Also, I tried starting ND today.

I can see what you mean @Jamal about how the difficulty has gone up a few notches. I've had to reread several sentences just due to the sheer number of pronouns, and the parts that I've understood so far are only because we've gone over them in the lectures prior -- so I'm glad we started with something to at least give me some footholds into the material!

Yeah, I've read the prologue and a page or two of the introduction and it just doesn't feel like a good translation. I have no way of knowing if it is or not, but it just feels like it isn't.

Because Minima Moralia shows that he's actually a great writer, suggesting it's the different translators that make the difference.

On the other hand, an Adorno scholar I was reading recently (can't recall which one) said that MM is his best work in terms of prose quality, and ND is not so good.

So I don't know. I think I can get used to it, and it's not as difficult as some other stuff I've read, but I might have a look at the original English translation by Ashton to see if it reads any better (but even if it does this doesn't mean it's as accurate)

but there's still this element of desire as a lack that I generally think is a common but wrong way to think on happiness since I don't think happiness is something that even can be fulfilled or pursued so much as worked towards by stopping doing what we think will make us happy and starting doing what will actually make us happy. But that's not as tragic as Adorno's philosophy — Moliere

That doesn't seem all that far from his view actually.

Okiedoke. Then it's just a wondering on my part where I'm not fully following everything.

Don't worry, I'm probably wrong.

:rofl: Well that's reassuring...

OK I think I've figured it out -- if you've ever just "felt suspicious" of an idea in a philosophical text I think that's it because I can't really pin something down in the text. And I probably "feel suspicious" just because I've thought about happiness a lot in my own thoughts so it's harder for me to disentangle my thinking on the topic because of emotional attachment to it, on a philosophical level.

I think I can get used to it, and it's not as difficult as some other stuff I've read, but I might have a look at the original English translation by Ashton to see if it reads any better (but even if it does this doesn't mean it's as accurate) — Jamal

I think I can get used to it too. And I prefer accuracy to readability.

The excessive use of pronouns reminds me of Norman Kemp Smith's translation of Kant. (could be a choice thing -- breaking out the German words that are compact into explicit English sentences which explicitly state, if repeatedly, the meaning)

It's not that subjectivity is just ideology, but that it's becoming ideology. He marks a contrast between the era in which the ideology of liberal humanism had something real, or emancipatory, about it; and the late twentieth century, in which it has been entirely hollowed out. My way of putting this was to say that ideology has become all-pervasive due to the total absorption of the masses into the system by means of bureaucracy, all-encompassing commodification, mass media and the culture industry. — Jamal

I agree with your interpretation, and the import of historicity, process, becoming, but Adorno leaves significant ambiguity for interpretations which are inconsistent with yours. Since he designates the structures of society as "essence", and the behaviour of individuals as "appearance", then we have to assign priority to ideology, as an essential aspect. This makes the actions of resistance, assigned to the philosopher, non essential, therefore not-necessary, and free in that sense. So freedom of the individual is derived from breaking out of, or resisting ideology, but this has necessitated a response from the ideology, which has turned this freedom into an ideology itself. The idea of the freedom of the subject, as an individual distinct from society, has evolved from being speculative philosophy to being an ideological therefore essential aspect of society.

Imagine that the speculative philosopher in the past, has dreamed up ways to resist, and be free from the oppression of ideology. Then these speculative theories are accepted by others, until what was once speculation becomes itself ideology. This is why he rejects such philosophy as shallow. It's not speculative anymore, as such subjects were when they were newly speculated, it's just mimicking the prevailing ideology now. It's old hat, and that philosophy is now a matter of following ideology, rather than resisting it, even though it might bare the name of being new and innovative, "deep", because it was given that name when it was such.

He is not lending support to the abolition of human beings (in the sense of human subjectivity), but to the claim that human beings are being abolished. He doesn't mean he thinks it's a good thing; he means that we should not not be afraid to point it out. — Jamal

I believe that the ambiguity mentioned above, could allow the interpretation that he is lending support to the abolition of human beings, and I think that is the proper interpretation, what is intended by the author.. I suspect that this is where he turns things around, in a lecture which is rather twisted. First, it is fact, by the objective essence of societal structure, that the individuality of the human being is supported by the ideology of that structure. This is what our society has come to. The philosopher's position is one of resistance to the prevailing ideology of society, resist the essence. If the ideology is one which prioritizes the human being, then to resist this, is to negate it with the abolition of the human being. So I interpret Adorno as actually promoting the abolition of human beings.

"If anyone objects that I am lending support to the claim that in a sense
this would mean the abolition of human beings, I can only reply by
saying in good American: that’s just too bad.'

Notice, "that's just too bad" in this context, means something like 'tough luck for you, that's what I'm doing, and you won't be stopping me'. And he explains, this idea of abolition is not itself inhumane, but it is the conditions which produce it which are. Then he makes those remarks about people who "find such statements uncomfortable". Philosophers ought not reject such ideas outright, but understand them, and "incorporate such statements into their way of seeing things and where possible making use of them to arrive at a correct form of practice."

So, the "abolition of human beings" is not metaphorical, it's a speculative principle, proposed as possibly something to be pursued in practice. And, it's an example of philosophy which is very deep. We'll find that this principle is well supported by both science and theology, so it makes a good candidate for secular theology. Science has shown us the reality of evolution, and we can tunderstand the reign of humanity as just a passing phase in the evolutionary process. Further, sciences such as genetic manipulation, and perhaps AI, may bring such an abolition into the range of practicality. And theology, with its principle of a being greater than the human being (God), has long emphasized human weakness, and the deficiencies of the human intellect. So the abolition of human beings, as a deep philosophy has much support.

Here's a sort of example. In ancient philosophy, the human species is referred to as "man". Aristotle defined "man" as rational animal. It wasn't until the Latin greats, Aquinas and the scholastics, that "man" was replaced by "human being". This is actually a significant difference marked by a better understanding of our position in the universe. Most people do not see this as significant, but in actuality "man", the rational animal, was sort of abolished as inappropriate for the newer beings who wanted to distance themselves from the old. This allowed them to escape the traps of established ideologies. After abolishing "man", and creating this new identity for themselves, "human being", they were able to revisit the old, "man", as superior to man, and reject foundational certainties (Wittgenstein's bedrock) which man believed, but were found after this rejection, to be false and misleading. A specific example is the nature of the solar system, and the cosmos in general.

Since he designates the structures of society as "essence", and the behaviour of individuals as "appearance", then we have to assign priority to ideology, as an essential aspect. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand this interpretation of ideology as essence, since it undermines his whole point about breaking through the facade:

In other words, the sphere of immediacy that we are all concerned with in the first instance, and which we are accordingly tempted to regard as a matter of absolute certainty, is actually the realm of the mediated, the derived and the merely apparent, and hence of uncertainty. On the other hand, however, this appearance is also necessary, that is to say, it lies in the nature of society to produce the contents of the minds of human beings, just as it is the nature of society to ensure that they are blind to the fact that they mistake what is mediated and determined for actuality or the property of their freedom, and treat them as absolutes. It follows that since the immediate consciousness of human beings is a socially necessary illusion, it is in great measure ideology. — p100

On one side he has “the nature of society” and on the other side “the contents of the minds of human beings”. Essence and appearance, respectively. (That’s too static and dichotomous a formula, but you get the idea)

This makes the actions of resistance, assigned to the philosopher, non essential, therefore not-necessary, and free in that sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Non-essential to not-necessary looks like a non-sequitur. Adorno seems to me to say explicitly that the appearances are necessary (“socially necessary illusion”).

But maybe I’m misunderstanding you.

Notice, "that's just too bad" in this context, means something like 'tough luck for you, that's what I'm doing, and you won't be stopping me'. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, and what he’s doing is claiming that, in a sense, human beings are being abolished. I don't see any support for the interpretation that he is promoting the abolition itself. It’s not “human beings are being abolished, and that's tough luck,” but rather “I’m claiming that human beings are being abolished, and that's tough luck.”

That said, some have interpreted Adorno generally as an anti-humanist along the lines of Althusser. In my view, all of his supposed anti-humanism is critique of the ideology of humanism, and he retains a negative humanism, along the lines of his negative utopia and negative happiness. That is, the capacity of the subject to resist ideology remains.

I think I can get used to it too. And I prefer accuracy to readability. — Moliere

Yes, me too.

I find myself conflicted often with his various remarks on happiness, and ideology, and especially the use of the term "bleating" -- reminds me of Nietzsche's disdain for the herd. — Moliere

I know what you mean about “bleating,” but with Adorno it definitely isn't disdain for the herd, at least not in this case:

By bleating I don’t just mean the cry of ‘Yeah! Yeah!’9 The latter, I would say, is an open and, if I may call it that, a relatively self-aware form of bleating, and as such is comparatively innocent. I am thinking rather of resistance to all those disguised and more dangerous forms of bleating of which I hope I have given you a few examples in my Jargon of Authenticity. — p107

So the bleaters are Heidegger, religious existentialists, and romantic conservatives.

I often make a distinction between elitism and snobbery, such that elitism is in a sense democratic (high art and philosophy is open to whoever is interested) and snobbery is bigoted and essentialist (those Others are constitutively unable to partake in high art and great philosophy). According to this scheme, I see Adorno as an elitist, but not a snob.

So where he seems to be disdainful of what is popular — not here particularly, but definitely in other places — it’s out of an elitism that works as a kind of sympathy for the benighted and suffering masses.

EDIT: The endnote for “Yeah! Yeah!” reveals that he said it in English, suggesting he was mockingly alluding to the American habit of relentless affirmation and cheerleading. No doubt this really got on his nerves and factored into his elitism, but even so, he says it’s comparatively innocent, so he’s not overflowing with contempt, Nietzsche-style.

OK, that helps me understand better.

It occurred to me that his attitude can also be seen in the idea of a culture industry: the target is not "mass culture," which might imply a culture native to and produced by the masses, but rather a top-down industry assimilating the leisure, thoughts and desires of the masses.

Right -- I think expressions of elitism automatically incur some kind of disdain from me, but you're pointing out significant differences.

I wouldn't expect such language to go down well in a union hall, though :D I can hear the jeers already...

Looking over Lecture 10 again I can see these are just my little prejudices getting in the way. The real thrust of Lecture 10 is what resistance is, and all the prior examples are him trying to outline what it is not in order to get at what it is.

There we go. If that sounds right I think it all clicked for me finally.

I think expressions of elitism automatically incur some kind of disdain from me — Moliere

Then I suggest you avoid what he says about movies and jazz :grin:

Unless you really hate movies and jazz. Me, I think he just got it wrong, and didn't really know what he was talking about. Or, more charitably, he was talking about the most commercial stuff of the 30s through to the 50s and wasn't aware of the rest.

Heh. I've heard. In fact I think I've put off reading him so long probably because I heard he disliked Jazz, at which point I thought "No man could be a good thinker and dislike Jazz" :D -- so petty.

There we go. If that sounds right I think it all clicked for me finally. — Moliere

Yes, sounds right. Although Adorno would no doubt caution you against being satisfied with anything clicking into place.

Heh, fair.

but I want it to...

Heh. I've heard. In fact I think I've put off reading him so long probably because I heard he disliked Jazz, at which point I thought "No man could be a good thinker and dislike Jazz" — Moliere

Yeah I haven't even read his writing on jazz and only know about it from secondary sources. I've probably avoided it for similar reasons as you. But I seem to be able to compartmentalize his thought and pick and choose.

It's a good thing. I'm glad to have you reading along to help me realize where I'm getting lost on garden paths.

The blind leading the blind? :wink:

I used to think so too, but now I’m not so sure. Is one pointing at the same thing when one says it's unsayable as when one says that concepts are distorting it by the exclusion of particularity? One is pointing at the unrepresentable, while the other is pointing at the misrepresented. The former is transcendental, the latter is immanent. So their differing views on what to do about it can be seen as presuming different ontologies, i.e., a different "it".

Take the example of pain. Adorno would say that the pain scale does conceptual violence to pain by reducing particular suffering to numbers—the pain as experienced is nonidentical with pain as measured (this is not to say he was against its use in medicine). But Wittgenstein would not say that pain is unsayable or mystical; that one cannot “say” one's private experience is unproblematic, because that's not what language does.

I’ve alluded in this post to both early and late Wittgenstein without distinguishing them. It might matter but I’m not sure. — Jamal

Yes, you are right, I think I misspoke when I said "same" or "similar", hmm "closely related" might be more appropriate, as this is ambiguous enough to leave room for interpretation and representation.

I am attempting a syncretism of various quite different schools of thought, the result of which is, more than often, dubious, not to say ridiculous.

Nonetheless, I didn't have pain in mind, or other such private and subjective experiences, but was alluding to the original concepts from the TLP, like values, beauty, meaning, the sense of the world as a whole. Are these misrepresented or unrepresentable? More importantly, what happens if we lump them into the same category as pain?

If we ask, "oh, but what is pain", LateW would tell us: "don't ask 'is' questions, see how pain is being employed in context". But if we try to divide pain into different kinds, then we could say there are 3 kinds of pain: physical, psychological and intellectual (Or maybe a 4th - as existential). I take it that identity thinking is when an experienced pain in each kind is being reduced to a measure or number. Even worse, when pains from different kinds are mixed together in the one and same concept of Pain. This reduction of pain, and thereby reality itself, to a system, fails to do (it) justice. And with no justice, there can be no vindication, for anyone or anything. And Lord Pain goes on laughing in our face.

But is it identity thinking when an unspeakable tooth- or heartache, is treated the same as matters of beauty, by virtue of their common unspeakability?

I don't understand this interpretation of ideology as essence, since it undermines his whole point about breaking through the facade: — Jamal

It's actually a very subtle difference of interpretation, with significant consequences. First, consider all those different connotations of "ideology" which you provided. Think about things like " a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class". Now, do you consider ideology to be a feature of the individual human being's mind (subjective), or do you consider it to be a feature of a specific society (objective)? I think you will accept the latter.

Further, the following phrase is easy to pass over, but really needs to be seriously considered: "the distinction between essence and appearance is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is real". That line sets the context, of the distinction between what is real (the true essence) as the social constructs, and what is appearance, as metaphysical speculation. Don't forget though, that what he is promoting, is metaphysical speculation. Not any speculation, but that which is "deep", as opposed to shallow. So he is promoting an aspect of appearance (metaphysical speculation), which extends right to the essence, by being deep. This would be the boundary, where our metaphysical speculations about where the boundary lies, do not always line up exactly with the real boundary. And so it is with ideology itself, it may not itself be properly representative. And that's where the facade comes in, where ideology misleads the subjects.

Then he exposes the common misunderstanding between the immediate and the mediate. This common misunderstanding places behaviour of the subjects as immediate. This is because we see ourselves as acting subjects, interacting with others, and the empirical experience of human subjects is prioritized. So this behaviour is perceived as immediate, and the structure of society is apprehended as something which develops from these subjective interactions, therefore the social structure is understood as mediated by the interactions of the subjects. That is the illusion. Adorno proposes that a proper understanding requires that we turn this around, and we see social structure as the immediate, and the interactions of the subjects as the mediated. This puts priority onto the social structure, making it the cause of subjective interactions.

In the traditional, classical hierarchy, the immediacy of the state is easier to understand, because God is placed at the top, higher than the state. Then the ruling class, clergy and aristocracy, with their ideologies, are immediate to God. So the subjects are mediated. The modern society removes God, but this leaves no principles to support the superiority of society, or the sate over the subjects, so priority must be handed to the individual. Marxism does this, it makes the purpose of the state to serve the needs of the individual. And it does this by removing God, so that the priority is no longer that the individual serves God through the state, in the state's immediacy with God. Without God, the relation between state and individual is reversed, because the state no longer has the claim of closeness to God, required to maintain its priority over the subjects, and so there is nothing left but to prioritize the individual.

Now, since human subjects act with intent, ideas and goals, and this intent guides their actions, we need to interpret "ideology", (which shapes these intentions), as the immediate, a property of the social structure, which shapes and forms the intentions of individual subjects, making their behaviour a representation (as appearance) of the underlying essence, which is the society itself, with its ideology. I suggest you read the following very carefully, and apprehend what he is actually saying. This is representative of Plato's "noble lie". Notice that society produces the illusion of "the immediate consciousness of the human being", and for reasons unexplained, this is said to be a necessity for society. That is ideology.

On the other hand, however, this appearance is also necessary,
that is to say, it lies in the nature of society to produce the contents of the
minds of human beings, just as it is the nature of society to ensure
that they are blind to the fact that they mistake what is mediated and
determined for actuality or the property of their freedom, and treat
them as absolutes. It follows that since the immediate consciousness
of human beings is a socially necessary illusion, it is in great measure
ideology. — p100

So all that is just a sort of preamble, a setting up of the context, or conditions for this idea, "the abolition of human beings". We have the following two important principles. Ideology has created the illusion of the immediacy of the human being, and philosophy resists ideology. Third, we can say that Adorno is promoting philosophy, and not just any philosophy, but deep philosophy. Now, we can approach his mention of "the abolition of human beings from that perspective. Please read the following passage thoroughly:

If anyone objects that I am lending support to the claim that in a sense
this would mean the abolition of human beings, I can only reply by
saying in good American: that’s just too bad. By this I mean that this
abolition is being brought about not by the inhumanity of the idea
that describes it, but by the inhumanity of the conditions to which
this idea refers. And if you will permit me to make a personal remark,
it seems to me very questionable for people to take offence at
statements that go against their own beliefs, however justified and
legitimate these beliefs may be, simply because they find such statements
uncomfortable – instead of attempting to incorporate such statements
into their way of seeing things and where possible making use of
them to arrive at a correct form of practice. — p100-101

What this passage means, is that if anyone objects to what he is dong, claiming that he supports the abolition of human beings, then that's just too bad (Indicated by the qualification of "good American" as —used in an ironic way to show that one is not sorry or does not feel bad about something).

Then, he goes on with a "personal remark", about people who "take offence at statements that go against their own beliefs", simply because the statements make them "uncomfortable". He says it is "very questionable" that they take offense in this way, instead of attempting to include such statements into their own perspective, and try using such statements in their own practice.

Yes, and what he’s doing is claiming that, in a sense, human beings are being abolished. I don't see any support for the interpretation that he is promoting the abolition itself. It’s not “human beings are being abolished, and that's tough luck,” but rather “I’m claiming that human beings are being abolished, and that's tough luck.” — Jamal

What he is saying is neither "human beings are being abolished", nor "I'm claiming that human beings are being abolished". He is proposing a deep speculative philosophy that resists the current ideology which prioritizes individual human beings, and that proposal is an approach to the necessary abolition of human beings. And if this makes you feel uncomfortable, well that's just too bad. You ought to instead, consider the truth of his principles, and work with them to be consistent with your principles, and make them conducive to your own practices. Consider for example, that if human beings are inherently evil, then the abolition of them is the rational choice.

Nice interpretation, very subtle and deep. The only defect I can see is that it's wrong.

I might elaborate later, although I fear I'd just be repeating myself. In a nutshell, first you reify what is meant to be dialectical and fail to see that both essence and appearance are mediated; and then you completely misread Adorno by saying he is "claiming that he supports the abolition of human beings," which flatly contradicts what he says.

Generally as you say I'm at an advantage because I had already read some Adorno before this started, so for what it's worth: unless I've been completely misunderstanding him the whole time, your interpretation couldn't possibly be true.

It's actually a very subtle difference of interpretation, with significant consequences. First, consider all those different connotations of "ideology" which you provided. Think about things like " a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class". Now, do you consider ideology to be a feature of the individual human being's mind (subjective), or do you consider it to be a feature of a specific society (objective)? I think you will accept the latter. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, it’s both, and anyway it doesn’t follow that Adorno puts ideology on the side of essence. It’s a feature of society, but he makes a distinction within society:

subjective modes of behaviour in modern societies are dependent on objective social structures — p100

Ideology is in the realm of "subjective modes of behaviour" as that which is produced by the objective social structures (again with the caveat that this is too static a picture, a shorthand for a dialectical process).

Further, the following phrase is easy to pass over, but really needs to be seriously considered: "the distinction between essence and appearance is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is real". That line sets the context, of the distinction between what is real (the true essence) as the social constructs, and what is appearance, as metaphysical speculation. — Metaphysician Undercover

My brain hurts.

He makes no such distinction "between what is real (the true essence) as the social constructs, and what is appearance, as metaphysical speculation."

I believe that it is one of the essential motifs ... of philosophy – that the distinction between essence and appearance is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is real.

By "real" he means actually operative in the world. He does not mean to align it merely with essence. And he is saying that if you do philosophy you should believe that there is a distinction between appearance and essence, that it is not just an artifact of the conceptual or linguistic paraphernalia of metaphysical speculation as claimed in various ways by phenomenologists, logical positivists, pragmatists, and ordinary language philosophers. He is alluding to contemporaneous philosophies, explicitly going against the fashion of collapsing or rejecting the distinction.

Don't forget though, that what he is promoting, is metaphysical speculation. Not any speculation, but that which is "deep", as opposed to shallow. So he is promoting an aspect of appearance (metaphysical speculation), which extends right to the essence, by being deep. This would be the boundary, where our metaphysical speculations about where the boundary lies, do not always line up exactly with the real boundary. And so it is with ideology itself, it may not itself be properly representative. And that's where the facade comes in, where ideology misleads the subjects. — Metaphysician Undercover

Adorno is not promoting metaphysical speculation; he mentions it in reference to the tradition of dogmatic metaphysics attacked by those 20th century philosophies I just mentioned. His position is ambivalent on metaphysics. What he says about Impressionist paintings is the key:

you need only to look at such a picture with what I would call a modicum of metaphysical sensitivity for the situation to become quite clear: you will perceive something like a certain absence of sensuous happiness, a certain melancholy of sensuous happiness arising out of the picture before you; or else the expression of mournfulness from a realm that presents itself as a sphere of pleasure; or else the endless tensions that exist between the world of technology and the residues of nature that technology has invaded. . . . All such problems are really metaphysical problems, and they will become readily visible in the greatest paintings by Manet, whom I regard as a metaphysical painter of the first rank, but equally in those of Cézanne or Claude Monet and some of Renoir’s. I think that something similar happens in philosophy too. Consider, for example, the way in which Nietzsche resists the positive introduction of any so-called metaphysical ideas. The violence with which his thought rejects such attempts shows much greater respect for metaphysical ideas than writings where they are celebrated in the style of the Wilhelminian commemorative speeches ... — p105

Thus he embraces metaphysics more in a negative sense than intended by the term "metaphysical speculation".

On the other hand, I don't really object to your conclusion in that paragraph.

Then he exposes the common misunderstanding between the immediate and the mediate. This common misunderstanding places behaviour of the subjects as immediate. This is because we see ourselves as acting subjects, interacting with others, and the empirical experience of human subjects is prioritized. So this behaviour is perceived as immediate, and the structure of society is apprehended as something which develops from these subjective interactions, therefore the social structure is understood as mediated by the interactions of the subjects. That is the illusion. Adorno proposes that a proper understanding requires that we turn this around, and we see social structure as the immediate, and the interactions of the subjects as the mediated. This puts priority onto the social structure, making it the cause of subjective interactions. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. As I say, they are each dialectically intertwined and mediated with and by the other. It sometimes seems that he goes along with the base-superstructure model in Marxist sociology, but the dialectical element is the crucial difference. There is no general priority (it depends what you're looking at).

As for the abolition of human beings, here is Adorno:

If anyone objects that I am lending support to the claim that in a sense this [human beings becoming ideology] would mean the abolition of human beings, I can only reply by saying in good American: that’s just too bad.

And here is you:

What this passage means, is that if anyone objects to what he is doing, claiming that he supports the abolition of human beings, then that's just too bad (Indicated by the qualification of "good American" as —used in an ironic way to show that one is not sorry or does not feel bad about something). — Metaphysician Undercover

He doesn't claim that he supports the abolition, but rather supports the claim of abolition.

And very generally, fascism and Stalinism engendered in Adorno (and Horkheimer) a strong antipathy to collectivism and the lack of real individuality, and I think your interpretation goes against that.

Yes, you are right, I think I misspoke when I said "same" or "similar", hmm "closely related" might be more appropriate, as this is ambiguous enough to leave room for interpretation and representation.

I am attempting a syncretism of various quite different schools of thought, the result of which is, more than often, dubious, not to say ridiculous.

Nonetheless, I didn't have pain in mind, or other such private and subjective experiences, but was alluding to the original concepts from the TLP, like values, beauty, meaning, the sense of the world as a whole. Are these misrepresented or unrepresentable? More importantly, what happens if we lump them into the same category as pain?

If we ask, "oh, but what is pain", LateW would tell us: "don't ask 'is' questions, see how pain is being employed in context". But if we try to divide pain into different kinds, then we could say there are 3 kinds of pain: physical, psychological and intellectual (Or maybe a 4th - as existential). I take it that identity thinking is when an experienced pain in each kind is being reduced to a measure or number. Even worse, when pains from different kinds are mixed together in the one and same concept of Pain. This reduction of pain, and thereby reality itself, to a system, fails to do (it) justice. And with no justice, there can be no vindication, for anyone or anything. And Lord Pain goes on laughing in our face.

But is it identity thinking when an unspeakable tooth- or heartache, is treated the same as matters of beauty, by virtue of their common unspeakability? — Pussycat

I applaud your effort but it looks like a stretch to me. No doubt there's much more to be said, so feel free, but I don't think I have anything else at this stage.

There's a type of activity, which is sort of passive, what Wittgenstein called idling. Wittgenstein criticized this, but he was wont to demonstrate in his use of words, what he criticized with the meaning of his words, in a sort of hypocritical way. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are saying that Wittgenstein was a hypocrite? That the famous "meaning is use" is invalid, not because there isn't a correspondence between meaning and use, but because Wittgenstein's true intention was hidden behind this principle?

Now, as much as Adorno calls thinking and theorizing an activity, simply thinking is really not doing anything. So Adorno seems to request a balance between the Marxist's call for action, and the logical requirement of theory. To avoid irrational acts we must make rationality into an act itself, so that it can qualify as virtuous. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure whether this is a correct assessment. First of all, I don't understand what it is you are saying here. What do irrational acts have to do with theory? It only makes sense to me if you mean that all actions are irrational.

As far as I understand, but of course I could be wrong, Adorno is saying that there are people whose thought system is deeply non-identical, like it is and feels natural for them, without much effort: these are the true artists. Adorno realizes that himself is no artist, for example he cannot write poetry or paint, however, he has a knack for theory. And so he wants to provide the theoretical framework.

Good morning Jamal, I see that you somewhat misunderstood what I wrote, so I'll clear up that aspect right away:

As for the abolition of human beings, here is Adorno:

If anyone objects that I am lending support to the claim that in a sense this [human beings becoming ideology] would mean the abolition of human beings, I can only reply by saying in good American: that’s just too bad.

And here is you:

What this passage means, is that if anyone objects to what he is doing, claiming that he supports the abolition of human beings, then that's just too bad (Indicated by the qualification of "good American" as —used in an ironic way to show that one is not sorry or does not feel bad about something).
— Metaphysician Undercover

He doesn't claim that he supports the abolition, but rather supports the claim of abolition. — Jamal

Oh, I see, I wasn't clear, and you misunderstood me. What I intended (meant), is that the person who objects, is claiming that Adorno supports the abolition of human beings, not that Adorno is claiming himself to support such.

In a nutshell, first you reify what is meant to be dialectical and fail to see that both essence and appearance are mediated — Jamal

Then what meaning do you give to the following?

I believe that it is one of the essential motifs,
I almost said one of the essential legitimating elements,
of philosophy – that the distinction between essence and appearance
is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is
real. — p100

Is he saying that the essential motif of philosophy, which takes the distinction between essence and appearance as real, is a mistaken motif? Then why does he say, or "almost" say that it is an essential legitimating element of philosophy?

Ideology is in the realm of "subjective modes of behaviour" as that which is produced by the objective social structures (again with the caveat that this is too static a picture, a shorthand for a dialectical process). — Jamal

This is clearly backward. Ideology is a feature of objective social structures, which produces subjective behaviour.

On the other hand, however, this appearance is also necessary, that is to
say, it lies in the nature of society to produce the contents of the
minds of human beings, just as it is the nature of society to ensure
that they are blind to the fact that they mistake what is mediated and
determined for actuality or the property of their freedom, and treat
them as absolutes. It follows that since the immediate consciousness
of human beings is a socially necessary illusion, it is in great measure
ideology. — p100

Look, "the immediate consciousness of human beings" is an illusion, a form of deception which is "socially necessary". The means for this deception is ideology, and since it is said to be socially necessary, the goal or end inheres within society itself, as an entity. Therefore it is society which is using this means called "ideology". It is not the human beings who are deceiving themselves in self-deception, it is society which is deceiving them with ideology. As I've been saying, it's a form of Plato's "noble lie".

By "real" he means actually operative in the world. He does not mean to align it merely with essence. And he is saying that if you do philosophy you should believe that there is a distinction between appearance and essence, that it is not just an artifact of the conceptual or linguistic paraphernalia of metaphysical speculation as claimed in various ways by phenomenologists, logical positivists, pragmatists, and ordinary language philosophers. He is alluding to contemporaneous philosophies, explicitly going against the fashion of collapsing or rejecting the distinction. — Jamal

In that context, where he is distinguishing between essence and appearance, he does not at all say what you are saying here. I believe you are reading into it, extra baggage, for the sake of supporting your preconceived ideas, which support your faulty interpretation.

In this context of LND, he is using the distinction of subject/society, to apply to the distincton of mediated/immediate, to elucidate the appearance/essence distinction, as something real, not merely metaphysical speculation. So, the behaviour of individuals is said (as a primary assumption) to be dependent on objective structures of society. This validates '"structures of society" as operative in the world, real. Then he proceeds to assert (which I'll mention, is without proper justification, which "God" serves as in theology) that these structures of society are actually immediate, rather than the behaviour of individuals. The idea that the behaviour of individuals is immediate is claimed to be an illusion produced by those structures of society which are operative in the world, and this illusion is claimed to be "socially necessary". (As I explained in the last post, this social necessity is produced by the removal of God). Then he assigns the name of "ideology" to these structures of society process create that illusion.

Thus he embraces metaphysics more in a negative sense than intended by the term "metaphysical speculation". — Jamal

He simply points out a specific inverse relation involved with metaphysics. When a philosopher expresses disdain for metaphysics, that person is actually demonstrating the highest regard for metaphysics. This can manifest in many ways, even to the extent of the hypocrisy of Wittgenstein which I mentioned. So for Adorno, it appears like metaphysical speculation is this process, negative dialectics, within which metaphysics is criticized. It's a twist in the matter of "taking things seriously" (and this reflects back on "that's just too bad"). To simply praise something creates the illusion that you take it seriously, when in reality you are just going with the flow, and not taking any time to understand it. To criticize it requires that you actually take it seriously.

We could say, then, that an essential aspect of the concept of depth
is that the insistence on the idea of depth negates the average traditional manifestation of it. — p106

You are saying that Wittgenstein was a hypocrite? That the famous "meaning is use" is invalid, not because there isn't a correspondence between meaning and use, but because Wittgenstein's true intention was hidden behind this principle? — Pussycat

There is more to meaning than simple use. That is exemplified by ambiguity. The person who speaks, or writes, is the user of the words, and proper "use" is attributable to the author's purpose. The audience however must interpret, and this itself is an assignment of "meaning". This assignment of meaning s not a matter of "use". it is what Adorno would call a mediated act, whereby the immediate would be the social structures which trained the individual to interpret the way that one does.

What do irrational acts have to do with theory? — Pussycat

Theory is rational. It is through the means of theory that we avoid irrational acts.

As far as I understand, but of course I could be wrong, Adorno is saying that there are people whose thought system is deeply non-identical, like it is and feels natural for them, without much effort: these are the true artists. Adorno realizes that himself is no artist, for example he cannot write poetry or paint, however, he has a knack for theory. And so he wants to provide the theoretical framework. — Pussycat

I see no problem with this. And, think that it s likely that the non-identical here is the irrational.