Good summaries! — Moliere

Thanks :smile:

But, then, I also may just be thinking that because it gets along with my own notions, and Adorno really does think that philosophy is superior in the sense that the qualitative distinction is what "grounds" the quantitative method -- being able to differentiate what something is from what it is not is the basis of being able to count and individuate, i.e. think quantitatively. — Moliere

Yeah, but in his utopian mode I think he would say not that philosophy is superior, but that all thinking, scientific-empirical and otherwise, stands to benefit from this wider kind of reason that doesn't leave qualities behind. Like I was saying recently, he doesn't think that philosophy and empirical science are separate domains.

But given the state of things, a kind of philosophical elitism might be apparent. He really tries to persuade us that it's not that (which is kind of funny considering that many of the people who knew him and worked with him said he was a genius).

So, yes to this:

a generic defense of philosophical thinking in a scientistic society — Moliere

Another dialectical twist. Does it mean that only in our alienated modern society in which everyone must be an exclusive specialist of some sort could there be people, like Adorno and his peers, capable of focusing intently and deeply on the qualities of things? If so, this is a natural follow-on from the "Privilege" section. — Jamal

I will offer my opinion here, but our modes of interpretation have diverged significantly, so much so that unless you adopt the principles which you recently disputed, what I say will look far off track.

As discussed in the prior sections, our object is now the subject. He says we yield to this principle. "To yield to the object is so much as to do justice to its qualitative moments." Kantian principles have demonstrated that we have no immediate access to any supposed independent objects, therefore if we want a true immediate understanding of the object, we need to look internally, and look at oneself as an object. This means that I am primarily an object, and I need to yield to this fact and understand myself as an object. This perspective will provide a basis for understanding that this object is also a subject, the objective being prior to the subjective though. Primarily, the person, myself, must be removed from the social context, within which the word "subject" applies, and understood as an "individuated object".

Form this perspective the qualitative, based in non-conceptual sensations and feelings, is prior to the quantitative which is conceptual and therefore mediated by the social context. In Plato, "the good" (qualitative) replaces the Pythagorean "One" (quantitative) as the first principle.

There is no quantifiable insight which does not first receive its
meaning, its terminus ad quem [Latin: end-point], in the retranslation
into the qualitative.

Now the sentence at question:

The qualitative subject awaits the potential of its qualities in the thing, not its transcendental
residue, although the subject is strengthened solely thereto by means of restrictions based on the division of labor.

The subject awaits the qualities within itself, the thing, as sensations and feelings. The "transcendental residue" is what is left from that qualitative moment and communicated to the social context, thereby transcending the individual. The division of labour has produced certain restrictions which enhance this capacity of the subject to experience its own qualitative aspect, it's being an object amongst other objects.

Notice the next sentence:

The more meanwhile its own reactions are denounced as presumably merely subjective, the more the qualitative determinations in things escape cognition.

The qualitative moment is dismissed within the social context, as "subjective", and therefore is neglected and escapes cognition. This relates back to what he said about truth in "Privilege of experience".

The "capability of distinction" is a relation between the nonconceptual object, and the conceptual subject, within the individual person. It is a judgement the person carries out.

After this Adorno describes how Hegel misrepresented the individual consciousness as requiring the concept for its continuity. This he did from the intent of disempowering the individual spirit. And he proceeds to explain how the individual, being in its primary sense, an object, becomes a subject.

The qualitative moment is dismissed within the social context, as "subjective", and therefore is neglected and escapes cognition. This relates back to what he said about truth in "Privilege of experience" — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep.

The "capability of distinction" is a relation between the nonconceptual object, and the conceptual subject, within the individual person. It is a judgement the person carries out. — Metaphysician Undercover

Although I obviously don’t think this relation itself is “within the individual person,” it’s true that Adorno is interested, in the introduction, in intellectual experience, so the precise way that the philosophical subject relates to the object is the main focus at this stage. So I think we probably agree on at least this: that he wants to see subjective qualitative judgement make a comeback.

Although I obviously don’t think this relation itself is “within the individual person,” it’s true that Adorno is interested, in the introduction, in intellectual experience, so the precise way that the philosophical subject relates to the object is the main focus at this stage. So I think we probably agree on at least this: that he wants to see subjective qualitative judgement make a comeback. — Jamal

We are essentially in agreement, other than some fine details about word usage which creates the appearance of inconsistency to me. The principal dispute I have is concerning your desire to portray the state, or society in general, as "objective". This I believe derives from Hegel's representing the state as the evolution of the Idea, which he bases in absolute Spirit. So that form of "objectivity" which is based in absolute Spirit, and consisting of concepts and ideology, is really in truth, subjective because these are evolving aspects of the subject rather than having an eternal base of absolute Spirit.

So Adorno is showing that we should really base "the object" in the opposite pole, the experience of the individual, and this pays respect to the spirit of the individual, as objective, instead of the absolute Spirit which is a theologically based falsity, for him. But now with your usage, we have a duality of "objective", which is confusing and may produce ambiguity, equivocation, and mislead us, even though your usage is the conventional, as derived from Hegelian ideology.

Think of the "object" as the grounding, what objectifies or substantiates the philosophy. Hegel has the false ground of idealism, absolute spirit, which when analyzed produces the infinite regress of bottomlessness. So we need to follow Marx's lead, and flip things over, putting the ground in the individual, making the individual an object with relations to other objects. This provides a true ground, for true objectivity.

I'm glad we found some agreement MU.

However, I don't know what to say about the other stuff. You didn't like what I had to say before, but now you're bringing it up again. I fear that if I respond, you'll complain that I'm lecturing you again. Ultimately, I agree that subjects are also objects, but the rest of your interpretation of "the object" makes little sense to me, and since trying to address it before was counter-productive and thus even worse than a waste of time, I'm not willing to engage with it any more.

Before anyone cuts me off with heavy criticism, I'll go a bit further to explain the need for the turn around. Plato exposed this need with "the good". The guiding principle is always intention, and this produces another sense of "object" or "objective", the goal. If we base the state in the abstract Idea, absolute Spirit, then the guiding intention is equivalent to the will of God. But we have no access to God's intention, so we haven't a clue as to what the true objective (goal) is. When we flip things around, then we have the intent of individual human beings to deal with, as what guides us. Since we have no access to God's intent it cannot be what guides us, but I have access to my own intent, so this must be what guides me, rather than God's intent.

I'm not willing to engage with it any more. — Jamal

That's good. We'll just continue, I'll speak my words, you speak yours. When we clash we clash, so be it.

On the other hand...

In an introduction to Adorno's essay, "Subject and Object," Ruth Groff succinctly summarizes his view:

Subject and object cannot be pried apart, he insists. To begin with, subjects are always and only embodied: there is no such thing as a subject that is not also an object. Transcendental subjectivity itself therefore turns out to presuppose material objects that are not themselves synthesized a priori by pure reason. For if there were no such objects, there would be no bearers of reason to do the synthesizing. Admittedly, there exist objects that are not subjects—and in this respect the relationship between subject and object is a-symmetrical. Adorno famously refers to this a-symmetry as the “primacy of the object.” But of the objects that are not subjects, many are artifacts that are made by subjects. Moreover—and more important for Adorno—any object that is an object for a subject is thereby directly mediated, for the subject, by the socially-mediated subjectivity that is his or her embodied consciousness. Even if one does not want to go as far as Kant does in the Critique of Pure Reason in saying that it is transcendental subjectivity that constitutes phenomenal objects as objects, nevertheless it would seem to be that, for subjects, there is no access to objects that bypasses subjectivity. Indeed, the very concept of pure materiality presupposes a subject to conceive it. In Negative Dialectics, Adorno suggests that the most basic epistemic challenge is to ensure that the unavoidable mediation of objects by subjects, in our experience of them, does as little damage as possible. — Frankfurt School Writings on Epistemology, Ontology, and Method

Assuming this is correct (I think it is), am I wrong in thinking it might help us get past our current impasse?

I'm always open to adjust my view point as I read the text further, and often forces me to reread. So I don't know if we can get past the impasse at this point. How my understanding stands right now, I agree with the first part of your quoted secondary reference, all subjects are objects. However, when the subject views oneself as an object, "subjectivity" becomes an ambiguous term, because it doesn't distinguish between the person as an object and the person as a subject. Then, the part of the person, which the person understands through reflection on oneself as an object, e.g. feelings and qualitative value judgements, are said to be "subjective", while things that the person as a subject understands, mathematical judgements etc., are said to be objective. So this is reverse of what the person sees in oneself as an object.

My interpretation of what I've read so far of ND indicates to me that Adorno is assigning priority to the objective (nonconceptual) aspect of the human person )feelings sensations), as immediate to the person, and the conceptual as mediated through societal justification of the concepts, e.g. ideology and education. I provided the quotes to support that interpretation, and it is further supported by his claims that the qualitative (nonconceptual sensations) are prior to, and underlying, the quantitative (mathematics). We do not need to agree on this.

But notice that Adorno singles out the philosopher, just like Plato's cave allegory, as an individual who sees beyond the conventional, or traditional ideology, which the sheep (Adorno), or cave dwellers (Plato) accept. In both cases, for some reason it is incumbent on the philosopher to open the eyes of the others.

In the Privilege of Experience:

To those who have had the undeserved good fortune to not be
completely adjusted in their inner intellectual composition to the
prevailing norms – a stroke of luck, which they often enough have to
pay for in terms of their relationship to the immediate environment –
it is incumbent to make the moralistic and, as it were, representative
effort to express what the majority, for whom they say it, are not
capable of seeing or, to do justice to reality, will not allow themselves
to see.

In Quality and the Individuated:

The Party is supposed to
have a cognitive power a priori superior to that of every individual
solely due to the number of its members, even if it is terrorized or
blinded.
The isolated individual [Individuum] however,
unencumbered by the ukase, may at times perceive the objectivity more
clearly than a collective, which in any case is only the ideology of its
committees.