I think we need to assume Adorno was attempting to be consistent, and not ambiguous or equivocal. So I see the difference as a matter of perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am sure he was, but the main problem is that all of our concepts have been reified by ideology. And so equivocality is more pertinent than ever. Take the concept of theory in this case. What does it tell you? Is it the same when it is used in "theory of knowledge" as in "critical theory"?

Another way to see the same concept differently, it would be with perspectivism, I suppose. This was advanced foremost by Nietzsche. Not having the concepts of reification and non-identity at hand, and unable to procure them on his own, since he was a psychologist and not a philosopher, lacking theory, he was naturally led to perspectivism.

That is why I spoke of pre-consumption and post-consumption, from the perspective of a particular subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

I take post-consumption to imply a deification process, where theory becomes live and kicking, in the subject, from its reified static and external state.

Consider that theory is fed to the subject as an educational tool in the form of ideology, in the process of the subject's intellectual experience. Also, the subject might freely choose theory for consumption. But post-consumption, theory is within the subject, and is then a tool of that subject. The analogy is one of eating. Food is fed to a child, who then learns to choose one's own food. But in both of these cases, after consumption the food is then used by the subject who consumes. The difference is an external/internal difference, and the point you appear to be claiming is that there is a difference between the thing when it is external, and the thing after its been internalized. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes exactly this is what I am saying, the thing - theory in this case - is transformed after consumption. Before, it was something external, say a set of rules that one learns, and applies them to objects of experience so that to receive knowledge. After, it is in dialectic with experience, the one shaping the other. But I am sorry, I got a bit confused with your food example, isn't this what you are also saying?

Maybe. I'm not opposed to these notions on their face, at least.

The importance of incoherence, contradiction, and falsity preoccupies much of my thoughts.

I take post-consumption to imply a deification process, where theory becomes live and kicking, in the subject, from its reified static and external state. — Pussycat

I don't buy this. He says that it disappears into experience. So the best we can say is that it becomes a part of experience. As such, you would think it is govern by the whole, like Adorno's food analogy. The food is consumed and the nutrients are used within the living being which has consumed it. The food is not alive and kicking within the subject, it is now a part of a system. But, it plays a very special role, and this is why you say it is "live and kicking". Think of the food you eat as energy, in a sense it is "live and kicking" as energy is active, but we tend to believe that it is controlled by the system that has consumed it. In the analogy, theory is consumed by experience, but it maintains a very special, active role, which is why you say that it is live and kicking. Nevertheless, we tend to believe that it is governed by the subject which consumes the theory.

Do you think we can figure out the special role which Adorno assigns to theory, after it disappears within the intellectual experience of the subject? To me, it seems like the subject is first repulsed by non-identity within the theory, and reacts by retreating into itself. This might be like a sort of toxicity in the food. So a separation of difference is still maintained after consumption, between subject and object, the object being theory here. There is a reciprocal relation between theory and intellectual experience, but theory is very limited and cannot fully provide what is desired by the subject, which is freedom, the ability to move.

The result is a dialectical movement, and this rebels against the system. So, is "the system" here, that which consumed the theory, the intellectual experience of the subject? Does theory now, from within the subject, in this immanent, authentically dialectical process, being open-minded self-consciousness, rebel against the very intellectual experience which consumed it? Is that what is meant by "Both
positions of consciousness are connected to one another through each other’s critique, not through compromise."?

SVO/SOV and inflection, as the main problems I see. :rofl: And so it would seem that the project is severely hampered and severed from the outset. The translated material we are working with is mostly analytic and not dialectical, as it has been mediated through the english language. This poses an additional challenge, as english readers can't be helped by language, the dialectic is neither immanent nor immediate in it. But I guess this is the whole point, mediation, which even in a highly dialectical language such as german, cannot be avoided. As to our own style and presentation, tone or syntax tricks must be employed, at the peril of making one sound like Yoda. Yet another challenge we brought ourselves against, who wouldn't love a challenge anyway, what else is there? — Pussycat

But what if we formalize dialectics into the one Final System.... :D

Yeah, the language barrier is already there -- though I think there's enough similarity between English and German that with a comprehension of both you can give "the idea", if not the strict meaning of a text. I liked the analogy which the translator had of the photo-negative or the depictions of planets that we see on NASA's website and the like: These aren't the images an astronaut looking from down on orbit would see, but they are also not-false, exactly, but bitmap recreations that have a sort of negative relationship to what would be seen. Whatever this negative relationship between say what the astronaut sees and what a picture of the Moon shows I might term "the conceptual" -- that which can be translated, but only through familiarity with the particulars of both and only in this negative way. i.e. there won't be some easy 1-to-1 substitution one can do between German and English such that "the meaning" would be expressed -- if the original is in German then the meaning, as meant, is German meaning, not English meaning. (but, luckily, there's an absurd world to keep us in check from getting lost in meaning)


Anyways, catching up with everyone now. Summers over, schools back in session, and I'm reading again.

Alright, this is where we left off last. Because of the pause I reread everything up to Portrayal and it was heartening because it read much faster and more smoothly this time -- which means we're making progress. And I think I've figured out the reason for Portrayal or expression is so important, and different, from the representation. I think I'm reading it like you do here where the representation is the fact itself, whereas the expression of a fact is an interpretation: And how this occurs follows from the previous section on the speculative moment.

I was wondering what he was going on about when talking about how reciting a philosophical text does not make you profound -- there's not a profoundness sitting within The Republic before anyone reads it -- but rather the expression of some text in the proper moment that leads to profundity, or by analogue, the goal that philosophy is aiming at: to express correctly is to move beyond the representation -- beyond the facts as he said in the speculative moment -- and speak freely about this unfree (factual) state of affairs fully dominated by things.

Your explanation of "thingly" helped me wrap my mind around that sentence. The "thingly bad state of affairs" -- a state of affairs dominated by the thing where expression does not exist but merely converges with science is this thingly state of affairs, and it is bad because there is the speculative impulse of philosophy which is being ignored by such an approach (or, perhaps, it's simply too dominating in the world Adorno finds himself in, where people sort of refuse to speculate on the basis of it not being worthy) ((Though I am also finding myself asking after a better explanation for why it is bad -- I feel like I'm doing some handwaiving to make sense of the text rather than referencing something he said))

I'm still reviewing "Portrayal" and intend on finishing "System" today. But there's something of a report (without an answer to your question you posed)

EDIT:

That final paragraph is a doozy.

To think is, already in itself and above all particular content,
negation, resistance against what is imposed on it; this is what thinking
inherited from the relationship of labor to its raw material, its Urimage. If ideology encourages thought more than ever to wax in
positivity, then it slyly registers the fact that precisely this would be
contrary to thinking and that it requires the friendly word of advice
from social authority, in order to accustom it to positivity. The effort
which is implied in the concept of thinking itself, as the counterpart to
the passive intuition, is already negative, the rejection of the

31

overweening demand of bowing to everything immediate. The
judgement and the conclusion, the thought-forms whose critique
thought cannot dispense with either, contain critical sprouts in
themselves; their determination is at most simultaneously the
exclusion of what they have not achieved, and the truth which they wish
to organize, repudiating, though with doubtful justification, what is not
already molded by them. The judgement that something would be so,
is the potential rejection that the relation of its subject and its predicate
would be expressed otherwise than in the judgement. Thought-forms
want to go beyond what is merely extant, “given”. The point which
thinking directs against its material is not solely the domination of
nature turned spiritual. While thinking does violence upon that which
it exerts its syntheses, it follows at the same time a potential which
waits in what it faces, and unconsciously obeys the idea of restituting
to the pieces what it itself has done; in philosophy this unconsciousness
becomes conscious. The hope of reconciliation is conjoined to
irreconcilable thinking, because the resistance of thinking against the
merely existent, the domineering freedom of the subject, also intends
in the object what, through its preparation to the object, was lost to this
latter.

Mostly in the various justifications and explications rather than the thesis of the statement -- that thinking is negative rather than positive. The analogy between worker and "raw material" as the Ur-image makes sense, though. The part that really throws me is the very end: Where thought does violence upon its subject but with the ability to "restitute" what thought has done to its object.

What is this "hope" about? Does the proper expression always hope to reconcile its violence to its object in order to restitute it? Is this what it would mean to reach the non-conceptual?

Mostly thinking out loud about the difficult parts, though I'm tracking well enough to keep reading.

You might say that my re-write is a middlebrow petit-bourgeois deradicalized version. Maybe that describes all of my posts in this group? — Jamal

It could be... though I'm not really too concerned if it is or isn't. In some sense this would be inescapable in the administered state even by Marxist standards. The way he speaks of ideology can only be escaped, I'm guessing, through this negative dialectics, but coming to understand such a thing we can only start with what we are familiar with now which, if we're good Marxists, means that it's going to start with ideology whether we want that to be the case or not.

What I am concerned with is making sure I'm not just fooling myself, though :D -- I want something somewhat coherent to point to if I were to say, "When Adorno says... " blah, mostly because that's how I check myself and learn while reading: I purposefully attempt to restate what I believe I'm reading in my own words, which inevitably are simpler than the philosopher's that I'm reading. It's a good practice.

And given what Adorno said about how language is the only way to objectify thought, and that what is poorly written is poorly thought out, I think it makes a good deal of sense for the student to try and think it out in the manner we're able: we're still trying to figure out this beast negative dialectics, we can't be expected to "think dialectically" before finishing the book!

Anyways, catching up with everyone now. Summers over, schools back in session, and I'm reading again. — Moliere

Well, holidays got to me, eventually.. :cool: Have fun catching up!

A lot on my plate right now, so it might be a few weeks before I get back to the reading. Carry on without me and I'll catch up.

Yup, that's my intent.

The Vertiginous:

This section appears to describe an approach to truth. Vertiginous is distinguished from bottomlessness. And truth is vertiginous, (makes one's head swim) rather than bottomless as the abyss of untruth.

The last paragraph of the section appears to be describing the difference between coherency and soundness. The "frame of reference" provides the basis for a coordinate system, and everything within the system is consistent. But the soundness of the coordinate system, and the frame of reference itself, is generally not questioned. But, it may simply be a product of stipulated axioms.

That, the coherent coordinate system, is contrasted with a philosophy which throws itself at objects. This throwing itself at objects creates a vertigo described as "index veri" (index of truth). The index to truth is revealed in negativity, as untruth.

Fragility of the Truth:

Here we get a deeper look at truth. He appears to be saying that we must let go of what gives us comfort. Clinging to what gives us comfort, which is really untruth, is actually the bane.

With these human beings fear they will lose everything, because they have no other happiness, also none within thought, than what you can hold on to yourself, perennial
unfreedom.

Later in the section, this turns out to be what is popular, I'd say conventional.

Philosophy must "continually renew itself". It makes "few concessions to relativism", and "drives past Hegel".

Then there is a paragraph that I have difficulty to understand, which appears to be directed against the absolutism of Hegel. There is a jettisoning of that which is first to thought, but the jettisoning does not absolutize it. The jettisoning seems to be intended to remove the content of thought, from thought. But it's irrational to think that the content of thinking could be removed from thinking, because this would leave thinking as something other than thinking.

Even in the logical abstraction-form of the
Something, as something which is meant or judged, which for its part
does not claim to constitute anything existent, indelibly survives that
which thinking would like to cancel out, whose non-identity is that
which is not thinking.

So, it seems to me, that Adorno is criticizing this type of thinking, which conceives of thinking as having creative power to put abstractions outside the mind, as this is fundamentally contrary to the meaning of "thinking".

The objection of
bottomlessness needs to be turned against the intellectual principle
which preserves itself as the sphere of absolute origins; there however,
where ontology, Heidegger first and foremost, hits bottomlessness, is
the place of truth.

He then gets to the fragility of truth, "fragile due to its temporal content". Contrary to the beliefs of some, who say that truth cannot be lost, Adorno says that truth can be lost, and we can fall into the abyss. This is because truth requires great effort.

Only those thoughts which go to extremes can face up to the
all-powerful powerlessness of certain agreement; only mental
acrobatics relate to the thing, which according to the fable convenu
[French: agreed-upon fiction] it holds in contempt for the sake of its
self-satisfaction.

How it is, that thought can actually find truth, when it is easily led astray by what is popular, and "nothing notifies it that it has adequately satisfied itself in the thing", is another question.

The consistency of its execution, however, the density of the web, enables it to hit what it should.

This section appears to describe an approach to truth. Vertiginous is distinguished from bottomlessness. And truth is vertiginous, (makes one's head swim) rather than bottomless as the abyss of untruth. — Metaphysician Undercover

He doesn't say that bottomlessness relates to untruth, rather the opposite, that the acknowledgment of it is what touches truth. Negative dialectics, being foundationless and non-unitarian - better, a dialectics which is no longer “pinned” to identity - will be either accused of:

a) bottomlessness. This accusation, he says, comes from the "fascist fruits", which demand strong foundations, eg race, family, "blood", religion, nation, history etc. And so, a philosophy that does not provide some foundations, is outright and with no much further thought discarded by them as silly, to say the least.

b) vertiginous. Those that think it through, will still discard it, because of the felt vertigo that bottomlessness induces. But this relates to great modern poetry, and moreover is what philosophy needs: "This feeling has been central to great modern poetry since Baudelaire; philosophy, runs the anachronistic suggestion, ought not to participate in any such thing".

Then there is a paragraph that I have difficulty to understand, which appears to be directed against the absolutism of Hegel. There is a jettisoning of that which is first to thought, but the jettisoning does not absolutize it. The jettisoning seems to be intended to remove the content of thought, from thought. But it's irrational to think that the content of thinking could be removed from thinking, because this would leave thinking as something other than thinking. — Metaphysician Undercover

The objection of bottomlessness needs to be turned against the intellectual principle
which preserves itself as the sphere of absolute origins; there however, where ontology, Heidegger first and foremost, hits bottomlessness, is the place of truth.

Here I think he is alluding to Heidegger, not Hegel. Of Heidegger's absolutization of Being. As if he thinks that Heidegger correctly arrived at bottomolessness, to Being, but then he stopped by making it absolute, and left it abstract:

Even in the logical abstraction-form of the Something, as something which is meant or judged, which for its part does not claim to constitute anything existent, indelibly survives that which thinking would like to cancel out, whose non-identity is that which is not thinking.

And so it seems that the above does not apply to Heidegger's Being.

The jettisoning of that which is first and solidified from thought does not absolutize it as something free-floating. Exactly this jettisoning attaches it all the more to what it itself is not, and removes the illusion of its autarky. The falsity of the jettisoned rationality which runs away from itself, the recoil of Enlightenment into mythology, is itself rationally determinable. Thinking is according to its own meaning the thinking of something. Even in the logical abstraction-form of the Something, as something which is meant or judged, which for its part does not claim to constitute anything existent, indelibly survives that which thinking would like to cancel out, whose non-identity is that which is not thinking. The ratio becomes irrational where it forgets this, hypostasizing its own creations, the abstractions, contrary to the meaning of thinking. The commandment of its autarky condemns it to nullity, in the end to stupidity and primitivity. The objection of bottomlessness needs to be turned against the intellectual principle which preserves itself as the sphere of absolute origins; there however, where ontology, Heidegger first and foremost, hits bottomlessness, is the place of truth.

Heidegger, by throwing away first principles, arrived at Being. But this Being, according to Adorno, is neither absolute, nor free in itself, it is still dependent on what is thought. When philosophy forgets this and hypostasizes its own creations - without relation to what is being thought - it becomes irrational, null and stupid.

He doesn't say that bottomlessness relates to untruth, rather the opposite, that the acknowledgment of it is what touches truth. Negative dialectics, being foundationless and non-unitarian - better, a dialectics which is no longer “pinned” to identity - will be either accused of: — Pussycat

I agree with this to an extent. Acknowledgement of the bottomlessness is what touches the truth, but it is an acknowledgement of bottomlessness as untruth. What actually constitutes bottomlessness, is the untruth, and this is what negative dialectic sees in identity philosophy. And, the charge that negative dialectics is bottomless, is itself an untruth. This is evident in the last statement of the section. The bottomlessness of the untruth creates the vertigo which is the index of truth, in the negative approach. In general, the untruth of identity is the truth.

The vertigo which this creates is an index veri [Latin: index of truth]; the
shock of the revelation, the negativity, or what it necessarily seems to
be amidst what is hidden and monotonous, untruth only for the untrue.

As explained in the lectures, negative dialects is actually pinned to positivism, or identity, in a negative way. It is pinned to the falsity of positivism, and this constitutes the determinate negative. Otherwise negative dialectics would be completely indeterminate, negating anything, and everything, therefore useless. The subject of negative dialectics is the untruth of positivism and identity philosophy, and in this sense it actually is pinned to identity, in a way which allows it to escape the bottomlessness which is actually a part of the identity philosophy it resists.

Here I think he is alluding to Heidegger, not Hegel. — Pussycat

I think it applies to both, the philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger. I mean, Hegel is mentioned, as the philosopher who wished to have his dialectics as the "prima philosophia". He put the "identity-principle" as the "absolute-subject". So we cannot remove Hegel from this category of absolutism which Adorno is criticizing, even if Heidegger is cited as the prime example.

The key point being that "bottomlessness" is really characteristic of this absolutism. This is why the accusation of bottomlessness, although charged against negative dialectics, ought really be turned against this absolutism. Heidegger is the best example. The bottomlessness which is supposed to be truth, is really untruth.

Heidegger, by throwing away first principles, arrived at Being. But this Being, according to Adorno, is neither absolute, nor free in itself, it is still dependent on what is thought. When philosophy forgets this and hypostasizes its own creations - without relation to what is being thought - it becomes irrational, null and stupid. — Pussycat

I think it is important to note that this is described by Adorno as untruth. "The falsity of the jettisoned rationality which runs away from itself..." It is falsity because it dissociates thinking form its content, to make thinking, or as you say "Being" absolute. But content is necessary to thinking, so this way of absolutizing Being is a falsity. Therefore the "rationality which runs away from itself" by accepting this false impression of itself, as an absolute, is really irrational.

I agree with this to an extent. Acknowledgement of the bottomlessness is what touches the truth, but it is an acknowledgement of bottomlessness as untruth. What actually constitutes bottomlessness, is the untruth, and this is what negative dialectic sees in identity philosophy. And, the charge that negative dialectics is bottomless, is itself an untruth. This is evident in the last statement of the section. The bottomlessness of the untruth creates the vertigo which is the index of truth, in the negative approach. In general, the untruth of identity is the truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you read it slightly wrong. My take is that Adorno says that identity philosophy despite claiming bottomlessness with its absolute, solid grounds, and scolding negative dialectics for lack of bottom, is in reality the epitome of bottomlessness. The fact that it doesn't recognize this, consists in its untruth. This is why he says that the objection of bottomlessness "needs to be turned against the intellectual principle which preserves itself as the sphere of absolute origins", it's a turntable, ah you said so yourself. And so the untruth lies in the claim, not in the bottomless itself.

As explained in the lectures, negative dialects is actually pinned to positivism, or identity, in a negative way. It is pinned to the falsity of positivism, and this constitutes the determinate negative. Otherwise negative dialectics would be completely indeterminate, negating anything, and everything, therefore useless. The subject of negative dialectics is the untruth of positivism and identity philosophy, and in this sense it actually is pinned to identity, in a way which allows it to escape the bottomlessness which is actually a part of the identity philosophy it resists. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a misunderstanding here to what "pinned" means. THE VERTIGINOUS passage starts with "
A dialectics which is no longer “pinned” to identity provokes...". I understood it as Adorno describing negative dialectics, that the dialectics does not presume the identity claim. But like you say, if ND isn't pinned to anything, it will be completely arbitrary, criticizing everything in its pass, with no compass guiding it. Better then to say that ND is pinned to identity thinking, but not to identity. By its holding fast and being tethered to identity philosophy, ND doesn't lose itself and offers valuable critique. It feeds off the latter, and works towards its own dissolution. However, I don't think it escapes bottomlessness, maybe Adorno means that this tension should, as always, be kept standing?

I think it is important to note that this is described by Adorno as untruth. "The falsity of the jettisoned rationality which runs away from itself..." It is falsity because it dissociates thinking from its content, to make thinking, or as you say "Being" absolute. But content is necessary to thinking, so this way of absolutizing Being is a falsity. Therefore the "rationality which runs away from itself" by accepting this false impression of itself, as an absolute, is really irrational. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I agree, it is a regress into myth, as Adorno also noted in his Enlightenment book with Horkheimer.

So it seems that he is really against any absolutizations, then, one would say that he is a relativist, since you must either be the one or the other.

The meaning of such complaints is to be grasped in a usage of the dominant opinion. This refers to present alternatives in such a way that one would
have to choose between one or the other. Administrations frequently reduce decisions over plans submitted to it to a simple yes or no; administrative thinking has secretly become the longed-for model of
one which pretends to be free of such. But it is up to philosophical thought, in its essential situations,
not to play along.

Didn't have time to get to "against relativism" next.

I think you read it slightly wrong. My take is that Adorno says that identity philosophy despite claiming bottomlessness with its absolute, solid grounds, and scolding negative dialectics for lack of bottom, is in reality the epitome of bottomlessness. The fact that it doesn't recognize this, consists in its untruth. This is why he says that the objection of bottomlessness "needs to be turned against the intellectual principle which preserves itself as the sphere of absolute origins", it's a turntable, ah you said so yourself. And so the untruth lies in the claim, not in the bottomless itself. — Pussycat

This is very consistent with my reading, except I read bottomlessness itself as untruth. It's like an infinite regress of indeterminacy. The accusation that negative dialectics is bottomless is untrue for the reason I explained. And, the assumption of the absolute, which creates bottomlessness, is an untruth. I don't know how to take the following sentence, maybe "is" is a typo which should be "in"? If so, then bottomlessness is clearly an untruth itself.

"Heidegger first and foremost, hits bottomlessness, is the place of truth."

So it seems that he is really against any absolutizations, then, one would say that he is a relativist, since you must either be the one or the other. — Pussycat

I don't know about that. If one does not take a positive stand, but remains critical, it would be possible to be against both, absolutism and relativism.

This is very consistent with my reading, except I read bottomlessness itself as untruth — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes I know, it is what I was saying, we agree in everything else but this, but this is a very crucial part.

I don't know how to take the following sentence, maybe "is" is a typo which should be "in"? If so, then bottomlessness is clearly an untruth itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

there however, where ontology ... hits bottomlessness, is the place of truth.

Take it as it stands: a true ontology is a bottomless ontology.

He is criticizing attempts to secure the bottomless abyss with tautological absolutes, whereas he'd rather leave the chasm open, engaging with it with mental acrobatics.

Take it as it stands: a true ontology is a bottomless ontology.

He is criticizing attempts to secure the bottomless abyss with tautological absolutes, whereas he'd rather leave the chasm open, engaging with it with mental acrobatics. — Pussycat

We'll just have to disagree then. I think what he says, is that this form of ontology, absolutism, hits bottomlessness, and that is the truth. He is not saying that any true ontology would hit bottomlessness. Further, the bottomlessness spoken about is a form of untruth, "to be recognized by its fascist
fruits", as described in the prior section. So the truth is that this ontology, absolutism, is untrue. You seem to be neglecting the negative aspect of the dialectics, truth is to reveal what is untrue. Look at the full sentence:

The objection of
bottomlessness needs to be turned against the intellectual principle
which preserves itself as the sphere of absolute origins; there however,
where ontology, Heidegger first and foremost, hits bottomlessness, is
the place of truth.

Notice, bottomlessness is hit by this absolutism. The point is that bottomlessness is a feature of this ontology, not a feature of negative dialectics. That the objection of bottomlessness is incorrectly directed at negative dialectics was the point of the prior section.

I don't know if it will help but it might be worthwhile to look at the alternative translation online, which is often easier to understand:

https://sites.williams.edu/cthorne/theodor-adorno-negative-dialectics/16-the-fragility-of-truth/

Their translation is "groundlessness" rather than "bottomlessness".

Indeed, in "fragility", it is "groundlessness". However, in "vertigo", it is bottomless:

A dialectic no longer “riveted” to identity prompts if not the objection, which ye shall know by its fascist fruits, that it is bodenlos—bottomless, without ground or soil—then the objection that it is dizzy-making.

Whereas the Thorne translation in "vertigo" is:

The objections leveled at everything groundless should be turned against the principle of a mind or spirit that maintains itself within itself as the sphere of absolute origins. But Wherever ontology, and above all Heidegger, starts banging away at groundlessness—that is where truth dwells.

But curious that you say that, because I was thinking of asking MU whether he thinks that bottomless is any different from groundless. For my part, I think they are all the same, bottomless, groundless, foundationless. The abyss, even.

Wouldn't you think that, as long as subject and object cannot be reconciled, as in Hegel, then an abyss would form between them? And that this abyss would be manifest in any grounding attempts? So far we agree of what negative dialectics would say of others, but what would it say of itself?