The purpose of using names isn't to demonstrate what I've read and understood, but to refer to a shared body of knowledge between speakers. So when I say "Aristotle", I presume you understand Aristotle well enough and modern science well enough to be able to put together the dots that teleology and modern science, especially of the enlightenment era, are in conflict.

I switched to divisibility because the example is as good as the teleological one -- namely, I don't know if Lavosier, on a personal level, might have believed there was some kind of teleology behind water, but the whole enlightenment project basically rejects teleology in favor of efficient causation for its mode of explanation -- this is one of the primary reasons people reject Enlightenment era materialism and go in various ways. — Moliere

So again, Aristotle's teleology does not contradict Lavoisier's chemical claim, whereas the idea that water is indivisible does contradict that chemical claim. So one argument is valid and the other is not. It is helpful that you switched over to a valid argument and left the invalid argument behind.

There is nothing about Lavoisier's claim that commits him to an anti-teleological view. The idea that Lavoisier lived in an age that often rejected teleology is not a real argument in favor of the idea that Lavoisier's chemical formula contradicts Aristotle's teleology, much less that the current state of affairs accepts the idea that one entails the other.

I think all it takes to grow in knowledge is to plant seeds and see what happens. — Moliere

I think that is so vague as to be saying nothing at all, and in this it causes many problems. I don't think you are even presenting a theory of knowledge growth here. It's as if Aristotle gives a theory of seed germination and growth, and in response you say, "I think you just have to throw seeds and see what happens."

But noting here: even our notions of "falsification" are at odds. So perhaps we cannot appeal to falsification in our back-and-forth, because even this is being equivocated in our dialogue. — Moliere

Well I know exactly what I mean by falsification. Do you know what you mean? Or is it a vague term that allows one to affirm all sorts of things, depending on what they prefer?

To say what's at stake: I don't think science delineates what is real. I also think that the project towards finding essences using the sciences is doomed to fail -- the big difference between Aristotle's and our day is the sheer amount of knowledge that there is. In Aristotle's day it probably seemed like a reasonable project to begin with the sciences and slowly climb up to a great metaphysical picture of the whole.

But any one scientist today simply can't have that perspective. Looking at https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ their tagline on the front page states "PubMed® comprises more than 38 million citations for biomedical literature from MEDLINE, life science journals, and online books."

Aristotle could review all the literature that was in his day and respond to all his critics and lay out a potential whole. But he didn't have so many millions of papers or forebears to deal with. And I'd be more apt to look to the Gutenberg Press to explain this difference.

But this is only if we treat metaphysics as exactly the same as science, too. That was Aristotle's goal, but it need not be metaphysics goal. I'm more inclined to think that these metaphysical ways of thinking are ways of dealing with the sheer amount, the multiplicity, that one must consider to make a universal generalization. The generalizations, rather than capturing a higher truth, is a way of organizing the chaos for ourselves. — Moliere

Well, is there an argument here? And is it valid? The basis of any such argument is something like <There are more scientists and scientific papers today; therefore metaphysical realism cannot be true>. But as with many of your posts, I have no idea how you got from your premise to your conclusion. It seems pretty clear to me that scientists today are trying to understand the world, just as Aristotle was trying to understand the world. Both reject the idea that truths about reality could contradict one another, and therefore both seem to have a unified idea of science. I'm not sure how more scientists and more scientific papers in any way invalidates these propositions.

It is odd to say that it is false. If it is "good enough" to begin understanding, then it simply cannot be wholly false. If it is wholly false then it is not good enough to begin understanding. — Leontiskos

Another terminological difference. I tend to think attributions of "not wholly false" or "not wholly true" can be reduced to a set of sentences in which the name is sometimes the predicate and sometimes not the predicate, — Moliere

That's fine. My point still holds.

So what I see is that skepticism, rather than security, is the basis of knowledge. Jumping out into the unknown and making guesses and trying to make sense of what we do not know is how new knowledge gets generated — Moliere

As above, I don't think this is a theory. Note too that if one thinks "guess and try to make sense" is a viable approach, then they already hold to the idea that reality is intelligible and sensible. They are not starting from skepticism.

I think your construal of AW and LW is such that they look like they agree more than they do not agree. — Moliere

Sure, and we could add in your new thesis about indivisibility to complicate the picture, but my general point will still hold.

Aristotle's concern is philosophical and scientific, and he lives in an era where his project is feasibly both philosophical and scientific. He has a much wider theory of water that conflicts with the enlightenment, mechanistic picture of H2O which Lavoisier is credited with determining. I think of hisLavoisier's work primarily as a scientist because his work as a scientist was in improving analytic methods, and it was due to his care towards precision that he was able to demonstrate to the wider scientific community the ratio of Hydrogen to Oxygen you get with electrolysis. So maybe there's some philosophical work of his I do not know, but I'd say this work fits squarely within the scientific column, even if we don't have strict definitions to delineate when is what. — Moliere

I'm not sure why Lavoisier's claim that water is composed of H2O should not be considered philosophical. In this Lavoisier is involved in a truth claim of metaphysical realism. Similarly, the modern rejection of teleology is a metaphysical truth claim. It's not like there is some clear separation between philosophy and science.

And, likewise, Kripke is making a point about whether essences can be made viable in the 20th century after they had been largely abandoned by contemporary philosophy (even if there are other traditions which keep them). So he's a philosopher, but if science turns out to be wrong about the whole H2O thing his points will still stand(EDIT:or fall) regardless. — Moliere

I don't think your last sentence is true, namely the inference. Kripke's work depends on scientific claims. He could adapt his claims to something like, "If water is H2O then water is necessarily H2O," but he apparently wants to say more than "if". More, he is presupposing that some such "scientific" relations are demonstrable and existent, even if the relation between water and H2O turns out to be false. If all such "scientific" relations turn out to be false then Kripke's points will not stand.

I think that is so vague as to be saying nothing at all, — Leontiskos

I'd say it's on par with "From the more certain to the less certain"

For one, I intend the biological metaphor to apply to knowledge: and what was once a good bit of knowledge depended upon the intents of the organism using it, the whole ecology within which it fits and is responding to. Further, life is something of a cycle and the final cycle of life, just like ideas, is death -- eventually the ideas die out because the environment has changed far too much.

Further, we don't begin with a solid foundation and build outwards. Rather I'd use the plant metaphor that we begin with a seed which, when nurtured in the proper environment, slowly takes roots to the soil and becomes something solid.

So rather than beginning with the certain I'd say we make random guesses and hope to be able to make it cohere in the long run.

As above, I don't think this is a theory. Note too that if one thinks "guess and try to make sense" is a viable approach, then they already hold to the idea that reality is intelligible and sensible. They are not starting from skepticism. — Leontiskos

I don't think that follows at all. I think that what this says is that @Leontiskos can't understand how someone could think that sensibility and intelligibility are important unless they are not skeptics, rather than that one doesn't begin with skepticism.

The intelligible and the sensible are what we deal with -- but whose to say that what is sensible is what is real? That's the question after all. How do we hop from "the intelligible and the sensible" to "and it is real"?

Sure, and we could add in your new thesis about indivisibility to complicate the picture, but my general point will still hold. — Leontiskos

Well, it's persuasive to you, but not to I.

Well, is there an argument here? And is it valid? The basis of any such argument is something like <There are more scientists and scientific papers today; therefore metaphysical realism cannot be true> — Leontiskos

Aristotle's method of metaphysics which utilizes science is what justifies his inference from the sciences to support metaphysical truths. At the time one could reasonably, though falsely, believe they had reviewed "all the sciences" such that they could reasonably make inferences about "all of reality at its most fundamental". Today, however, no one person can reasonably, though also falsly, make the statement such that "And now that I've finished reviewed all existent sciences and shown how my views are better I will now move onto the most general truths about being as such"

Aristotle, though he did not have access to all science, could feel confident that he'd responded to all the worthwhile arguments so that he could link science to metaphysics.

The sheer volume of knowledge today makes it so that Aristotle's procedure can't be carried out. So one's metaphysical realism can't be on the basis of science insofar that we are taking on a neo-Aristotelian framework -- it's simply impossible to do what Aristotle did today with how much there is to know.

So the whole "From the more certain to the less..." thing will work for some particular case, but it won't reach metaphysical universality.

Well I know exactly what I mean by falsification. Do you know what you mean? — Leontiskos

I'd start with Popper, at least, so falsification follows the form of a modus ponens.

But then I'd say that in order to falsify something you have to demonstrate that it is false to such a degree that someone else will agree with you. Which states clearly how there's so much more to falsification than mere disagreement, or believing in two different things that cannot both be true at the same time of the same object. That's just believing two different things, so all you need is a notion of belief and what beliefs are about.

For falsification there's not just beliefs at play, there's an interplay between measurement, theory, and practioners.

Loosely speaking I'd say that for falsification to take place the two have to be talking to one another in the same dialogue. So Aristotle and Lavoisier serve as a good example specifically because they mean very different things about water while referring to the same. There's no falsification taking place as much as the dialogues are doing different things entirely. Furthermore I don't think that for falsification to take place that the next theory which takes its place will be true or even needs to be demonstrated as true. Rather, it's "good so far, and here are the ways we can test its limits" -- falsification has a whole practice of testing built into it. It's a collective activity, and not just a status between competing theories of reality.

Posted prematurely. Sorry.

- Crap, I was hoping you would be preoccupied with your essay contest. :razz:

Further, we don't begin with a solid foundation and build outwards. Rather I'd use the plant metaphor that we begin with a seed which, when nurtured in the proper environment, slowly takes roots to the soil and becomes something solid. — Moliere

But how is a seed not a solid foundation? That seems to be precisely what a seed is. From an edit:

It's as if Aristotle gives a theory of seed germination and growth, and in response you say, "I think you just have to throw seeds and see what happens." — Leontiskos

So rather than beginning with the certain I'd say we make random guesses and hope to be able to make it cohere in the long run. — Moliere

Aristotle is well aware that most people have no method, and just throw seeds randomly, hoping to stumble upon something or another. He just doesn't think such a person will produce reliable fruit.

I'd say it's on par with "From the more certain to the less certain" — Moliere

It's just a part of Aristotle's account in the Posterior Analytics. I use it because it is so uncontroversial.

I don't think that follows at all. I think that what this says is that Leontiskos can't understand how someone could think that sensibility and intelligibility are important unless they are not skeptics, rather than that one doesn't begin with skepticism. — Moliere

It follows as long as you understand what skepticism is. If one holds and presupposes that reality is intelligible, then they are not skeptical of that proposition. If they say, "Oh, well I am skeptical of X even though I believe and presuppose it entirely," then they are equivocating on the word 'skepticism'. This is but one example of moving from the more certain to the less certain. The "more certain" is that reality is intelligible. You are again captive to Aristotle's knowledge even without realizing it.

At the time one could reasonably, though falsely, believe they had reviewed "all the sciences" such that they could reasonably make inferences about "all of reality at its most fundamental". — Moliere

Not sure why you think someone has to review every scientific paper, for example. Seems an odd idea.

Aristotle, though he did not have access to all science, could feel confident that he'd responded to all the worthwhile arguments so that he could link science to metaphysics.

The sheer volume of knowledge today makes it so that Aristotle's procedure can't be carried out. So one's metaphysical realism can't be on the basis of science insofar that we are taking on a neo-Aristotelian framework -- it's simply impossible to do what Aristotle did today with how much there is to know. — Moliere

Okay, so this is the new argument, <If we do not read and survey every scientific claim, then we cannot be metaphysical realists (or else we can't connect science to metaphysics)>. Again, pretty clearly invalid. Or else, I am still in no way sure how you are getting from the premise to the conclusion. Why must a metaphysical realist read and review every scientific claim?

I'd start with Popper, at least, so falsification follows the form of a modus ponens. — Moliere

I'm not sure what it means to say that falsification follows the form of a modus ponens. Does Popper say this somewhere?

But then I'd say that in order to falsify something you have to demonstrate that it is false to such a degree that someone else will agree with you. — Moliere

Anyone at all?

Furthermore I don't think that for falsification to take place that the next theory which takes its place will be true or even needs to be demonstrated as true. — Moliere

So X can falsify Y even when X is not true?

I would say that there is truth and falsity, and then there are also beliefs about propositions, namely that they are true or false. Falsification can be viewed from either angle, but both are interconnected.

I think TPF probably needs a thread addressing the deep problems with an intersubjective approach to truth, given how many people here are captive to it. We can falsify an individual's belief, but only if the content of that belief itself has a truth value (apart from any particular individual).

So, the question isn’t meaningful, it’s misguided. It treats certainty as something that needs to be justified, when in truth, certainty is what makes justification possible in the first place. — Sam26

I think we can say a little more than that.

One issue is that we can't just abandon our fundamental, taken-for-granted beliefs. Descartes, for example, sets out to doubt everything, but continues to sit comfortably by his stove, writing down his thoughts with pen on paper, believing that someone else will read them sooner or later. (Hume sums up this point by saying that the conclusions of the radical sceptic make no difference - life goes on as usual. The sceptic's argument is irrefutable, but pointless.)

When we ask ordinary questions about what is real, we ask in the question in a context that tells us what the difference is between what is real and what isn't. Asking about reality in general doesn't set a context that would enable us to answer the question.

There's a big ambiguity about the question. Macbeth famously had a hallucination of a dagger after he killed the previous king of Scotland. That dagger wasn't real, didn't exist. But when you see the bent stick in water, it exists all right, but isn't what it seems. When you see through the illusion, you see reality. Many arguments of this kind don't distinguish between the two claims.

Some philosophical theories seem to fit in between these two alternatives. Plato, Berkeley, Dennett, and modern physics don't deny the existence of common sense reality, but do assert that it is very different from what common sense thinks it is. But this seems paradoxical, because if common sense reality is so misleading, what basis can it provide for the alternative account of reality? (Berkeley, I think, was acutely aware of this paradox. Hence his protestations that he is not denying the existence of anything even though he appears to be doing exactly that.)


There's a great deal in these posts that is helpful and to the point.

But I don't think they can get round the fundamental problem, which is nicely exemplified by Husserl. Somebody earlier posted a quotation from him about his intent to start his project from scratch, in poverty, etc. It's a classic idea. Such a project might have a special status, above the fray of all the competing schools. But it's not possible, as the history of phenomenology demonstrates.

Right, this is the same question I'm raising about whether something about reference needs to be included in a list of X's properties. — J

Yes. I should have acknowledged that. Sorry.
The thing is, however, that, although the argument is, IMO, sound, it is unhelpful, because it doesn't dismisses the theory, without enabling us to dissect out the truth in what he says.

There's a great deal in these posts that is helpful and to the point.

But I don't think they can get round the fundamental problem, which is nicely exemplified by Husserl. Somebody earlier posted a quotation from him about his intent to start his project from scratch, in poverty, etc. It's a classic idea. Such a project might have a special status, above the fray of all the competing schools. But it's not possible, as the history of phenomenology demonstrates. — Ludwig V

Okay, so what is the fundamental problem that you see, in your own words?

"What is real? How do we know what is real?"

This is one of those questions that can’t be answered in the way most people expect. It’s not that there’s no answer, but rather that the question itself rests on a misunderstanding; it assumes we need a justification or proof for what we already take for granted in our actions.

We don’t know reality in the same way we know facts; instead, we act with a certain conviction that things are real. This acting isn’t based on reasoning or evidence; it’s the foundation upon which reasoning and evidence even make sense. Doubt and knowledge only function because we already move through the world with an unquestioned trust in its reality. In this sense, the question "How do we know what is real?" is like asking, "How do we know that the ground holds us up?"—it’s not something we know in the usual sense; it’s the condition that allows knowing to exist at all.

So, the question isn’t meaningful, it’s misguided. It treats certainty as something that needs to be justified, when in truth, certainty is what makes justification possible in the first place. — Sam26

It seems to me that the problem with the Wittgenstenian approach is that it casts one half as certain and another half as justifiable, and never the twain shall meet. Except that's not really how certainty and knowledge work. The "reality" and the "facts" influence one another. There is no strict separation.

In this sense, the question "How do we know what is real?" is like asking, "How do we know that the ground holds us up?"—it’s not something we know in the usual sense; it’s the condition that allows knowing to exist at all. — Sam26

Continuing, there are not "conditions" in one part of reality and "knowing" in another part of reality. It would be more accurate to see "conditions" and "knowing" as the trough and crest of a wave, where everything is in continual motion, and "trough" and "crest" do not point to determinations that are primary (since the trough/crest is a secondary form of continuously moving matter).

(This presumably has also to do with @Moliere's misunderstandings of Aristotle. For Aristotle the movement from the more certain to the less certain is primarily individual, not "objective.")

But how is a seed not a solid foundation? That seems to be precisely what a seed is. From an edit: — Leontiskos

Because it's small and could die and remains uncertain from its inception. It only grows in certitude with growth, or gets thrown out -- but its beginning is not its end, unlike a building -- an architectonic -- which builds from a solid beginning.

Why must a metaphysical realist read and review every scientific claim? — Leontiskos

They don't have to unless they're following in the footsteps of Aristotle.

Also, a note -- realism isn't the thing I contest. I think we decide how things are real, but most of the time we believe false things -- hence, skepticism.

So X can falsify Y even when X is not true? — Leontiskos

Possibly, though there's a difference in kind here where "X" is some measurement and "Y" is some theory.

So the theory that follows is just another guess that sounds good, but doesn't have any observable measurements which falsify it.

I'm not sure what it means to say that falsification follows the form of a modus ponens. Does Popper say this somewhere? — Leontiskos

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Logic_of_Scientific_Discovery

I would say that there is truth and falsity, and then there are also beliefs about propositions, namely that they are true or false. Falsification can be viewed from either angle, but both are interconnected.

I think TPF probably needs a thread addressing the deep problems with an intersubjective approach to truth, given how many people here are captive to it. We can falsify an individual's belief, but only if the content of that belief itself has a truth value (apart from any particular individual). — Leontiskos

Yes, I think a lot of the questions we're running across are somewhat siderails -- but I don't think it's some fundamental error as much as a difference in approach to philosophy.

I'm not proposing an intersubjective approach to truth, but to justification, though. At least with respect to beliefs about what is real.

How do we know what is real? It hurts!

Because it's small and could die and remains uncertain from its inception. It only grows in certitude with growth, or gets thrown out -- but its beginning is not its end, unlike a building -- an architectonic -- which builds from a solid beginning. — Moliere

Okay.

They don't have to unless they're following in the footsteps of Aristotle. — Moliere

Where does Aristotle say that one needs to consider every scientific claim?

Do you have an argument that connects your premise to your conclusion, or am I right that your inference was invalid?

Possibly, though there's a difference in kind here where "X" is some measurement and "Y" is some theory.

So the theory that follows is just another guess that sounds good, but doesn't have any observable measurements which falsify it. — Moliere

Again, I don't see any substantial claims being made here. "Possibly" is not saying anything. "Another guess that sounds good" doesn't tell us much of anything.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Logic_of_Scientific_Discovery — Moliere

Your article says nothing at all about modus ponens, and so fails to answer my question.

Yes, I think a lot of the questions we're running across are somewhat siderails -- but I don't think it's some fundamental error as much as a difference in approach to philosophy. — Moliere

In order to do philosophy I would say that one has to make claims and support those claims with arguments.

Why would you feel the need to represent things that you already observe and if some reader/listener doesn't exist yet? The whole point of representing things in the world is to communicate with others. If there are no others, then why would you feel the need to represent things - for who, or for what purpose? — Harry Hindu

Surely, most writing is done to communicate with the living. Mailing letters to people. Leaving notes for people. Emailing people.

People often write for posterity, though. Sometimes to pass on knowledge to later generations, even if the living can also use it. Novels are not usually written for a specific person, even if dedicated to someone specific. These days, the living can read a novel, and authors can make a lot of money because of it. But that's not why people wrote them centuries ago.

Sometimes people write with no intention of anyone reading it.

But I would think most writing is too communicate with other living people.

The sceptic's argument is irrefutable, but pointless.) — Ludwig V

You say the skeptic’s argument is irrefutable, but pointless. We definitely agree it is pointless. However, I am not sure I want to agree it is irrefutable, which I take to mean impossible to disprove. If I present to you a work of fiction, and you assert that this work of fiction is irrefutable or impossible to disprove, what could you mean by such an assertion? I make no claim that it is supposed to be true, nor that it should be entirely coherent. Or was it just to mean, we typically don’t talk about proving or disproving a work of fiction?

From my perspective, the skeptic’s argument is like a work of fiction. The main difference seems to be the intention of what is being present, one being “possibly real” and the other “make believe”. We are not trying to prove or disprove the intentions of the author, but what is being said by the author. And what is being said in both case makes no sense to even talk about proving or disproving.

As Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus,

“6.51 Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said.”

Where does Aristotle say that one needs to consider every scientific claim?

Do you have an argument that connects your premise to your conclusion, or am I right that your inference was invalid? — Leontiskos

I infer that because of his method of induction -- in order for him to be able to consider being, as such, he would have to start with the lower categories and move his way up. As I read the move from the physics to the metaphysics that's pretty much how we gets to his claims to have philosophical, metaphysical knowledge.

Your article says nothing at all about modus ponens, and so fails to answer my question. — Leontiskos

Blah, that's cuz I said it wrong. Modus Tollens.

- Okay, well I agree that falsifiability pertains to modus tollens. I don't think our notions of falsification differ on that score.

I infer that because of his method of induction -- in order for him to be able to consider being, as such, he would have to start with the lower categories and move his way up. As I read the move from the physics to the metaphysics that's pretty much how we gets to his claims to have philosophical, metaphysical knowledge. — Moliere

So your argument is that <Induction requires exhaustive knowledge; in order to have exhaustive knowledge we would have to survey every scientific claim; therefore induction is no longer possible in an age with such a large multitude of scientific claims>?

So your argument is that <Induction requires exhaustive knowledge; in order to have exhaustive knowledge we would have to survey every scientific claim; therefore induction is no longer possible in an age with a multitude of scientific claims>? — Leontiskos

Aristotle's use of induction to reach metaphysical truths would require him to survey the prior categories before he could move upwards towards being, as I understand it. That's why he does that prior to the metaphysics, at least as I read it -- I know it could just be a nomenclature thing and not something separate from physics. It definitely fits with his general process for generating knowledge -- start with the senses and move by induction through the categories, and he usually only moves after he thinks he's considered all the options.

Not that the future couldn't be different, but now there are just that many options that this method is not feasible to do metaphysics with.

So, for instance, I wouldn't say induction requires, but I'd say that the manner in which Aristotle's induction does. The way I see him move is securing his claim by an exhaustive survey of the extent arguments, a review of their merits and demerits followed by the conclusion of Aristotle's.

So, yeah, you'd have to figure out some other way to be an Aristotelian, at least, if you wanted to progress to metaphysical truth in the manner of induction as Aristotle practiced it.

But that is relevant to the OP -- if Aristotle secures knowledge of the real through a thorough review of all of what's known and induction towards being, such that he could be in a position to say the what-it-is-ness of a thing is, its real definition stating its essence, and this is the way by which we are saying there is no separation between science and philosophy, it seems that we'd need another way to coherently weave science and philosophy into the same practice in order to rely upon the science to claim it's relevant to the question "What is real?" -- which is largely where I'm contending against not science's relevance, but an over-reliance upon science in asking that question of reality.

Basically I think philosophy and science are separate activities. That's the claim at stake from when I originally jumped with in this particular interlude.

Okay, so what is the fundamental problem that you see, in your own words? — Leontiskos

Well, there are a number of issues.
Every problem in philosophy seems to have its own foundation. Which of them is fundamental? That depends on the context.
The meaning of "fundamental" is ill-defined. All too often, it is a metaphor that is never cashed out.
There seems to be an idea that, every philosophical problem can be resolved simply by identifying its foundation.
It is hard to believe that all of philosophy starts with just one foundation.
In philosophy, if you identify a foundation, you will certainly start a search for some foundation of your foundation, so foundations will never provide what you are looking for.

BTW, why did you add "... in your own words"? If a quotation answered the question, why should I not post it?

However, I am not sure I want to agree it is irrefutable, which I take to mean impossible to disprove. — Richard B

Well, technically, I was reporting what Hume said, though I admit I wasn't clear about that.

When I learnt philosophy, there was a widespread belief that scepticism had been refuted by Ryle, Wittgenstein etc. But scepticism is still ubiquitous. So my puzzle is that so many people have set out to resolve, for example, Cartesian scepticism (starting with Descartes himself) and yet it keeps coming back, like a noxious weed or the Hydra. So clearly those refutations have not sufficient purchase to put the issue to bed. Like Cavell, I am pretty sure there is something else going on here, though I don't have a defensible theory of what it is. It may be simply due to the fact that scepticism is an an initiation that very many, if not all, philosophy students are expected to go through. It's also possible that it is a phenomenon of the kind that the Harman-Vogel paradox high-lights. (That paradox turns on the fact that you can create a doubt where none exists simply by asking "Are you sure about that?".)

From my perspective, the skeptic’s argument is like a work of fiction. The main difference seems to be the intention of what is being present, one being “possibly real” and the other “make believe”. We are not trying to prove or disprove the intentions of the author, but what is being said by the author. And what is being said in both case makes no sense to even talk about proving or disproving. — Richard B

That's a very interesting take on scepticism. I get the point - a fiction needs to be "possibly real" even if it is also "make believe". Come to think of it, that's exactly how Descartes presents his method of doubt. But I don't quite see why you say both that you don't agree that the sceptic's argument is irrefutable and that it is impossible to prove or disprove. Since the sceptic is presenting the argument as a proof, doesn't that impossibility contradict or refute the assertion?

As Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus, — Richard B

I like the quotation. But doesn't it also show some of the complexity about irrefutable. In normal argumentation, demonstrating that a thesis is nonsensical is regarded as a classic refutation - reduction ad absurdum. (Note, however, that he says it is obviously nonsensical. It isn't obvious to most people.)

If the only description of Homer is that he wrote the Odyssey, then this story just establishes that Homer is Kostas. — Ludwig V

Sort of. We might say Homer is the guy we think wrote the Odyssey. But turns out it was Kostas who wrote it. Now at stake is the difference between thinking of "Homer" as denoting exactly and only "the bloke who the Odyssey", and thinking of it as denoting Homer, that person. That's what this group of thought experiments target. And that in turn is the difference between the descriptive theory of reference and the idea of a rigid designator. If "Homer" and "Kostas" are rigid designators, then we can say that it was Kostas that wrote the Odyssey, and do so without fear of our system of reference collapsing. If we think in terms of the descriptive theory, and so "Homer" refers to "The guy who wrote the Odyssey", then "Homer" refers to Kostas.

There's the interim possibility, implicit in "the guy we think wrote the Odyssey", that reference is dependent on intent, that "Homer" denotes whomever I intend it to. There are all sorts of troubles with that, not the least being that it begs the question. How is it that what you intend to denote and what I intend to denote by using "Homer" happen to be the very same individual? Which is the very question we were seeking to answer.

There's the point, too, that we might well see that the descriptivist theory is inadequate and yet not have at hand another theory to replace it. We sometimes have to be comfortable to say "I don't know", and to see that doing so is better than trying to repair a defunct theory.

Does this work the other way round? I mean if "a" designates an object in all possible worlds in which that object exists, is it also true that that object is designated by "a" in all possible worlds in which "a" exists. Then is there a possible world in which that object exists, but the Roman alphabet was not invented? — Ludwig V

Sure. It's possible that you were named "Ebenezer" instead of "Ludwig". That would be a fact about you. That we in this world use "Ludwig" does not meant that folk in some other possible world could not refer to you using "Ebenezer". Or 以本尼泽尔, which the AI assures me means "stone of help", which is the meaning of "Ebenezer".

Similarly, if "a" necessarily designates a, can we conclude that a necessarily has the property of being designated by "a"? — Ludwig V

Being designated by "a" is not a property of a. So it can't be a necessary property of a.

It's not a property because that "a" designates a is not a formula within the system, but part of the interpretation, of the model.

Much of the apparent bumpiness here might be worked out by your looking at the formal system and how it functions. You seem to have. good intuitive grasp of the ideas involved.

So, the question isn’t meaningful, it’s misguided. It treats certainty as something that needs to be justified, when in truth, certainty is what makes justification possible in the first place. — Sam26

Good post. Yep.

I know of two viable responses. The first is from Austin, and looks at how we use the word "real", noting that we contrast it with something that is not real. It's a real dollar bill, not a counterfeit, or it's real vanilla, not artificial, and so on. This works fine.

The other comes from David Chalmers, who agrees more or less with the Wittgensteinian argument that we usually don't use "real" in this way, but goes on to ask why we couldn't. He proposes a room in to which we can go, within which we can ask such questions, and discuss the consequences. Now that strikes me as quite a good response - and we could go down that path. I don't think it quite works, but I won't rule it out forthright. It's part of the thinking behind the renewal of metaphysics that spread out from Australia a few decades back.

A worthy topic. I don't now of any one here who could explicitly defend such a view.

Are you familiar with Charmer's argument, mentioned above?

Good reply to

So in a way, the question for those of us with a Wittgenstienian bent is, can folk make up a game of metaphysics that can be played in a coherent fashion?

From our point of view, the ball is in the metaphysician's court, to show that there is a way to play the game that makes sense.

Right, this is the same question I'm raising about whether something about reference needs to be included in a list of X's properties. — J

Good stuff. If I've understood, there is an answer to your puzzle.

In a formal system, there is a difference between the syntax - S4, S5 and so on - and the semantics, the interpretation given to the system. In the syntax the letters don't stand for anything, and the formulae are neither true nor false. To show completeness and coherence we need to give the system an interpretation, also called a model. For modal logic there is an interpretation that works, using possible world semantics.

Now the predicates "f","g", "h"... are understood as properties of "a","b","c"..., and so we can write f(a), g(a), g(b) int he usual fashion, but this is just stringing letters together until the "a", "b", "c" and so on are given an interpretation.

Giving an interpretation is assigning "a" to a, "b" to b, and so on, and also assigning f={a,b}, and so on. So we have the name and the predicate in the uninterpreted system, and the corresponding individual and property in the interpreted system.

Notice the difference between saying that a is f, f(a), which happens within the interpretation, and saying that "a" stand for a, which is giving (stipulating) the interpretation?

That's why it's not quite right to say that a has the property of "being a". Being a is a part of the interpretation, not of the system of properties.

It’s like saying: “Is the fact that we call the Eiffel Tower ‘La Tour Eiffel’ a property of the Eiffel Tower itself?” Obviously not — that’s a fact about us, our language, not about the tower as such.

, , oh, and the continuation of my previous post is that fixing the name - with an original baptism or whatever - is a very different sort of thing to using the name.

Naming a thing and using a name are very different speech acts.

So we might say that using a name involves a rigid designation, while setting aside the way in which that rigid designation came about for seperate investigation. Th utility of possible world semantics does not depend on our having an accepted theory of how things are named.

Is it simply a stipulation? — Michael

Pretty much. I use that idea.

Others might picture a logical space in which all possible worlds are listed, and think instead of selecting those worlds that match some criteria from that set.

It amounts to much the same thing.

Importantly, logically possible worlds have no relation to the possible worlds of quantum mechanics. They are very different activities. Trying to join them will lead to confusion.

Not so sure about this. First of all, I don't take "If I were Barack Obama . . . " as a genuine reference to a possible world. For me, this is loose talk for "Barack Obama should have. . . " If we insist on pressing this hypothetical, we run up against Kripke: "You can't be Obama; he was born of different parents." And I think this is right. "If I were Obama . . . " etc. reads like a meaningful sentence but that's an illusion. — J

Yep.

Not that the future couldn't be different, but now there are just that many options that this method is not feasible to do metaphysics with. — Moliere

Okay, but do you have an argument for your conclusion? Are we no longer capable of induction in the 21st century? Was Aristotle wrong that we should have wide experience before drawing conclusions?

So, for instance, I wouldn't say induction requires, but I'd say that the manner in which Aristotle's induction does. The way I see him move is securing his claim by an exhaustive survey of the extent arguments, a review of their merits and demerits followed by the conclusion of Aristotle's.

So, yeah, you'd have to figure out some other way to be an Aristotelian, at least, if you wanted to progress to metaphysical truth in the manner of induction as Aristotle practiced it. — Moliere

Let's suppose that Aristotle thinks one should have wide experience before drawing a conclusion, and one should consult popular theories (or even all theories) to the best of their ability. Okay. I think that's right. Do you have some objection to it?

Because the idea that such a process is defeated if we do not consider every single scientific claim that exists or is available in our linguistic context looks like a strawman. Even if we don't look at every single scientific claim, the process is still perfectly sound. And the person who looks at more evidence will be more suited to draw conclusions. There is no magic number or percentage of evidence that one must consult, nor does moving from 99% to 100% make the induction somehow qualitatively different. It's not like Aristotle made sure his pupils never made any "inductive" or "metaphysical" claims before considering "all" evidence. :grin: Have you ever engaged in teaching or tutoring?

Basically I think philosophy and science are separate activities. — Moliere

Are you able to say what each is?

How do we know what is real? It hurts! — karl stone

:wink:

How do we know what is real? It hurts! — karl stone

Aspirin makes the world disappear.