I think one could take your argument and claim that Aristotle and Lavoisier were not pointing to the same thing at all with the term "water." There was complete equivocation. Aristotle was pointing to the stuff found in rivers and lakes, whereas Lavoisier was pointing to H2O, and as Richard B argues, there is effectively nothing in common between the two and therefore "water is not H2O". — Leontiskos

The term “water” can refer to many things, while “H2O” seems to be referring to something very precise. It seems to me Kripke wants to say “water” precisely refers to one thing as H2O.

I find the quote from Chomsky’s Cartesian Linguistics useful:

“This is because, as Chomsky suggests, in the domains of mathematics and the natural sciences, one finds strong ‘normative’ constraints on same-use, constraints not found in the use of natural language, where people employ and enjoy linguistic creativity. Everyday speakers are not engaged on a unified project. And as Chomsky also points out, it is no surprise that Fregean semantic theories – those that suppose a community with shared thoughts and shared uniform symbols for expressing these thoughts, and an assumed constraint to be talking about the same thing whenever they use a specific symbol – work quite well with mathematics and the natural sciences. But they do not work with natural languages, a hard lesson for the many philosophers and semanticians who try to adapt Fregean semantics to natural languages.”

IDK, perhaps some of these can be ironed out but it certainly seems more intuitive to me that fire and water are, and remain, what they are. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree that's intuitive.

It's what I assume in my thinking about matter from the past to now.

I also agree that if we had a fully worked out philosophy we could make the analogy between historical events and matter, but I'll admit I think the former claims on matter are a little more secure than claims about particular events.

The other question is, how could we be wrong in these sorts of cases if what a thing is depends on what we currently think of it? How can we discover that "fire is not phlogiston" if there is no such thing as fire outside of ideas like phlogiston theory? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Because some scientist or researcher became obstinate about their theory and did what they could through the social structure to persuade others they were right after all.

Thinking through this question now -- Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions is what I have in mind, but with a more materialist mindset which doesn't give into the notion that nature itself changes with the sciences.

I think if phlogiston had won the day then we'd be talking about how the caloric theory was wrong -- once we collectively accept a theory we can begin to discard thoughts that seem irrelevant and get to the work "at hand"

If all the scientists then had decided phlogiston is better they could have worked out the various difficulties with accepting that theory, in my mind. But this is a historical counter-factual.

But then in virtue of what do we speak of some enduring thing, "water," that changes over time as theories change — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's in virtue of the things our species relies upon water for -- drinking, cooking, bathing, etc.

"Water" is not a scientific term exactly.

But this is, at most, an epistemic issue. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, yes.

I tend to favor the epistemic side over the ontology side -- I understand it's basically a "player's choice", but it's my preference. On the reverse of "How do you know unless you start with what is?" is "How do you know what is unless you start with what you know?"

Another thing I'm tempted to say is a dialectical of some kind...

Not exactly.

That is, we could use Kripke's lectern instead, and have the same discussion. — Banno

It might be better to use the lectern example than water example just to show what "necessity" and "essence" mean.

Where is that thread we talked about this in.... @Banno

Another attempt after re-reading -- pick which is best to reply to, or ignore it all if it's just bad:

But this is, at most, an epistemic issue. The step further, that claims that essences themselves change, has to say that the water that carved out the Grand Canyon isn't the same water we see causing erosion today. I think there are a host of problems with that though, not least of which is "why should our ideas about things evolve in one way instead of any other if there is no actuality that is prior to our speech about things?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

"at most"? As if that were the lesser question? :D

I admit I'm more on the epistemic than metaphysical side of thinking.

I don't think matter changes with our ideas, at least not so far with what I know.

"The step further" is the one I wouldn't take -- it's possible, but not something we really know or can claim to know.

As the epicycles were once thought universal, so can our theory of water be thought universal, but mistaken in terms of meaning.

IDK, perhaps some of these can be ironed out but it certainly seems more intuitive to me that fire and water are, and remain, what they are. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree there.

IIRC, Spade actually gets to some of the well known problems with "bundle metaphysics," fairly early on.

At any rate, it seems fairly unobjectionable that "in every possible world all cats have the property of being cats." Something cannot be cat without being a cat, and it cannot be cat if it is not-a-cat. As far as a metaphysical theory though, this doesn't say much.

For one thing, we might ask, "can a thing have both the property of being a cat and the property of being a dog?" If not, why? If so, doesn't it seem that, were we in the presence of such a being, we would be in the presence of some sort of third entity, a chimera, instead of being in the presence of both "a cat and a dog." Can we be in the presence of one thing and two essences, two distinct types of thing? The metaphysical notion of measure is unresolved here.

We might also ask: "what sorts of things have essences?" Our definition is unhelpful here. Is warm water essentially different from cold water? Well, warm water is necessarily warm, so we could say that it is warm in every possible world. If it wasn't warm, it wouldn't be "warm water," but would instead be something else, like "cold water," "hot water," etc. Does this mean there is no possible world where my cup of "hot tea" cools, because hot tea is necessarily hot? Rather, there would only be possible worlds where my hot tea is spontaneously replaced with an essentially different "lukewarm tea," and then that is replaced by a "cold tea."

We could ask the same question re ice and steam or black cats and white cats. A black cat is necessarily black in any world where it is a "black cat." Yet if Fluffy the cat falls into a vat of paint will we be faced with a sort of sorcerery whereby one being has been spontaneously replaced with an essentially different sort of being?

Does a chair or table have an essence? But then there are all sorts of chairs and tables with different properties, and all sorts of things might be used as improvised chairs or tables.

What makes something have an essence? Or what makes a property essential? If the answer cannot go further then: "a property is essential just in case some thing has it in every possible world," then that doesn't actually seem to tell us anything about positively distinguishing between essential and accidental properties at all. If someone denies that water is essentially H2O, arguing instead that water is only essentially clear, potable, and wet, what decides between these?

Without more, it seems that the answer would have to be either: "we just know essences when we see them," or "we decide based on what it is useful to consider essential." The former isn't much of a theory, whereas the latter says that "essential" is itself always predicated per accidens, which is actually a denial of essences and essential properties, and so not much of a theory of essences.

I tend to favor the epistemic side over the ontology side -- I understand it's basically a "player's choice", but it's my preference. On the reverse of "How do you know unless you start with what is?" is "How do you know what is unless you start with what you know?"

That's what Pryzwarra says. You will always have a sort of "passing back and forth" between questions of the "metaontic" and "metaepistemic" in first philosophy, although he does give a slight nod to the ontic here in that even framing an "act of knowing" presupposes something about "act." He ties this back very interestingly to the instability of "creaturely being," where essence does not explain existence.

This was a problem for Plotinus as well. Even if being and being known are two sides of the same coin, they seem to imply some sort of composite action, an essential difference. There is the being and the knowing of being, or "being the knowing of being." Yet if the One is absolutely simple, this distinction causes a problem (hence "real" versus "conceptual" distinctions). It's the same deal with the "life of the Trinity."

I think it's in virtue of the things our species relies upon water for -- drinking, cooking, bathing, etc.

Yes, but we might argue that water is only good for these things because of what it is in the first place. There is a (prior) reason (cause →actuality → form) determining why people want to drink water but not molten rock. Usefulness and human behavior flow from some sort of determinant being, both in terms of man himself and what he interacts with.

At least, that seems quite reasonable for me.

Not exactly — Moliere

Not sure what you are referring to but I will take a wild swing.

One of my favorite passages from Naming and Necessity, “Don’t ask: how can I identify this table in another possible world, except by its properties? I have the table in my hands, I can point to it, and when I ask whether it might have been in another room, I am talking, by definition, about it. I don’t have to identify it after seeing it through a telescope.”

Obviously, in the case “Water”, you may be pointing to one thing or a multitude of things. Sometimes you might be referring to nothing in particular at all. As for H2O, it is not about pointing at all but theorizing and testing (Also, not quite like viewing something thru a telescope).

But what I find revealing in Kripke’s passage is his interaction with the conceptual/abstract and the actual/concrete. Once there is certain stage setting with the world, he shows that we should feel confident in moving between talk of ideas and talk of actual things.

That's an interesting point, although I am not sure if it would challenge notions of essences or substantial form directly. Essences and substantial form do not in any way rule out equivocal predication, what they are supposed to do is explain the possibility of univocal predication.

Thinking through this question now -- Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions is what I have in mind, but with a more materialist mindset which doesn't give into the notion that nature itself changes with the sciences.

C.S. Lewis published a book made from his lectures on the "model of nature" underlying medieval and renaissance literature (The Discarded Image) just two years before Kuhn and it has this interesting, although not very developed, quite similar insight about the role of paradigms, but obviously coming from a very different background. I always thought that Kuhn (and particularly later interpreters) was perhaps overreaching a bit. Models, language, theories, etc., my argument would be that these are not what we know, but rather means of knowing. Hence, when a model, or paradigm, or in Lewis's terminology a "backcloth" changes, we are not transported to a new world or dealing with new things, so much as making use of refined tools. But, I will allow that if one has already accepted:

A. That truth is primarily a property of sentences;
B. Representationalism; and
C. The empiricist epistemic starting positions that tend to make arguments from underdetermination nigh impossible to defeat;

The theories that turn natural science into more of a question of sociology start to make a lot of sense. I guess part of what initially made me skeptical here though is just the wide plurality of "skeptical solutions" (as opposed to "straight solutions" à la Kripke) leading in radically different directions in 20th century thought.

Whom? — Moliere

Leon.



Kripke: Identity and Necessity?

or

Naming and Necessity, reading group? and Naming and necessity Lecture Three?

Been a few others, too.

Here's the main paragraph concerning the issue from Identity and Necessity:

In recent philosophy a large number of other identity statements have
been emphasized as examples of contingent identity statements, dif-
ferent, perhaps, from either of the types I have mentioned before. One
of them is, for example, the statement "Heat is the motion of molecules."
First, science is supposed to have discovered this. Empirical scientists in
their investigations have been supposed to discover (and, I suppose, they
did) that the external phenomenon which we call "heat" is, in fact,
molecular agitation. Another example of such a discovery is that water is
H₂O , and yet other examples are that gold is the element with such and
such an atomic number, that light is a stream of photons, and so on.
These are all in some sense of "identity statement" identity statements.
Second, it is thought, they are plainly contingent identity statements,
just because they were scientific discoveries. After all, heat might have
turned out not to have been the motion of molecules. There were other
alternative theories of heat proposed, for example, the caloric theory of
heat. If these theories of heat had been correct, then heat would not
have been the motion of molecules, but instead, some substance suffus-
ing the hot object, called "caloric". And it was a matter of course of
science and not of any logical necessity that the one theory turned out to
be correct and the other theory turned out to be incorrect. — Kripke

Here it's not only water being considered. Nothing much of this argument hangs on the truth or falsity of water being H₂O, or any of the other identities listed. Rather he's concerned with the modal consequences of any such equivalence: that If a and b are rigid designators and a=b then ☐(a=b).

The step further, that claims that essences themselves change, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Who does this?

Lots of thinkers. If it's "there are something like essences, but they change," we can consider Hegel, a number of Hegelians, Whitehead, maybe Heidegger (unfolding), a lot of contemporary process philosophers, etc.

If it's "there is nothing like an essence (in the classical sense) but what classical metaphysicians called essences changes" then Deleuze, Kuhn, Butler, Merleau-Ponty, constructivists generally, etc.

Lots of thinkers. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ok. Anyone in this thread?

Yep. And there is the additional problem of their never quite explaining what an essence is, at least not in a way that is anywhere near as clear as "A property had by a thing in every possible world in which it exists". — Banno

I've long thought that possible world semantics is simply an exploration of what we can coherently imagine. That said, I haven't looked into it much. In light of my perhaps limited understanding of it I would reframe your formulation―" A property had by a thing that we cannot imagine it existing without".

...an exploration of what we can coherently imagine... — Janus

That's pretty close. And "A property had by a thing that we cannot imagine it existing without" works for many purposes. The formal definition is somewhat different. The trouble is not just that we can imagine alls sorts of odd things, but that what one person can imagine might be quite different to what another person can imagine.

An alternative might be to understanding "what if this blue table had been red instead of blue" as asking what would be the case, what would be true, if this table were red instead of blue. It's convenient, if perhaps for some folk not intuitive, to call the things that would to be true were this table blue, a "world".

There's the additional problem that some folk imagine impossible worlds. A whole other story.

There's considerable overlap between "A property had by a thing in every possible world in which it exists" and "A property had by a thing that we cannot imagine it existing without", but they are not quite the same.

That's all very curious, , but where does it get us?

I guess I’ll have to respond to each item.

• Yep, all cats are cats. Whether a cat can be a dog would be an issue for the taxonomists, I suppose. I think they would say "no".
• "What sorts of things have essences" will depend on how you use "essence". Individuals, picked out by a rigid designator, may have properties in every possible world that we could call their essence; same for natural kinds; It's a topic of some discussion.
• And we might agree that being hot is a necessary property of hot things, while also agreeing that individuals can be hot at one time and cold at another. Not sure this gets us very far.
• If a black cat ceases to be a black cat when painted, then being black is just not a necessary property of black cats. But again, this seems to be a result of how we choose to use the words "black cat".
• I doubt if there is something common to all chairs or to all tables in every possible world, so I doubt there is an "essence of table" if that is what is had by every table in every possible world. That’s kinda what family resemblance addresses.
• The terms "accidental" property might be fraught with ambiguity in PWS, so that we might not be able to agree on a suitable use; you are welcome to try.
• If someone denies that water is essentially H2O, arguing instead that water is only essentially clear, potable, and wet, then that's their prerogative, and all we might do is point out that others disagree or use the terms in different ways. There need be no correct use, in any absolute sense. If that's not much of a theory, so be it.

Now what?

IS there some conclusion that you would like to draw from all this?

Edit: No response, so I've edited the block of text to hopefully make it more readable.

It's the thing we were discussing. If water was not H2O in Aristotle's day would this mean that being H2O is neither essential nor necessary for water or that water itself changes? Or could heat be caloric? might be a similar sort of question (or was it?)

at least not in a way that is anywhere near as clear as "A property had by a thing in every possible world in which it exists". — Banno

I'm not sure how possible worlds semantics is supposed to be clear. Hardly anyone knows what a possible world is supposed to be. Or else, if "possible world" is supposed be derived from colloquial meaning and usage, then "essence" is much clearer, having a much greater basis in colloquial meaning and usage.

If water was not H2O in Aristotle's day — Count Timothy von Icarus

Water presumably was H₂o in Aristotle's day.

But I'm pretty sure Aristotle never called it "water".

And if water were not H₂O in ancient Greece, then water would not be the very same thing as H₂O. So Water would not be H₂O in every possible world - Ancient Greece being an example of a possible world in which this is not so. So then, being H₂O would not be a necessary characteristic of water.

Note the couching of these in hypothetical sentences... "If... then...". That's the bit where we are looking at the logic of the situation, leaving aside the science, which philosophers do so poorly.

Imagining impossible worlds is an interesting idea―I have no doubt a physically impossible world could be imagined, but I wonder whether it is possible to imaginable a logically impossible world.

So this

It's the thing we were discussing. If water was not H2O in Aristotle's day would this mean that being H2O is neither essential nor necessary for water or that water itself changes? Or could heat be caloric? might be a similar sort of question (or was it?) — Count Timothy von Icarus

raises a question for me:

Is there a possible world in which water is not H2O? if there is, what would make it count as water in such a world? Presumably since water was not understood to be H2O in Aristotle's time, people of that time could have coherently imagined a possible world where water was a black opaque liquid (because the god's could have made it so, say), but can we coherently imagine such a world if water must be H2O and H2O cannot possibly be a black opaque liquid?

If we said we could imagine it what would make it count as imagining water? Mere stipulation?

What about imagining a world in which there are round squares? We can say 'there is a possible world in which there are round squares", but would that count as imagining such a world? Would it count as coherently imagining such a world?

Imagining impossible worlds — Janus

Might be worth a new thread. Recently, in another thread, @Hanover drew attention to a SEP article on the topic. But as many folk - present company excepted - are having trouble with possible worlds, impossible worlds might be too much.

I have no doubt a physically impossible world could be imagined — Janus

Yep. But we are going to have to introduce more terms. There's a hierarchy of possibilities:

So physical possibilities are metaphysically and logically possible. Metaphysical possibilities include all physical possibilities and a few other possibilities, and are all logically possible. The space outside the logical possible is that of the logically impossible.

Is there a possible world in which water is not H2O? — Janus

There's a logically possible world in which water ≠ H₂O. But there is not a metaphysically or physically possible world in which water ≠ H₂O. That water=H₂O is a metaphysical fact, not a logical fact. It should be apparent that once we agree that water=H₂O, we rule out the possibility that water ≠ H₂O.

In order to consider worlds in which water is not H₂O, you have to reject ☐(water=H₂O), or reject the rigidity of those terms. That is, you are working outside the circle of metaphysically possible words.

Formally, this sort of thing is dealt with by access relations. So you from logically possible worlds we can get to metaphysically possible worlds, and from there to physically possible worlds, But not so in the other direction.

When you imagine a world with round squares, you are imaging something outside the circle of hat is logically possible. Sure, you can't bring to mind an image of such a thing, but we might be able to world out some of the consequences that would follow from there bing a round square, if we had at hand a suitable counterpossible logic; if there is such a thing.

The Stanford article from which I stole the image has more on this sort of thing. It takes tome to grasp these ideas, however the result is a consistent picture of nested possibilities and impossibilities.

How do possible worlds intersect with the anthropic cosmological principle? As is well known this principle states that had a very small number of constants and ratios on the atomic scale been ever so slightly different, matter and living organisms could not exist.

The fact that it is logically possible that those ratios and standards might be different only goes to show the emptiness of pure logic.

The fact that it is logically possible that those ratios and standards might be different only goes to show the emptiness of pure logic. — Wayfarer

Why?

Well, if it’s true that the strong force was a small percent different, then matter would not form, the fact that it’s a logical possibility that it might be a small percentage different is meaningless, isn’t it?

So I think I’m actually agreeing with the post I responded to, but I didn’t read it very carefully.

We don't know where, say, that the value of G (6.6743 x 10^-11 m³ kg⁻¹ s⁻²) may have been slightly different, sits in the diagram above - a logical possibility to be sure; but not logically necessary, one presumes? So Metaphysically necessary or physically necessary? I don't see how either follows.

The appropriate response is that we lack sufficient information.

I went back over the thread in order to work out why we are talking about modal logic when the topic is "What is real?".

There were posts from many folk: , , , , the usual suspects.

I found this:

Perhaps the very urge to ask “why is there something rather than nothing?” is a kind of metaphysical craving that misunderstands the role of explanation. Explanations work within the world—given that things exist, why does this or that happen?—but they break down when we try to apply them to existence as such. The impulse isn't deep; it’s a confusion of category. — Banno

and then this:

...if any role for intuition and understanding is ruled out and reason is 100% discursive, you have an infinite possibility space of possible "games" and no reason to choose one in favor of any other. The authority of reason itself rests on intuition and understanding. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Two examples amongst many, but they maybe give an indication of the tension that has kept this thread going . So I'll restate my line of thinking here. The question is "What is real?"; and the answer suggested is that "real" is a term that depends on it's contrary in order to achieve meaning - it's not real, it's counterfeit; it's not real, it's an illusion; and so on. The response is something like "No, I don't mean that, I mean what is really real, in an absolute sense". And the reply is that it is not clear that "what is really real" makes any sense at all, and if it does, then it's sense needs explaining.

We do have an "infinite possibility space of possible games", and we can choose whichever suits our purposes.

Note the "we". Not "I". It's about a conversation, not about what you do in private.

Asking "What is really real" supposes that there is One True Answer, rather than a whole bunch of different answers, dependent on circumstance and intent and other things. There doesn't seem to be a good reason to hold such a monolithic view.

There's a logically possible world in which water ≠ H₂O. But there is not a metaphysically or physically possible world in which water ≠ H₂O. That water=H₂O is a metaphysical fact, not a logical fact. It should be apparent that once we agree that water=H₂O, we rule out the possibility that water ≠ H₂O. — Banno

The Stanford article from which I stole the image has more on this sort of thing. It takes tome to grasp these ideas, however the result is a consistent picture of nested possibilities and impossibilities. — Banno

Cheers, I will take a look at the article. The question I have right now (which may be resolved after reading the article) is this: if we want to say there is a logically possible world in which water is not H2O, on what other basis could it be said that it would count as being water?

A nice summation. In the context of metaphysics the answer to "what is real?" would seem to be 'what is actual, as opposed to what is imaginary or merely an idea'. But now the question will be 'what is meant by 'actual'?'. Is it what exists, what acts or something else? @Wayfarer is constantly saying that 'what is real' is not equivalent to 'what exists'. The paradigm example is numbers―they are said to be real but not to exist. So the question becomes 'in what sense are they real then?'.

Numbers may be merely ideas, I think of number as real and existent. We don't see actual numbers, but we see number or plurality everywhere. It is not an individual entity or thing, but it exists just as space and time do. For me that solves the supposed conundrum.

The same goes for universals―they are not real or existent in some platonic sense. I prefer the less loaded word 'generalities'―I see generalities in observed regularities, patterns and similarities that also exist, but obviously not as individual entities.

Asking "What is really real" supposes that there is One True Answer, rather than a whole bunch of different answers, dependent on circumstance and intent and other things. There doesn't seem to be a good reason to hold such a monolithic view. — Banno

That is a helpful frame for "what is real?'

Personally, I don’t find the question to be a useful one. I have no choice but to accept the apparent physical world I inhabit, even if physicalism is ultimately illusory. I have no confidence that meditation, drugs or other so-called higher consciousness practices can lead to anything substantively meaningful and lasting. Those who believe otherwise, I simply take to have a different disposition than my own.

The question I have right now (which may be resolved after reading the article) is this: if we want to say there is a logically possible world in which water is not H2O, on what other basis could it be said that it would count as being water? — Janus

This is the question of reference? How is it that "water" refers to water, and nothing else?

The big change in thinking that was consequent on Possible World Semantics was the rejection of the previously ubiquitous description theories of reference. These held that a name refers to an individual in virtue of some description that serves to pick out that individual and no other. This approach was found to be indefensible in the face of modal interpretations, because whatever description was offered, it had to work even in those possible worlds in which the description failed to pick out the relevant individual.

And example might help here. Supose that all we know of Thales is that he was from Miletus and claimed that every thing was water. Then on the description theory, "Thales" refers to whomever is the philosopher from Miletus who believed all was water.

But supose that in some possible world, Thales went into coopering, making barrels of all sorts, and never gave a thought to ontology. But some other bloke, also from Miletus, happened to think that everything was made of water.

Then, by the description theory, "Thales" would not refer to Thales, but this other bloke.

There are numerous other examples. The upshot is that most philosophers who care now reject description theories.

So there is no basis for such reference, and instead there is talk of a chain from our use of "Thales" to refer to Thales, back through time to when Thales said such odd things, but not dependent on what he said or any specific facts about him. You and I refer to Thales becasue the people we learned about him referred to Thales; and they in turn referred to Thales because the people they learned from did so; and so on back to when Thales was a lad. "Because", hence this is called the "casual" theory of reference.

Now there are subtleties involving reference to kinds, such as water, compared with the individual in the example given, but the principle is much the same. We can talk about water because we learned what water is from our teachers, and they in turn from theirs. And so the reference to "water" is independent of any description, including finding out that water is H₂O.

On this account, the basis is a casual chain stretching back through time rather than any particular attribute of water.

Something like that.

Yep. Some folk - @Wayfarer might not mind me including him here - make a leap of faith to some spiritual position or other. To my eye it's unjustified, and not needed.

We can just get on with it.

make a leap of faith to some spiritual position or other. — Banno

Or, a philosophical perspective that you can't fathom.

Anyway, carry on.