me and ask what I mean by "a".

In a topic such as this one, I think not. Pragmatically from day to day interactions, yea, we all know what is meant by it, and few ponder how our observation of it makes it preferred to us, but not preferred.

I don't think they spring from nothing, for no reason. — Patterner

'Spring from' implies a time when the 'real thing' wasn't yet real, but time is there, so if it sprang, then it wasn't from nothing. I don't think our universe is contained by time.
The question I find unanswerable concerning realism is: "how does one explain the reality of whatever it is you consider to be real?". If a relational definition is used for 'being real', then the answer is simply 'because I relate to it'.
Do I relate to all those worlds I don't see? I think I do, because they're necessary for explaining what I see. That point is debatable of course.

Number 17 is not matter. Therefore, number 17 or the word "blue" can not be caused nor effect anything. — Athena

I didn't say either 'caused or was affected by anything. I said that some consider 17 to be something that exists (see platonic realism), and some don't. It existing due to being causal seems to leverage that Eleatic Principle discussed in the OP. 17 is part of mathematics, and some theories (Tegmark's MUH for instance) posit that universes supervene on mathematics, which would give 17 causal powers.

I would like to gracefully withdraw from this thread. I do not understand what anyone is saying.

No problem. Thank you for your questions and contributions.

New theory of entanglement - Persistence Theory, Bill Gianokopoulos — Wayfarer

Spent quite some time looking at it. There must be a more formal paper somewhere since this seems to be more a pop article written for the likes of me. Has a scientific paper been submitted and peer reviewed?
I notice the author seems to have little respect for relativity of simultaneity the way he describes 'instant' change of wave function at the other end of the pair from the measurement taken. He also very explicitly denies counterfactuals, which is weird considering this instant state change sounding like one.

Anyway, haven't real too far yet and I've no strong opinion if it warrants inclusion in a list of interpretations. Thanks for the link, and for one that isn't blocked.

Spent quite some time looking at it. There must be a more formal paper somewhere since this seems to be more a pop article written for the likes of me. Has a scientific paper been submitted and peer reviewed? — noAxioms

You're welcome. Note the link to the author profile. He has many published scientific papers in his speciality, rheumatology. I don't know if he published a peer-reviewed article on persistence theory. I would view this more as a philosophical framework for understanding the phenomenon of entanglement rather than physics as such. I am drawn to it, because it converges in many ways with the kind of informational dynamics approach that I've learned about from Apokrisis and others on this forum (which is after all a philosophy forum).

Realism can be relational. You can talk about it either way. 2+2=4 seems like an 'ultimate truth', but who can say for sure? — noAxioms

One thing I've picked up reading your posts over the years, is that you're basically nihilist - kind of a 'soft nihilism', not harsh or cynical. 'Nobody knows for sure that anything is real.' It provides a kind of ultimate get-out-of-jail card for any argument or model, which can be nullified with a shrug, and 'who knows'?

In a topic such as this one, I think not. — noAxioms

Fair enough.

Do I relate to all those worlds I don't see? I think I do, because they're necessary for explaining what I see. — noAxioms

Again, i really don't know what you mean. In what way is any world you don't see explaining what you do see?

I can talk about the fork I used at dinner without meaning it's the only, or the preferred, fork.
— Patterner
But you've measured many forks, but measured only one world. This leads some (not all) to conclude there is but 'the' one world, and if 'what there is' is defined as what is observed, then there is indeed but the one world, but that definition isn't a mind-independent one. — noAxioms

If two minds that don't know each other, and don't know what the other is doing, independently go to the same place, and described it the same way, does that not mean there is something independent of either mind?

The number 17 doesn't seem to be a matter of cause & effect. It's just a member of the set of integers — noAxioms

It's true that that particular integer has no special significance, but the role of integers is significant in the overall scheme of quantum mechanics:

An object moving in a straight line has momentum. It is nothing more than the object’s mass times its velocity. An object moving in a circle possesses a property called ‘angular momentum’. An electron moving in a circular orbit has an angular momentum, labelled L, that is just the mass of the electron multiplied by its velocity multiplied by the radius of its orbit, or simply L=mvr. There were no limits in classical physics on the angular momentum of an electron or any other object moving in a circle.

When Bohr read Nicholson’s paper, he found his former Cambridge colleague arguing that the angular momentum of a ring of electrons could change only by multiples of h/2π, where h is Planck’s constant and π (pi) is the well-known numerical constant from mathematics, 3.14…. . Nicholson showed that the angular momentum of a rotating electron ring could only be h/2π or 2(h/2π) or 3(h/2π) or 4(h/2π) … all the way to n(h/2π) where n is an integer, a whole number. For Bohr it was the missing clue that underpinned his stationary states. Only those orbits were permitted in which the angular momentum of the electron was an integer n multiplied by h and then divided by 2π. Letting n=1, 2, 3 and so on generated the stationary states of the atom in which an electron did not emit radiation and could therefore orbit the nucleus indefinitely. All other orbits, the non-stationary states, were forbidden. Inside an atom, angular momentum was quantised. It could only have the values L=nh/2π and no others. — Kumar, Manjit. Quantum: Einstein, Bohr and the Great Debate About the Nature of Reality (pp. 98-99).

So, while it is true that integers lack causal powers, they nevertheless constrain the space of possible causal relations in quantum systems by defining the allowed states of the system. In this way, mathematics — and whole numbers specifically — shape the possibilities of physical reality. Don't overlook the fact that the quanta in quantum physics refers to the fact that physical properties are constrained to discrete, numerical (often integer-based) values. Even if integers aren’t causal forces, they govern the structure of what’s physically possible ('other values were forbidden')

As Deacon says in Incomplete Nature, causal powers in nature are not exhausted by interactions of forces; constraints are also formative. Mathematical structures like quantized angular momentum states do not act on physical systems, but they fundamentally determine the organization of possibilities, and thus are indispensable to explaining physical outcomes.

If two minds that don't know each other, and don't know what the other is doing, independently go to the same place, and described it the same way, does that not mean there is something independent of either mind? — Patterner

That would be evidence of not-solipsism, but the fact said place is said to exist because it is being described by one or more observers makes its designation as such pretty dependent on the observation.

I am searching for a rule that defines objective existence in some way that doesn't depend on any observation of anything. The EP discussed in the OP is one way to do that, but surely there are others.
My relational definition is more restrictive than straight-EP, but it also works, and it doesn't require any explanation of how anything came to exist.

So, while it is true that integers lack causal powers, they nevertheless constrain the space of possible causal relations in quantum systems by defining the allowed states of the system. In this way, mathematics — and whole numbers specifically — shape the possibilities of physical reality. — Wayfarer

Yes, quantum theory seems to have a special relation with integers and not just real numbers like Newtonian physics.

The quote you gave seems to be pretty old, referencing the Bohr model of orbiting electrons like little satellites, deprecated a century ago for the more modern orbital model which still uses those integers, but doesn't suggest electrons going around in cute orbits with nice clean angular momentum like that.

One thing I've picked up reading your posts over the years, is that you're basically nihilist - kind of a 'soft nihilism', not harsh or cynical. 'Nobody knows for sure that anything is real.' It provides a kind of ultimate get-out-of-jail card for any argument or model, which can be nullified with a shrug, and 'who knows'? — Wayfarer

Well this made me dig a shallow pit into the nihilism thing since there's so many variations of it and some of it probably does apply to me. Yes, I see no use for non-relational existence. I see that in a Russell's teapot sort of light, posited by many but lacking any predictive power, also similar to the premise of a preferred moment in time, another very intuitive but empirically empty proposition.

So quoting wiki-nihilism page we get:
"There have been different nihilist positions, including the views that life is meaningless, that moral values are baseless, and that knowledge is impossible. "
This seems totally wrong. Life has meaning, moral values and knowledge. It just isn't absolute, it's all relative. I've not discussed it much, but morals seem to be a social contract, valid only within the society where the contract is valid. Being immoral means going against society and bearing their social consequences. Best example is it being immoral to shoot a German soldier surrendering, but not immoral to shoot a Japanese one. That one is a written contract, but often the rules are not written.

As for knowledge, 2+2 adding up to 4 seems to be pretty objective knowledge. Knowledge is not all relative.

Closer to home is this quote:
"In the field of epistemology, relativistic versions of nihilism assert that knowledge, truth, or meaning are relative to the perspectives of specific individuals or cultural contexts, implying that there is no independent framework to assess which opinion is ultimately correct. "
This is under epistemology, suggesting that what I know is relative to my perspective, to which I can only agree. But being an 'observer', it makes any knowledge of mind pretty observer dependent, and when querying ontology, all I see is relations, no absolutes at all. X exists relative to Y, but there seems to be no meaning to 'X exists'. My prior topic tried to address (question) the claim that X cannot be whatever it is unless it first exists, that 'being' depends on ontology. Perhaps that's the answer. Instead of stubbornly insisting that X can be itself regardless of its ontic status, maybe that very existence simply is X being itself. That's totally circular, but ultimately, everything is I suspect.

Another quote from the page:
"Mereological nihilism asserts that there are only simple objects, like elementary particles, but no composite objects, like tables."
That's totally my assertion, two topics ago
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15297/is-there-any-physical-basis-for-what-constitutes-a-thing-or-object
I didn't know there was a term for what I was observing (demonstrating) in that topic.


Comments on this post are encouraged because I'm trying to fit my relativism into more than just an epistemological stance. I don't care what I know, I care about a model of what is that doesn't depend on mind, which makes empirical evidence take a secondary role.

You ask whether anyone really supports (I presume you mean believes in) a mind-independent reality. Do you believe anything existed prior to the advent of minds?

That would be evidence of not-solipsism... — noAxioms

How so? I can't know that the other person describing the same thing I saw and the thing I saw are not both products of my imagination.

but the fact said place is said to exist because it is being described by one or more observers makes its designation as such pretty dependent on the observation. — noAxioms

I say it does not exist because it is being observed. I say observing it is the means by which we know it exists, but it would exist if it was never observed.


Regarding the casual power of integers, 7 + 3. What caused "10" to exist in the mind of probably everybody who read that sentence?

The quote you gave seems to be pretty old, referencing the Bohr model of orbiting electrons like little satellites, deprecated a century ago for the more modern orbital model which still uses those integers, but doesn't suggest electrons going around in cute orbits with nice clean angular momentum like that. — noAxioms

But the point about integers remains. I'm sure a better-educated Platonist physicist than myself could make something profound out of it.

Re nihilism, I meant 'soft nihilism'. Not the bitter 'everything is meaningless' type, but the 'shrug, whatever' type. Bart Simpson rather than Friedrich Neitszche. (Not that it really matters ;-) )

I've not discussed it much, but morals seem to be a social contract, valid only within the society where the contract is valid. — noAxioms

Which is moral relativism, generally contrasted with moral realism. Tractatus Logic-Philosophicus 6.41:

The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value—and if there were, it would be of no value.

If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental.

What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise this would again be accidental.

It must lie outside the world.

Whatever he means by that, it emphatically could not be a matter of 'social contract'.

I care about a model of what is that doesn't depend on mind — noAxioms

But models are clearly mind-dependent in some fundamental sense. Einstein said once, in dialogue with Tagore, 'I cannot prove scientifically that Truth must be conceived as a Truth that is valid independent of humanity; but I believe it firmly. I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man.' But this overlooks the point that it is something only man can know. It's not a sense object, but an intelligible relationship that can only be discerned by a rational intellect. Like all of physics. The problem with today's understanding is, that it generally forgets to take into account the mind that knows it.

I don't care what I know, I care about a model of what is that doesn't depend on mind, which makes empirical evidence take a secondary role. — noAxioms

Can you just assume there is such a model that you don't know about? If so, and you don't care what you know, then your quest is over.
:grin:


I really don't understand what you're after. You want a way to prove that there is a reality that doesn't depend on mind. But the mind can't know what that model is, because that defeats the purpose. Is that right?

Einstein said once, in dialogue with Tagore, 'I cannot prove scientifically that Truth must be conceived as a Truth that is valid independent of humanity; but I believe it firmly. I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man.' But this overlooks the point that it is something only man can know. It's not a sense object, but an intelligible relationship that can only be discerned by a rational intellect. Like all of physics. The problem with today's understanding is, that it generally forgets to take into account the mind that knows it. — Wayfarer

I agree that taking into account the knowing mind is essential, and that too much physicalist or scientistic thinking refuses to see this.

But actually, it makes a difference whether "the knowing mind" is limited to a human mind. Let's go with your other term, "a rational intellect," instead. What might this include? Other intelligent ET species, certainly. But also the sort of cosmic mind that is often posited in religion. Is there an argument you'd want to make that such a mind is impossible, or hopelessly unlikely? If not, and positing such a mind, then the existence of all intellectual objects of knowledge doesn't require human minds at all. Isn't that exactly the sort of independence we're looking for?

And if you want to get really Western-theistic, not only does this cosmic mind know intellectual objects, but they created them in the first place, arguing for even more independence from human thought.

But . . . even if all this were true, we're still left with the gap between how we represent this relationship of intellectual objects to ourselves, and how the cosmic mind did or does. Any sort of mind-independence calls into question the accuracy of what we can know. It requires further premises and arguments to conclude that the Pythagorean theorem looks the same to you, me, ET, and God.

I can't know that the other person describing the same thing I saw and the thing I saw are not both products of my imagination. — Patterner

OK, I took that from the evidence that each has language, something one doesn't have without interactions with others.

I say it does not exist because it is being observed. I say observing it is the means by which we know it exists, but it would exist if it was never observed.

That's the standard line, yes. The OP is full of challenges to not so much that, but our presumed nonexistence of stuff not observed.

Typically, the realist presumes (if not explicitly posits) a classical reality:
P1 There is one (mind-independent) reality, and we happen to observe it, there being no other reality to observe
Maybe that's an unfair strawman because I totally take that apart in the OP.
There need to be more mind-independent worlds, and not just worlds like this one but without people, but funny worlds with say multiple dimensions of time or something. We observe this one because this one is tuned for observation, and the vast majority of them are not.
So this brings up the problem of which worlds/things exist and which don't, and why?


I came up with some alternatives:
1) Existence is a mental construct only. There is no existence in itself, only the idea of it. Hence it can be applied at the whim of whoever uses the word, and the presumer of this existence is fooled into thinking it actually corresponds to something actual, like things are actually divided into existing ones and nonexisting ones.

2) Existence is not based on empirical evidence at all, but on some logical reasoning. Trick is to come up with that reasoning, and a few have been suggested in my prior post an in the OP.

Regarding the casual power of integers, 7 + 3. What caused "10" to exist in the mind of probably everybody who read that sentence?

Probably the symbols and their meaning as taught to said readers. Good question though. Suppose integers don't exist. Not saying they don't exist somewhere in our universe, but that they don't exist at all. Can 7+3 really add up to 10, or must they be instantiated somewhere first, like 7 oranges and 3 grapefruits in a basket of 10 citrus fruits.
This is an important question. Can 7 be itself (can it be say an odd number) if it doesn't exist? If 7+3 need not exist to add up to 10, then similarly, objective existence seems unnecessary for anything to be whatever it is.
I've asked this before, and many actually say that 7+3 do not add up to 10 unless the integers exist (and not just if 3,7,10 are all members of the set of otherwise nonexistent integers). I don't answer that way, and I say that the sum is 10 regardless of the ontological status of the integers involved.

We're talking about what seems to be objective truth here, and no some property of our universe.

Can you just assume there is such a model that you don't know about? — Patterner

I want a plausible model, even if I cannot know the correctness of it. Nobody can know if their interpretation of anything is the correct interpretation. That's true by definition.

But the mind can't know what that model is, because that defeats the purpose. Is that right?

I don't think so since the model would not require itself to be known, but neither does it forbid it.
That didn't come out right. The way that it actually is, does not require (nor forbid) a mental model to, by chance or good reasoning, correspond to this actuality.

You ask whether anyone really supports (I presume you mean believes in) a mind-independent reality. Do you believe anything existed prior to the advent of minds? — Janus

If existence is but an ideal (described in alternative (1) just above), then yes, the above suggestion would be true. Also, the universe seems to contain time, not be contained by it, so all of it exists equally, meaning the universe is self-observed, period. There's no before/after about it. Yes, the parts prior to the observation are the ones observed. Its the events after the observation that are not observed, so maybe it's those that don't exist under some mind-dependent position.

All that said, this topic is not about if the apple has mind-independent existence, its about what exists besides the stuff observed. If the answer is 'not much', then it sounds pretty observation dependent to me.

But the point about integers remains. — Wayfarer

Yes, I tried to convey that the point still stood.

the 'shrug, whatever' type.

I don't think so. I really care, and I want a model that lacks fundamental problems, but I'm getting nowhere. The relational thing works nice on paper, but it has problems of vanishing probability of the relations I perceive being actual perceived things instead of illusions, a sort of Boltzmann Brain problem. That's a hard one to get around, and it must be solved for the view to be rational.

But models are clearly mind-dependent in some fundamental sense.

The model itself is of course, but I mean that which it is modelled.

Einstein said once, ... '... I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man.'
But this overlooks the point that it is something only man can know."

You assert that no alien intelligence is capable of coming up with that theorem? If not, what are you saying? It seems discoverable even by an intelligence in a universe with completely different physical rules.

You assert that no alien intelligence is capable of coming up with that theorem? — noAxioms

Not at all, but there is no evidence of such. I mean ‘rational intelligence’. And there’s also no grounds to entertain the idea of a universe with ‘different physical rules’. This is where your relativism/nihilism shows through. It underwrites the idea that there are no necessary truths.

But actually, it makes a difference whether "the knowing mind" is limited to a human mind. Let's go with your other term, "a rational intellect," instead. What might this include? Other intelligent ET species, certainly. But also the sort of cosmic mind that is often posited in religion. Is there an argument you'd want to make that such a mind is impossible, or hopelessly unlikely? If not, and positing such a mind, then the existence of all intellectual objects of knowledge doesn't require human minds at all. Isn't that exactly the sort of independence we're looking for? — J

As I said above, I meant ‘rational intelligence’. To all intents and purposes, that refers to our minds, although I'm open to the possibility of other intelligent species in the Universe. But the point is, that while Einstein says that the Pythagorean theorem is true independently of man I think he overlooks the fact that, at least in our world, it is something only knowable to a rational intelligence that is capable of abstract thought and symbolic representation. So in one sense it is independent of us - does not depend on our assent for it to be true - but in another sense it is mind-dependent, in only being perceptible to the rational intellect (nous.)

As to whether there is 'one mind' or 'cosmic intelligence' or 'divine intellect' - the way I put it is that mind is 'some mind' or 'mind, generally.' While individual minds have their own idiosyncracies and proclivities, the mind also possesses universal characteristics and attributes, which are what is described by logical principles (Frege's 'laws of thought'), among other things. I think that's what Bernardo Kastrup means (or should mean!) by 'mind at large'.

If existence is but an ideal (described in alternative (1) just above), then yes, the above suggestion would be true. Also, the universe seems to contain time, not be contained by it, so all of it exists equally, meaning the universe is self-observed, period. There's no before/after about it. Yes, the parts prior to the observation are the ones observed. Its the events after the observation that are not observed, so maybe it's those that don't exist under some mind-dependent position.

All that said, this topic is not about if the apple has mind-independent existence, its about what exists besides the stuff observed. If the answer is 'not much', then it sounds pretty observation dependent to me. — noAxioms

What do you mean "the universe is self-observed"? Do you think observation occurs in the absence of observers? You say the universe contains time, which I take to mean that the universe is temporal, so how do you get to "there's no before/ after about it"?

The question boils down to whether "if nothing is observed then nothing exists" is true. If you believe that then would you believe that the fossil record didn't exist until we observed it?

Why is the question not about if the apple has mind-independent existence? If the question is about what exists besides the stuff observed, how could the answer be "not much", given that we observe only the tiniest fraction of the universe? And even if it were "not much" (speaking of the apple now) why should that lead to the conclusion that the apple is observer-dependent? The reason I switched to the Universe from the apple is that if there is much there to be observed which has not been observed then that would entail mind-independent existence, no?

You assert that no alien intelligence is capable of coming up with that theorem? — noAxioms

Not at all, but there is no evidence of such. I mean ‘rational intelligence’.
...
To all intents and purposes, that refers to our minds, although I'm open to the possibility of other intelligent species in the Universe. — Wayfarer

OK, so you're open to there being others, but you don't see evidence of such, which just means that they're sufficiently separated to not notice each other. An that's just this universe, never mind other ones

And there’s also no grounds to entertain the idea of a universe with ‘different physical rules’. This is where your relativism/nihilism shows through. It underwrites the idea that there are no necessary truths.

So I outline, in first paragraphs of the OP, grounds to entertain the idea of worlds/universes with different rules. By the relational definitions I've given, those worlds (like any other world) do not exist relative to us by definition, but neither do we exist relative to them.
By the EP, worlds with say 2 dimensions of time exist. Worlds with zero dimensions of time don't exist. EP is not a relational definition.

What do you mean "the universe is self-observed"? — Janus

I mean that this world has evolved observers.

You say the universe contains time

That means that time is part of the universe, one dimension of 4D spacetime, consisting of all events including the ones with us in it. This is an opinion.

Some say that the universe is contained by time (they don't use that wording), in which case the universe becomes an object, created, just like any other object, and there's something larger that better deserves the term 'universe'. In this model, there was a time before which this universe was not observed from within. As an object, it is subject to being externally observed if you can find any consistency in that.

The question boils down to whether "if nothing is observed then nothing exists" is true.

It's true under any observation-dependent definition of existence. I'm exploring alternate definitions.

Why is the question not about if the apple has mind-independent existence?

Because the apple is observed. No, I'm not talking about something merely unseen, say the nearest star to our exact position, but on the opposite side of the galaxy. Most assume that exists.
The test should probe the boundaries, such as the live cat when the box opened turns up the dead one.
Instead, how about 'the nearest star 50 GLY away in the exact current direction of North'? That's a complete counterfactual and 'is not real' by most interpretations of quantum theory. And as always, how about the number 17? That's also one of my frequent examples.

By the relational definitions I've given, those worlds (like any other world) do not exist relative to us by definition, but neither do we exist relative to them. — noAxioms

In which case, they're completely irrelevant in any sense other than providing rhetorical elbow-room in which any claim whatever can be accomodated. It's a way of avoiding admission of necessary truths, which suits your relativist arguments.

Okay the way you frame it I tend to think the Universe contains time, which means there was no time prior to the existence of the Universe. In other words, if there is anything there is also time because things are necessarily temporal, and if there are no things then there is no time.

You also seem to agree that there are things independent of minds. In which case you would appear to be one the "anybodies" who support mind-independent reality.

So I outline, in first paragraphs of the OP, grounds to entertain the idea of worlds/universes with different rules. By the relational definitions I've given, those worlds (like any other world) do not exist relative to us by definition, but neither do we exist relative to them. — noAxioms

We have no relation to such worlds, but they have some relation to us (if they exist) insofar as we think about them. The MWI is a possible one in QM. It is criticized for being unfalsifiable, but then so are the other interpretations as far as we can tell. How could we ever demonstrate that consciousness collapses the wave function, for example, or that there really are hidden variables?

That is because realism is a mental perspective which cannot be proven or disproven. . . only HELD or NOT HELD. Whether you hold to a particular form of realism or idealism will probably not impact much of anything as the direct nuts and bolts pragmatism of advancing science requires. — substantivalism

Up to a certian point, I'll agree. From a pragmatic perspective, in fact, realism is probably preferable than 'idealism', if by the latter we mean that anything outside the mind(s) doesn't exist. But conversely, a broadly 'idealistic' perspective actually helps in a practical sense.
For instance, even the most consistent physicalist nowadays is ready to admit that reality is not like it appears to us. That is, a suspension of disbelief about 'common sense' is needed to accept the counterintuitive facts that scientific theories sometimes require us to accept. The common sense view that we have about the world is, indeed, for a large part mind-dependent. So, I would say that even if 'idealisms' are wrong they are still useful pragmatically.



Well, thanks for your thoughts. Unfortunately, I am not well-versed to that philosophical perspectives, so I am sorry if my answer isn't satisfying.
I believe that in these kind of discussions we have to remember the historical meanings of terms like 'realism' and 'idealism'. I believe that realism is more like an epistemic position rather than an ontic one. If by 'realism' one means that there is a 'mind-independent reality' outside minds, it is pretty rare to find 'idealists' that flatly deny that (Plato or Kant for instance would be realist in this sense). But realism is more a claim that we can have knowledge of that 'mind-independent reality' and it's where things get murkier.

If I am not mistaken, ontic structural realism is the position that, while we can't know the intrinsic properties of mind-independent reality, we can, at least in principle, know some structural aspects of it. For instance, conservation laws, symmetries in physics and so on are probably the most general laws we can discover. Probably it's the least 'speculative' form of realism there is. It doesn'r require that we can describe 'faithfully' the world but just that, in principle at least, the mathematical/logical structures of our theories might mirror the structure of the mind-independent reality. In other words, it's merely the claim that mind-independent reality is partially intelligible by us.

I would say that it is a reasonable stance to hold. After all, the assumption of the existence of a mind-independent reality has much more explanatory powers than the denial of it. So, it would also seem reasonable to assert that we can have some knowledge of it. But then, if we accept that 'mind-independent reality' is intelligible, we might ask ourselves how is that possible. That is, why that mind-independent reality is intelligible in the first place. To me this is a strong argument to some kind of 'platonism' about mathematics, logic and so on: after all, if mathematical, logical truths and so on are not merely creations of our minds but in some way properties of mind-independent realities, then the partial intelligibility is easily explained. Paradoxically, then, the 'mind-independent' reality would be something that is not wholly 'different' from the mind, in a sense.

Can we have certainty of this, however? I would not say so. After all, if our knowledge is inductive it can't be certain. On the other hand, though, as you say it would absurd to deny that, say, newtonian mechanics makes correct predictions. The empirical knowledge that science gives us is undeniable. But, in a sense, we can't 'prove' in any way that this means that we do know the structure of 'reality as it is'. So, here we are in an antinomy. On the other hand, basically everything seems to tell us that we can know something about a mind-independent reality. On the other hand, however, there is no logical compelling argument that we can. It is a fascinating mystery IMHO. And what is even more interesting is that if we do accept that we can know (part of) the mind-independent reality it is because it shares something with our own mental categories. So, it would imply that, say, mathematical platonists are in some sense right to say that mathematical truths are mind-independent, eternal and so on.

Realism can be relational. You can talk about it either way. 2+2=4 seems like an 'ultimate truth', but who can say for sure? — noAxioms

Do you think that '2+2 = 4' is a mind-independent truth? I actually think it is. But I can't be sure of it. That's why I lean toward some form of matematical platonism. It seems that mathematical truths are discovered, not 'invented', at least in part. But I guess that I can't give compelling arguments about it.

Take away that preference and it becomes mind independent, but it also drops the barrier to all those other worlds from equally existing, leaving open the question if there is still a barrier at all distinguishing what exists from what doesn't. — noAxioms

I think I see what you mean. But then all the worlds would be mind-dependent. Not dependent on a particular mind. So we would have a pluarality of worlds that depend on their respective 'minds'.

To exist means to stand out. This world stands out to us, making it a mind-dependent standing out. From what do these other worlds stand out? — noAxioms

Either to other minds or, if RQM is correct, they stand out to physical objects.

Only if a perspective requires a mind, which I often emphasize to the contrary. — noAxioms

Correct. I disagree, in the sense that I don't see convincing reasons to say that. It would be quite a coincidence that the world 'in the perspective of a pen' is describable in the same terms as it is 'as it appears to me'. But, I think we can discuss about this forever without convince either of us of the opposite :smile:

As you quoted Rovelli saying, he knows the other observes the same elephant. — noAxioms

I am not sure that Rovelli meant that. I think he meant that each observer when asks "what did you see?" to another will get an answer which is coherent with his observations. I don't think that Rovelli meant anything more than this.

I'm not sure what it would mean to go outside one's own perspective. I have a lot of perspectives (any moment along my worldline), but those are all mine. Nothing prevents anybody from imagining what another observes, which is exactly what's being done here with Wigner's friend. Almost all thought experiments leverage imagined perspectives. — noAxioms

That's a good point, indeed. I need to think about this to give you a proper response. Hope you don't mind.

Do you think that '2+2 = 4' is a mind-independent truth? I actually think it is. — boundless

We both think that. I don't go so far as to say that I 'know that'.

That's why I lean toward some form of matematical platonism. It seems that mathematical truths are discovered, not 'invented', at least in part.

Right. I don't know a whole lot about mathematical Platonism, being unsure about the arguments for each side, and why 2+2=4 perhaps necessitates it or not.

I think I see what you mean. But then all the worlds would be mind-dependent. Not dependent on a particular mind. So we would have a pluarality of worlds that depend on their respective 'minds'.

Well, a plurality of worlds that don't depend on minds at all. A great deal of them would be unfathomable to us, but what, do they all exist? I came up with a world from Conway's Game of Life (GoL), which is very crude, 3D (2 space, 1 time), and arguable has 'objects'. Does an evolution of a given initial GoL state exist? It certainly is a world. That's what I mean by questioning where the line should be drawn (from what does it stand out?) Nobody has answered the question. I have only vague answers, none supported by logic. That's a great deal of the reason I'm not a realist.

It would be quite a coincidence that the world 'in the perspective of a pen' is describable in the same terms as it is 'as it appears to me'.

I'm not comparing it to how things appear to you. The pen is not conscious and nothing appears to it at all. But the pen has a causal history and thus measures (interacts with) that history, just as you do. So not as things appear to you, but how your entire causal history relates to you. Your mental processing of a fraction of those measurements has nothing to do with this causal relation, thus the pen and a random meat-wad are on ontological level ground.

So I'm using 'perspective' here in the same was as 'measure', just meaning physical interaction with environment. I confine 'observer' to something with mental interaction. I'm not asserting that a perspective is that, I'm just using the word that way.

I am not sure that Rovelli meant that. I think he meant that each observer when asks "what did you see?" to another will get an answer which is coherent with his observations. I don't think that Rovelli meant anything more than this. — boundless

But that's my take on that comment as well.

That's a good point, indeed. I need to think about this to give you a proper response. Hope you don't mind. — boundless

Thinking about stuff rather than giving a quick knee-jerk response is always a good thing. I'm often delayed in replying precisely because I'm looking up sites relevant to the response. It's not like I think I have all the answers already. I certainly don't.

In which case, they're completely irrelevant in any sense other than providing rhetorical elbow-room in which any claim whatever can be accomodated. — Wayfarer

If you equate 'irrelevance to us' as 'nonexistent to us', then sure, but those other worlds are relevant to the only viable models that explain certain things. I notice you don't have a solution yourself to say the fine tuning problem, perhaps waving it away as being somehow necessary, but without saying how it is necessary.
How do you explain the reality of whatever you consider to be fundamentally real (mind?)? Or is it 'it just is'? I ask because I think the relational view solves that problem, but only if you take it on its own ground and not mix it in with a contradictory view.

It's a way of avoiding admission of necessary truths, which suits your relativist arguments.

I think I proposed 2+2=4 as a sort of necessary truth. A whole lot of stuff falls apart if that isn't accepted.

Okay the way you frame it I tend to think the Universe contains time, which means there was no time prior to the existence of the Universe. In other words, if there is anything there is also time because things are necessarily temporal, and if there are no things then there is no time. — Janus

Pretty good summary, yes. To say 'there was nothing, and then there was something' implies that there was time in which more stuff besides time suddenly 'happened'. It seems a category error to consider the universe to be something that 'happened'. Again, opinion, but the opposite opinion is to posit the existence of something (a preferred moment in time) for which there is no empirical evidence, only intuition, and I rank intuition extremely low on my list of viable references.

You also seem to agree that there are things independent of minds. In which case you would appear to be one the "anybodies" who support mind-independent reality.

Except for the 'reality' part, sure. Mind-independent, sure. Relation-independent, no. I think in terms of relations, but I don't necessarily assert it to be so. I proposed other models that are not relational and yet are entirely mind-independent. See OP.

We have no relation to such worlds

Sure we do. It's just a different relation than 'part of the causal history of system state X', more like a cousin relation instead of a grandparent relation. The grandparent is an ancestor. The cousin is not. The cousin world is necessary to explain things like the fine tuning of this world, even if the cousin world has no direct causal impact on us.

How could we ever demonstrate that consciousness collapses the wave function

That interpretation can be shown to lead to solipsism, which isn't a falsification, but it was enough to have its author (Wigner) abandon support of the interpretation.

or that there really are hidden variables?

By definition, those can neither be demonstrated nor falsified.
They have proven that certain phenomena cannot be explained by any local hidden variable theory, but that just means that hidden variable proposals are necessarily non-local.

Do you think that '2+2 = 4' is a mind-independent truth? I actually think it is. But I can't be sure of it. That's why I lean toward some form of matematical platonism. It seems that mathematical truths are discovered, not 'invented', at least in part. But I guess that I can't give compelling arguments about it. — boundless

If they are invented, not objective, then wouldn't 2+2=5 be an equally valid invention?

I think I proposed 2+2=4 as a sort of necessary truth. A whole lot of stuff falls apart if that isn't accepted. — noAxioms

Wow, that sounds pretty serious, if 2+2=4 is not a necessary truth a whole lot if stuff falls apart. What exactly do you have it mind? Maybe, for example, I am a kid at school learning arithmetic and I learn that addition and say to myself, “that is nice, it is true today but maybe tomorrow it will be false”, or that is nice but maybe the teacher is mistaken and it is really false”, and the kid decides to give up learning addition. Maybe if they were taught it was a necessary truth this unfortunate situation might not occur.

Up to a certain point, I'll agree. From a pragmatic perspective, in fact, realism is probably preferable than 'idealism', if by the latter we mean that anything outside the mind(s) doesn't exist. But conversely, a broadly 'idealistic' perspective actually helps in a practical sense.
For instance, even the most consistent physicalist nowadays is ready to admit that reality is not like it appears to us. That is, a suspension of disbelief about 'common sense' is needed to accept the counterintuitive facts that scientific theories sometimes require us to accept. The common sense view that we have about the world is, indeed, for a large part mind-dependent. So, I would say that even if 'idealisms' are wrong they are still useful pragmatically. — boundless

Yes, there is a pragmatic role for all philosophical perspectives but that doesn't mean that non-pragmatic concerns might still out weigh against such roles.

There are no empirical issues with realism or idealism, nor logical issues, or immediately obvious metaphysical objections which can bury all such alternatives from either camp. However, that leaves it up to us to choose one without the baggage of those former concerns and I think most would sooner pick the most intuitive than the least.

_____________________________________________________________________________

Forms of idealism might be more unified in covering certain aspects of quantum mechanics or QFT but they most definitely do not make such notions more easily dwelt with.

Forms of realism require tons of fine tuning to get them to fit and leave lots of free variables but once those issues are settled in our eyes we can quickly move one. Foundations are set and we can start building from something that our consciousness can work with amenably.

Unified and esoteric VS. dis-unified and immediately manipulable?

I notice you don't have a solution yourself to say the fine tuning problem, perhaps waving it away as being somehow necessary, but without saying how it is necessary. — noAxioms

Might it not be along the lines that necessary truths don’t have further explanation? The epistemological buck has to stop somewhere. (I'm not at all referring to the crude idea of so-called 'brute facts'. )

One way I've thought about the anthropic principle is simply to observe that it puts paid to the argument that the origin of life is a consequence of the fortuitous combination of elements, the 'warm little pond' theory of abiogenesis. And that's because the causal sequence that gave rise to those circumstances can be traced back past the formation of the planet, to the stellar transformations that gave rise to those complex elements, which in turn can be traced back to some specific characteristics of matter-energy that seem to have existed from the earliest moments of the cosmos. It is perfectly understandable that theologically-inclined philosophers will regard that as evidence for a higher intelligence, although I don't personally hold to that, and also that this will of course be contested by atheists. But I think the argument that there might be uncountable further unknown universes doesn't amount to saying anything whatever. We'll never know. Ironic that anti-theological philosophers use this blatantly metaphysical argument to argue against religious metaphysics.

If they are invented, not objective, then wouldn't 2+2=5 be an equally valid invention? — Patterner

I believe that formalists and, in general, mathematical anti-realists would say that "2+2=5" would not be correct because it would be coherent with the system of definitions, rules of argumentation and so on in which the operation "2+2" is found. But for them, mathematics is like, say, the game of chess. It's an invention where you can establish 'objective' rules (i.e. rules valid for all), but it's still an inevention.
On the other hand, if you invent a different 'game' where "2+2=5", that would be just fine.

Right. I don't know a whole lot about mathematical Platonism, being unsure about the arguments for each side, and why 2+2=4 perhaps necessitates it or not. — noAxioms

Well, the general term is matheamtical 'realism'. There are different variants. Platonists assert that mathematical truths are both independent from our minds and also from the world. The main argument is that mathematical truths do not seem to rely on any kind of contingency. So they seem to be eternal and independent.
Opponents of platonism question the possibility that such a 'realm of truths' can be known by us.

I personally lean towards platonism. But I don't think I can make compelling arguments about it.

Well, a plurality of worlds that don't depend on minds at all. — noAxioms

Well, they might not depend upon minds. But if each of them is dependent on a 'perspective'.

I came up with a world from Conway's Game of Life (GoL), which is very crude, 3D (2 space, 1 time), and arguable has 'objects'. Does an evolution of a given initial GoL state exist? It certainly is a world. That's what I mean by questioning where the line should be drawn (from what does it stand out?) Nobody has answered the question. I have only vague answers, none supported by logic. That's a great deal of the reason I'm not a realist. — noAxioms

Well, to me it would be a subset of 'our world', wouldn't it?

So I'm using 'perspective' here in the same was as 'measure', just meaning physical interaction with environment. I confine 'observer' to something with mental interaction. I'm not asserting that a perspective is that, I'm just using the word that way. — noAxioms

Ok! Sorry for the equivocation. In fact, you have already said that and I insisted to use the word 'perspective' in a way that would be compatible with both the cases. It inevitably lead to confusion.

Anyway, the point I am making would be that the division into 'objects' might be a conceptual division, i.e. something that makes sense in the context of an 'observation'. There is no guarantee IMO that outside the 'observations' it is indeed possible to speak of such a division. The relationality of physical propoerties for instance suggest to me that the way we carve the world into objects is in large part a mental construct. So, describing the world outside the context of observations with concepts that are being introduced to make sense of observations would be a leap that might have to be justified.

Thinking about stuff rather than giving a quick knee-jerk response is always a good thing. I'm often delayed in replying precisely because I'm looking up sites relevant to the response. It's not like I think I have all the answers already. I certainly don't. — noAxioms

Thanks! Here's an idea. Maybe the 'change' of my perspective is just an useful abstraction. 'My' 'observing perspective' is the same even when the description changes because I moved in my worldline. So, maybe any kind of perspective that physics tells about is an useful abstraction, which doesn't necessarily connect to something truly real.

Forms of idealism might be more unified in covering certain aspects of quantum mechanics or QFT but they most definitely do not make such notions more easily dwelt with.

Forms of realism require tons of fine tuning to get them to fit and leave lots of free variables but once those issues are settled in our eyes we can quickly move one. Foundations are set and we can start building from something that our consciousness can work with amenably. — substantivalism

Interesting point. That would seem an antinomy to me. There seems no way to decide one over the other with purely rational motives. Note that I say so because I don't know how you can explain consciousness by something totally unconscious.

Well, the general term is matheamtical 'realism'. There are different variants. Platonists assert that mathematical truths are both independent from our minds and also from the world. — boundless

For one, I distinguish mathematics being objectively real, and mathematics being objectively true. The latter seems to hold, and the former I thought was what mathematical Platonism is about, but you say it's about being true. I am unsure if anybody posits that the truth of mathematics is a property of this universe and not necessarily of another one.

The main argument is that mathematical truths do not seem to rely on any kind of contingency.

Well I agree with that, and so does @Richard B given his last post.

Opponents of platonism question the possibility that such a 'realm of truths' can be known by us.

Being objectively true (and not just true of at least this universe) does not imply inaccessibility. The question comes down to if a rational intelligence in any universe can discover the same mathematics, and that leads to circular reasoning.

Well, to me [Conway's Game of Life] would be a subset of 'our world', wouldn't it? — boundless

Only a simulation of it. The things in themselves (all different seed states) are their own universes.
Funny thing is that our universe can be simulated in a GoL world, so it works both ways.

The relationality of physical propoerties for instance suggest to me that the way we carve the world into objects is in large part a mental construct. So, describing the world outside the context of observations with concepts that are being introduced to make sense of observations would be a leap that might have to be justified. — boundless

Totally agree here.

Here's an idea. Maybe the 'change' of my perspective is just an useful abstraction. 'My' 'observing perspective' is the same even when the description changes because I moved in my worldline. So, maybe any kind of perspective that physics tells about is an useful abstraction, which doesn't necessarily connect to something truly real.

A perspective seems to be a sort of 5 dimensional thing, 4 to identify an event (point in spacetime), and one to identify a sort of point in Hilbert space, identifying that which has been measured from that event. All these seem to be quite 'real' (relative to our universe)

So for instance, two perspectives of our friend in the box, one having measured up, and one down. Same event, different states with which the perspective is entangled, which is the different 'locations' in Hilbert space. I put that in scare quotes because it isn't a linear dimension like distance or something.

One way I've thought about the anthropic principle is simply to observe that it puts paid to the argument that the origin of life is a consequence of the fortuitous combination of elements, the 'warm little pond' theory of abiogenesis. — Wayfarer

That's one way. An extremely unlikely event, but no end of places and time for it it occur. Plenty of dice being rolled, so abiogenesis doesn't seem to be a problem at all.

And that's because the causal sequence that gave rise to those circumstances can be traced back past the formation of the planet, to the stellar transformations that gave rise to those complex elements,which in turn can be traced back to some specific characteristics of matter-energy that seem to have existed from the earliest moments of the cosmos.

Most of that has unlimited rolls of the dice, so improbability isn't a problem. The part in bold, if this is 'the one universe', only gets one shot, since those incredibly unlikely characteristics are the same everywhere, and that means you only get one shot at it.

Yes, having a theological conclusion already in mind, this anomaly was eventually used as evidence of design. Before that, it was the 'design' of all living things, but science kind of won out on that issue, so now the goal post has been moved to the 'designed' tuning. I think they're getting tired of conceding points instead of ever winning one.

But I think the argument that there might be uncountable further unknown universes doesn't amount to saying anything whatever.

People finally accepted uncountable further unknown planets. Why is this one so different?

I do agree that throwing up one's arms and saying 'everything exists' seems to dilute the concept into meaninglessness. To exist is to stand out, and nothing can stand out if there's no distinctions.

It seems neither of us has a satisfactory answer. I do my best, but my view very much borders on the one lacking distinctions. The question that kills me: Why does our universe seem so interesting? There are far more structures that are not interesting and yet have identical copies of me in it. If they are 'exist' (whatever that means), I'm probably in one of the uninteresting ones without knowing it. I have no answer to that one. Such is the consequence of not restricting ontology at all.

People finally accepted uncountable further unknown planets. Why is this one so different? — noAxioms

Surely you can understand how unknown planets and unknown universes are on a different ontological plane? The universe being ‘the totality of what exists’. I’m open to Penrose’s idea of the cyclical universe, but really only because it harmonises with my sympathies for Indian mythology, which has always taught that. But the idea of ‘universes, plural’ in any other sense, I think is completely meaningless - as it’s obviously not an empirical hypothesis, in the sense of not being able to be refuted empirically, so it must be metaphysical, but without any connection to what the term was devised to mean.

But the idea of ‘universes, plural’ in any other sense, I think is completely meaningless - as it’s obviously not an empirical hypothesis, in the sense of not being able to be refuted empirically, so it must be metaphysical, but without any connection to what the term was devised to mean. — Wayfarer

In the past 100 years our knowledge of the universe has expanded by orders of magnitude. I find the notion of a multiverse intriguing - but I'm just an armchair physicist. However, much smarter people than I think it's worth looking into.

https://www.thescienceblog.net/is-there-scientific-evidence-for-the-theory-of-the-multiverse/

https://organicallyhuman.com/googles-quantum-multiverse-exists/

As if one isn’t enough ;-)