Good morning MU.

Oh, I see, I wasn't clear, and you misunderstood me. What I intended (meant), is that the person who objects, is claiming that Adorno supports the abolition of human beings, not that Adorno is claiming himself to support such. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh right. Well, I disagree with that too, but it's less important so I'll leave it there. :grin:

In that context, where he is distinguishing between essence and appearance, he does not at all say what you are saying here. I believe you are reading into it, extra baggage, for the sake of supporting your preconceived ideas, which support your faulty interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You won't be surprised to learn that I think that's exactly what you are doing. My interpretation is backed up indirectly by what he says on page 102:

And it was not by chance that this took the form of the distinction between essence and appearance. That distinction of course is almost universally disputed nowadays. ... However, I regard this attempt to deny the distinction between appearance and essence as the arch-ideology because it compels us to accept that the phenomena are just as they appear, since there is nothing else behind
them.

"Disputed nowadays" by contemporary philosophers. So I'm not just making things up to suit my secret agenda. I'm reconstructing his view as best I can, based on the lecture, the other lectures, and other stuff of his I've read.

Then what meaning do you give to the following? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see any conflict.

Is he saying that the essential motif of philosophy, which takes the distinction between essence and appearance as real, is a mistaken motif? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. It doesn't follow that he's promoting metaphysical speculation in the sense he is using the term.

Look, "the immediate consciousness of human beings" is an illusion, a form of deception which is "socially necessary". The means for this deception is ideology, and since it is said to be socially necessary, the goal or end inheres within society itself, as an entity. Therefore it is society which is using this means called "ideology". It is not the human beings who are deceiving themselves in self-deception, it is society which is deceiving them with ideology. As I've been saying, it's a form of Plato's "noble lie". — Metaphysician Undercover

You describe it as intentional deception, but it's systemic, and is in fact also reciprocal. Plato's noble lie only half fits.

I find the rest of what you say unconvincing. I believe it's a misinterpretation, but I think I've said enough about it.

I have just a few last remarks before we leave this difference of interpretation, which may not be substantial anyway. It appears to me, like the difference is based in you attributing ideology to the subjective mind of the individual, and I attributing ideology to the objective social structure. The issue is "the facade". We agree that the facade is an aspect of appearance, beliefs in the minds of human subjects. Where we disagree is on the method required to break through the facade. I understand, that since ideology is an attribute of social structure, and ideology produces these beliefs, Adorno is promoting a resistance to the prevailing social structure, which may even be characterized as the abolition of human beings. You reject this, and seem to think that there is another way to break through this facade of human belief, but I do not understand what you are proposing.


Here's something from p 101 to consider:

This at any rate is what I understand by speculation:
it is hostility towards the ideological as an alternative to resigning
oneself simply to establishing facts, in very marked contrast to the
habits of a science based on such a statement of facts – while the
prevailing habit of thought is of course to conflate speculation and
ideology.

.

My interpretation is backed up indirectly by what he says on page 102: — Jamal

I don't see how 102 supports your interpretation. He says, that the attempt to deny the distinction between appearance and essence is the arch-ideology. And he says this right after he describes philosophy as resistance to ideology. So as much as the distinction between appearance and essence is commonly disputed, this is exactly the arch-ideology which deep philosophy must resist.

It doesn't follow that he's promoting metaphysical speculation in the sense he is using the term. — Jamal

How can you deny this? It is the conclusion of the lecture. He promotes "depth", and speculation is depth.

Thus the concept of depth always implies the distinction between
essence and appearance, today more than ever – and this explains
why I have linked my comments on depth to that distinction. That
concept of depth is undoubtedly connected to what I described to
you last time as the speculative element. I believe that without
speculation there is no such thing as depth.
— p 108

You describe it as intentional deception, but it's systemic, and is in fact also reciprocal. — Jamal

I think you misunderstand the meaning of "socially necessary illusion". This refers to an illusion which is needed by society. This necessity implies 'required for its ends'. Therefore it is intentional deception, just like a noble lie. It's an illusion which society needs, to fulfill its ends in its relation to its subjects.

I believe, that the reciprocation aspect is what actually makes it intentional. Ideology is produced from earlier speculation, but how it becomes ideology is questionable. There is either shallow acceptance in the form of innocent "bleating", or depth of further speculation, which is true resistance. The innocent "bleating" may be characterized as reciprocation, but it is described as a "self-aware form of bleating" therefore we can say it is intentional. And the more dangerous form of bleating, which he alludes to seems to be no less intentional. So I do not see how you escape "intentional deception".

The real problem is what I pointed to earlier. The supposed objective "society", or "social structures" is really a false objectivity. So the reality of ideology is based in this reciprocation. But reciprocation is actually nothing but human to human interactions, and when understood in this way, the supposed object, "society", is redundant. The object, society, is nothing but intersubjectivity.

On ideology in particular I think you're not seeing the forest for the trees, maybe because you're reading too much into some ambiguous comments in what is a fairly disorganized, improvised lecture. I also think you're not understanding my interpretation.

We agree that the facade is an aspect of appearance, beliefs in the minds of human subjects. Where we disagree is on the method required to break through the facade. I understand, that since ideology is an attribute of social structure, and ideology produces these beliefs, Adorno is promoting a resistance to the prevailing social structure, which may even be characterized as the abolition of human beings. You reject this, and seem to think that there is another way to break through this facade of human belief, but I do not understand what you are proposing. — Metaphysician Undercover

He is promoting resistance to ideology, i.e., to the beliefs produced by the social structure. This is also a form of resistance to the social structure itself, because if what you're doing is theory, your resistance to objective social conditions takes the form of resistance to their socially necessary illusions.

Rather than ideology producing the beliefs, a better basic understanding is: ideology is the beliefs.

It seems quite clear that depth and speculation in Adorno's hands are to be wielded in the immanent critique of ideology. But I can't quite tell what you disagree with here.

I don't see how 102 supports your interpretation. He says, that the attempt to deny the distinction between appearance and essence is the arch-ideology. And he says this right after he describes philosophy as resistance to ideology. So as much as the distinction between appearance and essence is commonly disputed, this is exactly the arch-ideology which deep philosophy must resist. — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn't follow that he's promoting metaphysical speculation in the sense he is using the term. — Jamal

How can you deny this? It is the conclusion of the lecture. He promotes "depth", and speculation is depth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I explained it already. Here you are conflating speculation and metaphysical speculation. I agree that he is promoting depth and a kind of speculation, but when he says that the distinction between appearance and essence is not just a product of metaphysical speculation, he means to oppose the more common position in the twentieth century that the distinction is metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. Note that it doesn't follow from this that he is 100% on board with metaphysical speculation, since by this he is referring vaguely towards the targets of contemporary sceptics of the distinction, targets like German idealism and earlier kinds of metaphysics like Leibniz. In other words dogmatic metaphysics. But I've forgotten why we're arguing about this.

I think you misunderstand the meaning of "socially necessary illusion". This refers to an illusion which is needed by society. This necessity implies 'required for its ends'. Therefore it is intentional deception, just like a noble lie. It's an illusion which society needs, to fulfill its ends in its relation to its subjects. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a non-sequitur. You can't get from the structural necessity of ideology, which is what "socially necessary illusion" refers to—you can't get from that to intentional deception without some additional premises. Also, I'm not sure just how literally you intend your "intentional" to be understood. Plato's noble lie is a lie and not just a falsehood because it is known to be untrue by the elite rulers who promote it. It is an intentional deception on the part of certain people. Are you suggesting that Adorno thinks there is such a conspiracy in capitalism? If so, you're misunderstanding him and the tradition he comes out of. (No doubt some Marxists have a tendency to talk in terms of elite conspiracies, but that's loose talk at best, vulgar misunderstanding at worst).

I believe, that the reciprocation aspect is what actually makes it intentional. Ideology is produced from earlier speculation, but how it becomes ideology is questionable. There is either shallow acceptance in the form of innocent "bleating", or depth of further speculation, which is true resistance. The innocent "bleating" may be characterized as reciprocation, but it is described as a "self-aware form of bleating" therefore we can say it is intentional. And the more dangerous form of bleating, which he alludes to seems to be no less intentional. So I do not see how you escape "intentional deception". — Metaphysician Undercover

I take this as an attempt to supply the missing steps in your argument that concludes with intentional deception, but I don't get it. How the comparitively innocent "Yeah! Yeah!" has become intentional deception in your mind I really can't tell. But then, I have so far not been able to work out what Adorno means with his "Yeah! Yeah!" comment, particularly the supposed fact that it is self-aware.

Generally I think you should keep in mind that rather than ideology being a product of speculation, it emerges out of material conditions. It's better to say that speculation is often a product of ideology, or that if it's not properly deep and speculative in Adorno's senses of those words, it just is ideology.

I see no problem with this. And, think that it s likely that the non-identical here is the irrational. — Metaphysician Undercover

In general, I am thinking of the non-identical more as the non-dominating aspect of nature, rather than the irrational.

@Metaphysician Undercover

But then, I have so far not been able to work out what Adorno means with his "Yeah! Yeah!" comment, particularly the supposed fact that it is self-aware. — Jamal

I'll try again.

By bleating I don’t just mean the cry of ‘Yeah! Yeah!’ The latter, I would say, is an open and, if I may call it that, a relatively self-aware form of bleating, and as such is comparatively innocent. I am thinking rather of resistance to all those disguised and more dangerous forms of bleating of which I hope I have given you a few examples in my Jargon of Authenticity. — p107

Ok, so the "Yeah! Yeah" refers to the enthusiastic affirmation of ideology, i.e., of prevailing beliefs like the superiority of capitalism or whatever, perhaps even conformist cheerleading in support of the government on specific issues. We can also think of employees chanting a corporate slogan.

Even if this is genuinely enthusiastic and heart-felt, it is self-aware in that the participants know what they're doing, to the extent that they know they are cheering on particular ideas. They probably do not know it is false or illusory, but they do know they are supporting a particular idea, conception of the situation, etc., and they don't pretend to be deep. But the philosophical bleaters targeted in The Jargon of Authenticity think they're doing something more profound and independent, when in fact they're merely riffing ideologically.

In neither case is there any intentional deception as far as I can see.

EDIT: Actually, there is a small space for intentional deception to get in there. I said the innocent bleaters "probably do not know it is false or illusory," which suggests that maybe sometimes some of them do. Certainly it's reasonable to believe that some of the cheerleaders know that the ideas they're cheering on are not quite true, that they prioritize the effectiveness of the ideas over their truth (this is obviously the case with a lot of deliberate propaganda, e.g., in times of war). But I don't think this is paradigmatic of ideology, and I think Adorno would say this makes it less ideological (in Minima Moralia I think he says fascism is less ideological than liberal capitalism).

There is more to meaning than simple use. That is exemplified by ambiguity. The person who speaks, or writes, is the user of the words, and proper "use" is attributable to the author's purpose. The audience however must interpret, and this itself is an assignment of "meaning". This assignment of meaning s not a matter of "use". it is what Adorno would call a mediated act, whereby the immediate would be the social structures which trained the individual to interpret the way that one does. — Metaphysician Undercover

Got it, I think! So instead of "meaning is use", you would replace it with "my meaning is my use", right?

But suppose there were indeed such a principle that would claim universality as to what meaning is, then I guess that would be a perfect example of identity thinking, as it would not fully represent the whole spectrum of meaning. Additionally, it could easily turn out to be and become totalitarian and dominative, strangulating other voices that think otherwise. Correct?

Rather than ideology producing the beliefs, a better basic understanding is: ideology is the beliefs. — Jamal

OK, so this difference of interpretation is rooted in the different ways that you and I apprehend "society". You have claimed that society is an object, and Adorno seems to accept this premise as well, with "objective social structures". And so Adorno sees society as essence (objective), and individuals as appearance (subjective).

Now, I do not see this separation of category, and my basic intuitive inclination is the opposite to this. I see things exactly the way that Adorno is critical of. I see society as an extension of human individuals, so that society might be called "inter-subjective" but this does not support the unity required for "object". This is what I explained at the beginning of this adventure, I have difficulty conceiving society as an object.

So, I make the attempt, to conceive of this object, society, with objective social structures, in order to read and properly understand the author. Accordingly, you should recognize that I have no basic principles (biases or prejudices) by which I would draw a boundary to distinguish properties of the object, society, from properties of the subjects, the human beings. So when Adorno says that this distinction between appearance and essence is real, that's just a subjective statement to me, and I continue to believe that all such distinctions are metaphysical efficacies. However, I have to accept this principle to understand the author, therefore I am prepared to apply it within his material, to determine whether he actually adheres to his own stated principles.

With respect to "ideology" then, I believe Adorno very clearly describes it as property of the object, society. To me, the entire object (society) is fictional, imaginary to begin with, so I have no problem with proceeding from this principle, to assign whatever fictional properties are required to understand this supposed object. You however, seemed to be inclined by "the reality" of the situation, and you cannot separate "ideology" from the beliefs of individual human beings, because that's what you believe is real. For me, I have already accepted what I consider a fictional object, "society", so I have no problem doing what Adorno proposes, and accepting ideology as a property of this fictional object. The critical point, for me, is that whether or not Adorno actually believes in this separation between human subject, and society as an object, is not relevant. What is relevant is that this is what he is proposing, for whatever reasons.

For you, you already accept this separation between human subject and society as an object, so the truth or reality of this is irrelevant to you as well, you accept it as a premise. However, Adorno uses a term, "ideology", which is very ambiguous, having many connotations, which allow it to cross the boundary, and refer sometimes to a property of the minds of subjects, and sometimes to a property of the object, society. And, since you already accept this boundary, between human subject and societal object, you already have a preconceived idea as to which side of the boundary this term applies, the subjective. Therefore you need to pay special attention, read very closely, to determine how Adorno is using the term, because if he is using it in a way which makes it refer to a property of the other side of the boundary, societal object (and I submit that he is), then to read it in the other way is a sort of equivocation.

Therefore I beg you please, consider the following: "it lies in the nature of society to produce the contents of the minds of human beings" -100. He does not explicitly define this as ideology, but do you not agree with me, that that this "nature of society to produce the content of human minds" is precisely "ideology"?

Well, I explained it already. Here you are conflating speculation and metaphysical speculation. I agree that he is promoting depth and a kind of speculation, but when he says that the distinction between appearance and essence is not just a product of metaphysical speculation, he means to oppose the more common position in the twentieth century that the distinction is metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. Note that it doesn't follow from this that he is 100% on board with metaphysical speculation, since by this he is referring vaguely towards the targets of contemporary sceptics of the distinction, targets like German idealism and earlier kinds of metaphysics like Leibniz. In other words dogmatic metaphysics. But I've forgotten why we're arguing about this. — Jamal

This is problematic. Adorno's claim that the distinction between essence and appearance is real, can simply be dismissed as itself metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. So he does not make any progress here with those metaphysicians like myself, who already deny that distinction. However, he appeals to people like yourself, who already accept a real categorical division between societal object, and human subject. But if you are in this position, of accepting this distinction, then you need to carry through with a complete understanding of what he proposes, and that is resistance to the societal object (as resistance to ideology).

The following is indicative and very powerful:

Resistance means refusing to allow the law
governing your own behaviour to be prescribed by the ostensible or
actual facts. In that sense resistance transcends the objects while
remaining closely in touch with them. — p 107

You can't get from the structural necessity of ideology, which is what "socially necessary illusion" refers to—you can't get from that to intentional deception without some additional premises. — Jamal

Aren't you just admitting here, that you actually believe that Adorno is using "ideology" to refer to a property of society? This statement clearly exposes the problem with the 'human subject/societal object' division. Once you put ideology into the 'societal object' category, as Adorno does, and you do here, then you separate it from intention, which is proper to the human subject. By doing this you separate it from moral value, leaving terms of moral reprehension like "intentional deception" as inapplicable.

Now, with that vague separation between moral human subject, and amoral societal object, immoral, blameworthy, intentional actions can be hidden as property of the amoral societal object. So you talk about "the structural necessity of ideology", but if this is a true objective necessity, distinct from human intention and moral value, how could a lowly human being, with subjective human values, ever obtain the authority to judge ideologies?

How the comparitively innocent "Yeah! Yeah!" has become intentional deception in your mind I really can't tell. — Jamal

Human actions are inherently intentional, and naivety, or claims of innocent 'going with the flow' (which leads to mob rule), do not absolve one from responsibility. If a human being rapes another, and "innocent" others are cheering, those "innocents" are actually complicit and not so innocent.

In neither case is there any intentional deception as far as I can see.

EDIT: Actually, there is a small space for intentional deception to get in there. I said the innocent bleaters "probably do not know it is false or illusory," which suggests that maybe sometimes some of them do. Certainly it's reasonable to believe that some of the cheerleaders know that the ideas they're cheering on are not quite true, that they prioritize the effectiveness of the ideas over their truth (this is obviously the case with a lot of deliberate propaganda, e.g., in times of war). But I don't think this is paradigmatic of ideology, and I think Adorno would say this makes it less ideological (in Minima Moralia I think he says fascism is less ideological than liberal capitalism). — Jamal

This is exactly the problem with the 'human subject/societal object' distinction, or 'division' I'd prefer to call it because it makes a categorical separation. The object, society, cannot have status of moral responsibility, because it cannot have intentionality, as explained above. The 'innocent onlookers' accept authority, having no status to judge principles of the society (ideologies), also alluded to above. The "bleating", Yeah! Yeah!, cannot be assigned the status of "unintentional", because then you allow that the individual acts of individual subjects are included into the amoral societal object. That would be analogous to saying that the democratic vote (the Yeah! Yeah!) is unintentional, whenever a voter didn't adequately understand the principles being voted for.

But suppose there were indeed such a principle that would claim universality as to what meaning is, then I guess that would be a perfect example of identity thinking, as it would not fully represent the whole spectrum of meaning. Additionally, it could easily turn out to be and become totalitarian and dominative, strangulating other voices that think otherwise. Correct? — Pussycat

Yes, I think that's the point. Such a principle of universality of "use" would necessarily be false, because actual use is inherently formed to match the uniqueness of the circumstances. So this would in a sense, misrepresent each particular instance of use, in order to fit it into the universal. That's representative of "identity thinking", which neglects aspects of the true identity of the individuals, in order to identify the individual conceptually.

I wonder what you think of the following quotation from his sociology lectures, a year or two later than the LND:

Last time I demonstrated in great detail that this concept [that of society] should be understood as a mediated and mediating relationship between individuals, and not as a mere agglomerate of individuals. Today, in my admittedly cursory remarks on Durkheim's concept of society, I pointed out that it is equally inappropriate to regard society as an absolute concept beyond individuals. It is neither the mere sum or agglomeration, or whatever you wish to call it, of individuals, nor something absolutely autonomous with regard to individuals. It always contains both these moments at the same time; it is realized only through individuals but, as the relationship between them, it cannot be reduced to them. On the other hand, it should not be seen as a pure, over-arching concept existing for itself. This fact, that it cannot be reduced to a succinct definition - either as a sum of individuals or as something existing, rather like an organism, in itself - but represents a kind of interaction between individuals and an autonomous objectivity which stands opposed to them, is the macrocosmic or, as it tends to be called today, the macrosociological model of a dialectical conception of society. It is dialectical in the strict sense - and here you can see very clearly why sociology must be conceived dialectically - because the concept of the mediation between the two opposed categories - individuals on one side and society on the other - is implicit in both. No individuals, that is, people existing as persons with their own claims and, above all, performing work, can exist except with regard to the society in which they live, any more than society can exist without its concept being mediated by the individuals composing it. For the process by which it is maintained is, of course, the process of life, of labour, of production and reproduction, which is kept in motion by the individuals socialized within the society. That is a very simple and - if you like - elementary example of what could be said to make it obligatory to adopt a dialectical approach to society. — Introduction to Sociology p38

Is this consistent with your interpretation or does it suggest an amended one? I'm thinking of course of your attribution of "separation" to Adorno (and me), and your either/or framework.

Yes, I think that's the point. Such a principle of universality of "use" would necessarily be false, because actual use is inherently formed to match the uniqueness of the circumstances. So this would in a sense, misrepresent each particular instance of use, in order to fit it into the universal. That's representative of "identity thinking", which neglects aspects of the true identity of the individuals, in order to identify the individual conceptually. — Metaphysician Undercover

Could we say that the above critique applies to all universal principles, irrespective of their content?

Now, as much as Adorno calls thinking and theorizing an activity, simply thinking is really not doing anything. So Adorno seems to request a balance between the Marxist's call for action, and the logical requirement of theory. To avoid irrational acts we must make rationality into an act itself, so that it can qualify as virtuous. — Metaphysician Undercover


I am not sure whether this is a correct assessment. First of all, I don't understand what it is you are saying here. What do irrational acts have to do with theory? It only makes sense to me if you mean that all actions are irrational.

As far as I understand, but of course I could be wrong, Adorno is saying that there are people whose thought system is deeply non-identical, like it is and feels natural for them, without much effort: these are the true artists. Adorno realizes that himself is no artist, for example he cannot write poetry or paint, however, he has a knack for theory. And so he wants to provide the theoretical framework. — Pussycat

After having read the SEP article on Adorno and more specifically this:

Principles of rational morality, as in Kant, are tailored to the self-reflection in which the modern autonomous subject engages, which simultaneously separates insight from action, exemplified, for Adorno, by Hamlet.

I have to say that for Adorno theory and praxis are two completely different things. Hamlet, deeply knowledgeable of the intricacies and perplexities of his situation, was still unable to decide on a proper action. And so it seems that, for Adorno, knowledge, even if complete, does not necessarily inform on action, this has to be treated separately, theoretically again. For example, the revolutionaries in his time looked up to him and expected him to lead the revolutionary movement against establishment. How must they have been disappointed, to say the least, when he decided to turn them down, only to lend a hand to established educational systems. So there is a difference between knowing and acting upon this knowledge, my guess is that Adorno anticipates this, and he will have a lot to say about that.

Is this consistent with your interpretation or does it suggest an amended one? I'm thinking of course of your attribution of "separation" to Adorno (and me), and your either/or framework. — Jamal

I would say that it is just a little but amended. And that is very easy to understand, because "society" is an extremely difficult and vague concept, generally shaped and adapted toward the purpose of the discussion, in general usage. That's much like all the connotations of "ideology" you listed. The concept "society" is similar to "God" in that way, it generally fills a gap in our understanding, so the concept at play, changes form depending on the context.

As for the separation, the subject/object distinction is significant, and I do not see how it can be anything other than a categorical distinction. If for example, there was a difference of degree between subjective and objective, such that if a subjective idea became well enough justified, it would become objective knowledge, this would allow both to be of the same category. However, I do not think that this is what we're talking about here with the distinction between moral human subjects, and the objective structures of society.

So the difference I see is that in the LND "society" has a place of priority over the human subject, whereas in this "Introduction to Sociology" there is more of a balanced and equal relation between the two. That society has a place of priority in LND is evident from the beginning of the exposé on p100. The relation between society and human subjects is brought up to exemplify that the distinction between essence and appearance is a real distinction, not just a distinction of metaphysical speculation. So here, that relation between society and human beings, must fit that mold, of a real distinction. We can of course maintain the possibility that Adorno's actual intention was to doubt, and criticize claims that the essence/appearance distinction is real, and something more than just speculative. However, he goes on in that exposé to explain "that subjective modes of behaviour in modern societies are dependent on objective social structures", and this implies that human behaviour is mediated rather than immediate. Then he goes on with "the nature of society"... "to produce the contents of the minds... to ensure that they are blind...". So he is describing society as something with this described nature.

In this passage, "Introduction to Sociology", "society" is given a slightly different concept. Instead of having priority over human individuals, "to produce...", "to ensure...", society is said to be a "relationship between individuals". I believe the description in LND is somewhat dismissed with "On the other hand, it should not be seen as a pure, over-arching concept existing for itself", and also with the dismissal of "something existing, rather like an organism, in itself ". Those phrases I feel are applicable to how society is described in LND, because it is described as a thing with a specific nature, but that is rejected here.

So in this passage, society is robbed of its thinghood (which it has in LND), and described as a type of relation. The two, individuals and society, are said to name opposing categories, but they aren't really opposing, though they are clearly distinct categories. Truly opposing terms are usually within the same category. And, I can see another problem which could develop. This way of describing "society" doesn't necessarily produce a whole. And if there is a whole, it needs another name. There is human beings, and there is relationships (society), but what is the whole in this model? Normally, we'd say that the whole itself, human beings and their relationships, is society, and this is why we think of society as an object. Now, Adorno says there is human beings, and there is their relationships (society), but we do not have a whole, what the unity of human beings and their relationships produces. The other description in LND is more conducive to a interpreting society as that whole, therefore a describable object with its "nature".

Any way the you approach it, understanding the concept "society" is not an easy task. And, I think it tends to be a shape shifting sort of thing, which takes it form from the context of usage.

I have to say that for Adorno theory and praxis are two completely different things. — Pussycat

I don't think so. In that lecture he explicitly said that he does not accept a clean separation between the two.

The best approach is to work out how LND and ItS can be consistent. Two comments of yours, one from your most recent post and the other from the previous one, stand out to me as possible obstacles along this path:

The relation between society and human subjects is brought up to exemplify that the distinction between essence and appearance is a real distinction, not just a distinction of metaphysical speculation. So here, that relation between society and human beings, must fit that mold, of a real distinction. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have claimed that society is an object, and Adorno seems to accept this premise as well, with "objective social structures". And so Adorno sees society as essence (objective), and individuals as appearance (subjective). — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not how Adorno's logic goes. Also note that the claim that society was an object was a strategic one in the context of the provisional but unavoidable use of the subject-object and concept-object polarities, such that "the object" is just that which is beyond the subject and which the subject directs its thought towards.

Specifically on society, it is better to think of society as the relation, the totality in which we can non-rigidly identify essence and appearance: social structures, modes and relations of production etc, on one side (essence); and beliefs on the other (appearance). If you force Adorno to say that society is essence and individuals are appearance, you are imposing your own framework, because Adorno says no such thing, and never would.

For Adorno—and I agree—society is not an autonomous object standing over individuals, but neither can it be dissolved into intersubjectivity as you propose.

Any way the you approach it, understanding the concept "society" is not an easy task. And, I think it tends to be a shape shifting sort of thing, which takes it form from the context of usage. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems to be a good way to think about it.

And that is very easy to understand, because "society" is an extremely difficult and vague concept, generally shaped and adapted toward the purpose of the discussion, in general usage — Metaphysician Undercover

One way to think of it in terms of needs. Think about the way we limit the freedom of individuals to protect society, as when we sanction theft. The needs of the individual thief threaten the well-being of society. On the other hand, if the well-being of society always trumps individual well-being, what's lost is creativity and innovation, which come from the dreams of individuals.

That's a way of seeing a spectrum with individuality as one pole and society as the other. Capitalism is heavily focused on the well-being of individuals, especially wrt freedom of the spirit. Capitalism says do whatever you want, there's no limit. There's theory that says no harm can come to society from individual greed, but though that theory is perennial, it's been shown over and over to be false.

We might imagine that collectivism would be the cure for all of mankind's ailments, but remembering that the spectrum is indivisible should be a warning about that.

The best approach is to work out how LND and ItS can be consistent. Two comments of yours, one from your most recent post and the other from the previous one, stand out to me as possible obstacles along this path: — Jamal

Sometimes, it is good to look specifically at inconsistencies. This I think, is "critical" analysis, and that approach helps to reveal the evolving aspects of an author's thought. We can oppose this approach (perhaps as the negative approach) with the one which looks for consistency (the positive approach). I think that this is a very good way of reading Plato for example, but it requires much study. So Plato is commonly divided into 3 phases. My interpretation is that he works hard to elucidate Pythagorean idealism in the first stage. In the process he notices the interaction problem, so he proposes "the good", and also a medium between body and intellect (tripartite soul), as a remedy. Then by his late period he is firmly rejecting Pythagorean idealism. The defective interpretation produces "Platonism" as a rendition of Pythagorean idealism, and attempt, through misinterpretation, to make late Plato consistent with the early.

I admit, that when I look at an author like Aristotle, what I look for is consistency from one work to the next. The principles he sets out in one work, when well understood, are applicable toward understanding another work. The works sort of build on each other, and Aristotle clearly started with some principles which he would adhere to throughout..

But maybe this difference is the difference between a negative dialectic (Plato), which criticizes and deconstructs, and a positive system-building type of philosophy (Aristotle).

This is not how Adorno's logic goes. — Jamal

In that example, in LND, he explicitly brings up sociology as a means of exemplifying the essence/appearance distinction, and the claim that it is a real distinction rather than just an artificial division produced by metaphysical speculation. With the use of this type of example however, we must be very careful to judge how well the example actually portrays the purported principle. With Plato, for example, he'll provide a principle, then an example to portray it, and I am sure that the example is intentionally chosen to disprove the principle. Plato doesn't draw the conclusion though, that the principle has been disproven, but leaves the reader to make that conclusion. So, the dialogue will read as if the example provides proof of the principle, but careful reading reveals the exact opposite. This may be the case here in Adorno's LND.

Notice how the example really twists and turns, with the immediacy of subjective behaviour being an illusion, and society producing the illusion as a necessity, and this being ideology. But, ultimately the subject, through deep speculation can resist that supposed "necessary" illusion. So really, what Adorno has done with that example, is proved that the essence/appearance distinction is not real, because "deep" speculation can overturn it. So he proceeds through the rest of the lecture speaking about philosophical resistance, and deep speculation, which actually would be impossible if that essence/appearance distinction was real.

Specifically on society, it is better to think of society as the relation, the totality in which we can non-rigidly identify essence and appearance: social structures, modes and relations of production etc, on one side (essence); and beliefs on the other (appearance). If you force Adorno to say that society is essence and individuals are appearance, you are imposing your own framework, because Adorno says no such thing, and never would. — Jamal

I believe this passage indicates that you and I are now consistent in our interpretations. In the above, I accept that what Adorno is really doing is demonstrating the falsity of the claim that the essence/appearance distinction is real, it is actually a product of metaphysical speculation. This is consistent with your claim of non-rigid identity. Further, I indicated that "society" is a sort of gap filling concept, used to fill lapses in our understanding, so we can pass over them with that word, without requiring that we actually understand what the word refers to, allowing the supposed concept of "society" to be a shape shifting form, determined by context. This is consist also with your determination of non-rigid identity.

The key to making our interpretations consistent (and this I believe is more important than trying to make Adorno consistent), is the recognition that when he says that within the "entire philosophical tradition", "that the distinction between essence and appearance is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is real", and he appeals to sociology to demonstrate this, what he is really doing is demonstrating the falsity of this principle. Then when he says that human beings are becoming ideology, this is not necessary, or essential, it may just be appearance, and therefore can be reversed without the need for the abolition of human beings.

what Adorno is really doing is demonstrating the falsity of the claim that the essence/appearance distinction is real — Metaphysician Undercover

The key to making our interpretations consistent (and this I believe is more important than trying to make Adorno consistent), is the recognition that when he says that within the "entire philosophical tradition", "that the distinction between essence and appearance is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is real", and he appeals to sociology to demonstrate this, what he is really doing is demonstrating the falsity of this principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then we'll have to carry on disagreeing. Adorno believes there are beliefs and ways of thinking that obscure underlying social relations, and uses appearance/essence to frame this. In other words, the distinction is real, meaning that it's not something merely dreamt up by metaphysicians. But we can think of this as a re-purposing of the distinction in a new, dialectical context (which probably goes for all of the binary distinctions he uses).

I'm just going to begin with the first section in trying to summarize what I'm understanding. It's thick enough that I'm having to slow down and type out things just to make sure I'm reading it correctly. Here's my attempt at the beginning section of the introduction -- and on paragraph four I've tried to describe my confusion:


On the Possibility of philosophy.
1. Theory is once again relevant.
2. The philosopher has been overshadowed by the engineer – the engineer has demonstrated to the world positive cognition just at the moment philosophers turned on their discipline and away from positive cognitions. This to the point that philosophy appears to be a product of commodity society. (What do the last two sentences mean?)
3. The course of philosophy supports the notion that the engineer has overshadowed them since philosophy in its academic form splits into several sub-discplines, much like the scholastics of old, instead of reaching for the world concept. Where philosophy confuses the scholastic concept of philosophy for the world it de it degenerates into sheer ludicrousness, and then forgets the distinction when immanent truth is what philosophy depends upon.
4. If a philosophy cannot realize the difference between the concept and the non-conceptual which it is about it is too naïve to be worth thinking about. We must instead ask, in light of Hegel’s failure, whether philosophy is possible in the exact manner that Kant investigated the possibility of metaphysics after a critique of rationalism. There is an account which is long overdue – that account is of the Hegelian doctrine of the dialectic: a representation of an impossible goal showing that the representation is equal(fit?) to the task of (what was ultimately heterogenous to such?****
This is the part of the paragraph I begin to lose the plot on, just at the end. “what was ultimately heterogenous to such” I do not know what that sentences is referring to.

And after “an account is long overdue…” – “of its relationship to dialectics”; of what’s relationship to dialectics?

Getting lost in the pronouns on that paragraph

This is the part of the paragraph I begin to lose the plot on, just at the end. “what was ultimately heterogenous to such” I do not know what that sentences is referring to. — Moliere

I think the “such” refers to the “philosophical concepts” just mentioned.

If the Hegelian doctrine of the dialectic represented the impossible goal of showing, with philosophical concepts, that it was equal to the task of what was ultimately heterogenous to such, an account is long overdue of its relationship to dialectics, and why precisely his attempt failed.

So my version is as follows:

“Since Hegel attempted to do the impossible, namely to apply philosophical concepts to that which is irreducibly nonconceptual, an account is long overdue of the relationship of Hegel’s dialectic to dialectics in general, and why the attempt failed.”

I'm going to catch up in a couple of days, but I might post something about the prologue first.

“Since Hegel attempted to do the impossible, namely to apply philosophical concepts to that which is irreducibly nonconceptual, an account is long overdue of the relationship of Hegel’s dialectic to dialectics in general, and why the attempt failed.” — Jamal

Ahhh thanks. That makes sense.

I'm going to catch up in a couple of days, but I might post something about the prologue first. — Jamal

Oh yeah, no worries. I wasn't sure what to say about those so I just hopped into where I was beginning to have difficulties (page 1) -- but take your time.

Then we'll have to carry on disagreeing. Adorno believes there are beliefs and ways of thinking that obscure underlying social relations, and uses appearance/essence to frame this. In other words, the distinction is real, meaning that it's not something merely dreamt up by metaphysicians. But we can think of this as a re-purposing of the distinction in a new, dialectical context (which probably goes for all of the binary distinctions he uses). — Jamal

Due to the inconsistency in what you have written here, I interpret what you are really saying is that the distinction is not something real, it is merely metaphysical speculation, and that's the reason why it can be re-purposed by Adorno, because it's not fixed in anything real. If it was something real, it would be fixed by that reality, and not re-purposable.

Due to the inconsistency in what you have written here, I interpret what you are really saying is that the distinction is not something real, it is merely metaphysical speculation, and that's the reason why it can be re-purposed by Adorno, because it's not fixed in anything real. If it was something real, it would be fixed by that reality, and not re-purposable. — Metaphysician Undercover

I question this assumption that if a distinction is real, it must be fixed and immune to reinterpretation. That’s just one of those rigid frameworks we were talking about before. For Adorno, the appearance/essence distinction corresponds to actual social phenomena. However, because he is dialectical, he doesn’t treat the distinction as a static dualism. He repurposes it according to how social structures mediate and transform themselves, including how essences are historically constituted and never fully separate from appearances. So, the distinction is real in that it refers to something happening in the world, but it’s also a critical-philosophical tool, shaped by the task of demystification.

So don’t misinterpret me: the distinction is real. For example, beneath the ideology of employment—free contracts, the work ethic, meritocracy, etc.—there is exploitation. The former is the appearance that masks the latter essence. This is not imaginary, not mere highfalutin metaphysics, and this was Adorno’s original point.

But I probably wasn’t as clear as I should have been. To say that essence/appearance is real is to say it’s a conceptual framework that refers to real relations and processes, not that it is metaphysically baked into eternal reality. And although the distinction is repurposable, it isn’t arbitrarily so.

ND Prologue

The first paragraph is the familiar rejection of the tradition of affirmation in dialectics stretching all the way from Plato to Hegel. The second is a rejection of foundationalism:

What in accordance with the conception of philosophy would be the foundation, the author develops only after a great deal of explication of what that conception presumes would be raised on a foundation. This implies the critique of the concept of the foundation, as well as of the primacy of substantive thought. Its self-consciousness achieves its movement solely in its consummation. It requires what, according to the ground rules of the Spirit which always remain in effect, is secondary.

Before diving into a more comfortable rewording, it's worth stopping to wonder why he wrote like this. It is initially quite annoying. I don't think it's an intentionally inflated pomposity or pretentiousness, although it reads a bit like it is. It's a serious attempt to performatively express content in form. Difficult substance, difficult style. The idea, I suppose, is that the mode of clarity and linearity would be too comfortable to elicit proper intellectual engagement. Personally, I'm 50/50 on this issue. Sceptical but also sympathetic. In a way, this kind of writing is easier than a plainer kind of style, because you don't have to constantly remind yourself to slow down as you do when reading, say, Plato; it's forced on you.

The idea in this paragraph is that he won't start with a foundation and build up from there as traditionally expected in philosophy. Instead he’ll present things the other way, starting with what was commonly considered to be dependent on the foundation. In reversing the hierarchy he intends to question the very notion of foundationalism. As he says, he is also calling into question "the primacy of substantive thought," where substantive thought is thought in terms of fixed essences, which is another way of describing reified thought. Furthermore, although thought needs to be self-aware, it doesn't achieve this by starting off on a firm foundation but in the process of engaging with whatever objects are to be analyzed. Thus, the self-aware movement of thought requires an engagement with phenomena, which were considered by philosophers of the past to be secondary and derivative of a more basic reality like Spirit.

What is given herein is not solely a methodology of material labor of the author; according to the theory of negative dialectics, no continuum exists between the former and the latter. However such a discontinuity, and what instructions may be read out of it for thinking, will indeed be dealt with. The procedure is not grounded, but justified. The author lays, so far as he can, his cards on the table; this is by no means the same thing as the game.

Adorno is not presenting a neutral record of the method he has employed to get to his theory, and there is no methodology that guarantees a smooth transition from the labour of thinking to the philosophical product of the theory of negative dialectics. He intends to explain or show that this very lack of a guaranteed method is philosophically important. And again he rejects foundationalism: rather than a secure ground, his justification will appear as part of the process, or retrospectively.

I'm not sure of the meaning of "this is by no means the same thing as the game." My guess is that "the game" is his philosophical project, and that there is a lot more to it than laying his cards on the table, i.e., being open about what he's doing, even though that's necessary.

At the end of the following paragraph we find this:

To reach stringently across the official division of pure philosophy and what is relevant to the matter [Sachhaltigem] or what is formally scientific, was one of the determining motives therein.

In case we thought that Adorno was only interested in speculative philosophy, or that in recommending a philosophy that goes beyond facts he wants to thereby ignore the facts, this reminds us that he still sees scientific results as the material for philosophy. And this is borne out in his academic practice, in which he did sociology and psychology as well as philosophy. And I think he is also more generally emphasizing the importance of the particulars, of the material, of the down-to-earth and empirical in philosophy, therefore of social philosophy against the habitual abstraction of metaphysics and idealism.

In the next paragraph he says something interesting while laying out the structure of the book:

They are not examples; they do not simply illuminate general considerations. By leading towards what is relevant to the matter, they would like to simultaneously do justice to the substantive intention of what is at first dealt with generally, out of necessity, in contrast to the usage of examples as something indifferent in themselves, which Plato introduced and which philosophy has ever since merely repeated. While the models are supposed to clarify what negative dialectics would be, and to drive this latter, according to its own concept, into the realm of reality, they elucidate, not dissimilar to the so-called exemplary models, key concepts of philosophical disciplines, in order to centrally intervene in these.

And in the previous paragraph he had already said this:

Concretion was for the most part smuggled into contemporary philosophy.

So this goes back to what I was saying several pages ago about examples. His antipathy to examples is conscious. But what exactly is this distinction he is making, between examples and models?

First, examples are arbitrary, whereas models are relevant. Quills and mugs are "idiotic" because they do not take thought towards the matter to which it is meant to be directed. And second, this means that examples are misleading, because concept and example are not independent. Models are similarly mutually dependent on the concepts they elucidate, but since they are chosen carefully, they function also to develop the concept, not just to exemplify a solid, ready-made one. Examples are tools of instrumental reason, but models are where the thinking actually happens.

So don’t misinterpret me: the distinction is real. For example, beneath the ideology of employment—free contracts, the work ethic, meritocracy, etc.—there is exploitation. The former is the appearance that masks the latter essence. This is not imaginary, not mere highfalutin metaphysics, and this was Adorno’s original point. — Jamal

As far as I can tell that distinction is arbitrary. And from what I've read so far, Adorno treats it as such, regardless of whether or not he asserts that it is real. It is a tactic of philosophers, a ploy, to assert that something is real, "given", as a means of avoiding justification. This is "the postulate", which Adorno is very critical of, because acceptance of it makes one like a bleating sheep, and that stymies deep speculation. Read the beginning of the lecture very carefully, and you may come to agree with me, that Adorno is actually criticizing this postulate, that the distinction between essence and appearance is real. Consider that the claim to be "real", is what he refers to as "factuality".

I set aside here the consideration that one consequence of the postulate of
absolute certainty underlying the rejection of speculation – which is
itself the product of what we might call an inflated idealism, by which
I mean that we come to expect things of concepts that they cannot
possibly satisfy, namely absolute certainty – one effect of this postulate
is to muzzle thinking, thus preventing it from advancing beyond
the point warranted by supposedly certain facts. To the extent that
such concepts as certainty and factuality or immediate givens become
the object of philosophical reflection, they cannot be presented as
criteria for a priori thought. And it is the very ideas that are indigenous
in this realm, that is to say, the ideas that concern themselves
with the rightness or wrongness of such criteria which, looked at
naïvely from the standpoint of factuality or givenness, appear as
speculative. By uttering the word ‘appear’, I have arrived for the first
time in these lectures at a distinction that cannot be taken seriously
enough and that, if there is such a thing as a criterion of what is
philosophy and what isn’t, must certainly qualify as such. This is the
distinction between essence and appearance, a distinction that has
been sustained in almost every philosophy – with the exception of
positivist critique and certain invectives in Nietzsche – throughout
the entire philosophical tradition. I believe that it is one of the essential
motifs, I almost said one of the essential legitimating elements,
of philosophy – that the distinction between essence and appearance
is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is
real. — p 99-100

Now, turn to the conclusion of the lecture, and see how it supports what I say about the opening:

Resistance means refusing to allow the law
governing your own behaviour to be prescribed by the ostensible or
actual facts. In that sense resistance transcends the objects while
remaining closely in touch with them.
Thus the concept of depth always implies the distinction between
essence and appearance, today more than ever – and this explains
why I have linked my comments on depth to that distinction. That
concept of depth is undoubtedly connected to what I described to
you last time as the speculative element. I believe that without speculation
there is no such thing as depth. The fact that in its absence
philosophy really does degenerate into mere description may well
seem quite plausible to you. This speculative surplus that goes beyond
whatever is the case, beyond mere existence, is the element of freedom
in thought, and because it is, because it alone does stand for freedom,
because it represents the tiny quantum of freedom we possess, it also
represents the happiness of thought. It is the element of freedom
because it is the point at which the expressive need of the subject
breaks through the conventional and canalized ideas in which he
moves, and asserts himself. And this breakthrough of the limits set
on expression from within together with the smashing of the façade
of life in which one happens to find oneself – these two elements may
well be one and the same thing. What I am describing to you is philosophical
depth regarded subjectively – namely, not as the justification
or amelioration of suffering, but as the expression of suffering, some
thing which understands the necessity of suffering in the very act of
expression. — 107-108

That basic illusion, the so-called "façade of life", is the fundamental claim to facticity itself, supported by that principal postulate, of a real distinction between appearance and essence, which justifies factuality at its base. Smashing that façade is what provides to the subject, freedom of thought, happiness of thought, and depth of speculation, to go beyond those conventional limits which formulate "what is the case", facticity.

Very creative, MU. We'll see how each of our interpretations survives the onslaught of ND itself.

Re: Style -- I can understand him writing the way he does. Where I'm writing out the short version I'm mostly doing the thing where I'm checking myself to make sure I understand the basic message as a sanity check to my understanding. The style makes sense, though, because his justifications for his philosophical moves come from a large number of philosophical concerns and comparisons; the concept simply isn't easy to write about in a philosophically persuasive way.

Also, great rendition of the prologue. I think a lot of my silence comes from unfamiliarity, so your more thorough synopsis is helping me to think through things better.

Re: the game, and cards. The game, I thought, would be what comes after having laid out how one is thinking in the first place. So the application of negative dialectics to its detractors, or towards other subjects other than an exposition of negative dialectics (albeit, it seems to me, a consistent one -- i.e. this reflection comes from a dialectical process)

Re: the game, and cards. The game, I thought, would be what comes after having laid out how one is thinking in the first place. So the application of negative dialectics to its detractors, or towards other subjects other than an exposition of negative dialectics (albeit, it seems to me, a consistent one -- i.e. this reflection comes from a dialectical process) — Moliere

Yes, that makes sense to me :up:

He is fond of using the "cards on the table" metaphor, I think because he is aware how insistent the demand for initial justification is, particularly a justification for his method, that is, a foundation. Putting his cards on the table is openly saying look, I'm not going to do that; you'll have to wait for the justifications.

So what he is eager to get across is that there is so much more to (his) philosophy than this concessional starting point: okay, I can show you my cards if you insist—not that they will tell you anything—but let's play the game.

That basic illusion, the so-called "façade of life", is the fundamental claim to facticity itself, supported by that principal postulate, of a real distinction between appearance and essence, which justifies factuality at its base. Smashing that façade is what provides to the subject, freedom of thought, happiness of thought, and depth of speculation, to go beyond those conventional limits which formulate "what is the case", facticity. — Metaphysician Undercover

:up: Essence is the unchanging core of an object, the idea. Appearance is the transient expression of the core, alive in time, like music, unfolding out of itself. Any object is the dynamic tension between the two. We do move in a domain of ideas, but if we let those become concrete to us, it's like we're living in a dictionary. Life won't tolerate that for long.

ND Introduction: on the possibility of philosophy

Philosophy, which once seemed outmoded, remains alive because the moment of its realization was missed. The summary judgement that it had merely interpreted the world is itself crippled by resignation before reality, and becomes a defeatism of reason after the transformation of the world failed. It guarantees no place from which theory as such could be concretely convicted of the anachronism, which then as now it is suspected of. Perhaps the interpretation which promised the transition did not suffice. The moment on which the critique of theory depended is not to be prolonged theoretically. Praxis, delayed for the foreseeable future, is no longer the court of appeals against self-satisfied speculation, but for the most part the pretext under which executives strangulate that critical thought as idle which a transforming praxis most needs.

This first paragraph is basically lecture 5 in an extremely condensed form: (a) the failure of the project to change the world; and (b) the dialectic of theory and practice and the mistake of denigrating theory.

In lecture 5 this almost seemed to be covered in passing, but here it's placed right at the start of the introduction, so we can see that the failure of the project to change the world is central to negative dialectics. As he says in the prologue, he doesn't intend to lay out a foundation, but we can maybe see a central ethical motivation: preventing another Holocaust and keeping alive the possibility of changing the world, though practical concerns, depend on the independence of theory.

In the second paragraph he widens the scope. This is the best line:

The introverted thought-architect lives behind the moon which extroverted technicians have confiscated.

In German, someone who lives behind the moon is someone who is out of touch with reality, or as we might say in English, who has their head in the clouds or is living under a rock. The speculative metaphysician, having turned away from the empirical world and inwards into the world of ideas has not noticed that the world of philosophical wonder that they thought was their exclusive domain has already been requisitioned by the scientists and engineers.

As a result, the conceptual frameworks of the philosophers, which were meant to be deep and opposed to the naivety of empiricism, now look ridiculous or quaint, like bartering or family-run artisan manufacture within a society of corporate industrial capitalism.

This bit is confusing:

The meanwhile completely mismatched relationship (since degraded to a mere topos) between each Spirit and power, strikes the attempt to comprehend this hegemony by those inspired with their own concept of the Spirit with futility. The very will to do so betokens a power-claim which countermands what is to be understood.

@Moliere I think this is what you were asking about here:

The philosopher has been overshadowed by the engineer – the engineer has demonstrated to the world positive cognition just at the moment philosophers turned on their discipline and away from positive cognitions. This to the point that philosophy appears to be a product of commodity society. (What do the last two sentences mean?) — Moliere

My first thought was that Adorno was mentioning this "power-claim" approvingly: the attempt to comprehend the hegemony is at the same time revolutionary, seeking to overthrow it ("countermand"). But I don't think Adorno would ever mention a power-claim approvingly (the German is Machtanspruch, claim to power or literally power-claim), so I think he is warning that philosophy which tries to comprehend the totality on the basis of outdated concepts like Spirit has a dominating, totalizing tendency, like the hegemony itself. Its impulse is, say, to inherit or take over the hegemony and put Spirit on the throne, as in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. It’s another way of describing idealism’s imposition of concepts and systems, which does violence to the real world rather like capitalism itself does.

The retrogression of philosophy to a narrow scientific field, rendered necessary by the rise of specific scientific fields, is the single most eye-opening expression of its historical fate. Had Kant, in his words, freed himself from the scholastic concept of philosophy into its world-concept, then this has regressed under compulsion to its scholastic concept. Where it confuses this latter with the world- concept, its pretensions degenerate into sheer ludicrousness.

In the "Architectonic of Pure Reason" Kant contrasted two concepts of philosophy, the scholastic concept and the world-concept. The former is narrow, concerned only with building logically consistent systems, and the latter is wide and "cosmopolitan," concerned with the purpose of reason. Under the pressure of science and instrumental reason, philosophy has shrunk back to the scholastic concept, but sometimes still believes that what it's doing aligns with the world-concept and is thus ludicrous. Examples might be Husserl, and in the present day probably analytic metaphysics and object-oriented ontology.

Only the philosophy which dispenses with such naivete is the slightest bit worth thinking further. Its critical self-reflection may not stop however before the highest achievements of its history. It needs to be asked if and whether, following the collapse of the Hegelian one, it would even be possible anymore, just as Kant investigated the possibility of metaphysics after the critique of rationalism. If the Hegelian doctrine of the dialectic represented the impossible goal of showing, with philosophical concepts, that it was equal to the task of what was ultimately heterogenous to such, an account is long overdue of its relationship to dialectics, and why precisely his attempt failed.

So by the end of the last paragraph of "On the possibility of philosophy" he doesn't quite tell us if there is such a possibility, only that we need to work out if there is—by doing it.

Moliere I think this is what you were asking about here: — Jamal

Yes.

Trying again with some rest and your rendition --

"The meanwhile completely mismatched relationship (since degraded to a mere topos) between each Spirit and power, strikes the attempt to comprehend this hegemony by those inspired with their own concept of the Spirit with futility. The very will to do so betokens a power-claim which countermands what is to be understood."

"meanwhile" contrasts the way the technician and the philosopher operates in a world which glorifies the technician. So the philosopher has turned away from positive cognitions and instead critiques itself while the technicians demonstrate their worth through power -- the mismatch then is between Spirit and Power.

To add a punctuation mark to note how I'm reading this now...

"The meanwhile completely mismatched relationship (since degraded to a mere topos) between each,Spirit and Power, strikes the attempt...."


So the philosophers -- the introverted thought-architects who have a sense of Spirit, are struck with futility at even being able to comprehend the hegemony if the technician.

The desire to comprehend this hegemony indicates a technician's knowledge, which in turn turns one away from Spirit.

***


How's that sound to you?

How's that sound to you? — Moliere

Good, except I don't think the “power” and “hegemony” that philosophies of Spirit are directed towards or against refer to the technicians per se. Technicians are just agents of the hegemony; the hegemony itself is the totality of industrial capitalism. So these words, “power” and “hegemony”, refer back to “immeasurably expanded society”, i.e., immeasurably developed in terms of industry, administration, control and ideology.

Whether that makes much difference, I’m not sure.