(I recognize this isn't the engagement you're looking for, and isn't very great for conservation, but) I really love Wolfram's approach to everything in that second link. I line up with him so much.

David Hoffman meets Stephen Wolfram. A long video. Consciouness and a TOE. Fascinating - Wolfram cross-examines Hoffman - in a friendly but challenging wa — tim wood

Wittgenstein’s beetle in the box rears its ugly head again. Not sure if Wolfram knows it but he presents this argument from a philosophy of science meets philosophy of language angle.

We talk like we know what we refer to when Nagel talks about “what it is like to be a bat” or when Hoffman talks about “the taste of mint”, but it could be nothing, something, or somethings, all of which are irrelevant to the meaning of our expressions.

I recognize this isn't the engagement you're looking for, — flannel jesus

Hi. Not looking for anything in particular - don't know enough. But I thought them worth a moment or two here. And of course it turns out there are several videos for these two, both joint and several.

Point. But there are bats, and there is mint. I don't know enough about Hoffman, but from other videos I get the impression that he tries to keep one foot on the ground at least and is looking for the practical application, even if that isn't so practical. But interesting stuff.

[reply="tim wood;985774"

Yep, it is a great discussion. But confusion begets confusion. Notice how Wolfram says to Hoffman you are an N of 1, as if this is reasonable concept to apply to a thing called “consciousness”. But, in comes The Private Language Argument, how could we make sense of “one-hood”, “thing-hood”, “truth-hood” ascribe to something private like consciousness? The underlying assumption Hoffman is convinced he knows is that he has consciousness, but this “knowledge” is occurring in the box, we have no idea if he applies such a concept “correctly”, nor do we even understand what it means to apply such a concept “correctly”.

David Hoffman — tim wood

Donald Hoffman. His book.

I'll get around to watching these. I assume Wolfram is still promoting his ideas about Cellular Automata as a foundation for science and math. I bought his enormous book when it first came out, but flamed out of reading it after several hundred of the thousand pages or so. It did encourage me to write several computer programs and experiment developing the patterns he alludes to.

It became a joke at scientific cocktail parties that almost everyone had a copy, but no one had completed reading it.

You're right. Donald. My bad.

As an advocate for idealist philosophy, I hoped that Hoffman would provide grist for that particular mill. I've purchased and read parts of his The Case Against Reality, listened to quite a few interviews, and discussed his ideas here on philosophyforum.

Hoffman's idea is that evolutionary development favours adaptive fitness over perception of reality as it is. We have evolved to see the world in a way that helps us to navigate it successfully enough to survive and propagate. He then develops his theory of conscious realism, which is the idea that what we see are icons or visual representations

How can our senses be useful—how can they keep us alive—if they don’t tell us the truth about objective reality? A metaphor can help our intuitions. Suppose you’re writing an email, and the icon for its file is blue, rectangular, and in the center of your desktop. Does this mean that the file itself is blue, rectangular, and in the center of your computer? Of course not. The color of the icon is not the color of the file. Files have no color. The shape and position of the icon are not the true shape and position of the file. In fact, the language of shape, position, and color cannot describe computer files.

The purpose of a desktop interface is not to show you the “truth” of the computer—where “truth,” in this metaphor, refers to circuits, voltages, and layers of software. Rather, the purpose of an interface is to hide the “truth” and to show simple graphics that help you perform useful tasks such as crafting emails and editing photos. If you had to toggle voltages to craft an email, your friends would never hear from you. That is what evolution has done. It has endowed us with senses that hide the truth and display the simple icons we need to survive long enough to raise offspring. — Hoffman, Donald D. (2019). The Case Against Reality: How Evolution Hid the Truth from Our Eyes (Function). Kindle Edition.

I think there is some truth in that, indeed I argue something very similar in the OP Mind-Created World. But the problem I have with it is the implicit presumption that reason is also something that can be understood in terms of visual perception. As many reviewers have noted, if the argument applies to reason and mathematical logic as well as visual perception, then how is Hoffman's book not also an illusory artefact of the selfish gene?

In fact, an interesting comparison can be made between Hoffman's argument, and arguments from (among others) Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Nagel, and C S Lewis. These philosophers all propose various forms of 'the argument from reason', which says that, were reason to be understandable purely in naturalistic terms, as an adaptation to the environment, then how could we have confidence in reason? Of course, that is a very deep question - rather too deep to be addressed in terms of cognitive science, I would have thought.

In short, I think Hoffman's idea of 'truth' (as in 'the truth that is hidden from our eyes by evolution') is philosophically naive. Later in the book, he talks a lot about mathematical models which purport to demonstrate the veracity of his central argument, which culminates in the idea that reality comprises solely conscious agents. Again, an idea I'm sympathetic to - think Liebnizian monads -but the meaning of that claim is left open. The maths seems to be aimed at creating the image (ironically) of scientific versimilitude, as if any theory is not justified by mathematical models will lack credibility.

That's my two bobs, granted, I haven't finished the entire book, I like Hoffman's persona and am probably more open to his kind of argument than anyone who holds to physicalism, but those aspects of his project give me pause.

The underlying assumption Hoffman is convinced he knows is that he has consciousness, but this “knowledge” is occurring in the box, we have no idea if he applies such a concept “correctly”, nor do we even understand what it means to apply such a concept “correctly”. — Richard B

The resolution here is Cartesian. There is knowledge, therefore there is a knower, the rest being details.

I think there is some truth in that, indeed I argue something very similar in the OP Mind-Created World. But the problem I have with it is the implicit presumption that reason is also something that can be understood in terms of visual perception. As many reviewers have noted, if the argument applies to reason and mathematical logic as well as visual perception, then how is Hoffman's book not also an illusory artefact of the selfish gene?

In fact, an interesting comparison can be made between Hoffman's argument, and arguments from (among others) Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Nagel, and C S Lewis. These philosophers all propose various forms of 'the argument from reason', which says that, were reason to be understandable purely in naturalistic terms, as an adaptation to the environment, then how could we have confidence in reason? Of course, that is a very deep question - rather too deep to be addressed in terms of cognitive science, I would have thought. — Wayfarer

Really good point and one that is missed - it seems to be a blindspot in Hoffman's work.

Later in the book, he talks a lot about mathematical models which purport to demonstrate the veracity of his central argument, which culminates in the idea that reality comprises solely conscious agents. Again, an idea I'm sympathetic to - think Liebnizian monads -but the meaning of that claim is left open. The maths seems to be aimed at creating the image (ironically) of scientific versimilitude, as if any theory is not justified by mathematical models will lack credibility. — Wayfarer

Hoff's implying that maths has some kind of transcendent quality that can demonstrate truth outside of our false reality. Like he's a mathematical Platonist by default.

which says that, were reason to be understandable purely in naturalistic terms, as an adaptation to the environment, then how could we have confidence in reason? — Wayfarer

I've always found this point quite strange because from what I see, people reason "badly" and get things wrong literally all the time, including scientists and academics. I feel like, even though we are very smart, human progress in terms of knowledge is not some direct consequence solely of our ability to reason but this long process of trial and error where people throw stuff at the wall and get it wrong all the time, and some stuff just sticks for one reason or another and we remember it over the generations. Its like a another form of Darwinian selectionism.

My private hobgoblin in this kind of discussion is to establish some kind of ground, at least, for the terminology: in this case for "reality." What, exactly (for present purpose), do you say reality is? And I think the question itself is defensible in that I do not suppose anyone who is not as green as chlorophyll will suppose even for a moment that they interact with real reality. And my hobgoblin's red-headed cousin almost always wants to build up ideas from the ground rather than to take them pre-fab, thus making for a solid, if bespoke, structure of understanding with luck not subject to the flaws and failures, if any, of others, but standing or falling on its own. Please, sir, may we have some reality?

My private hobgoblin in this kind of discussion is to establish some kind of ground, at least, for the terminology: in this case for "reality." What, exactly (for present purpose), do you say reality is? — tim wood

I completely understand your concern. My off-the-cuff answer is that reality is lived. That response is more in keeping with European philosophy, and also with religious philosophies. You can create and call into doubt all kinds of complicated theories but existence has a visceral, felt quality that is before or prior to all such verbal rationalisations. How this relates to philosophical idealism, is that idealism doesn't ultimately comprise a 'theory about mind' but a recognition of the sense in which the mind constructs the reality in which we live (that's the part that Hoffman gets right). But in philosophy, this requires insight into that process. Buddhism is also grounded in that kind of insight.

What with the total dominance and pervasiveness of science and scientific technologies in life today, it is natural to presume that scientifically-based reasoning is as it were the arbiter of reality. But science by its very nature leaves something out, which is the subjective, visceral sense of lived reality. That's what existentialism and phenomenology is about. So whatever truth is to be sought, it has to be sought in that context. Pierre Hadot is an exemplar:

Pierre Hadot, classical philosopher and historian of philosophy, is best known for his conception of ancient philosophy as a bios or way of life (manière de vivre). ....According to Hadot, twentieth- and twenty-first-century academic philosophy has largely lost sight of its ancient origin in a set of spiritual practices that range from forms of dialogue, via species of meditative reflection, to theoretical contemplation. These philosophical practices, as well as the philosophical discourses the different ancient schools developed in conjunction with them, aimed primarily to form, rather than only to inform, the philosophical student. The goal of the ancient philosophies, Hadot argued, was to cultivate a specific, constant attitude toward existence, by way of the rational comprehension of the nature of humanity and its place in the cosmos. This cultivation required, specifically, that students learn to combat their passions and the illusory evaluative beliefs instilled by their passions, habits, and upbringing. — IEP

I'm not claiming by any stretch to have mastered or to be able to demonstrate these qualities but I believe this is the direction in which the answer lies.

I've always found this point quite strange because from what I see, people reason "badly" and get things wrong literally all the time, including scientists and academics. — Apustimelogist

Well, probably unlike most, I put some stock in spiritual insight. The archetypal sage - whom is most likely not an actual person - has the ability to see 'how things truly are', which exceeds the scope of mere objectivity. Again from the entry on Pierre Hadot:

The philosophical Sage, in all the ancient discourses, is characterized by a constant inner state of happiness or serenity. This has been achieved through minimizing his bodily and other needs, and thus attaining to the most complete independence (autarcheia) vis-à-vis external things. The Sage is for this reason capable of maintaining virtuous resolve and clarity of judgment in the face of the most overwhelming threats, from natural catastrophes to “the fury of citizens who ordain evil . . . [or] the face of a threatening tyrant”. In the different ancient schools, these characteristics differentiating the Sage from nonphilosophers mean that this figure “tends to become very close to God or the gods,” as conceived by the philosophers. The Epicurean gods, like the God of Aristotle, Hadot notes, are characterized by their perfect serenity and exemption from all troubles and dangers. Epicurus calls the Sage the friend of the gods, and the gods friends of the Sages. Aristotle equates the contemplation of the wise man with the self-contemplation of the unmoved mover.

Well, probably unlike most, I put some stock in spiritual insight. The archetypal sage - whom is most likely not an actual person - has the ability to see 'how things truly are', which exceeds the scope of mere objectivity. Again from the entry on Pierre Hadot: — Wayfarer

What's your point?

On "The Concept of the Ruliad", Stephen Wolfram's idea of the "entangled limit of everything that is computationally possible: the result of the following all possible computation rules in all possible ways." Stephen characterizes this idea as "something very universal", "a kind of ultimate limit of all abstraction and generalization", "All possible rules", "All possible steps" and "All possible conditions." He finds from such an idea one can derive the laws of physics. He goes on to claim that Ruliad explains why we have the perception that universe has these specific laws that it does. Well his answer is that "we are bounded observers, embedded within the Ruliad. But we don't fully see the Ruliad but only see in the lens of our particular methods of perception and analysis. Here he shares some similarity with Hoffman's views.

This is my first time reading of such a theory but I have to say that I am a bit suspicious of its lofty claims. I think I can summarize around two points:

1. I can imagine him sitting a front of a computer and being overcome by an analogy, as Paley did when being entranced of the inner workings of a watch. Wow, by simply programming steps on a computer, I can simulate an object on a screen to move at a rate across a screen like an object in the real world. Therefore, all laws of physics must be founded on computational principles. Where is Hume when you need him?

2. Stephen, I presume, he is also a "bounded observer who has his own particular method of perception and analysis." If that is the case, does not this idea come from his particular method of perception and analysis? Or, does he have some Platonic insight into of realm of perfect ideas he only sees? I am reminded what Wittgenstein said in Philosophical Investigations, "47. But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed? What are the simple constituent parts of a chair? The bits of wood of which it is made? Or the molecules, or the atoms? "Simple" means: not composite. And here the point is: in what sense 'composite'? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the simple parts of a chair."

My off-the-cuff answer is that reality is lived. — Wayfarer

Which is to say an entirely subjective admixture of judgment and perception, and without benefit of Kant's practical reason (as I understand that). Which is to say a reality that is not real, perhaps calling it a subjective reality. I refer (you) back to Pyrrhonists, who apparently were able to live within a subjective reality while taking care not to confuse it for anything it was not.

Stephen characterizes this idea as "something very universal", "a kind of ultimate limit of all abstraction and generalization", "All possible rules", "All possible steps" and "All possible conditions." He finds from such an idea one can derive the laws of physics. — Richard B

Perhaps a notion for physics akin to Turing's model of a computer? In the shorter video, Hoffman talks about his discovery - I'll get this wrong, so best to watch it - that I'll analogize as his saying that all subroutines are a part of their larger routine, with the thought that the larger routine may (or must be) itself be a subroutine of a still larger, even one we don't know about. And for this he claims to have the math.

Which is to say an entirely subjective admixture of judgment and perception, — tim wood

Not in the least. You ask 'what is reality', my answer is intended to convey that it has to be meaningful as a lived reality, not as an abstraction or theory. Philosophy as 'love of wisdom' as a quality of being, not as a theoretical abstraction.

without benefit of Kant's practical reason (as I understand that). — tim wood

On the contrary:

Despite its apparent absence from modern academic philosophy, the notion that one might turn to philosophy in pursuit of inner illumination and transformation, similar to that found the church and the lodge, was taken for granted in Kant’s milieu and formed a key part of the reception of his philosophy. ...

The decisive distinguishing feature of Western philosophical spirituality is that it does not regard the truth as something to which the subject has access by right, universally, simply by virtue of the kind of cognitive being that the human subject is. Rather, it views the truth as something to which the subject may accede only through some act of inner self-transformation, some act of attending to the self with a view to determining its present incapacity, thence to transform it into the kind of self that is spiritually qualified to accede to a truth that is by definition not open to the unqualified subject. .... — Spirituality and Philosophy in Kant's Ciritque of Pure Reason, Ian Hunter

Spirituality and Philosophy in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Ian Hunter — Wayfarer

Eh?

Methinks you should read less and think more. If you like you can translate Mr. Hunter's into English, but I am primarily interested in what you say reality is. (Or we can go for truth; I have some opinions on that.) And it seems to me that an idealist ought have ready-at-hand his own boilerplate on what reality is, so he can discuss it intelligibly. And that is what I'm asking for, some starting point.

My own would be that which is left on stage when the actors have left, that in being provides the ground/basis/opportunity for perception/judgment/experience.

My own would be that which is left on stage when the actors have left, that in being provides the ground/basis/opportunity for perception/judgment/experience. — tim wood

How does that sit against Donald Hoffman's 'conscious realism', and his claim that we don't see reality as it is, but only as evolution has shaped us to see it? It seems to me that from such a perspective nothing could be ventured as to 'what is left on stage', as 'the stage' is constructed by the actors. Indeed Hoffman says that reality is conscious agents 'all the way down'.

if evolution has shaped us to see reality in a particular way, that implies there was a reality there prior to evolution.

I mean, scientifically speaking, the history of life on earth starts a few billion years after earth came into being. If it's "consciousness all the way down", what does that say about those billions of years prior to life?

I accept that the way WE see reality wasn't "reality" back then (and arguably isn't "reality" right now either), but we still have sufficient evidence that "back then" was as real as right now. So with no conscious agents around to create that reality, what's the story?

if evolution has shaped us to see reality in a particular way, that implies there was a reality there prior to evolution.

I mean, scientifically speaking, the history of life on earth starts a few billion years after earth came into being. If it's "consciousness all the way down", what does that say about those billions of years prior to life?

I accept that the way WE see reality wasn't "reality" back then (and arguably isn't "reality" right now either), but we still have sufficient evidence that "back then" was as real as right now. — flannel jesus

That's a really excellent question, and a topic that is near to my heart. I've debated it up hill and down dale for years, but I'll try and sketch out a quick response in the few moments I have now.

The key point I make is that all judgements about the age of the universe, including all of the scientific evidence (which I fully accept) is interpreted by us. And that act of intepretation is mind-dependent. So, sure, we know prior to h.sapiens that the earth exist for 4 billion years odd, and a pretty good account of evolutionary development. But there is always an implicit perspective in that understanding, namely, that of yours and mine and humans generally. We don't really see it as it would be without any perspective whatever, becuase without any perspective, there would be no time or space which provides the framework within which all such knowledge is meaningful.

So there are two levels: first, there's the empirical facts, disclosed by science, which are inter-subjectively verifiable. But there's also a sense in which that is disclosed and understood by us in terms of the framework of understanding that we bring to the picture. But we generally don't take that into account, because science generally brackets out the observer, so as to arrive at what is considered to be the view from nowhere, which it takes to be synonymous with how things truly are. But it's not.

This goes back to Kant, of course, but it's an understanding that has also penetrated many schools of modern philosophy and even cognitive science. See The Blind Spot of Science for a more detailed account (Aeon essay).

That honestly feels like a cop out. Of course it's interpreted by us - everything we know and think has to come through a filter of us first. That doesn't mean we have to conclude reality is mind-dependent.

Imagine cockroaches gain sentience in 10,000 years. Everything cockroaches believe will also have to come through their filters, their interpretations. Should they believe reality is cockroach-dependent? I don't think so.

Lame counter. Cockroaches are barely sentient let alone rational. H.Sapiens alone can bring this fact into rational reflection.

let me put it another way: your support of mind dependence comes from the fact that everything we know has to come through a filter of human consciousness. But that would be true even if the world really existed in a mind independent way.

So since it would have to be true either way, it doesn't support the case for mind dependence.

But that would be true even if the world really existed in a mind independent way. — flannel jesus

If you were to see the world as it is, independently of any mind - what would you see?

Incidentally, if you don't know Donald Hoffman is, here's a TED talk where he lays out his basic idea, Do We See Reality as it Is?

that question doesn't make sense. Seeing is inherently an experience.

I don't think we "see reality as it is". I don't think "reality as it is" is a visual experience. But I still think there is a reality.

As do I.