“ . . . a position no one familiar with philosophical inquiry could take seriously.”

Do you not see the irony in having the write off fairly popular opinions in philosophy as "unserious" here? Grayling is responding to other professional philosophers. Harris's stories come from professional conferences as well, e.g. a speaker at an ethics conference who claimed that we could not say whether or not another culture was wrong if they tore out the eyes of every third born infant out mere custom because "it's their culture." Nietzsche is, I would imagine, the long-running title holder for "most popular thinker in the West."

But in virtue of what are positions to be dismissed as "unserious?" Again, it seems to me that you have to start with some (more or less foundational) premises here to avoid the problems mentioned in the "Dogmatism and Relativism" thread. And like I said before, the problem you mention seems to apply to affirming all sorts of premises, not just "foundational" ones. People will either affirm what follows from more or less obvious or well-supported premises or they won't. In Harris's example, "tearing infant's eyes out is not good for them," would be the obvious premise in question.

The person denying this premise seems factually wrong. Are they wrong in a moral sense? With that particular premise, I'd say yes. In particular, if they allow children to be blinded when they could have otherwise prevented it, or blind a child because "when in Rome do as the Romans," that seems particularly bad. Whereas, while "act is prior to potency" might be more "foundational," it's hardly blameworthy to have failed to consider it. Those terms need some serious unpacking. "What is known best in itself" is not generally "what is known best to us." What is known best to us is particulars, stuff like "blinding children isn't good for them." If people have any rational responsibility at all (through action or negligence)—and I would tend to say they do—it will tend to lie most heavily here, in these sorts of concrete judgements.

So is this your argument?

<A 4th century B.C. essentialist did not believe that water was H2O, therefore water was not H2O before 19th century chemistry> — Leontiskos

No, not in the least. — Moliere

Well then how in the heck are you getting to your conclusion that, "water was not H2O [at some point in the past]"? Do you have an argument for that claim? You seem to think that because Aristotle wasn't aware of H2O, or that because Aristotle was an essentialist, therefore your proposition is somehow made true. I don't see that you have offered any valid argument for your claim that water was not H2O (at some point in the past).

Paul Vincent Spade's The Warp and Woof of Metaphysics might frame things in terms you are more familiar with.

Or Klima's comparison, but I would say the first is more direct and accessible.

As Spade (along with many others) remarks, there is confusion because: "In analytic philosophy, there is a view called “Aristotelian essentialism”— by both its supporters and its opponents — that in fact has nothing to do with Aristotle."

Note that subject can be said in two ways, in terms of logic or in terms of metaphysics. In logic, the subject is what any predicate is "attached" to. In metaphysics, subject can be said properly or improperly, as of a thing or as of a things underlying substrate. Substance is said of particular things primarily. It is secondary substance where we see essence, the "type of thing" something is.

The logic interacts with the metaphysics but I am not really sure what to recommend for that aside from just reading the Categories (and Porphyry's Isogogue), the Physics, and Metaphysics. I have no found a really good summary the way I have for some parts of Plato.

Well then how in the heck are you getting to your conclusion that, "water was not H2O [at some point in the past]"? Do you have an argument for that claim? You seem to think that because Aristotle wasn't aware of H2O, or that because Aristotle was an essentialist, therefore your proposition is somehow made true. I don't see that you have offered any valid argument for your claim that water was not H2O (at some point in the past). — Leontiskos

Was Water H2O before Cavendish and Lavoisier?

De Dicto, no. There was no such language, so there was no such claim -- the thing, water, may have been H2O, but this isn't what I'm talking about. I'm talking about how we talk about essences, or more generally, how to get down to what's real, and whether or not science has much to say on that subject after all, and what is this water thing all about with reference to our philosophical meanderings.

Basically I see the work of scholars as generative -- before the work, nothing there, after the work, something there. This is generative of knowledge, though, not being. I am a realist for all this.

For Kripke this isn't a problem because we can come to find out necessities after the fact, so there's still a basis for laying out what an essence is -- an essence is what an individual has in all possible worlds.

But prior to the work of chemistry there wasn't really an individual "water" which we had some set of predicates for that held in all possible worlds, especially since "all possible worlds" wasn't used at the time.

Where Aristotle comes in as what appeared to be your account of essence, but your emphasis on his time and place seems to mean that what Aristotle means isn't as important to your account of essence. More or less since the account is vague we end up with arbitrarity where we can just sort of choose what counts as an essence and insist upon it -- the name could change to accommodate that particular thing as essence, or what-have-you. All it really amounts to is "This is what I've designated as the part that defines this individual" -- in this case let's just say "Water is necessarily H2O" is the sort of thing this essentialist believes.

So far I can grant a posteriori necessity,

But the essentialist you have in mind seems to believe that water is necessarily H2O, and it was necessarily H2O, and it will necessarily be H2O. For me I don't see the confidence in such a belief for the simple fact that we have changed our mind about water's essence before, so there's nothing stopping us from doing it again.

That the necessity holds a posteriori seems to allow updates to knowledge as we find out how wrong we were.

Yes, this akin to the problem of circularity in Locke where the nominal essence by which different things are defined ends up determining the real essence by which they are identified as a certain nominal essence. Nothing seems particularly essential in this formulation, as it's all subject to revision.

But this certainly goes against the intuition that water was water millions of years ago, one which is supported by plenty of empirical evidence.

This is to my mind a general weakness of formulating a theory of essences by begining with language and naming. It puts the effect before the cause, and one needs a sort of circularity to resolve things.

But this certainly goes against the intuition that water was water millions of years ago, one which is supported by plenty of empirical evidence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the underdetermination argument is what undermines this notion -- it's what I'd guess now, but it could be that we're reading patterns into the past that we accept now which are predictive and make sense, but so did the epicycles. Before Copernicus there was overwhelming evidence of the spheres having and will always being in existence.

On a quick look, I'm not seeing much to commend here. Why would I care whether Quine was more like Aristotle or Plato, when Kripke, who is not mentioned in your article, gives a better account anyway?

That Quine's criticism of essentialism was misdirected doesn't much impact Kripke.

If you are going to reject the notion that essentialism is just about necessary truths in possible worlds, then you would best present an account of essence that is at least as useful.

Again, what is an essence, if not a property had by a thing in every possible world in which it exists? Pointing us to an article that doesn’t offer a decisive argument for why Kripke’s modal metaphysics is insufficient just doesn't answer that question. Without showing that Kripke’s system fails or that the Aristotelian alternative can do the same explanatory work, it amounts to special pleading. Unless Spade can do the work Kripke does, the conversation will always favour the more robust, explanatory, and precise framework.

Water is necessarily H₂O. However, prior to Cavendish, folk did not use the expression "water is H₂O", and did not know that water was H₂O.

That seems pretty clear. Is there a problem?

The only problem I can think of is that we've only invented another epicycle, of sorts.

While I think the notion that nature changes a bit outlandish, I'm uncertain that our discoveries about the terms we've been using tell us what will and has been real.

I find the notion that nature changes outlandish, but I don't find the notion that our understandings of nature change outlandish -- so prior to Cavendish water was not H₂O, but after the next theorist of matter....

So the concern is that at some future date we re-assess "Water is necessarily H₂O" and decide that it is false.

Well, then we would say that water is not necessarily H₂O. That, prior to Cavendish, folk did not use the expression "water is H₂O", quite rightly, and then there was a period were people believed that water was necessarily H₂O, and said things like "Water is necessarily H₂O". But now we know better.

This could all be set out unambiguously using a formal notion. it's be a bit convolute, so I'll leave it.

The salient bit might be the difference between "Water is necessarily H₂O" and "We know that Water is necessarily H₂O". The first is extensionally transparent, the second, extensionally opaque, becasue the sentence "Water is necessarily H₂O" is within the scope of "We know that..."

Talk of real and nominal essences is a bit of a furphy. It's about scope.

Water is necessarily H₂O. — Banno

Are you saying H2O is necessarily H2O, or Water is necessarily H2O? If the former, sure; but the later, well I guess it depends on how you use the term “water”. And is this not where all the confusion and debate occur?

Sure. We covered that previously.

Of course it depends on how you use the term "water". It's a side issue. Here we are in effect supposing that the extension of "water" and the extension of H₂O are identical. If you think they are not, then for the purposes of this discussion, pretend that they are. Becasue "Water = H₂O" is being used as an example, and it is the resulting logic that is being discussed.

That is, we could use Kripke's lectern instead, and have the same discussion.

Ok, let’s explore extension.

Can we say water is necessarily H2O, D2O, HDO and T2O? (Because all of these naturally occurring in nature when analyzing water)

Or would we say no because I can imagine a possible world where water is just H2O?

Or is the rebuttal, no you can’t imagine water without the others.

Can we say water is necessarily H2O, D2O, HDO and T2O? (Because all of these naturally occurring in nature when analyzing water) — Richard B

Sure. Yep. Fixed to "water is necessarily H₂O, D₂O, HDO or T₂O". As discussed, I'd simplify all this by just stipulating that the "H" in H₂O incudes all the various isotopes.

Or would we say no because I can imagine a possible world where water is just H2O? — Richard B

Only if we reject "Water is H₂O". Taking ☐(water =H₂O) as true limits our access to only those worlds in which water=H₂O.

The issue is simply that of consistency. If water=H₂O then ☐(water=H₂O). If water is not always H₂O, then ~☐(water=H₂O).

SO yes, we can imagine a possible world in which ~☐(water=H₂O), but nevertheless, if (water=H₂O), then ☐(water=H₂O).

Again, a side issue.

The first is extensionally transparent, the second, extensionally opaque, becasue the sentence "Water is necessarily H₂O" is within the scope of "We know that..."

Talk of real and nominal essences is a bit of a furphy. It's about scope. — Banno

Yeh, all this talk is a bit furphy, to be honest.

So by what you say -- the sentence believed is extensionally transparent, but the sentence about our belief is not?

One is about the extension of the sentence, the other has a wider scope.

Was Water H2O before Cavendish and Lavoisier?

De Dicto, no. There was no such language, so there was no such claim -- the thing, water, may have been H2O, but this isn't what I'm talking about. I'm talking about how we talk about essences — Moliere

Yes, of course you are. That's what I've been saying over and over. You are talking about 1a, not 1:

1. The essentialist would be likely to say that water is H2O (or that water is always H2O).
1a. The essentialist would say that the term “water” signified H2O before 19th century chemistry. — Leontiskos

When you ask "was water H2O" and then immediately say, "the thing, water, may have been H2O, but this isn't what I'm talking about," you are contradicting yourself within three sentences. If we want to talk about "how we talk" then we are talking about signification and term-usage, which is precisely what 1a does.

Where Aristotle comes in as what appeared to be your account of essence, but your emphasis on his time and place seems to mean that what Aristotle means isn't as important to your account of essence. — Moliere

I think invalidity is plaguing your reasoning at multiple levels. Just because I think Aristotle was correct about essences does not mean that I think water was not H2O in Aristotle's time. That simply doesn't follow at all. Aristotle himself would not think that follows.

Yep

John had a drink of water=John had a drink of H₂O
Substitution works, so it's transparent.

John knew he had a drink of water ≠ John knew he had a drink of H₂O
If John does not know water=H₂O, substitution fails.

What's important is to see that putting the issue within the scope of what we know changes how the bits fit together.

I'll accept that I'm contradicting myself in three sentences, and not in an intentional manner. At the end of the conversation I prefer to figure out what is different between our perspectives -- as I said before it's the differences I value.

I get the idea that you must know what water is, necessarily, if your expressions are true.

Though perhaps I'm only frustrating you and we're talking past one another.

Nice.

Never thought we'd get this far in understanding one another.

For me I don't see the confidence in such a belief for the simple fact that we have changed our mind about water's essence before, so there's nothing stopping us from doing it again. — Moliere

I think one could take your argument and claim that Aristotle and Lavoisier were not pointing to the same thing at all with the term "water." There was complete equivocation. Aristotle was pointing to the stuff found in rivers and lakes, whereas Lavoisier was pointing to H2O, and as @Richard B argues, there is effectively nothing in common between the two and therefore "water is not H2O". So either they were talking about entirely different things, or else they were talking about the same thing and contradicting one another.

But the more plausible view is that Aristotle and Lavoisier were talking about the same thing, and that Lavoisier learned something about that thing that Aristotle did not know. I don't see why that view is so hard to entertain. Is there some reason that this view must be opposed? That Lavoisier could learn true things from prior scientists and nevertheless make contributions to the field?

Cool.

There's a bunch of ambiguities in Leon's formalism that muck it up. "Water" rigidly designates H₂O, and does so even when we talk about what happened before Cavendish. But it wasn't used in that way then, for obvious reasons. There's no contradiction or circularity here that I can see.

I think he is adamantly agreeing with you.

What says is correct. I can agree with him even if he must always stubbornly disagree with me (or at least pretend to).

But the more plausible view is that Aristotle and Lavoisier were talking about the same thing, and that Lavoisier learned something about that thing that Aristotle did not know. I don't see why that view is so hard to entertain. Is there some reason that this view must be opposed? That Lavoisier could learn true things from prior scientists and nevertheless make contributions to the field? — Leontiskos

O goodness no. Just up front -- I think they both contributed to the field. I think they likely were talking about the same thing, as you said -- in rivers, lakes, oceans, and so forth.

And I think I agree here too -- so maybe I've said something that's in error or wrong there, but I can at least put it in writing I agree here :D

- Okay, great. And for Aristotelian essentialism this is taken for granted, namely that we can know water without knowing water fully, and that therefore future generations can improve on our understanding of water. None of that invalidates Aristotelian essentialism. It's actually baked in - crucially important for Aristotle who was emphatic in affirming the possibility of knowledge-growth.

This means that Lavoisier can learn something about water, in the sense that he learns something that was true, is true, and will be true about the substance water. His contribution does not need to entail that previous scientists were talking about something that was not H2O, and the previous scientists generally understood that they did not understand everything about water.

I think he is adamantly agreeing with you. — Banno

Whom?

Okay, great. And for Aristotelian essentialism this is taken for granted, namely that we can know water without knowing water fully, and that therefore future generations can improve on our understanding of water. None of that invalidates Aristotelian essentialism. It's actually baked in - crucially important for Aristotle who was emphatic in affirming the possibility of knowledge-growth. — Leontiskos

I agree, sir. :)

He's attractive for a reason. His ideas are amazing in their explicitness for the time he expressed them in. He attempts to move philosophy into the scientific realm by being an empiricist who prefers biology first and foremost, and observes the world around him in making generalizations according to his categories and causes. These are the things I'd like to emulate again in some sense, but maybe with less slavery.

Aristotle's a move which respects Plato, because the ideas are still important, but diverges from him -- at least in the sense of the schools -- because matter is part of the essence of a thing, rather thingthan the forms defining the essence of things.

***

My thoughts come from a place of loving reading Aristotle while thinking about what it all means today.

I'm not certain how to distinguish how I think yet, but one thing I've noticed is how Aristotle's move from the more certain to the less certain might not be the way I generate knowledge.

Cf:

If that is right, you may be interested in Gyula Klima's "Contemporary 'Essentialism' vs. Aristotelian Essentialism," where he compares a Kripkean formulation of essentialism to an Aristotelian formulation of essentialism, and includes formal semantics for signification and supposition, which involves the notion of inherence. Paul Vincent Spade also has an informal piece digging into the metaphysical differences between the two conceptions, "The Warp and Woof of Metaphysics: How to Get Started on Some Big Themes." — Leontiskos

Klima spends more time with Kripke and Spade more time with Quine. — Leontiskos

From what I remember, Spade gets at the deeper issues (which bear on the discussion between @Banno and @Arcane Sandwich in the linked thread), but he doesn't engage Kripke and therefore requires more patience. If someone were open-minded about Aristotelian essentialism I would also point to the Spade piece, but for the brawlers of TPF I think Klima is better.

He's attractive for a reason. — Moliere

Thank you for the kind words, I appreciate that. :smile:

I'm not certain how to distinguish how I think yet, but one thing I've noticed is how Aristotle's move from the more certain to the less certain might not be the way I generate knowledge. — Moliere

Yes, well that would be an interesting topic. Aristotle thinks that any piece of new knowledge that someone arrives at must be generated from things that they then knew better and still know better. That they then knew them better is vacuous, so the more interesting claim is that they still know them better (at the moment the new piece of knowledge is acquired).

Yes, well that would be an interesting topic. Aristotle thinks that any piece of new knowledge that someone arrives at must be generated from things that they then knew better and still know better. That they then knew them better is vacuous, so the more interesting claim is that they still know them better. — Leontiskos

I'm beginning to think this is a dialectical point.

In a lot of ways I think of knowledge as the things I know are false -- don't do this, don't do that, this is false because, this is wrong cuz that...

Might be off topic to the original question, though.

Good to find some camaraderie though.

Okay, interesting. Such negatives are pretty slippery. I won't speak to practical prohibitions, but, "This is false," is an incredibly difficult thing to understand. Usually we require, "This is true" + PNC in order to arrive at a judgment of falsehood. I am not at all convinced that a falsehood can be demonstrated directly.

Before Copernicus there was overwhelming evidence of the spheres having and will always being in existence.

This is a difficulty for truth as primarily a property of (linguistic) propositions instead of "the adequacy of an intellect to being." Epicycles get superceded as a theory, and so all propositions about them (outside of the purely observational) take on the binary value of false. Phlogiston and caloric theory is superceded, and so likewise we are left with a bunch of false sentences, despite these theories representing real advances in knowledge. But one might suppose these are more or less adequate understandings of reality, truth being a case of contrary, as opposed to contradictory, opposition (like light and darkness).

I think the underdetermination argument is what undermines this notion -- it's what I'd guess now, but it could be that we're reading patterns into the past that we accept now which are predictive and make sense,

But this is, at most, an epistemic issue. The step further, that claims that essences themselves change, has to say that the water that carved out the Grand Canyon isn't the same water we see causing erosion today. I think there are a host of problems with that though, not least of which is "why should our ideas about things evolve in one way instead of any other if there is no actuality that is prior to our speech about things?"

Just think about applying this same sort of relationship to: "who killed JFK?" Would the killer be Oswald today and then become someone else if we discover decisive evidence that someone else killed JFK? But how could we "discover evidence" of a fact that doesn't exist until we acknowledge said fact? And would it be ok to have punished Oswald while he was "still the killer?" Obviously, this is absurd, but if it is absurd we need a reason for why this sort of change only applies to identies like "water" and not to "JFK's killer."

Second, if water was not H2O in 1600, then by today's definition, water was not water then. But then in virtue of what do we speak of some enduring thing, "water," that changes over time as theories change. It seems to me that, on this view, it might be better to say that nothing is changing so much as one thing is replacing another. If things just are whatever dominant opinion says they are, then things are popping into and out of being as theories change.

The other question is, how could we be wrong in these sorts of cases if what a thing is depends on what we currently think of it? How can we discover that "fire is not phlogiston" if there is no such thing as fire outside of ideas like phlogiston theory?

IDK, perhaps some of these can be ironed out but it certainly seems more intuitive to me that fire and water are, and remain, what they are.